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INTERNATIONAL

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OCTOBER, 1892.

THE NATIONAL TRAITS OF THE GERMANS AS SEEN IN THEIR RELIGION.

It may be doubted whether the well-known saying—As the man, so his God—can be proved to be true so far as individuals are concerned who hold their faith as the historical inheritance of a national and religious body, for only in isolated instances have such individuals the power to give to this common possession the stamp of personality.

In regard to whole nations, however, the saying is doubtlessly correct. The soul of a people, its uniformity in thought and desire, its emotions and its ideals, are reflected in its conception of deity as well as in the manner of worship. In this investigation, however, the difference between nations that have evolved a religion out of their inner consciousness and such as have received it from a foreign source must not be overlooked. In the former case alone can an undeniable connection between religion and national character be said to exist; in the latter instance the question arises how much influence is to be ascribed to the foreign source and how much is due to racial characteristics; for these characteristics cannot be effaced, and they will crop out the stronger in proportion to the youthful vigor of the nation at the time it embraces a foreign religion.

The history of Christianity is a continuous proof of this fact. Starting from Judaism, it underwent a radical change

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in passing over to the Græco-Roman world; and when the Teutonic peoples as heirs of the old world received the Christian religion as part of its general culture, they in turn gave it a particular stamp according to their national peculiarities. Especially is this true of the German people, because, commingling less than others with foreign elements, it succeeded in preserving intact the national character in speech and custom, and was able to make Christianity its own in so special a way that the Christian religion as developed by the Germans received a form peculiar to that people. We can, therefore, recognize the national character in religion more readily in regard to the German nation than in regard to others.

To pursue this investigation we must take the heathen religion of our German ancestors as a starting-point. Although our information concerning this religion is scanty, still even in the little that has come down to us we can perceive certain characteristic features which later on develop more clearly in the relation of the Germans to Christianity. Our next point for consideration is this same relation during the Middle Ages. Although during this time the German character was under the formative influence of the Christian Church, yet this training was rather an outward one in ecclesiastical form and discipline than a thorough penetration of the national character by the Christian spirit. Finally, we shall see how during the Reformation of the sixteenth century and its consequences the German spirit made itself felt to such an extent in the body of Christianity that a new development in the shape of Protestantism arose.

In pursuance of this task, it will, of course, be impossible to enter into the details of history, and attention will have to be directed only towards those features of each phase of religious development in which the German national character can be recognized.

I.

The religion of the early Germans as described by Cæsar and Tacitus and reconstructed by Grimm out of the combined

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vestiges traced in speech, custom, and myth, was a crude nature-worship, similar to that which may have existed among the other Indo-Germanic peoples in earliest times. A deep love of nature and a childishly poetical imagination peopled hill and valley, forest and meadow, with half-human spirits residing in the creative powers of nature, which, in the form of giants or dwarfs, of black or white gnomes, pursued everywhere their mysterious existence, now benevolently inclined towards man, again with malicious intent, but always outdoing him by strength or magic,—the objects of his secret fear.

As with the Hindoos and Greeks, so also among the Germans there were, in addition to these inferior deities, higher gods, the ruling powers of heaven and earth, in whom the personification of the forces of nature had developed so far that, besides their significance in this respect, they served also as models and representatives of the various activities and social relations of men. At their head stood Odin, or Wodan, the god of the storm-wind and of battles; the arbiter of the fate of nations and of individuals. Among the warlike Germans, like Indra among the Hindoos of the Indus Valley, he superseded the common Indo-Germanic god of heaven, Dyaus-Tyr. Beside Wodan stood Thor, or Donnar, the thunder-god; Freyr and his consort or sister, Freia, or Frouwa, the gods of fertility of the soil and of human love and marriage. These deities were by no means ideals of morality. Wodan was guilty of deceit and treachery towards the Giants, and Freia was not a model of chastity,—the especial virtue of German women.

But, on the other hand, the German saw in his great gods the prototype of fresh, vigorous strength, and of courage in combat, the occupation and the delight of his life. The struggle of the life-giving and sustaining powers of nature against the blighting and annihilating ones was the common feature of the Indo-Germanic mythologies. Among the Hindoos and Greeks this combat of the gods concerning the existence of the world was laid in the past, while among the Germans (as with the Iranians) it was continually going on

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and constituted the essence of life in the affairs of gods as well as those of men.

The impression made by nature in the north, through the sharp contrasts presented by the full life of summer and the deadly rigidity of winter, operated together with the still unsettled social conditions, with ceaseless feuds and expeditions for war or booty. The conditions both of the life of nature and of society were reflected in the religious conceptions of the Germans concerning the life of their gods, who are represented as engaged in a never-ending conflict with the threatening powers of evil (the Giants).

To sustain the gods in this struggle for the existence of the world, and to emulate them in the development of strength and of death-despising courage, seemed a pious duty to the early Germans,—the purpose and destiny of man and the means of participation in the blessed life of the gods. This happiness was not the portion of the victorious combatants alone, but of the fallen ones as well. Indeed, these more than the others were the chosen favorites of the gods. Their fate is decided in Wodan's council, and they are selected and designated during the battle by the "wish-maidens" of the father of the gods, the Valkyries. In their arms they are borne on high to the home of the gods, Valhalla, thenceforth to enjoy combat and sport and revel together with the heavenly powers.

In this faith, with all its naïve simplicity, we can scarcely fail to perceive the germs of an elevated ethical idealism. On the one hand we find a joy in living and a strong impulse to action; on the other, that delight in the sacrifice of life, which does not look upon the death of the hero as a lamentable event, but on the contrary celebrates and glorifies it as the highest consecration of life and as the means of entrance into the blessed life of the gods. We can agree with E. von Hartmann, when he speaks of a "tragico-ethical development" of the nature-religion among the Germans, even if we hesitate to ascribe to the universal national religion of the Germans the entire myth of the twilight of the gods as found in the poem Voluspa, of the Sæmund Edda.

In this myth the continuous strife of the gods with the

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powers of evil is to come to a close in a final catastrophe, foreshadowed in the death of the blameless god, Balder, through the cunning of Loki. When the end of all things is at hand, all hostile powers will rise against the realm of the gods, who will succumb in a hopeless struggle against the superiority of the enemy, and thereby atone for the sinfulness into which gods as well as men had fallen. Then a new world will arise out of the universal conflagration, in which the only blameless god, Balder, will come back to life and will rule among the new race of men in perpetual spring and peace. It is probable that this picture of the future in the Voluspa is a late product of the northern bards, who, in view of the victorious advance of Christianity, looked upon the approaching destruction of the Germanic gods as a sad fate, which they elevated to a great world-tragedy by assigning as the reason for it the sin of the gods. To this they gave a reconciling conclusion through the hope of the return of Balder at some future time. The analogy of this point with the resurrection and return of Christ is too striking not to be considered a result of Christian influence.*

At the same time, it may pertinently be asked whether the old German faith could have produced such a swan-song, so full of deep moral tragedy, had this ethical idea beneath the husk of nature-symbolism not been a part of it from the beginning, though in a half-unconscious way,—namely, that the good alone can survive the critical conflicts of the world, in that it is cleansed from earthly dross by the purifying flame of struggle and suffering.

Concerning the religious forms and ceremonies of the early Germans we have but little account. According to Tacitus, they did not worship their gods in temples nor by means of images, but they called gods "that mystery which they perceive only by experiencing sacred fear." In the dim light of sacred groves, under the rustling branches of ancient oaks,

* This view is accepted by most of the historians of the present day. Hase (Kirchengeschichte, § 73) speaks of this supposition as follows: "As if Balder, released from the realm of Hela, and the returning Christ had extended their hands to one another."

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they divined and became conscious, in the emotions of the fluttering heart, of the mysterious presence of invisible divinity. Can we not recognize in this point that truly German characteristic of *mystical introspection* (*Innerlichkeit*), which scorns to fix for sensuous perception the divine something that makes its presence felt in the depths of the sensitive soul, and to drag down the sublime mystery of the unknowable to the vulgar distinctness of earthly things? The fact that the Germans attached but little importance to religious ceremonies entirely accords with this view. The Germans, says Cæsar, have neither "Druids to administer religious affairs, nor do they think much of sacrifices." The German priests, unlike the Gallic Druids, had no hierarchical privileges nor divine authority; they were simply the oldest members of the community. Besides the offering of the simple sacrifices, their duties consisted in keeping order in the national assemblies (hence their name among the Saxons, "Ehwart," law guardian) and in the execution of the sentences there pronounced. They were, therefore, nothing more than the religious instruments of the community, entirely subordinate to it. Divination, although it played so important a *rôle* among the Germans, was by no means entirely confined to the priests. Any one could interpret the oracle by outward signs according to his ability. The inward perception, however, the really intuitive prophecy, was considered the especial gift of a few standing in closer relations to the deity; among these, the "wise women," pre-eminently. Tacitus speaks of single prophetesses, like the Bruktian woman, Veleda, who foretold the destruction of the Roman legion under Vespasian by the Batavians and who held a position in politics similar to that which the Delphic Pythia occasionally occupied. He declares, also, that according to German belief the prophetic gift is a prerogative of the female sex altogether. These wise women, who *saw* and *knew* more than ordinary mortals, could also *do* more. Together with the gift of divination, they possessed the art of magic, which rests on the knowledge of the secret power residing in words and objects. Although, in this particular, German superstition comes into close touch with the universal heathen one,

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we may still perceive in it a significant peculiarity and one of the highest importance to the morality of the national life,—namely, that they assigned supernatural sight and power to the female nature pre-eminently. They recognized instinctively that there are spiritual powers in the soul of woman, far superior to the bodily strength of man; that, furthermore, her *presentiment* is more intimately connected with the mysterious causes lying at the root of affairs, than man's *knowledge* and *action*. This religious reverence for the "sanctum et providum" (Tacitus) of woman's being was the foundation of the most beautiful side of early German morality,—respect for woman, for maidenly chastity, and for the purity of family life.

II.

The Germanic peoples who made inroads into the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries did not at first embrace Christianity in its Catholic form, but in the heretical shape of Arianism. The reason for this lay not alone in the accidental circumstance that they became acquainted with Christianity first through Arian missionaries, but also in the fact that the Arian conception of Christ as a half-divine messenger and vassal of God, in strict subordination to his master, appealed to them more strongly and was more easily understood than the complicated ecclesiastical doctrine of the trinity. Even much later, when all the connected tribes in the kingdom of the Franks had been for a long time converts to the Catholic faith through the Frankish royal power, we find the "Heliand," Christ, described in the Saxon "Harmony of Gospels" very much after the manner of a German tribal king. He travels through the country under the direction of the highest heavenly king, his father and lord, to advise and to warn, to overcome the hostile and to die for the salvation of his chosen ones. The apostles accompany him as his retainers, and all Christians belong to his host and are pledged to his service. How naïvely these religious relations were pictured as those of a national band of followers, may be judged, *e.g.*, by the introduction to the law-book of the Salian

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Franks of the time of the Merovingians. It reads, "Long live Christ, who loves the Franks! May he defend their kingdom and fill the rulers thereof with the light of his mercy! May he protect the army, support the truth! May the Lord of Lords, Christ Jesus, give us the joy of peace and happiness! For this is that people, small in number, but valiant and strong, which shook off the oppressive yoke of the Romans in battle. After accepting baptism they decorated with gold and precious jewels the bodies of the blessed martyrs which the Romans had burnt by fire or mutilated with the sword." We can see from this that the proud, warlike spirit of the early Germans had not been humbled by Christian baptism. These Christianized Germans were as far removed from the Augustinian feeling of human nothingness, wickedness, and depravity, as from the ascetic, primitive Christian sentiment of renunciation of the world and the longing for heaven.

Still, from the first, points of contact between the habit, feeling, and thought of the early Germans and the new faith were not wanting. With their active personal self-esteem the early Germans combined a religious deference to the authority of superior personages, which manifested itself in the fidelity of vassals towards their lord. To apply this natural feeling of reverence to his relation to Christ was so much easier for the German because, in spite of the supernatural grandeur of Christ, he looked upon him, first of all, as a man struggling and suffering in a human way, and sacrificing himself for the salvation of his chosen ones. Although Christ did not die in the battle-field in the thick of combat, still his end could easily be conceived of as the self-sacrificing death of a warring hero; more especially since the Church had long ago designated the demoniacal realm of the worldly prince, *i.e.*, Satan, as the real opponent of Christ, and had regarded the human enemies to whom he succumbed as instruments of Satan. A superhuman hero contending with superhuman enemies—the magical powers of hell—and at first succumbing in this struggle, though to the advantage of his chosen ones, whom he rescues from the blighting spell of magic, and afterwards, as a divine conqueror, leading them to battle and victory,—

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this whole series of conceptions lay so exactly in the trend of the early German faith that the transition to the Christian belief in salvation was attended with no great difficulty. Hero-worship was a sentiment natural to them, and not less so intense admiration for death met in an heroic way. They considered such an end a voluntary and salutary sacrifice, in accordance with the decision of deity, and to be rewarded by admission to the blessed company of the gods. This was the common, essential idea running through all phases of German belief, heathen as well as Christian.

Whether this thought was hidden beneath the veil of myth, or whether the struggle between Christ and Satan, around which the Christian drama of salvation turns, appeared only as a higher form of the mythical combats of gods and heroes (Thor and the Giants, Balder and Loki, Siegfried and Hagen, etc.), under the mythical form there always lay concealed an elevated moral idealism, no other than that cardinal ethical truth, which from the beginning up to the present day forms the unchanging kernel of evangelical belief,—namely, that universal salvation is bought with the deeds and sacrifices of heroic love and faithful devotion. The German people were by nature peculiarly well adapted for grasping the ethical significance of Christianity, which brings the soul into immediate sympathy with fellow-man, humbling and elevating it at the same time. The Greek Church had made Christianity a transcendental metaphysics, into the mysteries of which the contemplative spirit might penetrate while the soul remained cold and lifeless. The Roman Church had changed Christianity into a theocracy resting upon the sacramental wonder-working power of the priests, by means of its ritual and discipline proving itself a very effectual training-school for the uncultured nations of the Middle Ages. It could, however, effect a submission to outward authority and custom only, for the *spirit* was neither penetrated nor affected by this harsh, rigid formalism.

The German, on the other hand, brought to Christianity uncorrupt vigor and purity of heart, active personal self-esteem, and strong moral sympathy,—in short, the essence

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of a healthy spirit. On this soil the Christian mission of salvation could develop its inexhaustible wealth of bliss-giving seeds, and could sow, for mankind to reap, the changeless truth of its ethical idealism. Although at first there was no thought of criticising the ecclesiastical forms of dogma and hierarchy, which they had received simply as an inheritance from the superior antique culture, still they soon put into these inherited forms a deeper meaning, more expressive of inward feeling. This process, growing in strength, was in the course of time to burst the old forms asunder and to create a purer development of the Christian idea. They did not seek for Christianity in the depths of metaphysical speculation like the Greeks, nor in outward ecclesiastico-political organization like the Romans, but they perceived it in a fashion calculated to touch their emotions directly,—namely, as the victorious contest of the divinely-good principle with the godless powers of evil. In this fight the divine hero, Christ, through his sacrificing death, became the leader and bondsman of struggling mankind, which is pledged to follow him faithfully and to continue the warfare for his kingdom until victory shall reward them. A brave, warlike spirit, a ready, death-defying courage, and a steadfast fidelity in the service of the leader,—these are the characteristic qualities which the Germans brought to Christianity. By means of them they were able to grasp more deeply and to assimilate more completely than other nations the ethical significance of Christianity. Through those qualities they were finally enabled and chosen to free Christianity from the bonds of dogma and ecclesiasticism which held it during the first fifteen hundred years of its existence, and make it a part of the real moral life of mankind.

In tracing this intimate connection between Christianity and the national traits of the German, we must, however, not neglect the great contrast between the original ecclesiastical form of Christianity and the Germanic character.

The Christian religion, which came upon the scene of history as the old world lay in its death-throes, was marked from the beginning by an ascetic tendency to renunciation of the world. Already in the New Testament traces of this

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inclination may be noticed, although in a milder form than in the later ecclesiastical development. The underlying idea in the gospel of Jesus and the apostles was, that the present form of the universe was about to pass away, and a new, heavenly kingdom was to arise, holding the relation to the present world of actual existence to a shadow, of spirit to flesh, of life to death, of sanctity and blessedness to sin and destruction.

It followed, as a logical consequence of the severe contrast existing between this anticipated heavenly kingdom of everlasting bliss and sanctity and our present earthly existence, that man should renounce everything binding him to the life of this world; should subdue the flesh and its lusts, "mortify the members," sell all his possessions and give to the poor, forsake and hate father and mother, wife and child, despise and yield up even his own soul for the sake of the future life, lay up riches in Heaven, not on earth, seek country and home not here below, but in Heaven, not dispute concerning mine and thine, but suffer patiently scorn and abuse. This ascetic doctrine of denial of self and renunciation of the world presents an extreme contrast to the antique, classical doctrine of vigorous self-assertion and thorough enjoyment of life, and is at the same time a reaction against it.

In order to be a means of salvation, Christianity, necessarily, had to bring out the sharp contrast existing between itself and the actual condition of the world. The severity of this contrast was not lessened by the long and painful struggles, continuing for centuries, in which it sought to overcome the stubborn resistance of the heathen world, and in which it could hope for victory only through the passive virtues of patience and renunciation and delight in suffering on the part of its followers. Thus the ascetic ideal of renunciation of self and of the world became an integral part of Christian theory and practice, attaining in monasticism its extreme logical expression and organized realization. The perfect Christian was voluntarily to resign family, wealth, and personal liberty, and already on earth was to live for Heaven alone, dead to the world. This ideal still remained, even when the Church had

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been victorious over the heathen world, and when, acknowledged and favored by the state, she laid aside the *rôle* of patience and renunciation to take on that of authority and power.

Rulership over the world was now added, as a kind of supplementary pole, to the original tendency of renunciation. For as soon as the Church found its recognition by the state firmly established, and when it had created a governmental organization in the course of perfecting Episcopacy, it began to pass itself off as the threshold and representation of the kingdom of Heaven, if not as a realization of the same. The contrast of earthly existence and the heavenly kingdom now became that of World and Church. The Church now reaps the advantage of renunciation of this world in the assertion of herself,—her power and authority. Above the natural world, which is considered the scene of a useless, ungodly existence, without significance or value, rises the other world,—the supernatural one of the Church,—claiming to be the only godly and holy existence, the highest authority as well as the highest good of mankind, and to whose service all natural possessions and energies are to be devoted. In her character of theocracy the Church wishes to rule and to bend to her purposes all the nations of the earth; and inasmuch as she cannot absolutely forbid the earthly life in marriage and in the family, in work and gain, in art and science, she wishes at least to regulate these forces according to her superhuman ideals. Thus are combined the two apparently contradictory tendencies, ascetic renunciation of the world and hierarchical rulership,—the inseparable poles of mediæval Christianity.

From the first the German spirit stood in decided opposition to both these tendencies. Ascetic renunciation of the world could not but be repulsive to the German's delight in existence, monkish humiliation and bondage to his haughty self-esteem, and hierarchical restraint to his active individualism. Throughout the Middle Ages, since Boniface, the Apostle to the Germans, had attempted to bring the clergy of his dioceses under the control of Roman discipline, the Roman Church had labored untiringly at the task of making the Germans yield

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to her ascetic, hierarchical ideal. Although success attended her efforts to some extent, still she was always far from the attainment of her ideal. The spirit of the Roman Church and the spirit of the German nation were not only too different from one another, but also too much at cross-purposes, for more than a mere outward compromise to exist between them. It is true, the pupil submitted to a certain degree to the authority and discipline of his Romish taskmaster, but he always retained a considerable measure of liberty for following out the genius of his nature; in fact, he occasionally indemnified himself for the enforced restraint by a reaction all the more daring.

This deep antagonism between Germanism and Romanism found political expression in the long contests between emperors and popes. The downfall of the imperial power, however, was not a triumph of Rome, but rather a victory of the egotism and "particularism" of the German princes, who took advantage of the foreign complications of royalty to substitute their supremacy for the unity of the kingdom. Furthermore, these very contests between emperor and pope, and the confusion in Germany resulting therefrom, aroused the national consciousness and the inborn desire for liberty against the Roman greed for power.

The great Stauffen emperor, Frederick II., had the entire German people at his back in his contest with Gregory IX.; more still, he acted as the skilful spokesman of all the European nations and princes, in the challenge of Rome written in 1239, in which he said, "All vileness proceeds from the oldest born of Babylon. While seeming to rule the people, they change dominion into harshness and justice into suspicion. But you, kings and princes of the earth, do not pity us alone, but pity the Church as well, for her chief is weak and her leader like a roaring lion. A faithless man sits in her midst, an unclean priest and a mad prophet. It is true we suffer most from the evil effects and suffer more keenly than others the consequences of papal wrong-doing; but, after all, our shame is yours also, and your present subjugation will appear a light one as soon as the Roman emperor is van-

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quished." The same emperor wrote to Henry III. of England as follows: "It would be a labor of love to lead back the priests, especially the most powerful ones, to their position in the early Church, to an apostolic course of life, and to the humility of their Master, as well as to take from them their riches, which do them nought but harm." These words of the intellectually powerful emperor, in which the genius of the German nation of the thirteenth century found expression, echoed through the following centuries. Emperor Louis the Bavarian, who had been denied recognition by the French pope Benedict VI., declared in a manifesto addressed to all Christendom that the imperial dignity came directly from God, and that he who had been chosen by the electors needed not papal recognition. This declaration was approved by the German princes in the Electoral Convention at Rense. How much the development of this feeling, to which statesmen, scholars, and poets contributed, paved the way for the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and to what extent it brought about the success of that movement, is well known.

The German has at all times protested against the ascetic doctrine of the Church, the ideal of which is monasticism. The spiritual ideal of the monk found its direct opposite in knighthood,—a genuine product of that Germanic blood which courses through the veins of the Romance peoples also. While the ascetic ideal demands the renunciation of personal liberty, honor, and woman's love, the knightly ideal, on the contrary, is the assertion of personal honor, valor in arms, and woman's love. The hero of the Spanish romances, the noble Cid, the bold leader in the combat of the Christians against the Moors, professes the following principle: "The brave nobleman dies for any affair in which his honor is concerned, since blood alone can wash off the stain clinging to honor." In this particular the Christian knights agreed perfectly with their Saracen opponents during the Crusades. The closer resemblance of the Christian knight-templar to the Mussulman Saladin than to the Patriarch and the monk in Lessing's drama of "Nathan," is a singular fact, the truth of which is borne out by history.

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By a strange irony of history, the Crusades, in which the ascetic, hierarchical spirit of mediæval Christianity found its most glorious expression, were so influential in strengthening the knightly (hence the worldly and Germanic) spirit of European nations that their emancipation from the ecclesiastical guardianship went on continuously from that time. In spite of the establishment of clerical knightly orders, in which the opposing ideals of the monk and the knight were to be united, this tendency went on unchecked. The history of clerical orders of knighthood gives satisfying proof of the undue weight of the knight as over against the monk in this union, and of the final absorption of the latter by the former.

The service of woman, which played so large a part in the life of the knights and in the songs of the bards of the Middle Ages, is also in strong opposition to the ecclesiastical doctrine, which looks upon the love of the sexes as a sinful emotion because a sensuous one. On account of this very harsh, ascetic condemnation of the love of the sexes the Church lost the direct influence which it might have had in ennobling and idealizing this passion. In spite of the fact that she raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, the natural impulse, condemned in principle by the Church, revenged itself by disregarding all the more freely the confines of morality. The frivolous light in which marriage was regarded among the knights and Minnesingers, particularly those of the Romance countries, was the natural reaction against the asceticism of church doctrine. Among the Germans a comparatively better state of affairs existed, and in the poems of many German singers of the Middle Ages, particularly Walther von der Vogelweide, we find a spiritual love of woman characterized by a sincerity, tenderness, and purity unknown to classical as well as to Romance literature. The credit of this, however, is not to be attributed to the influence of ecclesiastical doctrine, for Walther himself distinctly protests against its artificiality in the maxim, "First, let him consider well, who says that love is sin." The contemporaneous Dr. Reinmar von Zweter voiced a sentiment of the Reformation in declaring marriage to be a divine order, more so than all orders of monks and nuns. The poet

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Barthel Regenbogen expressed the hope that the Emperor Frederick, who had been the leader in the struggle for German deliverance from the yoke of Roman priesthood, would, upon his expected return, destroy the monasteries and lead the nuns to the altar. If, then, the idealism in the German lyric love-poetry of the Middle Ages does not find its origin in the Church, but, on the contrary, stands in direct opposition to it, we shall have to seek its source in the German reverence for a "holy and mysterious" something in the feminine soul. The Christian religion, in spite of its ascetic and canonical dogma, indirectly influenced and furthered to a considerable extent the development of this peculiar disposition of the Germans. This influence came partly through the general deepening of the emotional life, but especially through the worship of the holy virgin, which veiled the harsh features of mediæval Catholicism. In the picture of the virgin-mother as portrayed by the Church on the basis of the evangelical legend, are combined the ideals of maidenly purity and maternal affection. The possibility of the intimate union of these equally estimable qualities in the real world and under natural conditions of life is illustrated in the supernatural story. Although through the worship of Mary the Church wished to glorify the ideal of perpetual virginity (the renunciation of natural love), she could not prevent the sacred nimbus surrounding the head of the heavenly virgin and mother from reflecting its splendor on the countenances of the earthly ones, whose natural attraction for men was thus not lessened, but rather heightened and purified.

In contradiction to its ecclesiastical purpose, the worship of the virgin thus brought about that deepening and refinement of sexual love, by means of which it has played a far more important *rôle* in the modern life which has grown from German and Christian sources than it did in antiquity. On the other hand, however, the Church could not prevent these repudiated earthly inclinations from creeping into the sacred worship of the heavenly virgin, bringing about that sensuously transcendental fervor in the virgin-cult of which the poetry of the Catholic Church gives abundant evidence. This sup-

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pressed emotion of nuptial affection took the form, in the monasteries, of a mystical enthusiasm for the virgin Mary, and, in the nunneries, of an ecstatic coquetry with the bridegroom of the soul, Jesus. Nature, instead of allowing herself to be dispossessed by the supernatural, found her way into it and became *unnatural.* It speaks well for the soundness of the German nation that it did not allow the sacred right of nature in the relation of the sexes to be blighted or desecrated by the artificiality of ecclesiastical asceticism. In the sphere of morals, the Germans had long before unconsciously overcome this Catholic dualism, the conscious triumph over which is due to an interpenetration of the religious consciousness with German mysticism.

The mediæval Church had made of the Christian religion a system of forms out of which the soul had vanished. The schools exercised their dialectical acuteness upon a set of subtle theorems, while the people could take both an active and a passive part in regard to the system of Church ceremonies and ascetic practices; but the religious nature found satisfaction neither in the one nor in the other. It was mysticism, that achievement of German feeling and spirit, which found in the sanctuary of the heart the God whom they could no longer discover in the forms of the Church.

In contradistinction to the Church, which had separated God and the world by a chasm so wide that there seemed no passage across it leading to Him, stood the doctrine preached by Master Eckart of Strasburg (1329), declaring that God imparts to all His creatures as much of His Being as they can grasp; that all are contained in Him and partake of His nature, but that in the soul of man, pre-eminently, a divine spark exists, which makes it capable of its legitimate union with God. It is self-love only which separates us from God; man must renounce it, and filled with unselfish devotion must allow God alone to work through him. He will then come to be one with God just as Christ was, for the incarnation which took place in Christ is still going on in every pious soul. A man is not considered righteous because of any works done for the sake of reward, not even if that reward be heavenly

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bliss, for then he is still the slave of self-love, and, as such, condemned. That pure desire alone is good which asks nothing for itself, but thinks only of God and of what is godly. He who resigns his own will and yields himself up to God entirely, does not need to struggle for righteousness, but by reason of his love of God is sure of eternal bliss. Tauler also taught, "Our eternal blessedness is not dependent on our works, but on the strength of our love." The profound work emanating from the school of Eckart, to which Luther gave the admirable name of "German Theology," is particularly to be noticed in this connection. In it the Christian doctrine of salvation receives a deep, ethical turn which does not take Church dogma and rite into consideration at all, but looks far beyond them. "If free-will did not exist, there would be no Hell and no Devil. Nothing exists without the aid of God or contrary to Him, except that will whose purpose does not coincide with the eternal will; for Adam, Nature, Devil, signify nothing but self-assertion, self-will, turning away from God. Man cannot be delivered from this evil by anything that occurred in previous times and without his co-operation, for nothing external to the soul can make a man holy and blessed. Even though God were to take all mankind to himself and humanize himself in them, and this were not to take place in me as well, my fall and backsliding would be in no wise atoned for. It is therefore better to probe one's own heart and to know one's self thoroughly than merely to look to the example of other people. If a man free himself from the shackles of sense and allow the divine light and the divine love to shine upon him, then God becomes a part of man, and there may Christ be said to reside and *man become divine*. This result cannot be effected by knowledge and insight alone, but by that pure love to which everything godless is a source of sorrow and which spurs a man on to good deeds. Such a man has need neither of restraining law nor of meritorious works, be they his own or those of others; they could avail him nothing, for as long as a man lives in disobedience his sin cannot be atoned for nor amended, and as soon as he leaves his ways all is corrected and forgiven."

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German mysticism freed man from the ecclesiastical bondage of priestly mediation and formal means of salvation, by attributing all significance to the sincerity of individual views and the unselfishness of the will. In allowing man to find and enjoy God in his own heart it removed the barrier between God and the world, and at the same time destroyed the foundation of the Catholic antithesis of the supernatural theocracy and the natural life of man, or of Church and world. Thus mysticism struck a blow at the ascetic, hierarchical view of the world characteristic of the Middle Ages, and prepared the way for freedom in religion and for the development of individualism in morals. Nevertheless, personal liberty of thought was not realized yet, because mysticism confined itself to the individual soul, and from this inner sanctuary failed to find its way into the active life of mankind. In order to become sure of his God the mystic takes refuge in the sanctuary of solitary devotion, and there, in emotion, in presentiment, in intuition, recognizes the gentle voice and soft whispering of the divine spirit; but he keeps his eyes closed to the fuller and clearer streams of divine revelation in the fulness of the world, in the course of history, in the communion of the Church. Thus his isolated mental devotion becomes obscure, confused, and dream-like, because the interpretation of his individual experience in the light of the community is wanting; this mental devotion likewise becomes weak, indolent, and inactive,—a state of mystical contemplation without effect on actual life.

Both in its strength and in its weakness mysticism reflects a characteristic feature of the German nature: on the one hand, the power of personality to make itself entirely independent of the outer world, concentrating itself upon the inner life of emotion and imagination, and finding in the depths of its own being the connection with the divine essence of life—that self-sufficiency which rests on God; on the other hand, the tendency of the individual to isolate himself from the community, to become entirely absorbed in his own existence, following his peculiar inclinations and opinions, regardless of common rules and regulations, and in doing so to become an

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obscure and impractical dreamer. A *one-sided, strong individualism* has always been the strength as well as the weakness of the Germans, the foundation of their power and their achievements as well as the cause of their weakness and sufferings. Of this the history of German Protestantism gives ample proof.

III.

At turning-points in history, when the universal need of the time calls for decisive deeds, heroes arise to become leaders of the present and seers and guides of the future. In them the spirit of a nation wakes to consciousness and frees and gathers up its confined powers. Such a hero we behold in Martin Luther. In him, as never before, the national spirit of the Germans and the religious spirit of Christianity became interpenetrated and united; and therefore Luther was to the Germans an ideal of their own true nature and purpose, and to Christianity a pioneer in a new phase of development. His work was the thoroughly German task of reformation; he was the founder of *Protestantism*. This did not mean merely a cleansing of Catholicism from various false doctrines and usages, but an entirely new stage of development of the Christian religion, a victory over the mediæval dualism of God and the world, of a supernatural, divine state, and a natural, earthly existence, a realization of the Christian principle of the reconciliation of God and the world, of the incarnation of the divine word, and the coming of the kingdom of Heaven among all mankind. Luther was influenced by St. Paul, Augustine, and the German mystics; but he was a Germanized Paul, just as Augustine was a Romanized Paul. For Luther, as for Augustine and Paul, the divine mercy was a well-spring of salvation; it had been personified in Christ and had successfully waged war against sin and tyrannous law, death, and hell. But the German champion of faith did not look upon his belief in the omnipotence of mercy as a binding shackle, as was the attitude of the Roman father of the Church towards ecclesiastical tradition and hierarchy. In the hand of the German his faith became a sword, which de-

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stroyed all such bonds, and finally achieved for the conscience, now responsible to God alone, "the liberty of a Christian."

Luther, moreover, could not say as Paul did that the world had been crucified for him in Christ, and that he was blessed only in hope through the anticipation of the second advent of Christ and the establishment of His Heavenly kingdom; but it was by his justifying faith that he was in possession of life and blessedness already while living in this world. He held that the world had been re-created through Christ and redeemed from the powers of evil, and that now, in its purified state, it was to become the seat of divine government. Hence it followed that Luther did not consider a turning away from active life to idle, contemplative enjoyment of God as a manifestation of loving devotion to him, for in his eyes true faith was a "life in God," and a genuine love of God was the source and motive for love of one's neighbor, proving its strength in active contact with the world. From this point of view the life of the world, with all its tasks and burdens, joys and sorrows, appeared in an entirely new light. Marriage now seemed a truly spiritual bond, much more sanctified and pleasing to God than the monastic life; the cells of the monks and nuns were now opened wide, and the lonely parsonage became the home of a pure family life; among its trials and tribulations this spiritual knighthood did not lose in force, but rather gathered strength for its struggle with the evils of life. From these idyllic parsonages of Protestantism how many brave heroes of word and action went forth!

Magisterial government was now reinstated in its dignity as a divine institution equal in importance to the priestly office and independent of it. The state, freed from its connection with the Roman universal theocracy and proud of its individuality, now asserted itself, and resolved to preserve and encourage the right of determining its destiny. Earthly callings and trades, art and science, were delivered from that false conception of the Middle Ages which considered all activity as a selfish submission to passion and as leading away from salvation. Work, now raised to the dignity of an act of devotion, became morally sanctified, by virtue of its relation to the king-

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dom of God, as the moral order of the universe, in which each member, by means of the work assigned to him, aids his fellows and contributes to the glory of God. Nature, moreover, did not appear to Luther, as it did to the mediæval Church, in the gloomy light of a hellish product, but rather as the marvellous work of divine wisdom, a reflection as well as an instrument of the divine spirit. The curse which narrow asceticism and slavish fear had laid on all innocent social pleasure, upon all things graceful and beautiful, was removed, since Luther recognized elevated pleasures, music, and joyous sociability as an excellent means of defence against the evil spirits of discontent and doubt.

The Christianity of Luther brought to a close the wide dissension and bitter strife between spirit and nature, and reconciled these elements which had stood in opposition throughout the Middle Ages. Through complete resignation of the spirit to God, man's belief in the divine origin of the soul and its triumph over nature becomes a certainty, and the way is paved for a harmonious reconciliation between spirit and nature.

In his contest with Rome Luther showed himself true to his convictions, both in his character of a brave German hero and as a conscientious Christian. Had it not been for the religious conscientiousness of this man and his unyielding force of character, this titanic struggle against the mediæval Church could never have been brought to a victorious issue. A trait equally Teutonic in its aspect may be recognized in the clear judgment which Luther preserved in all the trials of the contest, and in the conservative piety which made him cling fast to the old Church as long as possible and carry with him as much of it as he consistently could. He did not wish to break with historical Christianity, but desired earnestly to restore it to its pristine purity as testified to in Holy Writ.

In the historical word of God Luther found the Archimedean point from which he could move the world of the Church and put a restraint upon the iconoclastic radicalism of the over-zealous. It was through this restraining deliberation alone that it was possible for the ecclesiastical life of the German nation to be led into a new channel, after its unavoidable

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break with the old order, and for Protestantism to gain a firm, permanent, and active hold upon the community, without any fatal crises or obstacles to its progress.

It is true, indeed, that much of the old that remained fitted but poorly into the new order, but this evil and imperfection in the newly-constructed Church was the condition by which alone an active Protestant Church could be called into existence in the German nation. In the establishment of the new Church, as well as in the emancipation from the old, Luther showed his thorough understanding of the temper of his people, and offered them what they needed and as much as they could at that time digest. Luther, it is true, also possessed to an eminent degree that stubbornly firm individualism which may be considered the obverse side of German virtue. Through this perverse obstinacy, which, even in unimportant matters, persists steadily in maintaining its own opinion and refuses to yield to foreign convictions (*e.g.*, those of Zwingli) or even to tolerate them, Luther laid the foundation for the dismemberment of Protestantism into creeds, sects, and parties, and, through this disunion, the foundation for its political impotence and its bitter, dogmatic bickerings. This hereditary defect of Protestantism, for which Luther's personality was in part responsible, showed itself in so aggravated a form in his pupils and followers, who, as usual, inherited more of their master's weaknesses than of his virtues, that the work of reformation of German Christianity, whose beginning had been so promising, was soon entirely warped. Thus it came about that the greatest work of the German nation, the Reformation, bore so bitter fruits. The Germans paid for their religious deliverance from Rome with the loss of political authority and independence, with a permanent dismemberment into creeds and the impossibility of a national union, with the complete ruin of their economical welfare, and with the retrogression of national culture in art and science for two centuries to come. Even the religious life of German Protestantism, however, does not present a pleasing aspect in this period. A dogmatic warfare concerning the "pure doctrine" and a series of interminable polemics

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against innumerable heretics, old and new, animated pulpits and universities. While the people were suffering the evils of religious wars and their consequences, the theologians knew no higher interests than the new scholasticism, dogmatic even to the minutest details, yielding nothing to that of the Middle Ages in hair-splitting logic and mania for systematization, and at the same time decidedly inferior to it in width of horizon and elevation of thought. This rigidly orthodox cult of formalism contained in it nothing of that moral quality which cheers the spirits, ennobles life, and guides the people. The horrors connected with the persecution of witches, in which worldly and spiritual chiefs vied with each other, assumed fearful dimensions, and resulted in vulgarizing the feelings, in crushing out humane instincts, in unbridling the most savage, brutish traits, sinking far below the level of heathen culture. The flourishing period of Protestant orthodoxy in the seventeenth century can indeed be regarded only as a religious-ethical disease, whose cause can to some extent be discerned in the unfortunate external circumstances of the period during the Thirty Years' War and after it, but which must be attributed, at least in part, to a degeneration of those qualities of the German people which had proved effective during the Reformation.

A sensitive religious conscience and a deep feeling for religious truth always incline somewhat towards minute investigation of trifles and to doctrinal pedantry, and thus, by the premature crystallization of *ecclesiastical* truths into doctrine, the higher meaning of a search for truth is lost, as was the case at the end of the sixteenth century. Nothing remains for this spirit of investigation but to take up the consideration of petty details and small differences in the expression of dogma. Thus the zeal for truth, in itself a highly estimable quality, becomes a theological fanaticism for doctrinal forms, which, according to circumstances, appears in a tragic light as a heartless mania for persecution, and again takes on a farcical hue in the form of a meaningless delight in details. The history of religion furnishes other examples of this form of disease, but it cannot be denied that the

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tendency to it is especially characteristic of the German nature, for it presents the dark side of those worthy qualities which brought forth the Reformation.

The spirit of the Reformation, nevertheless, was not dead among the Germans even in this sad time, but only sunk into a deep sleep, overcome by the evil power of magic, like the Sleeping Beauty in the fairy-tale, or the mythic Brunhilde. The Siegfried who roused the sleeper and freed the prisoner was again, as in Luther's time, the conscientiousness and sincerity of the German character. At the end of the seventeenth century, Philip Spener, an Alsatian by birth, spurred on by his distress over the misery of the time, appeared as a new reformer, and sought to effect "an improvement of the true evangelical Church which should be pleasing to God." When he attempted to replace scholastic learning and barren discussion by active piety of heart and earnest discipline of life, and demanded in place of the interminable prating concerning the justifying power of faith a proof of its saving power in the purification of sentiment and of conduct, it seemed as though the warm, life-giving breath of spring were stirring in the barren regions of the orthodox, doctrinal Church, rousing it to new life after the prolonged torpidity of winter.

Among those studying theology at the various universities, "collegia pietatis" were now formed, in which they laid aside the meaningless scholastic dogmas of the lecture-room to become absorbed in the Holy Scriptures. They learned again from the Bible the real meaning of Christian piety and morality, and the proper constitution of a Christian congregation according to the pattern of the oldest apostolic communities. These circles of Bible friends stood up in active opposition to the wild, dissolute life then common in the universities, or at least withdrew from it and presented models of earnest Christian morality and self-control. It must be admitted that in doing so they fell into an ascetic rigor of life possessing some analogies with Catholic asceticism in its timid fear of the corrupting influences of worldly life. It would, however, be a serious error to look upon Pietism as simply a re-

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lapse from the Protestant to the Catholic monastic morality. At the foundation of monastic asceticism lay the condemnation of every natural sentiment as such; hence it always culminated in the condemnation of the love of the sexes, which must be regarded as the focus of the sensuous life. The measure of every ascetic tendency can hence be determined by its relation to this point. Pietism, it is true, opposed the libertinism of the seventeenth century, especially as manifested in the relation of the sexes, with earnest Christian restraint and morality, but it never regarded love and marriage as unholy or corrupting. This rigor, it is true, was exaggerated and used against innocent pleasures, for the Pietists preferred being too strict to falling into the laxity of the other party. This strictness, therefore, was not the product of unevangelical principles, but was rather brought about by the circumstances which put the Pietists into opposition to the surrounding community. Those imbued with a sincere and active Christian spirit could maintain no other position, over against the practical heathenism common among the so-called Christians, just as no other position was tenable by the early Christian communities in relation to the thoroughly corrupt heathen world.

A counterpart to the Pietism of Spener was furnished by the community of Moravians founded by Count Zinzendorf, in which the traditions of the Moravian brethren were united with the newly-awakened evangelical spirit of Pietism to form an "ecclesiola in ecclesia." According to this form of belief, Christianity was relieved of all unessential doctrines, and was thrown back upon the basis of sincere love for the Saviour and for the brethren; even in the arrangement and customs of the community the apostolic time was faithfully imitated. Among the Moravians, just as among the Pietists, the theoretical side of religion was disregarded in favor of practical piety; but while the Spenerians placed all weight on the will, upon strength of conscience and sanctity of life, the Moravians assigned all importance to the affectionate heart, to the bliss-giving emotion produced by the love of the Saviour and the grateful affection felt in return for him and for the brethren. It may perhaps be said that the Moravians represent Christianity

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in its feminine development. This explains the fact of their finding sympathy and followers to such an extent among women. It was naturally impossible for such a development to become national, confining religion entirely as it did to the subjective side of pious emotions, and founding the existence of the community upon natural sympathy and the attractions presented by subjective emotion alone. But as an element in increasing religious devotion and in refining the spiritual life, Moravianism had a great influence for good, as well as for evil. It certainly furthered considerably an effeminate sensitiveness and emotionalism, a morbid self-analysis and self-complacency, —the chief cult of that peculiar growth of the eighteenth century, the "beautiful souls" (die schönen Seelen). On the other hand, however, it was also favorable to a refinement of feeling, a development of heart-culture, an appreciation of the life of the individual, as well as a habit of introspection of the secret processes of soul-life, from which sprang the finest flowers of German poetry and philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century.

Goethe's relations to the Moravian communities, which he commemorated in his "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" ("Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele"), are well known; it is likewise an established fact that Kant, Novalis, and Schleiermacher went forth from Pietistic and Moravian circles. If the deep reverence felt by the early Germans for the "holy and mysterious" in woman be recalled, the conclusion will be justified that the effeminate piety of the Moravians and Pietists belongs to that class of phenomena in which the German national character shows itself in a peculiarly characteristic, though imperfect, light.

The supplement, as well as the counterpart, to this phenomenon, was *Rationalism*, which arose in Germany in the middle of the eighteenth century. Despite its opposition to ecclesiastical orthodoxy, it is a manifestation of that same German spirit of Protestantism which produced the Reformation. Just as the conscientious earnestness of the Reformation came to life again in Pietism, so in this awakening of the eighteenth century there comes to the front once more the

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earnest striving of the thoughtful mind after truth, the assertion of the right of individual investigation and examination, which had proved so effective in the early part of the Reformation, although soon crushed. Just as, in the case of the individual, moral sense and rational thought cannot be separated from one another, and as their union alone furnishes a sound basis for religious feeling, so all three elements are necessary to the existence of German Protestantism. Therefore it was in keeping with the natural order of events that in the historical development of Christianity, side by side with the practical Pietistic religion of conscience and of emotion, there arose the religion of reason, of the age of enlightenment,—the bias of the one supplementing that of the other.

One of the principles of the philosophy of Wolff demanded that one should have reasonable opinions about everything; explain everything on sufficient grounds and demonstrate it methodically; and allow the truth of revelation itself only so far as the possibility and necessity for it could be proved to be within the limits of reason. All this aroused the critical sense, even in the domain of religion, as well as the development of that fearlessness in probing and examining, which, it is true, is accompanied by doubt, even when it does not come into collision with the doctrine of the Church. The traditional dogma was not attacked by the popular form of enlightenment, but was simply ignored as an indifferent matter in no wise contributing to happiness. According to the optimistic Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy, happiness was considered the highest aim of man and the standard of all his judgments, and one did not consider it necessary to inquire minutely concerning the full meaning of this conception nor to go into details about the right and extent of its application to religion and ethics. Christianity, in coming into contact with the religion of reason, grew shallow and lowered itself to the level of a doctrine of expediency, and a sentimental admiration of the fortunate arrangement of nature and the natural excellence of man. It became, in short, a "natural religion" of unrestrained optimism, widely separated from the Christian-

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ity of the Bible and the Reformation, as well as from that of the Middle Ages. The unhistorical sense of German enlightenment in the eighteenth century overlooked this contradiction with a kind of childlike guilelessness. In this particular the Germans of the eighteenth century present a strong contrast to the contemporaneous French "naturalists," who were violently bitter and radical in their destructive tendencies. This radicalism is entirely in keeping with the cold, mathematical judgment of the French; in like manner the peaceful optimism of German enlightenment betrays itself in the inborn necessity of the German spirit to treat gently the sanctuaries of the fathers, even when it has outgrown them, and to bind the new to the old as closely as possible. This conservative tendency of the German national character, together with the courage of unrestrained criticism, secures the constant development of the community and prevents inclinations towards individual peculiarity from becoming fixed and isolated; for these tendencies find a contrast as well as a corrective in the progress of universal development, and become merged in it.

German enlightenment finds its completion, and at the same time its dissolution, in Lessing and Kant. With an acuteness unknown before his time, Lessing brought criticism to bear upon the Bible itself, and proved unhesitatingly, in the face of all logical defence, the untenability of the traditional theory concerning the verbal inspiration of the Bible. He was not moved to this vigorous and relentless criticism because he aimed at the destruction of Christianity; he was actuated, on the contrary, by a firm conviction of its indestructibility, and of the independence of the eternal truths revealed in it of any of the accidents of historical events with which tradition connected them.

The object of Kant's critical philosophy was to deduce these eternal truths (which, according to Lessing, form the essence of the Christian religion) from the nature of reason in man and to found them upon it. After a critical analysis of man's perceptive powers, he became convinced of the human impossibility of attaining an objective knowledge of the transcendental world, and then found in conscience, in the sense of

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duty, the fixed point in which the supersensuous, moral system of the world reveals itself to us in the undeniable claims of moral law. The certainty of this truth does not rest upon outward perception, but upon the inner voice of conscience; the supreme good of our will lies not in outward uses, but in its inner union with the law of the good,—in good will itself. Kant did not hold the will to be naturally good, as did the followers of enlightenment, for he considered it as standing in opposition to moral law and setting up selfish inclination against duty. This radical perverseness can be overcome by a complete change of principle alone, a new birth of inclination. This re-creation can be brought about by a voluntary act, which admits of no further explanation, and which makes the comprehension of the idea of the good the highest purpose of the will. According to Kant, it is possible for us to accomplish this because we ought to do so. From this obligation, which includes in itself a practically endless task, for the complete accomplishment of which our earthly existence is not long enough and human power is not adequate, Kant argues a moral and rational belief in God and immortality. Finally, he succeeds in bringing this "religion within the bounds of pure reason" into a certain connection with the Christian doctrine of salvation. In it he finds a symbolic illustration of the ethical ideas and events which are comprised within the experience of every reasonable being. According to Kant, Christ is the visible example or ideal of mankind beloved by God; to believe in him signifies taking this ideal into one's own volition. In the doctrine of the atonement and reparation through Christ is expressed symbolically that the new man in us, the good will, suffers for the sin of the old, wicked being, and at the same time makes good the sin. Kant declared the moral and allegorical change in the significance of the ecclesiastical doctrines to be the proper means of making, out of that mixture of truth and superstition, a religion of pure reason, which should become the authorized belief of the Church. With this change he hoped to prepare for a universal ethical community, superior to all churches,—the true kingdom of God.

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The teachings of the philosopher of Königsberg made a deep impression upon the moral and religious convictions of the German people, and still have a wide influence, and we are therefore justified in seeking in his philosophy a typical expression of certain phases of German national character. Two prominent features call for our consideration: one is a strong moral earnestness, the pathos of the sense of duty, the enthusiasm for the sublime majesty of moral law as the one true ruling power over the world. In the presence of this ideal all ignoble maxims of expediency vanish, as well as all flattering illusions concerning the goodness and the purity of human nature. The sacred precept bends the pride and the self-love of man in letting him see clearly the vast distance between him and his ideal; at the same time, however, it raises the lowly to a consciousness of his high dignity in making him a citizen of the transcendental world, and calls upon him to enter into a bold fight in the cause of reason, liberty, and truth, against the powers of sensuousness, of slavery, and of delusion.

Bold, vigorous fighting, according to the early Germans, was the purpose and occupation of the life of gods and men; and they received Christianity as the struggle of Christ against Satan and the evil powers attending him. It will be recalled that for Luther, also, Christ's work of salvation consisted in his vigorous combat with Satan, death, and hell; and the continuous task of the Christian is to fight against the attacks of Satan. In the same way Kant considered the purpose and substance of the life of the individual, as of mankind in general, to be the struggle of the good against the bad principle, of reason against sensuousness, of duty against inclination, of the moral religion of reason against the worship of crystallized superstition. In so far, then, Kant's view of life is good Christian doctrine, as well as genuinely German in sentiment. From another point of view, however, it diverges widely from the Christian idea of salvation, and represents in clear outlines that feature of German nature which is the dark side of the strong feeling of personality,—namely, unsocial and unhistorical individualism.

Kant believed that moral freedom of individuality could be

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secured only by making the individual rely upon himself alone, independent of every modifying influence of external powers, delivered from the trammels of nature, of society, of history, and of divinity. According to the Christian doctrine of salvation, neither the harm nor the welfare of the individual finds its first cause in himself; the former seeks its origin in the common nature of the species, while the latter looks for its cause in the education of the human race by divine powers of good, which throughout history wage a victorious war with the bad, and change the natural race of men to a new community, pleasing in the sight of God. Kant, on the other hand, holds that every individual is responsible for the evil in his nature through some unaccountable but voluntary act, and that his regeneration also can be accomplished by his free will alone. No one is to share any responsibility for the moral conditions of others, and likewise he does not owe his own state, whether good or bad, to foreign influence. In this sphere of isolated moral atoms there is no transfer of the operation of moral powers from one individual to another, and no continuance of the effect of a moral action from one day to another. This is a manifestation of that very individualism, systematized and raised to a principle, which has always formed part of the inheritance of the German character, and which it seems difficult for the educating power of Christianity itself to subdue.

From this point of view, consequently, Kant's religion of an ethical belief of reason, while it is but too thoroughly German, is so much the less Christian in spirit. It has always been the case, however, that biassed and morbid tendencies bring destruction upon themselves, because when carried out to their logical consequences they are sure to be reduced *ad absurdum*. At the end of the eighteenth century the truth of this was proven by the fate of the self-sufficient, self-exalting subjectivity of the time, which was shattered to atoms by coming into collision with the facts of experience as well as with the result of more earnest thought. When the combined powers of romantic socialism, held together by the master-hand of Napoleon, fell upon Germany, destroyed the political exist-

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ence of the Germans, fettered their much-vaunted liberty, and threatened even to denationalize—*i.e.*, annihilate—their culture, then the Germans understood fully what must inevitably be the fate of a nation in whose midst centrifugal and anti-social tendencies are at work throughout centuries, in thought and action, in ethics and politics, in religion and philosophy.

The people suddenly remembered the existence of a German *nation* with a glorious history behind it, whose past had been made bright by the development of a peculiarly German morality, art, and religion. The more pitifully the melancholy aspect of the German nation stood out in contrast to the glorious past, the more deeply did learning and poetry become absorbed in the treasures of the better past, and thus learned to love and respect once more what the arrogance of the religion of enlightenment had thrown aside as antiquated rubbish. At the same time philosophy, in its progress, came to recognize how absurdly limited the judgment and how unnatural the abstraction that sought to make the individual *ego* entirely self-sufficient, and to evolve the world of reality, in all its abundance, out of the idle reason of the individual. The *ego* cannot for a moment be conceived of without the non-ego, the subject without the object, the spirit without the nature, the individual without the community. It likewise became clear that there could be no morality and sanctity of individuals, the origin, abode, and support of which lay not in the historical morality and religion of the national and ecclesiastical community. In this manner there was effected the change from pure ethics and religion, the product of individual reason, to the recognition of that objective morality which is a fixed part of the system of a national state, and of that objective religion which owes its origin and nurture to the Christian Church, the historical community holding to the gospel preached by Christ.

This departure from unhistorical individualism to the historical community, in which the difference between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may be noted particularly, was not an unalloyed good. Some took the exaggerated stand that the reason and conscience of the individual meant nothing in the

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presence of the objective system and tradition of Church and State. Although a dangerous tendency, this was a natural one, a reaction against the other extreme of enlightenment. However, the great minds which at the beginning of this century directed the outer and inner life of the German nation into new paths were not led astray by this delusion, but with clear intelligence set about the task of reconciling the right of individuality with the claims of historical community.

In the field of religion, Schleiermacher, above all others, took up the work, and in a masterly manner showed its proper solution. In him were united the delicate religious feeling of Moravian Pietism and the manly clear-headedness of enlightenment and of the critical philosophy. From his youthful impressions of Moravianism he knew that religion is something more than a mere postulate of morality, a habit of looking upon our duties as a divine command. He recognized that it is a feeling of the connection existing between individual existence and the system of the world, a feeling which cannot thrive in an isolated individual, but craves a community of believers, out of whose common consciousness the pious self-consciousness of the individual grows and proves its existence. At the same time it was an absolute necessity for his keen, philosophically trained reason to dissect thoughtfully all experiences, whether of an internal or external nature, and to place them in the clear light of self-consciousness. In consequence thereof he became the reformer of the Protestant theology, and founder of a mode of religious thought in which large numbers of the Germans found, and still find, satisfaction, containing, as it does, the kernel of Christianity stripped of the dry husks of old dogma and brought into harmony with modern thought.

Sin and redemption are the poles of this form of belief, also; salvation, however, is not considered a supernatural act, as in the miraculous story of the past, but the deliverance of the pious consciousness from the shackles of sense, or the victory of the spirit over the flesh,—a process continually repeating itself in the pious experience of the community.

Dogma, from this point of view, also receives an ethical-

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allegorical meaning similar to the teaching of Kant concerning the victory of the good over the bad principle. Kant, however, considered this merely an event in the inner life of the individual,—an entirely voluntary act; whilst Schleiermacher looked upon it as the common experience of the Christian community—due not to the self-sufficient liberty of isolated individuals, but to that historical knowledge of God proceeding from Jesus in whom it was revealed in striking originality —which may be looked upon as the being of God in Christ, and, through him, in the "common spirit" of the Christian community.

The pious consciousness of the individual can thus be closely connected with the ecclesiastical community and with Christ, its historical head, without entailing the obligation of looking upon Christ as an absolute miracle, or of regarding the wonders of the gospels handed down by him as facts of history. The belief in Christ is, accordingly, nothing more than faith in the divine truth and world-subduing power of the knowledge of God revealed by Jesus,—a faith resting on the common experience of the Christian community. He is the "Redeemer," inasmuch as he is the creative prototype of the religion of salvation, which, it is true, is brought to us through the mediation of the Christian Church, but whose truth, as far as we are concerned, does not rest upon the outward authority of Church or Bible, but upon the inner experience proved anew in the daily life of every pious Christian. Here is a conception of the Christian religion which cancels the limited judgment of former points of view and strives to meet those necessities which are deeply rooted in the German nature, if not in human nature generally. Individuality and society are to have equal rights, and similarly the reasoning mind and the feeling heart attain full recognition.

Throughout all phases of history, religious as well as secular, the assertion of personality was a prominent feature of German existence, and forms pre-eminently the essence of the Reformation of the sixteenth century,—that great act in the drama of the world's history.

At the same time, however, during the progress of the re-

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form movement the obverse side of this virtue presents itself to view,—namely, a one-sided individualism, an aversion to any subordination of individuals to a common whole. To this defect can be traced the political weakness of the Germans, as compared with the socialism of the Romance nations, and the ecclesiastical weakness of the German Protestants, split up as they were into sects and creeds, in contrast to the close unity of the Roman theocracy. The dangers of this bent towards individualism were counteracted by another trait peculiar to German character,—namely, a conservative feeling of reverence for existing and inherited conditions, which held the Germans back from radical destruction even when they had freed themselves from intolerable bonds, and also made them seek to combine new and old together when making a new departure. German history, indeed, shows more than one epoch of reform and emancipation, but no *revolution;* it does not move forward by sudden leaps, by violent action and reaction, but in a course of development, on the whole, comparatively constant. To the accomplishment of this end, however, still another trait of German character contributed its influence. The German is of a meditative nature, disposed to ponder over affairs, to arrange his ideas in a logical sequence, and to regulate his acts according to consistent principles. His reflection is not so much that of abstract formal reason as of the *whole man;* his feelings, his moral qualities, his æsthetic intuitions, take part in it by putting questions to him, directing him in his course, and setting bounds to his conclusions. His thought in regard to religious matters finds it especially hard to free itself from the influence of the necessities of the spirit and the moral judgments of conscience. For this reason the philosophers, in their criticism of religion, proceed much more deliberately and moderately than the free-thinkers of Romance nations; for the latter are guided in their research by abstract, formal reason, which denies religious conceptions and institutions all the more readily because it does not take the trouble to consider the matter from all points of view and according to deep-lying motives. The voice of conscience and the divination of his feelings force the German to the

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conviction that some precious truth lies concealed in that which was sacred to his fathers, even though his reason may not recognize it. It is his duty to seek this truth beneath the antiquated wrappings; not till he has found it does he dare to cast aside the traditional forms; he maintains his position of negation unhesitatingly only after he has found a positive substitute for that which he has abandoned; having made sure of the spirit, he can easily dispense with the letter.

To the truth of this all our great thinkers and critics are witnesses,—Lessing and Herder, Kant and Fichte, Schleiermacher and Hegel. But this virtue has a weak obverse. Where religion and imagination are so powerful that it is impossible for logical reason to assert itself, religion becomes degraded to a mere blind faith, priding itself, perchance, upon its want of thought, its "*credo quia absurdum;*" or else it seeks to create a belief for itself by means of a poetic imagination, and frequently attains a fantastic mysticism in which deep meditation approaches dangerously near the abyss of insanity. Examples of this are not wanting in German religious history, but, since they are exceptions, they cannot be considered as typical of German nature. Among the Germans of different sects and creeds a compromise is struck between the necessity of the reason, which cannot be entirely ignored, to have an opinion even in matters of religion, and the impulse not to be disturbed in the possession of traditional conceptions and habits of thought. Thought is given jurisdiction over certain domains, and in return submits unquestioningly in other matters, and also manifests an unconditional willingness to defend the positions of traditional belief. It thus happens, by means of a sophistically demoralized understanding, that the most incredible view is looked upon as worthy of belief, and a tradition beyond the conception of the imagination as a reasonable truth. This attitude is common to all theology, but it is probably more frequent in that of Germany, where scholasticism took on a new lease of life after having run its course everywhere else, and where, moreover, it has not died out even yet, despite the Lessings, Kants, and Schleiermachers. It certainly cannot be denied that a tendency to

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obscurity and confusion, to subtlety and artificiality, to pedantry and formalism, as well as to a barbarous and involved style, is frequently characteristic of the reverse side of the German virtue of thoroughness and earnestness.

In the foregoing pages the attempt has been made to point out those qualities of German national character which may be recognized in the historical development of the religion of the Germans. The question suggests itself, What can be predicted of the future of the religious development of the Germans, in view of the historical individuality of the religious character of the nation? To answer such a question concerning the future is always a difficult task, and is doubly so in the case of the German people. Here the highly-organized religious belief, as well as the mode of life in Church and Theology, stands in so close relation to political affairs that all changes and alterations of the spirit or form of politics exert an influence upon the religious life of the ecclesiastical community. One point, however, must be taken into consideration. Teutonism and Christianity, it has been seen, stood in the beginning in the relation of pupil and teacher, and only in a few particulars did the pupil oppose the passive resistance of his individuality to the control of the training through which he was passing. Already towards the end of the Middle Ages, however, the German peculiarity, as shown in mysticism, had a positive influence on the conception and form of Christianity, and finally in the Reformation the German spirit developed its strength to such a degree that it succeeded in producing a new phase of Christianity, in the form of Protestantism. The relation, at first so one-sided, thus became reciprocal, and to such an extent that it is difficult to decide which of the two parties, Christianity or Teutonism, is more indebted to the other.

The peculiar phase of Protestant Christianity, in which the influence of the German spirit is seen in contradistinction to the Roman, Greek, and Semitic, has developed along a line growing more and more distinct throughout the three centuries of Protestant history, gradually freeing itself from the alloy

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of mediæval Catholic Christianity with which it was at first mixed in so large proportions. The obvious inference is that the German element in Protestantism will triumph completely over every foreign admixture, whether Romanism, Hellenism, or Semitism.

The purely human and universal essence of Christianity, the ideal religion of humanity, the religion of Jesus (according to Paul "the divine man," according to John "divine logos"), will be bound up with German nature much more closely when it is freed from the Oriental forms derived from successive national incarnations in Semitism, Hellenism, and Romanism. The ideal, ethically religious spirit of Christianity will receive glorious embodiment through reciprocal penetration with the noble German nature, which will attain thereby its most sublime moral spiritualization.

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PHILANTHROPY AND MORALITY.*

THERE is a widely-diffused notion nowadays that in our relations with our fellow-men we have simply to wish them well and to do them good, and that this is a perfectly simple and easy matter. The popular demand is for "practical" beneficence as opposed to a charity based upon "theory." It is assumed that what sets men at odds is the fruitless and age-long controversy about "ultimate truths and abstract propositions;" that if men would only devote themselves to doing good they would all fall into line and the sufferings of the world would be removed. The "service of humanity" is set forward as a substitute for adherence to creeds and dogmas and formularies of devotion, or the development of ethical systems. "Conduct is three-fourths of life," it is said, "and conduct has to do with people about us. The out-

* Delivered as a lecture before the School of Applied Ethics, Plymouth, Mass., August 1, 1892.

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worn theologies of the past have drawn off the energies of men in vain attempts to know a God who is by His very nature unknowable, and fixed the attention of so-called believers on the task of saving their own souls rather than on making this world a little less wretched and needlessly miserable. Why should we any longer hamper ourselves with the uncertainties of religion or the subtleties of a rigorous moral code? Let us go and make the poor comfortable and happy, and leave the affairs of Heaven to be attended to when we get there." Words like these are on the lips of many people in our day and generation. I am sure there is much to justify them. I hope we all sympathize with the spirit that inspires them. I hope we see that it is the spirit of a generous impatience at empty phrases and unreal professions, hollow forms and barren speculations, the spirit of a hearty interest in the welfare of others, and the longing to use one's life in the cause of human improvement. With all this we do well to be in thorough accord. And yet it is worth while to ask whether there is not an error of thought involved in setting the "practical" against the theoretical, in assuming that men will continue to act unselfishly when the grounds for self-subdual and unselfishness have been forgotten or denied, in believing that a philanthropy that rests on no moral sanction and is guided by no light but its own can be a factor in social progress. This is the subject with which we have to deal.

If we press for a definition of the terms "philanthropy" and "morality," we can settle the question in short order. Taking the loose expression "doing good to people" as sufficiently descriptive of philanthropy, it will at once appear that what is meant by the phrase is "doing good to *all* people," not merely benefiting one class at the expense of another; and, of course, the doing good must be some permanent and real good, not the gratification of the desire of people for a passing pleasure. That is to say, philanthropy, even in its vaguest and most popular meaning, has for its end social progress, the continual development and self-realization of society. But the development of society involves the development of the individuals that make up society, and requires

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that these individuals should become more clearly conscious of the relations that bind them together, and should voluntarily correspond with those relations. And this correspondence of the individual with the real and necessary relations in which he stands as a member of a universe of self-conscious beings is the very subject-matter of Ethics, or of Moral Science. Philanthropy requires that men should know themselves as bound together in a unity that imposes mutual services and duties. Morality is the illustration of those duties and the urging them home upon the individual conscience. Philanthropy would not be philanthropy if it did not make for human progress, and the progress of human society is the fulfilment of the moral law. The individual cannot come to his best save in a society that is moving forward to its true goal, and the advance of society depends upon the development of all the individuals that compose it. Thus a philanthropy that does not contribute to morality is false to its name. We will not linger now to ask more particularly what the conception of morality involves. It will serve a more immediate purpose if we aim to see in some detail how essential it is to bring the efforts of professed philanthropy constantly before the bar of morality, and to show how false is any so-called philanthropy that cannot approve itself there.

One corollary to the position taken can be stated at once. It is this, that *when a fundamental social injustice has come to be known and recognized, any efforts towards correcting special evils that are not contributive to the movement against the underlying wrong tend to become nugatory and abortive.* If that principle were to be generally accepted, a gauge would be furnished by which we could in some measure test the worth of any philanthropic movement in the direction of social reform and social progress, for all progress is on one side reform, since all progress is a passing out from a lower state of being, that, as the time for the higher state arrives, becomes not merely imperfect, but evil.

That there is some underlying wrong in our present civilization most of us feel, if we do not openly confess. The growing consciousness of it is the source of a vast deal of

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the social unrest of the age in which we live. This is as true as that the fact that comparatively few men see where the wrong lies, and who is responsible for it, and therefore how it is to be set right, goes far to explain the confusions and blunders and fruitless struggles in the war between social classes. Still a great deal has been gained in having brought so many of all classes to own that there is a wrong to be righted. And if, as has just been said, the existence of that wrong is sufficient reason for the failure of the best-laid philanthropic schemes, we who call ourselves philanthropists can with better heart and less desire for concealment bear the exposure of our ill success.

Let us take first, then, the effect of what is to-day recognized as philanthropy upon the recipients of out-door relief. It is one of the axioms of modern charity that the state cannot dispense relief to people in their homes. The ruinous effect of the old English Poor Law, which was in force from 1790 to 1834, has settled that. The fatal effect of state relief in keeping wages below a living point, and in undermining the self-respect and desire for self-maintenance of the working classes, is one of the most familiar themes in the literature of modern sociology. Archbishop Whately says, "Men will do what you pay them to do; if you pay them to work they'll work, if you pay them to beg they'll beg." But after the mischievous character of state aid had been proved, the notion still held sway that private alms-giving would not pauperize, because, being voluntary, it cannot be counted upon as a certainty or claimed as a right. It was very soon discovered that this hopeful presage had to be modified by adding after "private alms-giving" the clause, "provided that such alms-giving does not overlap, and that investigation of the case is made by the trained officers of the Charity Organization Society." Yet even with this proviso I believe that the same evils, in somewhat less degree perhaps, will be found to flow from private as from public relief. To those who look at the matter from a distance, the differentiation of private from public charity is easy enough; but to the poor there is probably little sense of distinction between the agent of the

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city or the county and the paid representative of a large charitable institution, except that one is more distinctly connected with the police in their minds than the other. In applying to both they have to anticipate being asked a great many questions that they don't want to answer, and that put a premium on lying,—successful lying,—and that bar the way to any sense of gratitude. In both cases they imagine that the treasury of the relief agency is practically unlimited, and that if they can only manage to be miserable and poor enough, its mighty forces will be set in motion on their behalf. In both cases the sight of some neighbor-family, apparently as well off as they are, drawing its partial or whole support from public or private alms, excites cupidity while it paralyzes all effort at self-support. And there seems to be hardly any degree of temporary suffering that human nature will not endure with the prospect of getting a living out of somebody else. In London, we are told, men secure an immunity from work for most of their lives by being periodically run over in the streets by the equipage of some wealthy and soft-hearted person. There are, of course, a great many small societies of one sort or another, that distribute doles and that are clearly differentiated, even by the poor, from the great relief agencies, either public or voluntary; but these, as developing in the poor the vices of flattery and religious hypocrisy, are not less demoralizing in their effects. Charity organization has done something to check this particular evil, but there seems little ground to hope that its influence will ever do more than check it slightly here and there. And the mischief spreads far beyond those who succeed in getting helped. The very existence of many of these charitable societies, whether "Associated" or not, is positively baneful and degrading; it keeps before the minds of the poor the dream of a life of dependence on others' bounty; it fosters the preaching of that travesty of the gospel, "alms-giving to the rich, and resignation to the poor;" it invests poverty with a kind of sentimental and sickly romance, and it makes many people, who might otherwise be cheerfully fulfilling the great and sacred law of self-respecting labor, regard their work as a

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mere misfortune and do their stent with grudging spirit, one eye on their task, the other squinting aside to catch sight of some chance to imitate the higher classes and live on other people. And this very desire is lowering. Mrs. Lowell says, "Human nature is so constituted that no man can receive as a gift what he should earn by his own labor without a moral deterioration, and the presence in the community of certain persons living on public relief has the tendency to tempt others to sink to their degraded level."

"But," it may be objected, "in this sweeping condemnation of philanthropic endeavor to assuage the sufferings of the poor, you must certainly make an exception in favor of the many institutions which, in their various ways, are ministering to those who, as children, or old people, or invalids, cannot possibly take care of themselves." It seems a graceless task to say anything in disparagement of hospitals and orphan asylums and fresh-air funds and old people's homes. Few things in this weary world are as worthy of honor as the tender and loving care of little children, and I hold that there is hardly any profession or calling so noble as those of the physician and the trained nurse. Nor do I suppose that the time will ever come here-down when certain forms of mental and moral infirmity, as well as of physical disease, will not call for segregation in buildings separate from the homes of the community, and under the skilful treatment of practitioners specially educated for the purpose and furnished with means to do for their patients what could not be properly done in their own homes, or in private houses at all. But I have to deal with the question whether or not these various institutions, regarded as dispensers of charity, are a blessing or a curse. And, I ask, is it well that the family,—taking that word as including near relations, as much as father, mother, and children,—is it well that the family, which most of us probably regard as a necessary factor in social progress, should be relieved of the support of its dependent members? Is it to the advancement of morality, that the science and art of true human relations, that the poor, the toilers, the ignorant, those who must be taught by life rather than by books, should be re-

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leased from the sense of responsibility for their own children or the children of their near kindred, of the maintenance of their own fathers and mothers or their grandparents, of tenderness to the sick and feeble and imbecile among their kith and kin? Can we complacently look forward to a time when only able-bodied individuals among the working-classes shall be at large, all the children, sick, and aged being grouped in institutions called, by a kind of refinement of cruelty and contempt of the divine appointment of the household, "homes"?

We, in our rank in society, do not consider it quite the thing to send away from our care and tenderness those members of our families who most need that care. And it is not only for the sake of those on whom we are so glad to wait. How much of the sweetness and brightness of our homes comes from those sick-beds and couches where lie patient sufferers ready to listen with loving sympathy to our tales of disappointment and ill success, bringing to the aid of our ruder faculties the quickened perceptions of spirits refined by long hours of pain, touching us to nobler issues, and sending us forth to endure with stouter hearts, as we carry with us the memory of calm, pale faces and the echo of faint but earnest tones. How many a mother, cut off by ill health from all active service, has ruled the hearts of headstrong boys and wilful girls from her sick-room. How many a little child has by its very helplessness kept soft a father's heart. Is it well that all this gracious influence should be taken out of the lives of the poor? It is of no use to say that the poor do not appreciate this poetical view of things. That is not true, to begin with; but if it were, it would only be an added reason against removing the very influence by which they may come to appreciate it.

Or fall back to lower levels and be severely practical. If the desire in our philanthropic endeavor is to "inculcate habits of providence and self-dependence," to make the poor diligent in their work, to give them an interest in the welfare and advancement of their country, surely it will be best not to remove from them the very incentives and motives that in all ages and lands have proved the most powerful in nerving men

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to exertion and effort. The hope in a man's heart of having a home, whose roof may shelter father and mother when they are old, and where his children may grow up shielded from the dangers of the world, has been a potent factor in the progress of humanity; it has launched ships, and dared tempests, and felled forests, and conquered fierce and hostile tribes, and made the American nation. No philanthropy that weakens this motive, no philanthropy that does not aim at all costs to preserve and strengthen it, can contribute to social progress. But what of a philanthropy that erects Old Men's Homes, and Children's Folds, and Children's Nurseries, and tolerates tenement-houses (in the interest of landlord benefactors), and says nothing against the robbery from the people of the very earth on which alone their homes can be built? The appeal to men to fight and struggle, and die, if need be, in defence of their hearths, the gray hairs of their sires, and their children's lives, has rarely been made in vain. But what patriotism is to be expected from a man whose wife has died worn out by drudgery in a factory, whose parents are in the almshouse, whose boys and girls are growing up in an institution, and who himself lives from hand to mouth in a room from which he may be evicted in a week if he does not pay his rent?

Or take up the question of the moral effects of philanthropic institutions upon their inmates. Of course the most important side of this question is the moral effect of philanthropic institutions for children. Childhood is the formative time; it is then that every touch leaves its mark. "The child is father of the man," because the education of the child determines the bent of the after-life, determines to which of the countless experiences and impressions that will come to him he shall give heed, and which he shall ignore and forget. It is one of the common mistakes to suppose that only learned people have a philosophy. If by philosophy we mean a theory of life, some sort of principle on which facts are arranged, then there is no one possessed of reason who has not a philosophy, no matter how unconscious of it he may be. And it is in childhood that this theory of life is formed. It may be thought that the number of children in charitable institutions is too small and

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their influence on society is too weak to make it necessary to take them into account in so general a discussion as this. But social progress must be judged, not by merely counting heads or considering majorities, but in asking what is the possibility put before the feeblest and the most obscure to live a true life and to realize the purpose of existence. And the number of children under public or private care is not so inconsiderable. In the State of New York, the number reported last year was twenty-nine thousand. These children will most of them go out into the community and marry; suppose them to have but three children apiece, and you have an aggregate of eighty-seven thousand, who may be expected to show something of the effect of the training that is now being given in the various orphan asylums and protectories of the Empire State. The question is, then, how far does this training make for morality. Of course I do not mean to say that in any case the education is intentionally immoral. I am sure we need not even contemplate such a horrible possibility as that. But that is a long way from saying that the teaching is bringing to these boys and girls all the force of moral example, all the inspiration of moral motive, all the infusion of moral strength, that they need.

The normal environment for the child is the family and the home. It were long to trace the subtle influences that there play in upon a young life, and it is not necessary; we all recognize them as existing: the sense of real and human relations with father and mother, brother and sister, and with a wider circle of those who are akin by blood; the *esprit de corps* of the household to which the child feels that he belongs and in which he soon begins to form an appreciable factor; the finding a basis for authority in one who is the author of his life; the chivalry called forth in the protection—even only the fancied protection—of mother and sister; the care and teaching of younger children; all these are as natural as air in the true family, but there is only the faintest shadow of them in the institution. Of course there is great difference between one and another form of asylum; where nine hundred boys, no girls, all of about the same age, or, if of different ages,

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divided up and kept apart, the older from the younger (a measure that is often, no doubt, necessary, though the very necessity only serves to show the unnatural effect of institution-life), are brought together in one enclosure, taught and worked in gangs, turned out to play by scores or hundreds, put to sleep in dormitories where the long lines of beds stretch like lines of graves on either hand,—where the very names of the boys are laid aside and they are known only by numbers, where they are dressed alike, taught alike, fed alike, and when they appear in public form but units in a procession that excites the curiosity or the contempt or the pity of the passers-by,—there the very principles of the family and the home seem to be not only forgotten, but reversed. This trying to bring up children by machinery, indeed, is slowly disappearing, and a more rational method is taking its place. Here the children are broken up into groups in which those of different ages live together in a house with an older person as its head, and the older ones have even rooms of their own and some sense of individual personal possession; here there is at least the simulation of family relations and a possibility of the growth of mutual loyalty among the members of the little group, and so of gentle affections being developed. But even at the best it is almost out of the question to attempt to give these children anything of that feeling of responsibility for the maintenance and welfare of the asylum that nearly every child has for the support of the home, and that does so much to draw forth the energy of the growing boy or girl and make life and its interests, the household and its needs, the family and its relations, keen and vital and vivid in a child's mind. The "charity-child" (what a mockery the name is!) accepts his support as just as much a certainty as the course of nature; he expects his food and clothing as he expects day to follow night; he knows that he does nothing, can do nothing, needs to do nothing, to provide for his physical wants, and grows up to look upon his tasks as a necessity more or less disagreeable, for which he sees no particular reason in the nature of the world about him. Quite possibly he does not handle money at all; certainly he has very little

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opportunity to know the worth of things, to understand that labor gives things value, and that price in some degree is the measure of work. Thus he knows nothing by practical experience of the processes of production or distribution, and grows up in a world as little like the one into which he will have to go out as Mr. Bellamy's fabled Utopia is unlike the world of to-day. Yet even that comparison is unfair, because Mr. Bellamy assumes that his socialistic state will be the creation of its members, that *all* the children will grow up under its paternal care, that therefore none will feel that they are cared for by the state as an act of grudging beneficence to the young of a dishonored and disinherited class. Under such conditions private charitable institutions for children would be unknown, and the debasing sense of entering upon life as a pauper would be rendered impossible. Opposed as I am to that system which is known among us as socialism, superficial as I believe its remedies to be, and impossible as I conceive it would prove to carry them out, without involving us in conditions yet more intolerable, yet I do not consider it in any way a part of my function in the world to apologize for the existing disorder and wrong. And while I acknowledge that voluntary philanthropic institutions for children often have many advantages over public institutions for the same purpose, it seems to me that they labor under one almost fatal difficulty: they are supported entirely by those whose interest it is that the existing social and industrial maladjustment should continue; they are therefore on the side of the very system that makes orphan asylums necessary.

The trustees and patrons and patronesses of the Home appear to the child as a kind of earthly providence, as beings from another world, who shower their gifts upon their suppliants beneath, and occasionally descend in their chariots with wonderful attendant angels in livery, to receive the admiring glances and grateful smiles of their clients, perchance to confer upon some particularly attractive child a kind of patent of nobility by some special notice and condescension. If anything were needed to enhance the child's reverence for these heavenly visitants, it would be found in the deep reverence

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and obsequious servility with which their advent is anticipated and their favor sought by the authorities of the asylum, who at other times seem to the childish mind to be possessed of well-nigh unlimited power. What is the effect of this sort of bringing up? In the minds of the many, to generate a feeling of dependence and unreasoning submissiveness to anybody who wears good clothes and rides in a carriage,—a dispirited acquiescence in life-long inferiority to the rich,—this in the minds of the many; in a few of the keener and more intelligent, whose elasticity of mind prevents them from being reduced to a dull conformity of opinion, the result is an attitude of silent but bitter antagonism,—a warped and distorted view of society, under the influence of which they will look upon the rich as their natural enemies and oppressors. These two classes can be found in almost every large orphanage. While they remain there their characteristics do not show themselves, save in exceptional cases; there is an institutional morality, just as there is an institutional health; the children seem to be obedient and well. But there is no foundation of moral or of physical strength; they have grown up like plants under cover; once out in the open where the sun shines hot and the wind blows free, and they wither or bend. The first class become the helpless victims of circumstances; they drudge through their work in a dreamy and exasperatingly complacent fashion, equally unresisting and uninteresting; the nerve, the snap, the spring, seem to be gone; they feel a constant and depressing sense of inability to cope with a world so different from any they have ever known. Its rough irregular ways, its freedom and spontaneity, perplex them; they yield to cruelty or oppression without dreaming of opposing it; they resort to the weapons of the weak,—deception, secrecy, and reserve; if they are girls they are easily led astray, not always, by any means, through inherited taint or native badness, but from a long habit of unthinking surrender to any one who seems to be above them. If father or mother be living, that strange mysterious bond between parent and child may assert itself, and once more unite them to the world; but if there be no close relatives, the years in the asylum have

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probably made too deep a breach between them and more distant kindred for the tie to mean anything particular. Thus they are really adrift in the world, and they naturally become the dupes and victims of the aggressive and determined among either the rich or the poor. After a few years they find their way back to institution-life again,—only this time it is the penitentiary, the reformatory, or the workhouse, instead of the orphan asylum. Poor, helpless sheep, fleeced and shivering, it is like getting into the fold again. If the fare is coarser and the regimen stricter, they themselves are coarser and harder to stand it. Once more they can throw off responsibility for food, or lodging, or raiment; once more the regular hours break up the day, and bolts and bars, though they limit locomotion, assure them of the uselessness of being anything but machines.

The race run by those of the second class, the bolder spirits, is usually shorter still. Society has, as they think, thrown down the gage to them, and they take it up. Life is for them a desperate struggle for reprisals from the community which has robbed their childhood of a home. In the orphanage they were the leaders in any scheme of mischief that was from time to time attempted; in the world they find a larger field for their ingenuity and daring. They become, if men, the dangerous criminals, the marauders and cut-throats, the sturdy beggars and more reckless tramps; if women, the adventuresses and betrayers of other women. But society usually proves too much for them, and has them under lock and key before long, giving them a chance to recover from dissipation, and devise new schemes of deviltry when their term in prison is over. In one respect both classes are alike; the sense of corporate life, of oneness with humanity, of fellowship, is wanting; and so the very foundation and groundwork of morality has not been laid.

I am perfectly aware that facts will be adduced to show that I am unjust in this description; I should be unjust if I meant to assert that all "charity children" go to the bad, or that there are not in almost every institution counterbalancing influences that often materially modify the tendency of the system to

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drag down the inmates, and so largely neutralize the evil. As there are in almost every religion men better than their creed, so there are in every form of philanthropy men and women better than the system they represent and administer. There are in children's homes teachers and keepers who pour out a wealth of love upon their charge, and win them to goodness by the beauty of it in their own words and deeds,—who build up even in these tardily responsive natures the sense of a wide and all-embracing love,—a love that encircles and unites humanity, because it is the presence in humanity of God, the Infinite Love. There are ties of affection that prove as firm and lasting as ties of blood. All this is true; I rejoice that it is; but we cannot judge of the effect of an institution by that which is accidental to it. That was the sort of reasoning that forty years ago justified chattel slavery, owing to exceptional instances of benevolent masters who made their slaves happy and tried to make them good. In the description I have tried to bring before you, what was the legitimate outcome of the system where other elements did not come in to interfere? Those of you who are familiar with the history of English orphanages will know that the picture is not a fancy sketch. Most of us have not quite forgotten our Oliver Twist. And it is the calm conclusion of many modern philanthropists that any home, however poor, even if it is not entirely clean, —any home, so long as it is not actually vicious,—is a better place for a child to grow up in than the most perfectly appointed and well regulated orphan asylum, furnished with all the modern improvements.

In the movement of industrial training and social settlements there is little danger of pauperization in the ordinary sense of the word, of sapping energy, or of fostering habits of indolence. Yet one cautionary word may find place. Just so far as, in this sharing with the poor of even the best gifts, we feel that we are doing them a favor,—something that evidences our own magnanimity and for which they are to be correspondingly grateful,—we are allowing the baneful element of "charity" to enter in. We need to remind ourselves from time to time that it would be only a fulfilment of

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our hopes if a day should come when, as we now establish college-settlements among the poor to teach them music and painting, they will establish trade-settlements among us and teach us the altogether noble arts of iron-moulding, weaving, and tailoring. Perhaps by that time there will be some arts they will *not* teach us, because they will have forgotten them as we shall have forgotten our supposed need of them.

There is not space to examine the relation to morality of present forms of philanthropy in the treatment of the criminal classes, but one suggestion I desire to make. It is, that the philanthropy which attempts to uplift these victims of self-indulgence and self-will must depend very largely upon awakening and stimulating the social instinct, upon exciting the impulse to do something for others. Mental and moral aberration are nearly allied: in one the mind, in the other the will, is centred upon self; but the line between them often eludes the most discerning scrutiny. Our modern method of treating insanity is to seek to draw the patient out of his isolation, to bring him into natural and healthful relations with others. In our dealing with moral disease this has not been used as much as it will be by and by. Where it has been tried the results have often been beyond expectation. Why should they not? Is not man raised rather by the power of self-sacrifice that links him with God than by self-interest that likens him to the brute? Is it not due to its appeal to this desire to help others that the Salvation Army, crude and vulgar as it is, and wretchedly individualistic as is its theology, has won its real and substantial victories among the dissolute and depraved? No sooner was the attention of some poor wretch caught by the beating drums and singing lassies, and some secret spring in his heart touched by a plaintive voice and the pressure of a kind hand, than he was set to work to do something for one of his companions in misery. Two years ago I was in London, and went with Commissioner Smith, then at the head of the Social Wing of the Army, to a work-yard in Whitechapel. We reached the yard—a small open space in the midst of a number of rough buildings—a little after noon. A boy in the red shirt of the Army opened

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the wooden gate, and we passed in under a covered archway. The first thing I saw was a group of fifty or sixty men gathered under the open sky in the middle of the yard, kneeling each on one knee, while one of the officers led the noon prayer-meeting held in all Salvation Army barracks and work-yards. As the crowd rose at a sign from the leader, I looked into their faces. Then I realized the desperate character of the work attempted: misshaped figures, pallid cheeks, lack-lustre eyes, gaping mouths, the scars of want and sin. Could anything be done for such as these? Among them one man was pointed out to me, a jail-bird, who had spent forty years out of his sixty-odd under lock and key. The keeper of the yard—a quiet, unassuming man—told me that this old fellow had come in the week before with another man. His companion after a day or two got out of temper with one of the officers, and was discharged. When the old convict heard that he was gone, he went away and put his arm up against the wall and hid his face in it and cried like a child. After a time he came back to the keeper and asked permission to go out and try and find the wanderer and give him another chance. The next Saturday night the permission was granted, and about ten o'clock he came back, bringing the other man with him, and his poor, bad old face all aglow with a new-found enthusiasm,—the enthusiasm of humanity. Suppose, for a moment, that that could be carried out on a grand scale; imagine some mighty movement that would lay hold upon the weakest and the worst and gather them up and send them forth to save their fellows, might there not be found a moral motive power that would be strong enough to lift men above themselves, above the cravings of their appetites, above their selfishness and their sin? And that is what must be sought by the new philanthropy. We used to stop with the negative half of the apostolic counsel, and say merely, "Let him that stole steal no more" (applying that, too, to small thieves, not to great ones; to men who stole bits of railroad iron, not to men who stole railroads; to those who stole the goose from the common, not who stole the common from the goose); we did a little better when we went on to say, "but rather let him labor"

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(though we were not wisely careful to see that opportunity to labor was set free). We did better still when we learned to add, "working with his hands the thing that is good," and taught the manual arts; but now the spirit of the coming age is calling us to go forth even to the cadger and the crook, for they, too, are men, and bring to them the nobler summons of the full message, "Let him that stole steal no more, but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing that is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth." That has, indeed, a ring about it that may well stir the dullest soul, for it makes the hard struggle against low desires something more than an exchange of one form of selfishness for another. But the call must come, not from the lips of two or three alone, but with the thunder of a great multitude, strong with the hope of a new and better world.

Leaving what has been said as merely illustrative, in a few instances, of how modern philanthropy fails to minister to the moral life of its beneficiaries, we must turn, if only for a moment, from considering the effects of alms-giving on the recipients to contemplate its results on its dispensers. One of the most patent facts about this side of the matter is, that the charities of the rich are an insurance which they pay for the security of their possessions and the continuance of their gains. Of late years the premium has risen somewhat, but the policy is still good. I do not mean to say that many people actually sit down to figure the thing out; but there is a sense of added security for wealthy people, "a soothing of their conscience and a calming of their fears," in knowing, or having reason to believe, that the poor are not quite starving. In the Middle Age, red-handed barons gave away large moneys to the poor out of their ill-gotten stores, in order to relieve their anticipations of reprisals made upon them in the *next* world; to-day, men do very much the same thing in view of possible reprisals in *this*. That is not in accordance with a very high morality: it is a contemptible combination of cowardice and greed. But worse still is the assistance to wilful ignorance and self-deception that alms-giving furnishes to the rich. This temptation to juggle with one's conscience is

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not, of course, confined to the rich; but it attacks them in particularly subtle and alluring forms. There is so much at stake in the case of one possessed of a great deal of money, and the position in the world that that assures; to be brought to acknowledge that one's wealth is the result of injustice, even if it were not one's own, would lead to such frightful consequences; to confess that one is living on goods stolen from the very poor that it is so pleasant to patronize, would be so horribly humiliating; and to think of surrendering one's property would entail such social obloquy and involve the loss of so much social esteem,—that we cannot be surprised that people of this class instinctively close their minds to any argument that might lead to such painful conclusions. This is a sufficient explanation of the way in which men and women in the higher classes cling to some exploded theory like that of Malthus, and repeat some mere sophism that an unbiassed mind would dismiss at first sight. Hardly a week passes that we do not hear some feebly-stirring conscience, vaguely uncomfortable at foolish and wasteful luxury, lull itself to sleep again by repeating the well-worn formula, "Oh, well, it gives the poor work and keeps them from starving." If sarcasm is ever allowable, it certainly is in meeting such mere salvings of conscience as this. It would seem to be one of the occasions to which the Scripture refers when it says, "Answer a fool according to his folly." The following lines may not be familiar to you. They seem apposite:

> "Now, Dives daily feasted and was gorgeously arrayed,—
> Not at all because he liked it, but because 'twas good for trade;
> That the people might have calico he clothed himself in silk,
> And surfeited himself on cream that they might have more milk.
> He fed five hundred servants that the poor might not lack bread,
> And had his vessels made of gold that they might have more lead;
> And e'en to show his sympathy with the *deserving* poor,
> He did no useful work himself, that they might do the more."

Now, if this temptation to lend one's self to a pleasant delusion exists in some special degree among the rich, it would seem a duty to avoid anything that might add strength to the temptation. But this is just what the philanthropy of our present

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state of things does. It enables wealthy men or women, without stinting themselves of a single thing that ministers to their comfort or enjoyment, to smother, under a host of benefactions and charities, the voice of conscience calling them to accept some unwelcome truth. Worse than this, these very charities draw forth a chorus of flattery and adulation, until the person is fairly bespattered with praise. The owner of fifty million dollars, who has not sufficient imagination to use more than a tenth of his income on all the gratifications he could fancy, gives fifty thousand dollars to a philanthropic effort. This for some of us would be about fifty cents; but for this deed of noble self-denial the man is lauded to the skies, and accorded the freedom of the city. It is very hard not to believe that what everybody says is true, especially when it is something that eases your conscience and makes you think yourself a remarkably fine man. This we reckon as another way in which modern philanthropy does not contribute to morality.

It were too long a task to enter into all the ways in which a philanthropy that will not acknowledge the fundamental iniquity of present conditions leads to other immoralities as well, but here is one other. While freely owning that many strikes are unjustifiable and wicked, it is not often confessed that there is about almost every strike a great deal that is heroic, unselfish, and, therefore, highly moral. Think of it. Here is a set of men receiving the highest wages in their trade, who for the sake and at the call of men they have never seen—men who have never done anything for them, and who they have reason to think would do nothing for them in like circumstances—are ready at a moment's notice to quit their work, their only means of subsistence, and face poverty and hunger, some of them, perhaps, imprisonment and death. How many rich men would do as much for their dearest friends? But philanthropy, the philanthropy of the present, has no sympathy for such morality as this. It never stops to ask whether the strike is not for a righteous cause,—whether it may not have arisen, as I have known to be the case, from a demand for the discharge of a foreman who had seduced one

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of the factory-girls, and was trying to seduce another,—but condemns all strikes indiscriminately, and refuses aid even to the women and children who have had no part in the matter. I said that all philanthropy did this; I am glad to say *that* is not true. During the great dock-strike in London in 1889, the Oxford University Mission in the East of London did a large relief-work among the strikers, and thereby lost a number of rich friends and gained a great many poor ones. I would remind those who do not agree with this part of my paper that the Church has not often of late erred in this direction.

Nor is this all. Much modern philanthropy not only fails to recognize the morality involved in men standing by each other in resistance to what they believe to be unjust on the part of the corporations that exploit them, but deliberately declares that to qualify himself for the receipt of charity a man must throw overboard any regard for the industrial welfare of his fellows, and be willing to work for the benevolent society or philanthropic individual for less than other men in the same trade are working, for less than would afford a self-respecting man a livelihood. And, not satisfied with this, many philanthropic institutions, especially those which profess to be of a religious character, pay their servants and employés less than the majority of laborers receive for like service, have their buildings erected by "scab" bricklayers, and their printing done by "bum" printers.

There are many shams in our modern religionism. I know of few more loathsome than the hypocrisy of the lady-managers (what a singularly suggestive title!) of an orphan asylum worth a half a million of dollars, who expect a hired nurse-girl to be content with less than a private family would pay, because she is working, as they say, "for the Lord,"—so afraid that she will not lay up sufficient treasure in heaven that they rob her of half her wages on earth, and, while they tell her in unctuous phrases that "it's all for the good of the dear little children," neglect to print her name among the benefactors of the "institution," though the proportion to her income of what she perforce contributes entitles her to head the list.

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Many of the trustees of such "Homes" profess an unbounded faith in the Bible. It would be well for them to show by their works that they believe that "God loveth a *cheerful* giver," and that the denunciation upon "those who build their houses by robbery and their chambers by wrong," in the under-payment of carpenters and masons, was not written only for Jews of three thousand years ago.

But it is time that we stopped and asked, "What if all this is true? What cure do you propose? Or do you want to abandon all charitable efforts and let things take their course, and natural laws work themselves out in their own relentless way?" I believe that morality must precede philanthropy. Before we can do good we must do right. We must hunger and thirst after justice before we can be merciful. It is not that, as the old, lumbering, Calvinist theology taught, Justice is opposed to Mercy, but that Mercy without Justice will not be Mercy, even as we cannot really do good unless we are striving to do right. "The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel," says the Bible, and it has been proved true over and over again. If we ignore the right and start out merely to do good to people, we shall before long make ourselves the judges of the good; we shall be saying (how many a philanthropist has come at last to say it!), "These people do not know what is really good for them; but I do, and if they will not voluntarily take what will do them good and is meant to make them happy, I will see that they do so under compulsion." And when that has once been said there is no atrocity that may not find shelter under that specious pretext. And from those who go forth to their fellows with the intent of forcing upon them the selfish conceits of their own minds, may a God of justice deliver His bleeding and defenceless children!

The first thing to settle clearly, then, is that we must first of all be right ourselves, and then do the right regardless of consequences. This is, and has been, and for ever and ever will be, the best thing for rich or poor, for high and low. It may be that the doing of the right will bring sorrow and pain upon us and upon others, but the mere escaping from present misery or the saving others from it is not the best thing for them or for us.

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The author of that most painstaking book, "Life and Labor of the People in East London," has one sentence so sad and yet so unflinchingly true that it will serve to illustrate what I mean better, perhaps, than anything else at hand. The paragraph is headed "Dr. Barnardo's Homes." It reads as follows: "The work of Dr. Barnardo is most remarkable. There is, I believe, nothing in the world like it. I need not describe either his methods or their results. They are well known. With its motto, 'Save the Boy,' a large and symmetrical structure has been built up, stone by stone, each stone an individual case of child-destitution. The only remark I would offer is that, with such dimensions as Dr. Barnardo's work has assumed, special dangers show themselves. His intervention may begin to be counted on, and, if so, it will finally stand convicted as the cause of misery."

To say that we must put morality before philanthropy is, after all, to repeat in other words what has been said elsewhere, that we must infuse into our emotional philanthropy the element of a true rationality. When we have come to recognize that there is a Divine Purpose in the world, that a great plan is working itself out, then we shall be more anxious to have our whole lives, our thoughts as well as our deeds, brought into harmony with it, than to engage in well-meaning efforts that may turn out to be rather a hinderance to the true order than a help. We must not try to cure symptoms, but attack the seat of the disease, even if we find it in our own hearts. This is what Henry Thoreau taught us thirty years ago. "He felt," says his latest biographer, Mr. Salt, "that philanthropy is not love for one's fellow-man in the broadest sense; not the flower and fruit of a man's character, but only the stem and the leaves; not the constant superfluity of his benevolence, but a partial and transitory act in which there is frequently too large an admixture of self-consciousness." Then, quoting from Thoreau, "there are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root, and it may be that he who bestows the largest amount of time and money on the needy is doing the most, by his mode of life, to produce the misery which he strives in vain to relieve. Some show

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their kindness to the poor by employing them in their kitchens. Would they not be kinder to employ themselves there?"

Agreement is assumed, then, in the proposition that we must *be* right and *do* right in order to *do* good; that if "Conduct is three-fourths of life," Character is the whole of it.

But Right is founded upon Truth; it is the Truth gone into operation. Now, the Truth that underlies our actions towards others is the relation we hold with others. What we can all do at once is to awake to a consciousness of these relations and begin to correspond to them in our dealings with the cook and the waiting-maid, the clerk and the cash-girl, the railway conductor and the telegraph-boy, the factory-operative, the dressmaker, the newspaper reporter, as well as the beggar and the charity "case."

When a distinguished visitor told an amusing story at Charles Kingsley's dinner-table, after laughing heartily at it Kingsley turned abruptly to his wife as though a sudden thought had occurred to him, and said, "My dear, I'm sure that Mary would enjoy that story very much; will you ring for her to come up? I know that Mr. So-and-so won't mind telling it again." Not only the obligation, but the joy, of thus entering into natural and real relations with others, rather than trying to create artificial and strained relations as dole-dispensers and friendly visitors, is being brought home in many ways to many hearts. When we have learned to value the friendship of the woman who washes our clothes and the man who carts off our rubbish, we shall find it easier to understand our neighbors, whether poor or rich.

But, in this world of past mistakes and present temptations, to do right requires also that we stop doing wrong. More and more clearly is the truth perceived, that in order that men may have freedom to live, they must have freedom of access to the source of life,—to the earth which the Lord hath given, not to certain favored individuals or classes, but to "the children of men." If the land of a nation belongs to the people of that nation, then there can hardly be a deeper underlying evil than the monopoly on the part of a few of the

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common heritage of all. It is that evil which we, in this new and apparently boundless country, are called to face. To remove the wrong of private property in land will not require any absurd attempt to reapportion the soil; but it will require the collection of the rental values of land, irrespective of improvements, as the fund from which the expenses of the city, state, and nation shall be met. Until we make that change we are wronging every landless or unemployed or ill-paid person in the nation, and we shall be baffled in all our efforts to do them good.

Tolstoi says, "The present position which we, the educated and well-to-do classes, occupy is that of the old man of the sea riding on the poor man's back, only, unlike the old man of the sea, we are sorry for the poor man, very sorry. And we will do almost anything for the poor man's relief; we will not only supply him with food enough to keep on his legs, but we will provide him with cooling draughts concocted on strictly scientific principles; we will teach and instruct him and point out to him the beauties of the landscape; we will discourse sweet music to him and give him lots of good advice. Yes, we will do almost anything for the poor man, anything but get off his back."

The words are sharp, but are they any more searching than these of Henry Thoreau, from whom I just quoted? "If I devote myself," he says, "to other pursuit and contemplation" (than the simple common labor of every-day life), "I must first see, at least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man's shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his contemplation, too."

Only let us remember that we are so involved with others in our political and economic life that we cannot free ourselves from the shame of this injustice, however we may see and detect it; we can only do our best to bring home the horror of it to other individuals, until the whole community is stung with the sense of its own misery, and, like Samson, breaks the bands that bind it down. That will not be a war of classes, but a struggle of the whole people to be free. And if we are to stir others to enlist in this campaign against

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the monopoly of the very earth and air and light, we must make all we do to meet the immediate wants of the needy or the suffering contribute to the propaganda of reform. We must still feed the hungry and clothe the naked, but we shall try and show them, if we can, whence hunger and nakedness proceed; we may open orphanages and shelters, but they will be training-schools for the new age; we may go down into the slums, but we shall remember the words of the dying Pestalozzi, "I lived like a beggar, that beggars might learn to live like men," and feel that our best mission is to show the poor how to make slums impossible.

In closing, it seems best to provide against possible misunderstanding by saying that in speaking of morality I have not meant merely a system of ethics or a code of manners. I have set forward morality as at once deeper and loftier than philanthropy, as furnishing philanthropy with its only foundation and its truest guide, because I believe that in order to bless the world we must first of all do the will of God. That requirement covers the whole field of duty, for it claims the whole man. Nor do I for a moment dream that we shall find a ground on which to resist legalized wrong and the despotism of vested interests, until we have discovered that behind *laws* there is a changeless and righteous law, and that even if the "highest crime be written in the highest law of the land," it may yet be known and branded as a crime, because there is in the souls of even plain and ordinary men the witness to an eternal right.

Nor does it seem probable that in the future, any more than in the past, will men be able to recognize an absolute law without an absolute law-giver, or an eternal right apart from an eternal will,—not indeed a self-will, a will to live, but a sacrificial will, a will to love. And speaking out of my own experience, I do not find a sufficient safeguard against the taking of my own conceits for truth, and my own desires for right, or a sufficient support against selfishness and pride in my own heart, and a basis on which to bid other men to resist those disturbing passions in themselves, save as I acknowledge that the unseen righteousness and love are manifested in a word

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of God made flesh in Jesus Christ, the Head of humanity, the Ruler of a visible and enduring kingdom in which love and law are one.

And if the philanthropy that now calls us is a philanthropy that rests upon a recognition of universal relations among all men, I cannot think that it should refuse to declare to all men the foundation of those relations in Him Who is in His One Person very Man and very God, the centre of human society, because He is the presence in human society of Truth and Right and Love.

JAMES O. S. HUNTINGTON, O.H.C.

INTERNATIONAL QUARRELS AND THEIR SETTLEMENT.

THE question of the probability of peace or war is always with us, and we may therefore view with satisfaction the increasing interest which those who now wield the decisive power in electoral battles are taking in proposals for the abatement and possible ultimate abolition of war. Quarrels are as old as the world, and there is no doubt that Sir Charles Napier was as accurate when he described man as a fighting animal as was Sir Henry Maine in speaking of peace as a modern invention. The question which is beginning to exercise many minds which till recently would have let it pass unheeded is, how we can most readily extend the application of this new invention, and make it, moreover, as an invention should be, labor-saving and money-saving,—how, having regard to actually existing circumstances, the world can retrench its war preparation and lighten the burden which is now imposed.

Not only was war a natural condition of primitive society, but a comparison of ancient and modern warfare shows that, on the whole, we have developed towards more humane rules in our quarrels. Possibly writers on international law are prone to belittle Grecian and Roman ideas of international

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morality, but there could be small hopes of humane treatment for the enemy from those whose feelings towards other nations were rather of contempt than of moral obligation. After the establishment of the Roman Empire and under the influence of Christianity some improvement is discernible, and in feudal times the influence of chivalry would, with many lapses, secure some mitigation of the cruelties of war,—only, however, to be renewed with increased vigor when we reach so recent a period as the early part of the seventeenth century. The horrors of the Thirty Years' War have probably never been exceeded, and certainly never since equalled,—unbridled pillage, plunder and ravages, and fiendish cruelty on the part of the soldiery creating such absolute desperation that wolfish ferocity and cannibalism became rampant among their miserable victims, and the sometimes bespattered reputation of Marlborough stands out like a beacon-light in the war of the Spanish Succession, beside the record of Mansfeld, Brunswick, and Wallenstein in the previous war. During the two and a half centuries which have since elapsed the influence of Grotius and his successors has done much to soften the rules of war, and we have also seen the growth of that important body of international rules,—the law of neutrality. War does not now make every nation either enemy or ally, but while the two combatants fight their battle other nations may pursue their vocations unmolested except so far as the necessities of the war prevent, and the authors of the Declaration of Paris, in 1856, made concessions to secure this end by exempting from seizure both neutral goods on enemy's vessels and enemy's goods on neutral vessels unless contraband. A beneficent distinction is now recognized between the combatant and the non-combatant portion of an enemy population, and the unarmed inhabitants cannot be robbed and slaughtered with impunity; quarter will, if possible, be given even to a defending garrison, and the inhabitants of a captured town will not be abandoned to the tender mercies of a victorious soldiery. Prisoners, instead of being tortured, killed, enslaved, or imprisoned, will, where possible, be detained for exchange, and in the mean time maintained, and even paid for work. The

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sick and wounded, instead of being either tortured and killed or left to their fate, will, where possible, be protected and tended, and every thing or person connected with such work privileged from hostile treatment. Passing to property, land, instead of being seized and dealt with by an invading force without restraint, will now be used or injured only so far as the necessities of war compel, and the invaders upon evacuation will be responsible for waste; again, movables instead of being seized and freely subjected to pillage will now only be taken under formal requisition and generally subject to payment being made.

So of the methods of warfare. All is fair in love and war, it is said; but, though that may have been true in ancient warfare (and possibly still of love!), it is certainly not true of modern warfare. The food or water of the enemy must not be poisoned, nor poisoned weapons used; the Declaration of St. Petersburg forbids the use of incendiary shells or explosive bullets below fourteen ounces, and guns must not be loaded with scraps of iron, glass, and other rubbish. Though it is permissible to kill by surprise, to assassinate—*i.e.*, to kill by deceit or treachery—is illegal. Wanton devastation of territory is now clearly unlawful, and only strict military necessity can justify it, though the rules upon one or two allied practices are not as well settled as might be desired. The Franco-German War and later our action in Egypt have given prominence to bombardment as an unnecessarily cruel means of attack when directed not merely against works but indiscriminately against a town, and the French appear inclined to go still further, and, irrespective of siege, employ bombardment as a threat against maritime towns for the purpose of exacting ransom, and totally regardless of the town being a purely commercial or a residential one.*

The foregoing *résumé* may satisfy us that, with the exception last noted,† the general rules of warfare have, during the

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* Admiral Aube in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1882, l. 331, and subsequent writers in the same review and in the *Nouvelle Revue*.

† Mr. W. E. Hall refers to Admiral Aube's proposal as "nothing short of

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last two hundred and fifty years, steadily developed towards a more humane ideal. There may have been periodical derelictions from existing standards, but the general trend of the customs of war has followed the general softening of manners in peace.

In curious contrast to this fact stand the enormous war preparation of the present day and the increased deadliness of modern weapons and engines of war. The English army and navy now cost nearly thirty-two millions sterling out of a total annual national expenditure of less than ninety millions, and the last ten years show an increase of sixty thousand men in the army, while the navy includes one hundred and thirty-one commissioned war-vessels, with a displacement of over three hundred thousand tons, against one hundred and eleven, with a displacement of little over two hundred thousand tons, in 1886, and with increased speed. A 100-ton gun now costs nearly £20,000, fires a charge weighing about a ton and a quarter and costing about £150, and finally requires repairing after one hundred and fifty shots. The United States spend about £15,000,000 per annum upon their army and navy, or less than five shillings per head of their population; Brazil spends rather more than £5,500,000, or about eleven shillings per head; passing to Europe, the six great powers spend nearly one hundred and seventy millions sterling, averaging about sixteen shillings per head of their total population, and on an emergency could put into the field some seventeen million men, or more than fivefold the number which could have been raised fifty years ago. In addition to all this direct military expenditure there are the huge national debts largely originating from war, and the loss which is incurred by large bodies of men being drawn away from peaceful production.

Accompanying the enormous increase in the armed forces of Europe is the increased deadliness of modern weapons and

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astounding," and reminds its advocates that not only may reprisals be made, but they need not be confined to acts identical with those which have called them forth. "International Law," 3d edition, p. 534.

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engines of warfare. In the light of such conferences as that of St. Petersburg, and the feeling which they represent, it is somewhat remarkable that such a premium should be allowed to be placed upon destructiveness; but, as Sir Henry Maine has pointed out, we may, on the other hand, reflect that the greater the man-killing properties of our weapons the less are we likely to follow the example of earlier times in the length of our wars. We may take it that the modern principle is that no greater cruelty, no more wide-spread injury, shall be inflicted than is necessary for the end desired; yet modern warfare recognizes mines as legitimate means of attack, notwithstanding their insidious nature and the danger that their ravages may extend to non-combatants. Again, notwithstanding the protests of the United States during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 against the unconditional recognition of the torpedo as a legitimate instrument of warfare, it appears now to be fully recognized. The danger which is being run is forcibly expressed by a French admiral, quoted by Sir Henry Maine. "You must remember," he says, "that a torpedo is used under water and in the dark. Now, are you quite sure that you will always aim your attack against the ship which you intend to destroy? Suppose that the commander of a torpedo fleet makes his way to a force of ships lying off a particular coast, and one of his torpedoes is successfully fixed to the vulnerable parts of one of them. The electric spark is applied, and the ship and everybody on board it is blown into the air or sent into the depths of the sea! Supposing, however, immediately afterwards, it is discovered that the ship which has been destroyed is a neutral, perhaps one of the finest vessels of a friendly power! Do not you think that there would be a thrill of horror through the civilized world, and are you sure that a combination of civilized nations will not be formed which will condemn the torpedo to the same proscription, and perhaps by the same means, as far more merciful weapons were condemned in the Middle Ages?"*

* "International Law," by the late Sir Henry Maine, pp. 147–8.

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So of the ram, by which a ship may be sunk in a moment or two. Again, though the Declaration of St. Petersburg proscribed explosive bullets and loading with scraps of iron, etc., modern conical bullets are said to be almost equally cruel, while in the Chili revolution the new Mannlicher rifle became known as "the machine of death," being regarded by Balmaceda's fugitive infantry with almost superstitious fear. Only a third of the Congressional troops were armed with it, yet fifty-six per cent. of the Balmacedist dead and wounded fell to it at the battle of Concon, and it is reported that volleys fired at six hundred yards ricocheted with fatal effect upon reserves stationed one thousand yards beyond. Its inventor calls it humane because it *kills* ten men where the Snider either wounded *or* killed one!

What is to be the result of the increased destruction which these new weapons cannot fail to bring about? Dr. Billroth of Vienna and Dr. Bardeleben of Berlin have recently dealt with this question in their professional lectures, in its application to the preparation for the wounded, and Mr. Archibald Forbes has added some interesting details, the conclusion of their combined experience being that the old system of carrying away the wounded on litters during the battle will in the future be utterly impracticable, since with the improved man-killing appliances brought into action the first battle would bodily wipe out the ambulance service. If a humane people demand that the help to the wounded shall be adequate and in proportion to the development and augmentation of modern fire-arms, Mr. Forbes replies that compliance is impossible, —that the ambulance corps, though privileged, would be simply shot down by the longer range and greater precision of modern rifle-fire,—and that "stern experience of future warfare will force home upon the nations the decision whether their wounded and necessarily untended warriors in their thousands are to lie bleeding to death on the battle-fields while the war is raging above them, or whether the peoples of Europe will take the accomplishment of the blessed millennium into their own hands and bring it about, in the words of the Scottish paraphrase, that

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"'No longer hosts, encountering hosts,
Shall crowds of slain deplore.'"

To summarize the present position of affairs, though the general body of rules or customs of war has become more humane, and though neutrality during war has now become a clearly recognized position, the weapons of warfare are more destructive than ever, and the financial burden imposed by preparation for war is heavier than ever, while the risk we in England run in case of war is as great as or greater than ever. We in England depend for at least a third of our food upon foreign supplies, and we are at the same time the largest carriers in the world. No other nation is so dependent as we upon sea-supplies; our combined imports and exports amount to more than a thousand million sterling, and are worth to us as carriers something like fifty million sterling in the year, thus exposing an area three times as great as either France, Germany, or Russia, and more than one-fourth larger than all three combined.* Whether Lord Clarendon and Lord Cowley were guilty of a fatal mistake in ever assenting to the Declaration of Paris, or whether we are guilty of another in refusing to agree to the exemption of the private property of belligerents from hostile capture at sea, is not for me to discuss here, but while the law remains as it is we can never flatter ourselves that we have little concern in the question of war or peace, or in proposals for the abatement of war.

Of those proposals, arbitration in one form or another is naturally the one to which our minds first turn, and its supporters certainly cannot complain of want of attention during the past few months. The President of the United States made an important speech on the subject last year; both Houses of the American Congress have unanimously approved its extension as a means of settling international quarrels; and here in England, whatever may be the result of the proposed motion on the subject in the House of

* See Lawrence's "Essays on Some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law," pp. 286–7.

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Commons, petitions representing (among others) more than a million and a quarter of members of industrial organizations have been signed in favor of a treaty of arbitration with the United States.

The weaknesses of this method of settlement have been frequently dwelt upon. The want of direct coercive power: if an award in a private dispute is not complied with, the minions of the law can quickly bring about a satisfactory result; but to levy execution upon a nation would be rather a difficult process, and would virtually mean the very remedy which arbitration is to avoid. Yet the United States by rejecting the award of 1831 in the matter of the British American boundary, and Mexico by her action in the dispute with the United States in 1839, have shown us that such a difficulty may arise. Again, there is the difficulty of securing a thoroughly unprejudiced and at the same time competent tribunal, and the objection to courts created purely *ad hoc*. General disapproval on the part of other nations may operate as strong indirect coercion of those inclined to defy arbitral decisions, but this makes the requirement of thorough competence on the part of the arbitrators all the more imperative, otherwise a country might acquire for itself a very bad name for the repudiation of what was in fact an unjust or improper award.

Mr. W. E. Hall considers that under these circumstances it must be permissible to distrust arbitration as a means of obtaining an equitable settlement of international controversies, though he admits that "where the matter at stake is unimportant, and the questions involved are rather pure questions of fact than of law or mixed fact and law, reference to arbitration is often successful both as a means of securing that justice shall be done and of allaying international irritation." Fortunately, it is not now an untried method, and we learn something as to its most appropriate sphere from past experience: a large number of disputes have in modern times been settled by arbitration, and the number is increasing with every decade. An analysis of the subjects of twenty-eight of the most important of these gives the following result:

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Seizure or destruction of ships or other property	9
Seizure of or injury to subjects	5
Boundaries	7
Sovereignty of islands	2
Breach of neutral duties	3
Fisheries	2

The United States government has been a party to thirteen of these settlements, Great Britain to ten, France and Portugal to four each, Spain three, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark one each, while South America is represented by Colombia, Chili, Peru, and Argentina; Central America by Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua; Asia by China, Japan, and Persia; and Africa by Morocco. The United States have thus had the largest experience of arbitration, and the opinion of their President last autumn probably well expresses the present feeling on the subject. "It is quite possible," said President Harrison, "to apply arbitration to such a dispute as a boundary-line. It is quite impossible, it seems to me, to apply it to the case of an international feud. If there is present a disposition to subjugate, an aggressive spirit to seize territory, or a spirit of national aggrandizement which does not stop to consider the rights of other men or other peoples, to such a case and to such a spirit international arbitration has no or, if any, a remote and difficult application." This is not quite the same as Mr. Hall's criticism; in excluding questions of law he doubtless had in view the Alabama arbitration, for though war was then avoided the permanent effect of the decision cannot be applauded, inasmuch as we started by accepting a statement as law which we denied to be truly so, and thereby increased the obligations of neutrals in direct opposition to the modern rule, and very proper rule, of allowing war to interfere as little as possible with the affairs of non-belligerents. In confining arbitration to "unimportant matters," Mr. Hall would doubtless thereby exclude the disputes which President Harrison describes as involving a disposition to subjugate, an aggressive spirit to seize territory, or a spirit of national aggrandizement, and probably he would exclude others,—cases in which the political freedom, the existence, or

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the honor of a nation is supposed to be touched; and at first sight this limitation might seem to make arbitration impossible in nine-tenths of the quarrels which arise. We must not, however, be too hasty. History and in fact every-day experience of foreign politics show that what may grow into a question of national honor generally has a very small beginning. Take the Chili affair, which attracted so much attention towards the close of last year: a dispute which originated in a drunken brawl at one time looked very much like ending in a bitter war between Chili and the United States. The late Lord Russell said of the wars of the last century that he did not see one of them in which, if there had been proper temper between the parties, the questions in dispute might not have been settled without recourse to arms; and if tackled early enough the settlement of most of our disputes to-day may be similarly facilitated. At the time of writing, the United States, after some tall talk, are beginning to see a little sense in Lord Salisbury's recent proposals, but if our government had taken the advice which Sir George Baden-Powell urged upon it in 1887–8, "the Behring Sea difficulty" need never have assumed the proportions which it has been allowed to do. Furthermore, we must always remember that if there is a danger of not obtaining a fair decision on the merits of a dispute in arbitration, the danger in war is ten times greater. Take the Crimean War, as Mr. Froude puts it in his "Life of Earl Beaconsfield:" though a million lives and a hundred millions of English money were expended, the only result was the capture of half a single Russian city! To quote a saying of the late President Grant, "An arbitration between two nations will never satisfy both nations alike; but it always satisfies the conscience of humanity," and that is more than war can do.

Admitting, however, that there are certain quarrels or "international feuds" to which arbitration cannot be applied, is there any other alternative for war, or is there any peace-preserving influence upon which we may rely? Lord Sherbrooke (then Mr. Lowe) once described the theory of the balance of power as "the pest of Europe," but there are many who now

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think that in the system and alliances which the theory has bequeathed to us are to be found the most practical peace-preserving influences of to-day. The six great powers of Europe, and when concerned others, may meet in conference and in a spirit of conciliation may smooth over difficulties which, while distance added enchantment to the view, might appear almost insurmountable by peaceful means, as witness the conferences of London in 1834 and 1867, of Paris in 1867, and of Berlin in 1878 and 1885. Then we have the European alliances,—the triple alliance and, if we may call it so, the dual alliance, with their possible additional adherents. When Germany, Austria, and Italy are allied on one side and France and Russia on the other, there should be little fear of either France or Russia acting aggressively unless assured of England's position; Italy in the South and Germany in the North would be seriously handicapped without maritime protection, but with the assistance of the English fleet the case would be very different, and England may thus say to her Russian rival, "Give us peace in Asia and there shall be peace in Europe;" an offer which the alleged pacific declarations of the Czar should make readily acceptable.

What, then, are the conclusions to which we are led? That throughout the civilized world there is a growing feeling against recourse to war as a means of settling international disputes; that the practice is growing of inserting in treaties precautionary clauses for reference to arbitration of disputes which may arise; that, even in default of any such provision, where disputes have actually arisen, their settlement by arbitration is becoming commoner; that quarrels to which arbitration cannot be applied may be and are being controlled by the peace-preserving influence of allied nations, and that though we may not look for any immediate disarmament, "though," to quote President Harrison once more, "we must still have our gun-factories, and probably shall best promote the settlement of international disputes by arbitration by having it understood that if the appeal be to a fiercer tribunal we shall not be out of the debate," still progress is for peace, and after long experience of the successful working of arbitration

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and long immunity from serious war, a gradual disarmament may follow, and the time may yet come when it may be true

> "That the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle-flags were furled
> In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world."

LEONARD H. WEST.

1792.—YEAR I.*

FAMILIES and nations and churches, in fact all communities of men, have recognized the ethical value of the commemoration of past events. The anniversaries of births, marriages, and deaths are remembered in the family circle. Schools, universities, societies, celebrate their centenaries. A feeling of *piety*, in the old Latin sense of that term, links the young to the old, the present to the past. As each of us may recognize certain dates as turning-points or crises in his individual life, so it is with the associations or communities to which we belong. And many nations can celebrate their birthdays, or the day when they came out of bondage, or the festival of their resurrection from the dead. In this matter of national celebrations England, partly because of the fortunate continuity of her recent history, is less fortunately placed than some other countries. All citizens of the United States of America can join in celebrating the Declaration of Independence. The present French republic has shown a wise instinct in choosing the Fall of the Bastille as the anniversary to be commemorated: that date for the new epoch divides the sympathies of Frenchmen less than any later date in the stormy history of the great revolution. Englishmen have given up celebrating the Whig triumph of 1688; they have given up celebrating the battle of Waterloo. The feeling grows (as we trust it may grow in Germany), that a battle is, in any case, not the best kind of event to celebrate; a national animosity is not the national feeling we wish to keep alive. And, be-

* A lecture delivered before two London Ethical Societies.

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sides, there are many victories in the past which we have come to regard with very mingled feelings. The battle of Waterloo ushered in a very gloomy period of European history,—a peace, under the patronage of the "Holy Alliance," that was sadder than some wars. Certain national events used to find a place in the Anglican "Book of Common Prayer,"—the gunpowder plot, the so-called "martyrdom" of King Charles, the restoration of his son, and then, with characteristic inconsistency, the landing of William of Orange, tacked on to the gunpowder plot. But these commemorations have been wisely abolished (in 1859). They accentuated the political partisanship or the purely selfish patriotism of the Anglican Church. Some of them were offensive even to many sincere churchmen.

Commemorations of a grander and wider character are the recurring festivals of the Christian year. Even those who have been trained in Puritan traditions, and have been taught to feel a religious abhorrence of the "keeping of days," may come to envy other Christians the system which lights up the seasons of the natural year with the memory of events, or supposed events, in the life of the founder of their religion, and with the names of its saints and martyrs. And the Puritan himself, turning away from the precise periodic commemoration of the story of the Gospels, gave all the more of his thought and sentiment to the national legend of the Hebrew people, which had already supplied a permanent historical background to the poets and prophets of the "Old Testament." The fall, the deluge, the call of Abraham, the coming out of Egypt, the conquest of the Canaanites, the tragic story of Saul, the glories of the reigns of David and Solomon, followed by the sad record of disruption and decay, the Babylonian exile, the return from captivity, and the building of the second temple, form a series of mythical and historical pictures which has furnished a medium for religious ideas and a language for religious emotions, and which might well serve as a typical representation of much that is most significant in human history, and a means of impressing certain moral and political lessons that never lose their value and necessity.

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That righteousness alone exalteth a nation, that the tyrant and oppressor is hated of God and man, that the king is bound by a covenant to his people and has no divine right to rule badly, that Providence is not always on the side of the big battalions, however much this may seem for a time to be the case, but on the side of those who have most faith in their cause, most perseverance, most discipline, most fidelity to one another and to the principles for which they are struggling,—these are some of the maxims which many generations have been taught, along with some more doubtful lessons, by the primitive philosophy of history contained in the Jewish Bible. What are called "prophetic" and "apocalyptic" books constitute, it should be observed, in a special manner the earliest philosophies of history. They are the attempt to vindicate the ways of God to man,—*i.e.*, to exhibit the history of the world as the fulfilment of a righteous purpose and a righteous judgment.

Mr. John Morley has remarked on the advantages which civil and political liberty has derived from the fact that the Puritans corrected the too passive doctrines of the New Testament by a zealous study of the history of the most rebellious people that ever existed. Putting the matter with less sarcasm, if with less point, we may say that it has been fortunate for Christendom that its sacred book contained the fervently and fiercely patriotic literature of the Old Testament, full—we can hardly say of political wisdom (which we must not expect from Orientals)—but full of vehement denunciations of tyranny and oppression, full of democratic sentiment, veiled under a theocratic form. With the New Testament writers, as with the later Stoics and Neoplatonists, the shadow of the Roman Empire is over all. Political despair had thrown man back on the solitude of his own soul. Although the disciples of Jesus were taught to pray "Thy will be done *on earth* as it is in heaven," they looked for the near coming of the heavenly kingdom as the destruction of all earthly society, and not as its regeneration. Religion and morals had become non-national, and even anti-social, as a preparation for becoming international and universal.

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We have a larger Bible open before us than the Old and New Testaments combined,—nay, larger even than the Bible with the Apocrypha added and the library of the Fathers besides. We do not look for teaching to Judea alone, nor to a certain limited list of canonical Scriptures. "Authentic writings of the Most High," says Carlyle in a fine outburst, "are they found in old books only? They are in the stars, and on the rocks, and in the brain and heart of every mortal."* Or, as it is expressed in these lines of Mr. James Russell Lowell's,—

> "Slowly the Bible of the race is writ,
> And not on paper leaves nor leaves of stone;
> Each age, each kindred, adds a verse to it,
> Texts of despair or hope, of joy or moan.
> While swings the sea, while mists the mountains shroud,
> While thunder's surges burst on cliffs of cloud,
> Still at the prophets' feet the nations sit." †

If the teaching of Nature be often too obscure, at least we have the "Bible of History,"—not the story of one chosen people only, but the record of all that is great, noble, and significant in the history of mankind. And if it be objected that history is too uncertain, too confused, too conflicting, to teach us anything, one must point out that history only shares these difficulties with the Bible which is limited to the Old and New Testaments. It is difficult in both cases to know which is genuine and authentic; it is difficult to interpret the text when we are assured that it is genuine; it is difficult to decide between or to reconcile contradictory statements; and opposite lessons can be drawn even from the same passage. The histories of Greece, of Rome, of modern Europe, and the prophets and poets and moral teachers of various ages and nations, do not suggest more conflicting ideas and emotions than are obvious to any one who will read "The Bible" with scientific care and without the previous assumption of a dogmatic system to guide him.

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* Reminiscences ("Edward Irving"), ed. Norton, ii. 206.

† "Bibliolatres."

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In this "Bible of History" there is no chapter more significant for us, and scarcely any more difficult to interpret, than the French Revolution. It is not enough to class it along with other political and social phenomena known as "revolutions." In many respects, indeed, the French Revolution only repeats the incidents and, with some changes, the ideas of the English Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century. The abolition of the legislative privileges of the clergy and nobility, the abolition of royalty, the trial and beheading of the king, the attempts at constitution-making, the military dictatorship, nay, even the assertion of the rights of man,* may all claim English precedents. But the French Revolution had a spirit of active cosmopolitan proselytism which was absent from its English counterpart. The English revolutionary ideas spread slowly, and in course of time, transplanted to different soils, they produced the American and French Revolutions. But the French Revolution was directly and consciously a world-significant event in a sense in which the English and American Revolutions were not. It is a movement that we can only compare with such events as the rise of Christianity or the Protestant Reformation. It is one of the great turning-points in the affairs of men. Historical study shows, indeed, more and more that the French Revolution is not an inexplicable volcanic eruption of hidden and mysterious forces; it makes in reality no sudden break in the course of events: it was being steadily prepared long before. And indeed, as Mazzini has said, it "was rather a *résumé* than a *program*." But this preparation in the past is no peculiarity of the French Revolution. It is true of the Protestant Revolution before it. It is true also of the rise and spread of Christianity; even the most orthodox and least scientific of ecclesiastical historians admits, in words at least, that the new religion was not entirely new, and that it came only "in the fulness of time."

But, while we recognize this continuity in human affairs, as

* See the Clarke Papers, edited by Mr. C. H. Firth for the Camden Society, pp. lx–lxv, 325.

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in the realm of mere nature, it is still true that we can fix on particular events in which long-prepared movements culminate. There is a definite moment at which crystallization takes place, at which thoughts and feelings are suddenly translated into deeds. And such great decisive moments may be fitly chosen for special remembrance and as centre-points of careful reflection. In a truly "catholic" calendar the fall of the Bastille and the proclamation of the French republic should assuredly find a place. September 21, 1792, is a date one naturally thinks about when the hundred years have run out; and it is right and reasonable to ask ourselves, How does it look to us now? Though the new republic was born after the frenzied horror of the September massacre, we know with what rapture the event was hailed by many of the wisest and best men at that time living. The German philosopher Kant, then approaching threescore years and ten, when he heard of the founding of the republic, shed tears of joy, and exclaimed, "I can now say, like Simeon, 'Lord, let thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation.'" Our own Wordsworth speaks of the emotion produced by the earlier period of the revolution in the mind of a young man:

> "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
> But to be young was very heaven."

We know, alas! what bitter disappointment and disillusion awaited the enthusiasts,—the reign of terror, the revolution devouring its own children, the awakened patriotism and heroism of the French nation spending itself in wars of conquest, the republic destroyed by its victorious general, the dreary years of reaction and repression. And even now, when at length a republic seems securely established in the nation that has gone through all these storms and sufferings, how prosaic it seems, how far short of a political *ideal*. It is "the government that divides France least:" it is a compromise between conflicting interests and passions. It does not rouse enthusiasm elsewhere. The oppressed of all nations do not hail it with rapture. Kings do not tremble on their thrones because of it; the very Czar of Russia can be its

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ally. The republican faith has ceased to be a religion, as it was in the days when a republic seemed hopeless; it has become at best a calm opinion about the most convenient way of managing the business of the community. Our problems and our aspirations seem to have become different from those of the National Convention of 1792. We do not think that kings and priests are always the sole, or even the worst, enemies of mankind. We do not think that the declaration of the rights of the individual and the framing of a republican constitution will suffice to bring about the reign of peace and justice upon earth. We have become aware of a silent revolution,—the "industrial revolution," we call it,—which was going on at the same time as the political, and which brings problems to us that the French Revolution did nothing to solve, and something even to aggravate. We are inclined to give way at times to a sort of political pessimism, and to ask in a despairing tone whether, after all, human beings are, on the whole, happier and better when national aspirations have been gratified and when political and civil liberty have been obtained.

Think of some of the events that have occurred within the lifetime of most of us. We have seen with our own eyes what poets, patriots, martyrs have longed to see and have died without seeing. Things pronounced impossible by the strong and mighty have come to pass, wrought out by faith and perseverance and sacrifice,—a united German nation, an Italy risen from the dead, Christian nationalities freed from Ottoman oppression, slavery and serfdom abolished throughout the civilized world, many reforms put into practice and accepted as a matter of course which it used to be treasonable even to advocate, a republic apparently securely established in France, and the various enemies of the republic withering and perishing before her as if they were smitten by some vengeance of fate; and with all this we feel how little has been done to make life better for individual men and women.

But is not this feeling of disappointment a salutary necessity of human progress? Let me use some of those time-honored Biblical illustrations of which I spoke. When Israel

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wandered forty years in the wilderness, how those who died in the wilderness envied those who entered the promised land! But those who entered the promised land found that they were only at the beginning of their struggles. The captives who sat down and wept by the waters of Babylon, remembering Zion, when their feet trod again the streets of Jerusalem were their sorrows at an end? The temple of the Lord had still to be rebuilded. The angels, in the evangelist's story, sang the glad tidings of "peace on earth" at the birth of Christ; but, though his disciples regarded him as the expected Messiah, did they not hear him say, "I came not to send peace, but a sword"? Every step onward and upward in our individual lives, in the lives of human societies, brings us in view of fresh heights to be reached, new difficulties to be overcome. Every attempt to read the meaning of history makes us aware of the slowness with which real progress is effected. This is the old problem with which, in a theological form, the religious Hebrew tried to grapple: Why does God delay to judge the world? The souls of the martyrs, in the Apocalypse, cry out, "How long, O Master, the holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?" And many suffering souls seem always crying, if not for vengeance, yet for justice.

The pessimistic feeling we are apt to have especially about the French Revolution is, among ourselves, partly due, I think, to the fascination of that great prose epic poem in which Carlyle has pictured its history. One great lesson, and one only, does Carlyle draw from the "fuliginous, fiery mystery" which he describes,—the inevitable doom of all rotten institutions. But reading this purely negative lesson, the everlasting damnation of whatsoever liveth and maketh a lie, he sees nothing but an apocalyptic vision of the pouring out of the vials of the wrath of God. Individual portraits and particular outward scenes stand out with startling vividness before us. But who could gather from the pitying scorn of Carlyle's references to the National Assembly and the National Convention that these bodies were doing a vast amount of solid legislative work,—work which has lasted and endured, much of which

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even the Restoration did not dare to meddle with? The apparent failure of the Revolution must not blind us to the ultimate triumph of its ideas. The French Revolution and its culmination in the first French Republic had not merely the negative result of revealing to the whole world the utter rottenness of the old régime: they have affected for good the government of every country in the civilized world, not excepting our own, always too tolerant of ancient abuses; not excepting even Russia, in which the abolition of serfdom may be traced ultimately to the ideas of '89—though these ideas have still work enough before them there. The abolition of slavery (so often incorrectly claimed by the Church), the freedom of opinion, the freedom of public meeting, the idea that government exists for the people and by the will of the people,—these are principles by no means peculiar to the French Revolution, but which gained their clearest and most conspicuous expression in it. The ideas of '89 may be found, as I have already said, in the American Revolution, and before that in the English Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century. They may be traced among Protestant, and especially Calvinistic, writers of an earlier date, and even in the Middle Ages, when the priest was the only tribune of the plebs, and when the rivalry between the spiritual and the temporal powers led Papal champions to teach the sovereignty of the people, and Imperial champions to assert the freedom of intellect. Nay, the ideas of the French Revolution may be traced further back still, not only to the republican* enthusiasm of Greece and Rome, but to the democratic* sentiments of some of the Hebrew prophets. A modern French writer† has said that the French Revolution in its aspirations was "the unconscious testamentary executor of the prophet Isaiah." There is among Hebrew prophets and among French revolutionary enthusiasts the same confident expectation of a reign of peace and righteousness, the same fierce

* I contrast these terms; for the ancient republics were, in the modern sense, slave-holding oligarchies.

† M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, quoted by Laveleye, *Le Gouvernement dans la démocratie*, i. 271.

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denunciation of vengeance on the oppressors of the poor and on the selfish luxury of the rich; nay, even the same rejection of traditional ceremonial religion in favor of an ethical Deism, and the same excusably patriotic belief that their own nation was the chosen people, through whom the redemption of the whole world was to come.

Governments may still disown the ideas of '89 and '93, but those ideas have been, and are, working. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, *i.e.*, that rulers are the servants of the nation and not its irresponsible masters, practically influences every European constitution, except those of Turkey and Russia, which survive as specimens of the kind of government that some persons affect to admire, in a thoughtless impatience with the defects of parliamentary institutions. If reformers nowadays do not feel the same hostility to monarchy which their predecessors felt in the earlier part of the century, is it not just because the French Revolution and its republican ideal, *i.e.*, its ideal that every true constitution must be a "commonwealth," have done so much to ameliorate the character of monarchy? Kings can no longer get rid of moral responsibility to their subjects by claiming, as of old, to be responsible to God alone. We are too apt to forget how much effort this change has cost, and how much the civilized world has gained by it. There is a Scotch story which I may perhaps be excused for telling here. It is said that after Culloden, a ragged Highlander, a fugitive from Charles Edward's unhappy army, broke into a cottage where a poor old woman was weaving cloth, and seized enough to make himself a coat. The old woman, attempting in vain to hinder him, exclaimed, "Ye'll pay for't." "When?" said he. "At the day of judgment." "That will be lang credit; she'll tak' a waistcoat, too." The rulers of mankind have been in the habit of getting this "lang credit." The struggle for political liberty, which culminates in the French Revolution, has meant the refusal of it. Kings now may or may not claim to rule by the grace of God: they do rule by the grace of their people. Similarly, if reformers feel less of hostility to the old churches, even to the Roman Church, than they used to

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feel, is it not because the churches have had their intolerance checked, their abuses diminished, their zeal in good works quickened, by the direct and indirect effects of the French Revolution itself? The Protestant revolt had in some ways a beneficial effect on the Roman Church—where Protestantism was sufficiently strong to keep it in check. And the French Revolution has, in the long run, had an effect even more striking and more beneficial on all bodies of Christians; for the French Revolution proclaimed those ideas of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," which the Christian churches had professed in a spiritual sense, while too blind or too timid to read them aright and to translate them into outward acts. Thus theological apologists are in the habit of claiming that the abolition of slavery is due to Christianity. But you will find that there is a startling difference between the usual attitude of theologians and churchmen generally to this subject before the French Revolution and after it. The abolition of slavery is due to Christianity, certainly,—but only in that sense of Christianity in which the French Convention may be accepted as a better exponent of Christian ideas than the Œcumenical Council of the Vatican or the Anglican bench of bishops. And I fear that the orthodox representatives of Christianity are not very willing to reckon Rousseau and his followers among the "Fathers of the Church."

If the lapse of a hundred years makes us recognize that the gospel of the French Revolution is no longer a sufficient gospel for us, if we feel that the declaration of the rights of man contains a very partial recognition of the truth about human society, and that the faith in abstract logic is apt to become a rather narrow and meagre creed, we must not despise the necessary work of freeing the individual from a blind submission to the yoke of king and priest,—a work that is not altogether nor everywhere completed yet. To destroy an effete, and therefore mischievous, type of social existence, and to prevent that type of society being ever permanently restored again, was a necessary task, for which the world owes undying gratitude to the prophets and heroes and martyrs of liberty, as liberty was understood and had to be understood a

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hundred years ago. To construct better social forms, to recognize the social needs and the social duties of the individual, is the task which falls to us; but it is a task made possible, as well as necessary, by the destructive and liberating work which preceded. Those who have to lay the foundations of the new building need not disparage the dangerous work of those who had to pull down a collection of ruinous and unwholesome structures.

We are inclined perhaps to smile a little sadly at the calm confidence with which the National Convention set to work to make all things new, cutting themselves adrift from the past, symbolizing their faith by altering times and seasons, and placing themselves at the outset of a new era—the year I. It is impossible thus to break with the past. Just as the sins of his fathers were visited on the well-intentioned but incapable man who found himself king of France when the day of judgment and vengeance dawned, so the enthusiasts of the new era were caught unawares in the meshes of the past, inheriting its ideas, its wisdom, and its folly. It is never the year I.: there is no absolute beginning in the history of humanity, any more than there is in the course of nature. In every department of life, in politics, morals, and religion, in literature, art, and science, there are apt to be two opposing camps,—those who think that everything is revealed already, that they possess permanent and authoritative truth; and, on the other side, those who catch at the newest phrases and the newest fashions, and think that all mankind have hitherto sat in darkness, and that a "new era" has suddenly begun in their own generation, that a quite "new spirit" is operating in the world. Neither of these opinions can be correct. All really living old ideas must in their very growth renew and re-create themselves. It is when this growth is checked and hindered that revolutions and convulsions occur. And, on the other hand, the new must be born of the old. Those who most violently break away from the past often carry about with them dead and encumbering fragments of it. A sympathetic knowledge of the past is the best preservative against its delusions. A true reverence for the past is essential to sound and healthy social

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life: it is one of the fundamental "pieties" of existence. But the truest reverence for the past is a reverence which will always prefer the living spirit to the dead letter. A "Protestantism" that has sunk into the acceptance of traditional dogmas, the cult of a revolution which erects its declarations of rights into barriers against social reform, are examples of that mere formal outward consistency which means unfaithfulness to the living spirit.

And so, if we are to turn to any practical account our reflection on the events of a hundred years ago, we must ask ourselves: How can we imitate the reforming spirit of that time and yet avoid similar errors? What are the crying evils of our own time? How can they be remedied? And how can they be remedied so that, if possible, new evils may not arise from the very remedies themselves? We may make many errors,—we are certain to do so,—but honest failures are at least more educative than sitting still and doing nothing. And if a consciousness of the admixture of evil with good in all human effort is apt to paralyze our energy, we must remind ourselves that admixture of evil is at least as certain to be present in a timid policy of keeping things as they are. And we must resist the temptation to pessimism by keeping before us the true scientific conception of evil,—as "want of adjustment," "want of cohesion," "incongruity,"—a conception which allows us to regard evil as self-destructive.

I have said that there never is a "year I.," and yet it is also true that every year may be to us a year I.,—to us in our individual lives, as well as to the society to which we belong. A new resolution deliberately formed and patiently acted out, a new work undertaken and zealously performed, a new and better adjustment of our relations to those around us, may date a real epoch in our lives, to which we and others may look back in after-years with satisfaction and gratitude.

There are times when the inexorable tyranny of the past, both in regard to our individual life and in regard to national and social existence, seems to oppress us and weigh us down with a feeling of fatalistic despair. But, if a careful study of history gives us this sense of the unbroken chain of cause and

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effect, it also shows us how the ideas of solitary and despised thinkers may gradually, and in spite of many apparent failures, work themselves out into practical realization, so that the dreams of one age become the commonplaces of another. And so it is in our individual lives. "Free-will," in the sense of an arbitrary and absolute power of initiation in every individual at every moment, is an unscientific delusion; but human beings are, by the power of thinking, raised above *mere* nature. Or, to express it otherwise, *ideas* are themselves natural forces, in that wider sense of "nature" which includes conscious as well as unconscious existence. A vivid consciousness of what we ought to do, and habitual reflection on it, become causes influencing conduct. "Conversion" is not the mere dream of religious fanatics; it is a psychological fact in the experience of many individuals. Well is it for us if the moral revolutions which quicken our energy, our sense of intellectual honesty, and our recognition of social duty, can take place without pain and convulsion and the tearing asunder of old and dear ties.

It is a great gain that the history of the French Revolution can now be studied and thought of without blind abhorrence and without blind partisanship. "Let us never glorify revolution," it has been said (by Mr. Goldwin Smith); "statesmanship is the art of avoiding it." And it is not only the statesman that has to seek to avert revolution, but every citizen, by helping to reform abuses and by keeping on the alert to prevent them accumulating; by public spirit, by *intelligent* sympathy with suffering, by honesty and conscientiousness in the exercise of all public functions, among which must be included the function of forming and criticising opinions,—a public function in which we all share. It is a terrible thing when the redemption of a people has to take the form of vengeance, the wild justice of unchained slaves; but does not the heavier blame rest with those who kept a people in slavery than with those who broke their fetters?

When we are sagely criticising the acts of the men of 1792, awarding our praise and our blame, more able at a safe distance to see a few redeeming points in the old régime, and

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with the benefit of knowing all that has happened since, it is right to ask ourselves how our own generation will be judged at the bar of history a hundred years hence. Will people then look back on this period as a time of doubt and feebleness, of uncertain beliefs and selfish timidity, or will they be grateful to us for facing our intellectual and our social problems boldly and honestly? Will they be able to pardon our mistakes and our delusions, because of the spirit in which we tried to leave the world—not worse but a little better than we found it?

Now and then a mocking voice may be heard to ask, "Why should we do anything for posterity? What has posterity done for us? We, the men and women living now, have our own urgent needs to satisfy: let us fit the world to our needs. After us—the deluge." It is impossible to reason with those who really think in this way, and do not merely speak with that foolish affectation of cynicism which, of all affectations, is one of the least excusable. We can only say, "Verily, they have their reward"—in their selfish isolation. They are withdrawing themselves in their egotism from the ranks of humanity, nay, even from a place among the higher animals. By mere instinct the bird will toil, and will even die, for its young ones; and shall we, who inherit from the labors of those who have suffered and died such privileges (to name no others) as our opportunities of knowledge and our right of free speech, shall we disown the claims of those who are to come after us? Surely, this, if anything, might be called "blasphemy against the Holy Spirit." It is faithlessness to humanity.

Less than a month after the Republican calendar was introduced (October, 1793) there was enacted in Paris a scene than which there is hardly anything in history more dramatic and more touching. Twenty-one Girondist deputies stood on the scaffold awaiting their death, and as they stood they sang the hymn of the Marseillaise in a chorus of which one voice was silenced every minute by the guillotine. They were suffering not like other martyrs, at the hands of their enemies: that could have been more easily borne. They were doomed to

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death in the name of the republic which they had themselves helped to create. And yet, in this bitterest of all disappointments, they sang their song of triumph. The critical historian is apt to be impatient with those eloquent Girondist deputies, who talked when they should have been acting; and there is no need to delude ourselves into thinking that the man who can die nobly or dramatically is therefore wise or just. But there was something more than courage in the way these Girondists faced death and disappointment. It was an act of faith, for which we owe them our gratitude and our reverence. They "did not despair of the republic:" they did not despair of humanity. And the world needs faith in humanity as well as insight into its weakness.

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UTILITARIANISM.

IT is the object of this paper to present in a brief way an argument for the main position of utilitarianism, bearing in mind the later criticisms on that system, and commenting on such of them as seem to need especial notice.

As utilitarianism, then, is so much concerned with happiness and unhappiness, and with larger and smaller quantities of these, it is well to begin by saying concisely in what sense these expressions are used. By happiness, therefore, is intended pleasure and absence of pain; meaning to imply by this that not only those acts cause happiness which give some one pleasure, or which actually free him from pain, but those also which lessen his unhappiness. By unhappiness is intended pain, including every irksome and uncomfortable state of mind whatsoever, and implying that not only those acts cause unhappiness which actually give one pain, but those also which curtail his happiness.

To all intents and purposes this statement has been made before, and has been pronounced obscure in certain criticisms; but an examination of such criticisms will show that the ob-

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security complained of does not lie in the definition just given, but, if anywhere, in the fact that the words happiness and unhappiness are defined by utilitarians in the above sense, and commonly employed in another and a different sense; hence I am satisfied that if I avoid such a real or apparent change of meaning the reader will have little reason to complain of want of clearness.

Respecting amounts of happiness and unhappiness, some critics seem to expect utilitarians to introduce the yard-stick into ethics, or to descant upon the specific gravity of pains; and they are loud in their disappointment. Utilitarians, however, are scarcely to blame, inasmuch as they never promised anything so picturesque. When they say of a pain that it is bigger than a certain pleasure, or equal to it, the quantitative words, like most words in all the moral sciences, are used metaphorically. When a utilitarian affirms that an act gives more pain than pleasure, he means above all things that it pains many people and pleases few. If the act be one, however, that does not affect many people, then to say that it gives more pain than pleasure means that it puts some one to much inconvenience, to considerable discomfort or severe pain, and affords some one else but a slight pleasure: *a slight pleasure* and *a severe pain* being, I hope, sufficiently intelligible.

That the above account, however, of what is meant by amounts of happiness and unhappiness does not always make it easy, in a given case, to determine whether the pain that an act produces is greater than the pleasure, has always been admitted by utilitarians, and is, indeed, pretty obvious. But it is no less obvious that these cases are the unimportant ones. Wherever the difference is very great between the numbers who are happily and who are unhappily affected, or where the pain is severe and the pleasure trifling, or the inconvenience trifling and the happiness great, then no difficulty appears. Nobody can doubt that it is causing more pain than pleasure to maim a man for life, or to flay him alive in order to gratify some one's passing whim; nobody can doubt that it is causing less happiness than unhappiness to make multitudes go destitute that some one or two may live in ceaseless luxury. The

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important cases are the plain cases; and even in the cases that are not plain, the principles that a utilitarian bids you proceed upon are determinate.

The terms being thus understood, one may state the question. It has been said with sufficient iteration that a utilitarian thinks no act wrong which is not such as to cause people more unhappiness than happiness, and that he thinks no act right which is not such as to cause people more happiness than unhappiness, taking into account the happiness and unhappiness not only of the agent, but also of everybody in any wise affected by his conduct, and, in especial, giving due weight to the remote and indirect as well as to immediate effects. All this has been so often insisted on that the utilitarian need seldom complain nowadays that he is in these respects misunderstood. What has not been sufficiently made plain is the more obvious truth that not every class of acts which produce more happiness than unhappiness is right, and not every class of acts which produce more unhappiness than happiness is wrong. The beating of the heart, for example, and involuntary actions universally: these cause more misery, direct and indirect, when they are disorderly than many of the wickedest of crimes, and yet they are not wicked, nor concerned with morality at all. Nor is every act that is voluntary concerned with morality. No matter how much more productive of happiness than of unhappiness, no act is right which, social interference apart, every one feels inclined to practise according to his ability. No matter how much more productive of unhappiness than of happiness, no act is wrong which, social interference apart, every one is inclined uniformly to abstain from so far as he is able. Those acts only are right which, besides being voluntary and causing more happiness than unhappiness, are, like honesty, such that some members of the community will not uniformly practise them, except it may be to gain good fame and other kinds of reward, and to escape censure and other kinds of punishment. And those only are wrong which, besides being voluntary and causing more unhappiness than happiness, are also, like stealing, such that some members of

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the community will not abstain from them, except it may be to escape censure and other kinds of punishment, and to gain good fame and other forms of reward.

This definition of right and wrong (which is the fundamental doctrine of utilitarianism, and in relation to which the other doctrines are in the position of premises or corollaries) is sound, if it be true that men desire in and for itself happiness, and nothing but happiness, other objects being chosen, if at all, only as the means of this: that is to say, that each man never desires for its own sake anything but to be happy himself, or that others should be happy to the neglect of himself. The corresponding statement respecting aversion is, that unhappiness—one's own or some other person's—is the only thing that in and of itself inspires one with aversion; this sentiment being felt towards other things, if at all, only because they are the occasions of unhappiness.*

That mankind do have an aversion to pain utilitarians have always thought was pretty plain; and although it is the logical outcome of the remarks of certain critics that they love to dally with the toothache, and would look forward to life-long neuralgia with positive yearning, yet I do not know that they ever actually affirm this, and I should entertain a Johnsonian doubt if they did. And similarly with the desire for happiness. But it is one thing to maintain that men do desire pleasure and feel aversion to pain, and quite another to maintain that they desire and feel an aversion towards nothing else. And the critics of utilitarianism stand ready to show that men desire many things in and for themselves which are in no sense pleasurable, and that they feel aversion to many things in and of themselves which are in no sense painful; some of them even stand ready to show that men never desire happiness at all, or feel aversion to unhappiness. So then it is necessary to answer all these objections before one can maintain utilitarianism; to answer, that is, not every partic-

* One might say simply that men never desire anything but happiness, regarding means and end as distinguishable but not separable parts of one chain of events, which must be chosen or not, as a whole; it being impossible to gain the end without the means.

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ular objection, for that would be to treat of some of them many times over, but to answer every class of them.

In the first place, then, some criticisms altogether mistake the point at issue. Utilitarians affirm that happiness is the only object desired in and for itself; they are often thought to affirm that expected happiness or unhappiness is the final cause, the *primum mobile*, of every act; and that when a man leaps from under a falling wall, he does so upon a thought of the misery of broken bones and lacerated flesh; and that when one hurls himself off a dizzy precipice, it is to gain some pleasure which I do not specify, because I cannot imagine what it would be. Now, this opinion, the adversaries of utilitarianism aver, is absurd. To leap from under the wall, they affirm, is, or at least may be, due to a blind impulse, born indeed of one's past experience of the danger of falling masses, but without, in the present instance, any prevision of that danger, or at least uncontrolled by such prevision; while to throw one's self off a precipice may be so far from being in pursuit of pleasure or in flight from pain, that it is one's very horror at being crushed by such a fall that makes the impulse to throw one's self irresistible. Now, all of this is very good doctrine. I am not disposed to deny the existence of uncontrollable impulses founded on habit, nor of "the power of a fixed idea;" but these, and the phenomena of involuntary activity generally, are irrelevant to ethics. The question is, do men feel aversion to anything but pain, in the broad sense in which utilitarians use that word, and do they desire anything but happiness? The question is not whether there is a source of activity other than desire and aversion. And those, therefore, who have thought that utilitarianism implies that desire for happiness and aversion to unhappiness are the sole springs of action, have disbelieved it, in so far as they have misunderstood it.

In the next place, some critics distinguish between the state of things in the outer world and our consciousness of it; and they aver that while it is the consciousness which is pleasurable, it is the state of things which is desired. It cannot be, they affirm, a pleasure that is desired, for, if so, illusion would

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be as dear to us as reality, and all men would wish to run merrily mad that they might be kings, or deities, or whatsoever else is to their mind the tip-top of blessedness. But rather than this, the argument goes on, one would prefer a sober, and even a dismal, sanity. One does not, then, desire happiness; he wishes rather for a certain state of things in the external world; he wishes to have vast possessions, not to imagine that he has them; to be respected, not to think that he is. Indeed, if one must be in error, he would choose to be his beau-idéal, and feel that he was far from it, rather than to be a poor conceited ninny in a fool's paradise.

The reply to this criticism is, that it does not distinguish between the way that madness appears from within, to the mad, and from without, to the sane. If one could see merry madness as the merry mad see it, possibly one would prefer it. Certain it is that when one is in a fool's paradise he thinks nobody so enviable as himself; and opium-eaters do prefer dreams to reality. But seen from without, as sane men must see it, to be a poor deluded creature is a condition of bitter humiliation and of real weakness, exposed to almost every kind of misery. While, on the contrary, to be one's beau-idéal, and at the same time modestly to undervalue one's self, although, indeed, uncomfortable, is nevertheless much better than real danger amid fancied security. I admit, then, that one does not wish to go mad, but aver that this does not controvert but rather confirms the doctrine that men desire happiness and feel aversion to pain. If to be insane were regarded, not as humiliating, but as a glorious career, not as a wretched but as a happy one, then indeed one's repugnance to it would need accounting for. But quite the contrary as it is. That no certain state of things in the outer world is desired in and for itself, or otherwise than for its effects on happiness and unhappiness, is made plain by the following. One desires money. Well, money exists, why does not that content him? Well, that is not what he wants; to say that one desires money is elliptical; he wishes to possess money; and that is to say, he wants his command of pleasures and his power to ward off unhappiness increased. To possess money that would not buy

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houses, nor food, nor service, nor deference, would not satisfy him; such money would be mere counterfeit, would be money in heaven, or magician's money that withers away when put in the till. What one desires money for, in short, is as a means, not as an end. And so with any other external situation. But this introduces the third objection; or rather it introduces the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth objections,—four, which are nearly related, dealing as each of them does with some object of desire (or aversion) that to some or all people is naturally unpleasant (or pleasant), but which has become artificially or factitiously pleasant (or unpleasant).

For example, it is urged that one desires for its own sake not always happiness, but also at times the means of it. Money, for instance, more often than not, perhaps, is desired without any immediate notion of what it is to be spent for; and when it is obtained the desire is satisfied. But if it were not the money which is desired, the desire would not be satisfied by the money; if it were a pleasure that was desired, the desire would not be satisfied until the money was spending, for it is in its use alone that money or other mere means can give happiness.

This objection might be dismissed with the single remark that it ignores such pleasures as the feeling of security, and generally what one may call the pleasures and pains of expectation or of power and weakness. It argues that money, and other means, can give no pleasure except when used. Was there ever a more patent absurdity? Two men shall eat their dinner at the same club, lodge in apartments equally luxurious, dress with equal taste and richness, spend, in short, precisely equal sums of money; and yet one of them will be seraphically happy, and the other haggard with misery; for the first has his income secure, and the second does not know one day that he can meet the liabilities of the next. It is true in many instances that we desire means; it is equally true in those instances that the mere possession of means is pleasant. What is more delightful than the possession of power of any kind? And yet it essentially consists in the consciousness that you can do thus and so, if you should want to. The reply is

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founded on facts so familiar that I do not see how one can hesitate about accepting it.

A similar line of remark disposes of the second class of factitiously pleasant or unpleasant objects, which are most typically illustrated by keepsakes and mementos. What, it is asked, is intrinsically pleasant about a faded ribbon or a lock of hair, a tin rattle or a baby's shoe? And yet people treasure these, and would not barter them against a host of pleasures. The reply is not obscure. As the former objection ignored the pleasures and pains of expectation, so this one ignores the pleasures and pains of memory, or what may loosely be called such. A lock of hair, a baby's shoe, are indeed capable of giving very little pleasure to those who have no associations with them; but if it was your wife's hair, if the baby was your baby, if, in short, these mementos are soaked through and through with your fond memories, then they are worth more to you than to anybody else; the sight of them stirs you with half-forgotten scenes of long ago, and to part with them lightly would be a desecration, and cost a pang that might be marvellous to Gradgrind or Ralph Nickleby. And as with keepsakes, so with the house that one was born in, the fields he played in when a boy, his old-time steadfast friends. To put it generally, any object that is associated with an interesting period of one's past has an artificial, a reflected, interest for him; pleasurable, if the period be one that he dwells on fondly, painful, if it be one that he hates to be reminded of.

This last class of facts differs from the one just previous, in being associated with the past, while that was associated with the future. Both of them are closely allied to a third class of objects, which are also ultimately desired in and for themselves, although naturally they are either neutral or even positively repugnant. These, too, are objected to utilitarianism. It is argued, for example, that there is nothing pleasant in business routine; a duller object could hardly be devised. And yet it is actually desired for its own sake by certain men. They "miss their work," and are eager to get back to it; they would not retire from business on any account, and will con-

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tinue it even at a loss. Is it not clear, then, that they desire something that is not pleasant? On the contrary, it is not at all clear. It is clear, perhaps, that they desire what was at one time not pleasant; but, however irksome in the beginning, a routine, as it becomes familiar, becomes to many minds positively agreeable; and to almost all minds it becomes, after a long time, relatively agreeable; they have been in its toils so long that they have lost the art of filling up the day without it, and are preyed upon by an *ennui* that it alone relieves them from. The extremest cases of this force of habit illustrate this best. Hardly any wretchedness can be greater than to be known as a criminal and an outcast from society, and to be restricted in your liberty, with all the items of degradation and brutality that the inmates of a prison must endure. This is a lot so woful that it is expressly chosen to strike terror to the hearts of would-be malefactors; and when the period of confinement ends only with the life of the condemned, it is admitted to be more fearful than death itself. And yet custom can make even this lot pleasant,—more pleasant than the old, free life it was such misery to be torn away from,—insomuch that released prisoners have come back and pleaded to be shut up again. They had become blunted to what was distressing in their confinement; outside ways were strange to them, and habitual ways were pleasant.

It is in this connection that it is pertinent to discuss the objection that some men have no aversion to being virtuous, which, it is affirmed, is surely at times not pleasant. The amount of sentiment that clouds the mind here is deplorable. To those who do desire virtue, is there ever a time when to feel that they have done right is not pleasant? Is there ever a time, for them, when to feel that they have been guilty is not a bitter humiliation? Certainly not. Then there never is a time, for them at least, when virtue is not pleasant. And this, too, when we have left out of account the substantial ills that men inflict on the wicked, and the indirect rewards of virtue. In truth, the objection is so flatly in the face of facts that it is absurd; so absurd that I do not believe that the objection as it is put is the real objection of those who urge it. Their

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real difficulty I believe to be that they do not understand how what is irksome to all people in childhood, and to some people all their lives, can eventually become agreeable to others. Cases of this kind, however, have just been dealt with in the three preceding objections. It was there shown how an object naturally neutral might become factitiously pleasurable or painful in any one of three ways. Virtue has become pleasant to some men, and vice unpleasant, in all three ways united. Is social excommunication less terrible than the ills that money can provide against? If not, there is as good a reason to desire virtue in and for itself as there is to desire money: the righteous are safe. Do men shrink from going into the dark because, when children, they were told of sheeted dead that wander there? A better reason exists why they should shrink from doing wrong. Look at the picture of abject terror on a child's face when he has been caught in naughtiness and is to be punished; think of what a single fright of that kind may effect, and of the number of times that such frightening is repeated, and of how mature reflection and experience tend not to efface but to deepen the impression. And above all and more than all, to those that love virtue and have an aversion to vice, to do right is habitual, to do wrong is new and strange. If habit will make a criminal's position in society, or rather in a jail, pleasant, what may it not do for virtue?

A seventh class of objections to the doctrine we are considering is founded on facts of the following kind. An object of desire or aversion may consist of parts, so to speak, which are individually insipid, but which taken as a whole afford happiness or unhappiness. This is best illustrated by games. One plays whist; his object is to make points; but there is nothing pleasant in that object; to see one figure in his counters is no more pleasant than to see any other. Or say one goes a-walking and determines to walk to a certain tree; he finds no enjoyment in being near that tree, neither did he expect to. These cases, it is argued, are typical of many of the activities of mankind; their objects are, many times, perfectly neutral, and yet are eagerly desired. It is not, in

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such cases, the objects that are pleasurable at all; it is, if anything, the relief from *ennui* or the exercise of skill; and these cannot themselves be the object of desire. For skill essentially consists in adapting means to an end; so that the exercise of skill of necessity implies the choice of an object other than the display of skill itself. Similarly with the pleasure of exercise. To exercise is to do something; but you cannot do anything without first choosing what it shall be, and then that will be your object, and not the pleasure that you will feel on the way to that.

This is the objection, and it is a quibble. No conclusion can be considered sound which is gathered from the notion that when a man goes a-shooting his object is to get a target with a hole in the middle. There are, indeed, good people who imagine that hunting and fishing are undertaken for the game; but all sane minds abandon that idea when they learn the price of an outfit. The object of hunting is sport,—the pleasures of skill and exercise. As I have said, the fallacy consists in fixing on one of a number of things which are pleasant only in combination, and calling that one the object; that one alone is not pleasant; therefore neither is your object pleasant. But the two words, object and object, have different meanings. Birds, for example, are indeed the object of a sportsman's gun, but not, perhaps, the object of his desire. The latter object is nothing less than the whole act,—hunting and shooting birds,—an act which is pleasant. Is it really necessary to say that one does not play whist that he may see the larger figures on his score-card? Man is seldom so lunatic that he could not attain that object in a much more brief way. Common language should warn a philosopher from such a slip as that. One does not say that he desires to behold a score of seven points, nor to shuffle cards, nor to deal them, and sort them, and lay them on the table one after another; he says that he wishes to play whist.

There are, again, some who affirm that the mere fact of having a desire fulfilled is itself a pleasure. The event desired may in and of itself be perfectly neutral; let it occur, and, so far as concerns it, one is no happier than before; but merely

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because one has set his heart on its occurring, and it has occurred, on that account he is happier. He has had a desire, and it has been gratified; and to have a desire gratified is pleasant in and of itself, apart from the power of the thing desired to afford pleasure. Now, this pleasure that belongs to the mere fulfilment of a desire is clearly not capable of being the object of that desire; for the desire of which it is the object would be by definition the desire of the pleasure of having a distinct and separate desire fulfilled. What, then, is the object of this second desire? Whatever it may be, it is clearly not the pleasure of its own fulfilment. Well, then, those who point out this peculiarity of a fulfilled wish affirm that utilitarians overlook it, and that it is only by so doing that they make out an apparent case for themselves. For if we deny that to desire money is to desire pleasure, the utilitarian replies, "What! is it not pleasant to receive money?" It may be so, we rejoin, but that fact does not prove that the pleasure we feel in receiving money was desired. For that pleasure may have been, and indeed we aver that it was, merely the pleasure of having our desire for the money fulfilled; and this pleasure was the object of our desire for money. The utilitarian, in effect, proves that the gratification of any desire, no matter what, is pleasant; this, however, is nothing to the point: what the utilitarian should prove is quite a different matter,—namely, that we desire nothing but the pleasantness of pleasant things.

Against this position a utilitarian might admit that it is pleasant to have a desire satisfied, but maintain that all the things which men desire are pleasurable. This, however, has already been done, so far at least as concerns the instances appealed to by those who urge this objection. It remains to join issue on the assertion that the mere fulfilment of a desire is pleasant. This implies that when one desires a pleasant object and obtains it he has two distinct and separate pleasures,—one due to the object, one to the satisfaction of desire. Now, if this means only that a state of craving is disagreeable, and that to be relieved of it is pleasant in the technical sense, then I have nothing to object, except that in this sense it is

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not even plausible to say that utilitarians mistake the pleasure of the satisfaction of desire for the pleasure due to the object desired. But if it means more than this, then I am content to appeal to the facts. If you are treated to music unexpectedly, do you miss any pleasure that you have when you have obtained the music by your own efforts? If not, then the objection under consideration is based on a fiction. When you have desired something which does not please you when obtained, does there exist side by side with the pain of disappointment a pleasure of some kind,—the pleasure of satisfied desire? To me it seems not. When I have obtained my object and am disappointed in it, I find no palliating pleasure in the fact that, having desired what would disappoint me, I have obtained it and been disappointed. But whether or not this be true, the reply already given to the objection must also be taken into account.

This, I think, represents fairly each class of the objections which have been urged against the doctrine: that the only thing which men desire in and for itself is happiness, and the only thing which they turn from is unhappiness. I have stated the objections as forcibly as I know how, and have placed after each of them what seemed necessary to show wherein I did not think that objection sound. In almost every instance the issue has been joined on a question of fact, which each must settle for himself by observation. Those who, like myself, do not find these objections defensible, will be justified, until better objections are brought forward, in holding that the only object desired for its own sake is happiness, and the only object that in and of itself inspires aversion is unhappiness.

In the mean time I pass to the rest of the argument, which is as follows. If each man desires only his own happiness, and feels aversion only to what is disagreeable to himself; or if each man desires only his own happiness and that of some one or more besides, and feels aversion to what is disagreeable to them; then the definitions above given of wrong and right are correct. For when men live together there are many things that one can do to make another happy, many that one can

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do to make another unhappy. If, therefore, it were a man's object to obtain happiness for himself or some one that he loved, he would, except when it would be more trouble than it was worth, employ the means at his disposal to make his fellow-men do those things which contribute to, and refrain from doing those things which detract from, his happiness or the happiness of those who are dear to him. He would not, however, find it necessary to make men perform every kind of act that he wanted them to perform, nor to make them abstain from every kind of act that he did not want performed. For some acts that would contribute to his happiness and to the happiness of those with whom he identifies himself would contribute also to the happiness of the man who does them, and would not improbably, therefore, be practised by that man in the pursuit of his own aims. Such acts there would be no need to make men do, for they would be doing them already. One would need to make men perform those acts only which they would neglect if one let them alone. In like manner it would not be necessary to make men abstain from every act that one wanted them to abstain from, for some of the acts that would make one or one's friend unhappy would also make the agent himself unhappy, and he would not improbably, therefore, abstain from them of his own accord. One would have to make men abstain from those acts only which they would practise if one let them alone. Now, passing by as irrelevant the question, what specific acts would need respectively to be discouraged and encouraged,—acts which, it is plain, would vary in different communities with the variations of national taste and character,—passing this by, as irrelevant to a discussion of general principles, there comes next, to inquire what the means are at one's command by which he can make men do thus and so. Everybody is practically acquainted with them. They are kind words and good offices, if one does as you wish; censure and ill offices, if one does not do as you wish. Each of us, in short, can make another happy and unhappy by some kind of reward or punishment. These are the means that each would use to make others do his will. But it is plain that these instruments of coercion work

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both ways. If it be pleasant for me to have you abstain from doing certain things, if for that reason I would strive to influence you by reward and punishment; so, on the other hand, if it be unpleasant to you to be obliged to abstain from doing those things, you would use reward and punishment to make me let you alone. It is not difficult to tell which of two persons thus situated, other things equal, would win. If the suffering that your act would cause me would be very grievous, while the inconvenience that it would cause you to abstain from that act would be very slight, I should be very active and persistent in my efforts to coerce you, and my condition would be such as deeply to move my friends and sympathizers to assist me, while you would not only be comparatively acquiescent yourself, but your friends would be so too. Other things equal, he would give way who would suffer least by doing so. Men living in society would tend from the first to enforce, under penalty of punishment, the habit on the part of each of abstaining from the pursuit of a pleasure which must be purchased at a cost to one's neighbor of a more than equivalent pain, and of submitting to something disagreeable, if by so doing one afforded his neighbor more than equivalent pleasure. Especially so when the happiness to be sacrificed and the unhapiness to be endured affected but a few, while the happiness to be gained and the unhappiness to be avoided affected a great many; for the many could make their favor well worth having, and their displeasure terrible to the few. In fine, voluntary acts would tend from the first to be distinguished into classes; and, among others, into the class of those that you must not do, under penalty of censure and graver forms of punishment, and into the class of those that you must do, if you would escape punishment and enjoy fair fame. Acts would, in effect, be classed as wrong and right. Acts which you must not do—wrong acts—would be those which, upon a consideration of all their effects, caused more unhappiness than happiness, and which, besides, would be practised by certain people if they were not restrained by reward and punishment. Acts, on the contrary, which you must do—right acts—would be those that caused

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more happiness than unhappiness, and which, besides, would be neglected by some people if they were not constrained by reward and punishment to do them. These, I say, are the qualities by which right acts and wrong acts would be respectively characterized, if men were beings each of whom desired in and for itself nothing but happiness, and felt aversion only towards unhappiness. But men are such beings, and these, therefore, are the qualities by which right acts and wrong acts are respectively characterized.

This is the argument. It might be confirmed by pointing out that such acts as we hold to be indisputably right and wrong—justice and murder, for example—do display in a marked degree the qualities above named as the basis of the classification. It might further be confirmed by taking certain customs regarded as right by the savages who practise them, but by us regarded as hideously wrong, and showing that from the point of view of the savages those customs possess the attributes of rectitude; showing, for instance, that a human sacrifice, intended to ward off the wrath of a maleficent deity from the tribe at large, is precisely on a par with a "forlorn hope" in civilized warfare. But, rather than to dwell on all this, I prefer to indicate the bearing of the position here taken on certain questions in dispute.

It may be urged, for instance, against what has been here said, that it is the business of ethics to give the grounds, not to trace the genesis, of morality. But anybody who supposes that the object of the preceding paragraph but one was to trace the genesis of morality has very much mistaken its import. It is intended to show what are the qualities that distinguish acts which must and acts which must not be done among mankind. It was with this purpose, and with this purpose only, and only in so far as suited this purpose, that anything which might bear on the question of genesis was alluded to. If I have not introduced anything that did not contribute to the discrimination of the qualities I was searching for, then nothing in the argument is irrelevant. And I may add that if nothing in the argument is irrelevant, they must be in error who hold that no psychological question is

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relevant to ethics; but this carries us over to the objection that utilitarians do not deal with the grounds of morality, which I must state more at large.

It occurs oftenest in this shape: that the preceding argument for utilitarianism is nothing to the purpose; that it has merely shown utilitarianism to be the morality that is, and not the morality that ought to be. There are, or at least may be, other and more desirable* ideals than the utilitarian, and it is the business of ethics to show which of these is the most desirable. This the preceding argument has not done, and it has, therefore, done nothing.

Often as I have heard this language, I have never understood which of two things it means. The morality that ought to be is a very dark expression. Ought, in a strict sense, refers to one's obligation to do right, his liability to punishment if he does wrong. In this sense of the word I can readily understand that there is a kind of man that a man ought to be, but not that there is a kind of morality that a morality ought to be. In a looser employment of the word "ought," however, one says that a thing ought to be thus and so, meaning that it would be thereby fitter to minister to man's wants, and that is to say to his happiness. Using the word in this sense, to affirm that utilitarianism is not the system that ought to be, is to say that if mankind would adopt another system they would be happier. And this is also one of the meanings of the doctrine that there are other ideals which are more desirable than the utilitarian. But either this is a contradiction

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* Mr. Mill's courtly critic, Mr. Grote, affirms that utilitarians confuse two meanings of the word desirable,—that it means both capable of being desired and worth desiring. Mr. Grote did not point out more in detail the distinction between these phrases; and if he had done so, it does not seem to me he would have found it of use against utilitarians. To say that a thing is worth desiring means that it has the quality which men desire. To say that some things are capable of being desired which are not worth desiring, means that one may be mistaken in thinking that an object has the quality which he desires, and that he may, therefore, out of ignorance of its true nature, desire it. But if this be true, one cannot say that pleasurability may be only capable of being desired and not worth desiring; for pleasurability is not an object which may or may not have the desired quality; it is the desired quality itself.

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in terms* or else the rival system is not feasible. For the ideal of utilitarianism, it is plain, is none other than to make mankind so conduct themselves that they will be happier than they would be on any alternative line of conduct whatsoever that is possible in the sense of feasible.* To say, therefore, that

* I hope that this is an intelligible statement of the object of utilitarianism. The time-honored statement that its object is the greatest possible happiness has been very much misunderstood; so much so that it has been thought that utilitarianism was refuted by the remark that one man might place his happiness in having another man miserable; and, in general, by the remark that it is not possible by any method whatever to make every moment of every life free from pain, and filled with the utmost bliss that the human frame is susceptible of. I hope I have made myself so plain that there is no occasion for criticism of that kind. Another kind of criticism, which I may call objection for objection's sake, no utilitarian can hope to avoid giving occasion for. I subjoin an example: "If happiness = pleasure, then 'get happiness' = 'get pleasure.' What is pleasure? It is a general name, and 'get happiness' will mean 'get a general name.' But a general name is not a reality, and cannot be got. The reality is the particular. 'Get happiness' will mean, then, 'get some one pleasure.' Is that it? No; we are to get all the happiness we can. And so, after all our quibbling, 'get happiness' does mean 'get the largest possible sum or collection of pleasures.'" (Bradley, "Ethical Studies," p. 88, note.)

But "the sum or the all of pleasures is a self-contradiction, and, therefore, the search for it is futile. A series which has no beginning, or, if a beginning, yet no end, cannot be summed; there is no all, and yet the all is postulated and the series is to be summed. But it cannot be summed until we are dead, and then if we have realized it, we, I suppose, do not know it, and we are not happy; and before death we cannot have realized it, because there is always more to come,—the series is always incomplete. We must say, then, that one never reaches happiness. Or, do you mean as much happiness as you can get? Then every one at every point is happy, and happiness is always complete, for, by the hedonistic theory, we all of us get as much as we can." (Idem, pp. 88, 89, text.)

"A pleasure is only in the time during which I feel it. A past pleasure means either an idea or another (secondary) impression. Itself is nothing at all: I did get it, I have not got it; and the 'did get' it is not the pleasure. In order to have the sum of pleasures you must have them all now, which is impossible." (Idem, note, p. 89.)

Of this brilliant compound of wit and reasoning its author should be justly proud. He deserves great credit for his ingenuity in misinterpreting his opponents. He is versatile: having understood something so obscure as Hegel, he can misunderstand something so clear as Mill. But he wishes to be taken seriously; he says so. A favorite exordium of his is, "I am ashamed to examine such reasoning." This seems an apt place for the quotation.

But to favor Mr. Bradley: When a utilitarian says that he wants all the happiness he can get,—if, indeed, a utilitarian ever put his doctrine so inelegantly,

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this is not the system that ought to be, is to say that men would be happier if they adopted a system which would make them less happy, or, if they adopted a system which they cannot adopt.

Either it means this—which is the first of the interpretations that I have put upon it—or else it means what may be explained in this way. It is implied by the whole of the argument for utilitarianism, that if the members of a society had no desire except to be in pain, and had no aversion except to pleasure, then the system of morals in that society would be the precise opposite of the one which obtains among men. And, in general, it may be said that there are as many different systems of morality conceivable as there are societies of beings with different objects of desire. Now, it has been asked, which of these systems is most desirable? To answer this question, it is thought, is the business of ethics; this system, whichever it may be, is the system that "ought to be;" and it is in its failure to show that utilitarianism is this system

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—he is believed by Mr. Bradley to mean that he wishes to make a cabinet collection of pleasures. If Mr. Bradley had a small nephew, anxious to learn horseback-riding, who said that he wanted to get as many rides as possible, Mr. Bradley would not, I am sure, suspect the boy of wanting a sum collection of something. Why, then, does he so understand utilitarians? I can think of but one reason: that if he had accepted the true and very evident interpretation there would have been no opportunity for his humor about a collection of pleasures. Are we to conclude, then, that Mr. Bradley had so little humor "that he must be witty where he can and not merely where he should"? We may at least infer that he is more conversant with the ridicule of ethics than with the ethics of ridicule.

But even a license to misconstrue does Mr. Bradley little service, for he uses it to prove that a man can never attain what utilitarians affirm to be his object; and as no utilitarian conclusion is founded on the notion that men can attain their object, Mr. Bradley's denial of that proposition is a superfluous irrelevancy. One would like to know, however, if Mr. Bradley really thinks it foolish to pursue perfect virtue, and wisdom, and other unattainable ideals, and whether he ever heard of approximating an ideal. One would like to know, moreover, why, if Mr. Bradley thought he was combating utilitarianism by showing that their object cannot be attained, he devotes the end of that paragraph to showing that it not only can but must be attained. Which side of the question is Mr. Bradley arguing on? What a pity that John Mill did not live to review the man who found his arguments pitiable!

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that the fault in the foregoing argument consists. Indeed, it is in the impossibility of deciding this question that the impossibility of ethics consists.

This looks very formidable, but in truth it is not at all so, unless it be a defect in a theory that it cannot answer unintelligible questions. For unintelligible it is, thoroughly unintelligible, to ask which of these systems is the most desirable. One knows what is meant when you ask, which of certain things is most desirable to you, or to me, or to any other person, or collection of persons; but to ask, which is most desirable neither to you nor to me, nor to any other being or collection of beings, but simply which is most desirable?—is nonsense. It is like inquiring, "Which is the heavier?" "Which what?" you ask; "which of these chairs?" "Oh, no, not which of any two things; just which is the heavier?" One can tell which of these conceivable systems of morality is most desirable for mankind; it is the utilitarian. One can tell which of them would be most desirable for beings who desired unhappiness and felt aversion to happiness; it would be the inutilitarian. But one cannot tell anything about which system is most desirable, not to mankind, nor to any other specified society of beings, but just which is most desirable; or, rather, there is one thing that one can tell about this question,—namely, that the people who ask it are darkening counsel by words without wisdom.

One-half of the criticisms of utilitarianism arise from a misconception of ethics. It is not the business of ethics to inquire what would be the morality of phantoms of the imagination, neither is it its business to answer absurd queries. Its business is to discover what qualities characterize the acts which must, and the acts which must not, be done among men; and then to decide, if need be, what specific acts, among a given people, belong to the one class and the other. When it has done this its work is complete.

But it seems to be thought that the ethical end must be one that appeals to the individual. It is apparently supposed that a utilitarian must prove that each man desires all men to be happy. There never was a more absurd idea; there never

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was a more thorough-going misconception. The object of a system of morals need not be desired by any individual whatsoever. Utilitarianism need suppose no more than that each person cares only to be happy himself. If he loves a few others and desires them to be happy, it is well and good; if he is a philanthropist and loves others than his immediate friends, it is better and better; but so far as the theory of morals is concerned, all this is unessential. The object of a system of morals is not the object of any individual, it is the object of society, and of society not as a mere collection of individuals, but as an organism. The object of every individual man may be his own happiness; the object of society is the happiness of all the individuals.

That it should be supposed for an instant that it is a paradox for an association to have an object which is not identical with that of any of its members, and is at times in conflict with the separate interest of one or more of them, does not speak well for the acumen of the critic. It is one of the commonest facts about us. Every joint-stock company is a working model of this paradox. The object of each of the stockholders is to get money for himself; he does not necessarily care a whit to enrich the other stockholders. But the object of the company is not to enrich that one stockholder, or any other single one; it is to enrich all; and in the pursuit of that object it may disregard the wishes of a minority, or condemn their property. A still more instructive example is afforded by an army. In fact, a large association more frequently than not has an object which is more or less in conflict with that of particular members of it.

To imagine from the fact that the object of morals is not an object to any individual, that the injunctions of morality will exercise no power over the individual, is to theorize blindfold. In and of themselves I admit that the injunctions of morality do exercise no power. I do not mean that they never do, but that they never do over all people: by its very definition an injunction of morality commands what somebody does not wish to do. Its power over such people lies entirely in the fact that they can attain their individual hap-

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piness only by obeying the injunction; they can attain the benefits of society only by living in society; and society endeavors, by loading wrong-doing with punishment, to make it more unpleasant for the doer than it, otherwise, would be pleasant,—to make it more repugnant by art than it is attractive by nature. Here is ample authority for the injunctions of morality over the immoral, so long as society can inflict the gravest suffering that a man is capable of. Over the moral, these injunctions have, indeed, the authority above alluded to, but have it only in the background. Men who have had rectitude bred into them do right for their own comfort, just as they wash their faces and hands; they do right, for the most part, from mere habit,—in extreme cases because they would be bitterly ashamed of themselves if they did not; and very rarely indeed does the thought of social disgrace and punishment enter in their calculation. And one who has a love for his kind finds in this a further motive for doing right.*

It will be seen from the three preceding paragraphs that a

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* Some thinkers endeavor to do away with all distinctions between moral and immoral injunctions. Every injunction, they say, prescribes a line of conduct that one must pursue if he would gain some object. They are of the form, "Be a firm friend if you would have firm friends," "Make yourself a chronic growler if you would have your material comforts looked to." And the only authority that the injunction exercises over him is the desire that he has for the object. And this being equally true of moral as of immoral and non-moral injunctions, there is no distinction between them, and no difference in their authority.

All of this follows from looking at ethical injunctions from the individual's point of view. Looked at, however, from the true point of view, the view of society and the individual, the distinction between moral and non-moral injunctions is plain, and so is the difference in their authority. For the non-moral injunction is conceived with reference to an object of the individual; a moral injunction is conceived with reference to the object of society. The non-moral precept says, "Do this, for it will gain you such and such an object that you want." The moral precept says, "Do this, for it will give society such and such an object that you perhaps do not want." The authority that the non-moral precept has lies in the attractiveness of its object to the individual. The authority that the moral precept has does not lie in the attractiveness of its object to the individual; it lies quite outside of that object. Here would seem to me to be abundant distinction.

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utilitarian does hold—and one who has mastered the utilitarian position will see that whoever accepts it must hold—that morality is infinitely nobler, infinitely more unselfish, than perhaps any of the individuals who are subject to it. It will be seen, too, how complete is the subjection of the individual to the moral law, and wherein the object of his moral responsibility consists. One's responsibility, and the fact of what is right and what is wrong for him, does not seem to depend upon his knowledge of it, or his belief in it, or his consent to it; for, in truth, it does depend on none of these things. The fact of his responsibility lies in the disposition and muscles of his fellow-men; to say that he is responsible is to say that he is liable to punishment at their hands; a liability which is in no wise dependent upon his consent to it. And, similarly, what he shall be responsible for, what is right and what is wrong, does not depend on himself; it depends on his fellows; and it is not a matter of caprice with them, but a matter foreordained, which has its root deep down in the nature of their being. The particular things that they will make him responsible for will vary indefinitely with their knowledge and their character, and at one period that act shall be called right which at another shall be denounced as wrong, but it will be for the reason that they have changed their mind about what qualities the act in question has, and not for the reason that they have reformed their classification of acts into wrong and right upon other and different qualities. So long as men desire nothing for its own sake but happiness, and so long as nothing but unhappiness inspires men with aversion, so long will the utilitarian account of morality be the true account; and the doctrine of morals, concerned though it be with the definition of terms, is not concerned with anything that is arbitrary or fortuitous, but with something as determinate and permanent as the constitution of human nature itself.

A. L. Hodder.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS, by J. H. Muirhead, M.A. (University Extension Manuals. London: John Murray, 1892, pp. xi, 239), is, in several respects, a highly interesting volume. This is the first attempt made in this country to state in a popular way the main ethical doctrines of the English Idealists. The conviction has been gaining ground during recent years that this school of thinkers has something valuable to say on moral and religious questions: it is believed that, by a method which is not dogmatic, like that of the Intuitionists, it is able to reach results that are not barren, like those of the so-called Evolutionists and Agnostics. But, beyond the moral impressiveness of some of the leaders of this school, there has been very little of anything to sustain the growing faith of the public in it. To all except experts the "Prolegomena" of the late Professor Green is a book seven times sealed, while Mr. Bradley's "Ethical Studies" has been for years out of print, and Professor Caird's ethical views are buried in his commentaries. It was with the hope of placing these authors within reach of "the beginner in philosophy," together with the greater writers of whom they are exponents—"the perennial sources of ethical inspiration"—that Mr. Muirhead wrote his book. His hope has, in my opinion, been realized. His volume is an admirable introduction to the ethics of idealism, and has nearly all the qualities of a first-rate text-book. It is an accurate, clear, proportionate, and very complete record of the results achieved by this school of thinkers. These results are reached through a critical statement of rival theories, and supported by clear and telling arguments; and consequently this text-book cannot be easily put to an illegitimate use,—it cannot be learnt without being understood.

Mr. Muirhead's knowledge of the ancient and modern classics in his subject is manifestly accurate and mature. He has added to this theoretical knowledge a rarer qualification, viz., practical sympathy and direct contact with some of the profound and significant moral movements now taking place in our social life. On this account his remarks on the relation of the individual to the state are peculiarly interesting; and to this are partly due the simplicity and directness of his style, and the freshness and charm of his illustrations.

I shall not attempt to summarize the contents of the book, but merely indicate the general direction it takes. A science of morals is rendered necessary by the discrepancy which arises from time to time between the moral habits of man and the practical demands made upon him by his natural and social environment. And the science is possible: so that there is no need to seek the vain refuge of intuitional or theological dogmatism. There are two main types of ethical theory,—one dominated by the idea of absolute law, the other by the idea of supreme end. The former, being abstract and foreign to the agent, is ultimately destructive of morality: whether the law be internal or external, it can produce no better results than prudent conduct, no higher motive than far-sighted selfishness. The latter, the conception of an end, yields a law which is at the same time absolute in its authority and a law of freedom; for the idea of an "end" is equivalent to self-realization. But the self to be realized may have for differ-

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ent persons different meanings: the individual may identify his *self* with any one of its constitutive elements. The history of ethics illustrates this truth: the self to be realized has been alternately regarded as merely emotional or merely rational; hedonism has sought to subordinate reason to feeling, and the rival theory of "self-sacrifice"—cynicism, stoicism, Kantianism—has sought to do the reverse. Both theories are untrue: the former makes a moral law impossible; the latter makes it useless, for no one can obey it. And both theories are ultimately individualistic.

By means of a criticism of hedonism in its utilitarian form Mr. Muirhead arrives at his own view of the end as the "common good;" and by means of his criticism of evolutionary hedonism he emphasizes the fact that the common good is moral and not merely natural. "This supreme good may indifferently be described as the satisfaction (*i.e.*, realization) of the self as a whole (*i.e.*, the better self), or as the maintenance according to opportunities of the social system, which is only the other or objective side of this better self" (p. 195). This view of the common good combines the truth contained in the rival theories of hedonism and self-sacrifice, makes "dying to self" a moment in the realization of a higher good than is attainable by the direct self-affirmation of hedonism, and at the same time identifies the welfare of the individual with that of society.

Having arrived at the supreme good, the author proceeds to deduce its content, —that is, to show the moral aptitudes or virtues and the moral opportunities or duties which flow from it. He draws a table of the principal virtues and shows how each of them directly or indirectly implies the others. To this is added a discussion of moral progress,—perhaps the most suggestive in the book,—in which the standard is dealt with as Relative, Progressive, and Ideal.

Unless I over-estimate the need which both teachers and private students have long felt for such a manual as this, "The Elements of Ethics" will soon be in its second edition. I should, therefore, suggest in a tentative way a few points for the author's consideration.

It seems to me that the representation of the Kantian view of the relation of law to desire is not quite accurate. Kant holds that the moral law is capable of creating an *interest* in itself, and thereby of becoming a motive to action. And is the Stoic and Kantian type of ethical theory well characterized as the ethics of "self-sacrifice"? I believe that, while regarding the supreme good as the good of the self as a whole, the author should take more pains to justify the distinction he makes between lower and higher, better and worse, in that self. And are the two alternative definitions of the *summum bonum* adequate (see p. 195), or does the very choice imply the need of pressing beyond both to the principle which reconciles them? It seems to me that it would be difficult to derive practical rules, for guidance in the ordinary habits of life, either from the maxim "Act so as to realize thy self as a whole," or from its alternative, "Act so as to maintain the social system." Whereas, such a principle as that of Christian love is immediately applicable, not because feeling is better than reason, but because it indicates to the individual whether he has in his action assumed the attitude which identifies his own good with that of others. I think Mr. Muirhead should have made more explicit the principle which reconciles the individual and the

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social good. It is possible, however, that to dwell upon the native universality of self-consciousness would have been beside the mark in an elementary text-book. But I am not sure that Mr. Muirhead has quite realized the significance of this truth. He speaks more than once as if consciousness *plus* impulse were of themselves adequate to constitute a moral agent, and does not point out with sufficient clearness how the former must transmute the latter. Consciousness might be conceived as a particular, existing by the side of other particulars. It is the same want of sufficient attention to the organizing or reconstitutive activity of a self, universal in its nature, which at times apparently leads the author to subordinate the individual to society (see p. 159), and to speak of him as if he were "only an instrument." On page 181 he even asserts that "self and society are related to one another as particular and universal, and are therefore only different sides of the one reality." There is one more point of minor importance which I should mention. The articulation, or, as the author calls it, "the exfoliation of the good," seems to me to proceed quite empirically; and the classification of the virtues is the least valuable, and perhaps the least necessary, portion of a book which cannot easily receive too much praise.

HENRY JONES.

ST. ANDREWS.

EINLEITUNG IN DIE MORALWISSENSCHAFT. Eine Kritik der ethischen Grundbegriffe. Von Georg Simmel. In 2 Bänden. Erster Band, pp. viii, 467. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1892.

The attitude of the author, who is *Privatdocent* at the University of Berlin, towards the present movement in the domain of ethics is pre-eminently a critical one. He is of the opinion that a dissolution is imminent and necessary of what has heretofore been comprised under the term "ethics." "If," he says in his preface, "moral science wishes to be elevated beyond the boundary existing between abstract imperatives and unmethodical or speculative reflections, . . . the time must come when a single book can no longer bear the title 'ethics' in the way that it might bear the title of 'physics.'" However, in spite of far-reaching differentiation, physics remains a distinct science, definitely separated from all other sciences, even though correlated to them, and I do not believe that the development of special knowledge sets aside but, on the contrary, decidedly increases the need of manuals and compendiums. In the same way, it is quite possible to conceive of a specialization within the field of ethics, which, as a matter of fact, has long since been begun to a certain degree. The task of explaining the ethical norms and rules of conduct that have been developed in the human race presupposes the investigator's familiarity with an extensive amount of material of the history of civilization and morality, and can in fact, as things are situate d to-day, only be furthered through special research. In the same way the student of ethics, when he attempts to arrange the concrete circumstances of life according to ethical principles, will be brought into contact with the inexhaustible complexity of modern life and its problems, and he will find it necessary, in the consideration of individual ethics, but much more in the treatment of social ethics, to make himself acquainted with the result of historical, national, statistical, economic, and legal investigations. And there is no reason why the

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treatment of special problems in all these fields should not be carried on and utilized for the general science. On the other hand, I must confess that just those fundamental conceptions of ethics of which our author treats (in the present volume, the following four: obligation, egoism and altruism, moral worth and moral duty, happiness) seem to me entirely incapable of participating in the specialization of ethics. The fundamental conceptions of every science must serve as preliminaries to all special investigations, and in case a revision of them is made necessary through some ascertained fact, this revision can only be undertaken in connection with the entire system. For instance, in the domain of "physics" special investigations may be undertaken with regard to the swinging of the pendulum, or to acoustic, optical, electrical problems, but not regarding the fundamental conceptions,—space, time, motion, rapidity, energy, mass, momentum, etc. On the other hand, a constant revision of the fundamental conceptions is of the greatest importance and usefulness in the domain of ethics, as in that of every science. For that which is in reality primary is never directly obtained; the fundamental conceptions of every science are hypotheses temporarily accepted, which must constantly be verified by their application to single instances.

Our author possesses admirable qualifications for this critical task. In addition to his extensive knowledge of psychology, he possesses remarkable analytical skill, combining with great dialectical facility of expression a clear perception of the various spheres of life, an insight into scientific problems and theories of every sort. As a consequence, his critical discussions are clear and full of meaning. There are few who possess to a like degree the power of making their investigations of abstract questions thorough and at the same time attractive.

It is difficult to trace the course of the investigation within the limits of a short review, and it is no less difficult to speak of the definite results, which aim, as distinctly confessed, merely at the dialectical dissolution of the so-called fundamental conceptions of ethics; the author claiming "that the uncertainty in the meaning and limitation of these conceptions permits of their combination with entirely opposed principles, each one of which possesses the same degree of apparent possibility of demonstration." The really valuable results are to be found chiefly in details, in the numerous corrections and emendations proposed by the author, in the large number of suggestive observations which act as a stimulus to the investigator of the fundamental questions of ethics and lead him to a sharp definition of his thought. However, much of this criticism is not as new as would at first sight appear. Dr. Simmel has not in mind any particular persons or systems, but wishes to emphasize and elucidate the difficulties that lie in the fundamental conceptions themselves,—a view that, considering the present state of ethics, can scarcely be called entirely new. Through the works of such men as Höffding, Paulsen, Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen, Alexander, Guyau, etc., leaving aside what has previously been done by others, the problem as to "the boundary between abstract commands and unmethodical but speculative theories" has been to a certain extent advanced, and in these works the models for many of our author's critical investigations may be found, as well as the solution of some of his points. While agreeing with Simmel in many particulars, I regard his criticism of morality, on the whole, as too sceptical. His critical view is not entirely in accord with the present position of our science with regard

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to fundamental problems, nor is he altogether free from the objection that occasionally, for the sake of heightening the effect, he combats matters which by no means are universally regarded as part and parcel of present ethics. Even if entirely correct, the result reached by Simmel would not prove that the ethics of the future need to be treated in an entirely different spirit. And in this particular I do not at all agree with him. There is no doubt that morality and moral judgments existed long before there was a science of ethics, just as correct thinking is older than logic, and artistic form than æsthetic criticism. It is equally certain that the primary object of these three standard sciences is descriptive and analytical, with a view of determining the actual processes by means of which those judgments and psychological actions are brought about which we call logical thought, good character, and the power of æsthetic construction. But with this the end is not reached. Practical application in these fields also expects aid from scientific perception, just as the natural instinct looks for advancement and clearness, and the ideal standards for critical investigation and further development. Direct practice and reflection must complement each other, and always have done so. We must not force out ethics from the science of ethics, for what then remains may be called psychology, ethnology, history of civilization and morals, but ethics will have disappeared.

PRAGUE. FR. JODL.

SOCIAL ETHICS: OUTLINES OF A DOCTRINE OF MORALS. By Theobald Ziegler, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Strasburg. Translated from the German. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892.

This little book is a praiseworthy effort of a kind which one can but wish competent thinkers felt themselves more frequently called upon to make. It is an endeavor to give the simplest, most popular expression possible to the best ethical thought of the day, as that appears to the writer. Professor Ziegler seems to think, and many of us will agree with him, that there is especial need at this time for such exposition. "Is the contradiction," he asks, "altogether harmless which we so often find between what we have been taught from childhood about moral questions and duties, and what we practise in daily life, or see our neighbors practise?" The book consists of a number of lectures "delivered to a general audience of cultured men and women" (from whom, however, no special culture in ethics is expected) with the aim of helping them to understand those difficulties which beset the thinking and even the action of many to-day in moral matters. "There arises," says Professor Ziegler, "an antithesis which we may briefly describe as the antithesis between authority and freedom, between conservatism and progress. This antithesis is at least related to, if it is not identical with, that between society and the individual, between conventional morality and conscience." An interesting sketch is given of the rise and history of the science of ethics, beginning, of course, with Socrates, and ending, strange to say, with English evolutional utilitarianism.

In this latter selection as the point of view most important and characteristic in modern ethics, we have the key to all that follows. "The Origin of Morals," "The Nature of Morals," "Duty and Virtue," and "The Supreme Good," are all treated on lines with which the student of Mr. Herbert Spencer is familiar.

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Professor Ziegler uses the terms "happiness" and "welfare" as interchangeable, giving at one time "the greatest happiness principle," and at another "the greatest possible welfare of the greatest possible number," as the standard and end. It is throughout apparent—as the above definition of "the good" would imply—that for Professor Ziegler society is an "aggregate of individuals." It is therefore somewhat startling to find him announcing, "there is for the individual no *summum bonum*, no supreme good." One wonders how, where, or in what it is to be realized! The radical defect, indeed, of our English utilitarian writers seems to attach to Professor Ziegler's thought. In spite of his German birth, in spite of at least some acquaintanceship with Kant and Hegel, in spite of denouncing the "narrow individualism" of Hobbes, Professor Ziegler remains first and last individualist. He never really transcends the antithesis he sets himself to explain. He speaks on almost the last page of his book of "that inward self-contradiction which we have already recognized in the idea of the Supreme Good,—it is that continual opposition between the individual and the whole, between morality and happiness,—an opposition which no *Deus ex machinâ*, no hereafter, has the power ever to reconcile or banish from the world."

His psychology has everywhere the same defect. "Man is an egotist by nature;" "I must first myself become a personality in order to be able to do something for others;" "Duty and virtue are peculiarly ideas of an individualistic ethic."

In spite of these serious defects, the book is characterized throughout by a social enthusiasm, and by the habit of taking in all matters of practice the social point of view. But to praise it in this respect is to reduce it to the position of a hand-book of morals, whereas it aims at being a hand-book of the science of ethics. The book contains much that is admirable, but nowhere the *rationale* of its most admirable conclusions.

M. S. GILLILAND.

SOCIAL STATICS, abridged and revised; together with THE MAN *versus* THE STATE. By Herbert Spencer. Fourth thousand and twelfth thousand respectively. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892.

This volume, together with the recently published treatise on "Justice," and the "Plea for Liberty," edited by Mr. Mackay, may fairly be regarded as containing the complete gospel of individualism as conceived by the Spencerian school. The articles of this gospel are so well known and have been so freely discussed that it would be out of place to attempt any criticism of them here. To bestow praise on a writer of Mr. Spencer's world-wide renown would be still more impertinent. It must suffice to indicate what are the main points in which the present combined edition differs from preceding ones.

In the case of "The Man *versus* the State," there is scarcely any alteration. The only important change is to be found in the essay on *The Sins of Legislators*, in which a note is added (p. 341) illustrating from the recent municipal history of Glasgow the terrible disasters that result from "socialistic meddling."

"Social Statics," on the other hand, is reduced to about half its former size. This condensation is effected partly by the omission of diffuse illustrations and truistic propositions. Thus, no reader is likely to regret the disappearance of

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the profound remarks that "restraint is for the savage, the rapacious, the violent; not for the just, the gentle, the benevolent. . . . Were there no thieves and murderers, prisons would be unnecessary." If this is philosophy, the writings of Martin Tupper were probably poetry. Partly, again, the condensation is effected by omitting discussions which have been more fully developed in the treatise on "Justice." Such omissions also need not be regretted. But another large section of omissions consists of passages with which Mr. Spencer is no longer in agreement. It is to these that we must specially devote our attention. If this edition were intended entirely to supersede the earlier one, it would be a matter for regret that so much of Mr. Spencer's earlier methods of thought should be lost; but the two editions, taken together, furnish material for an interesting biographical study.

The first thing that strikes us is the completeness with which the earlier theological conceptions are swept away. We hear no more about "the Divine Idea, and the conditions of its realization." We are no longer informed that "there are few, if any, amongst civilized people who do not agree that human well-being is in accordance with the Divine will. The doctrine is taught by all our religious teachers; it is assumed by every writer on morality; we may therefore safely consider it as an admitted truth." Nor are we treated any longer to such gems of reasoning as the following: "The denial of rights amounts to a libel on the Deity. For . . . that which a man has a right to is that which God intended for him. And to say that man has no right to freedom of action, is to say that God did not mean him to have it. Without freedom of action, however, man cannot fulfil his desires. Then God willed that he should not fulfil them. But the non-fulfilment of the desires produces misery. Therefore God intended that he should be miserable. By which absurdity we may safely consider the position disproved." Mr. Spencer has evidently advanced from the theological to the metaphysical stage. As for the *positive* stage, he was always at that! One cannot help wondering, however, whether Mr. Spencer's individualism is not a relic of his theological stage, which he has never fully reconsidered in the light of his new position. What is his argument for freedom? "God wills human happiness; that happiness is attainable only through the medium of faculties; for the production of happiness those faculties must be exercised; the exercise of them presupposes liberty of action: these are the steps by which we find our way from the Divine will to the law of equal freedom." *Voilà tout.* Mr. Spencer now omits this argument. But has he anything as cogent to offer from the point of view of evolutionary agnosticism? Or, again, "It is said of a certain personage that he wished he had been consulted when the world was being made, for that he could have given good advice; and not a little historical celebrity has attached to this personage in virtue of his so-thought unparalleled arrogance. Shallow, shallow! Why, the great majority of our statesmen and politicians do as much every day. Advice, indeed! they do not stop at advice. They actively interpose, take into their own hands matters that God seems to be mismanaging, and undertake to set them right! It is clear to them that social wants and relationships have been so carelessly provided for that without their vigilant management all will go wrong. As for any silent influences by which imperfections are in process of being removed, they do not believe in them.

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But by a commission, a staff of officers, and a parliamentary grant, every deficiency shall be made good, and the errors of Omniscience be rectified!" This passage is even better than the other. Why should we be deprived of so excellent an argument against physic?

But though these powerful arguments are withdrawn, Mr. Spencer is far from having weakened his faith in individualism. He even removes the small comfort formerly afforded by a little note in which he stated that his arguments against socialism do not "militate against joint-stock systems of production and living."

Another noteworthy point is the change of Mr. Spencer's attitude towards women. He carefully expunges all such statements as that "the attitudes of mastery on the one side and submission on the other are essentially at variance with that refined sentiment which should subsist between husband and wife," or the taunt that "here in England, in this nineteenth century, most women defend that state of servitude in which they are held by men." Mr. Spencer is more strict with women now.

Another omission is of a more pleasant character: "If a body of workmen formed themselves into a joint-stock manufacturing company, with elective directors, secretary, treasurer, superintendents, foremen, etc., for managing the concern, and an organization adapted to insure an equitable division of profits among the members, it was clear that the enormous sums previously pocketed by the employers would be shared amongst the employed, to the great increase of their prosperity. Yet all past attempts to act out this very plausible theory have, somehow or other, ended in miserable failures." It would seem that even the prince of Individualists can scarcely venture on this statement now.

He is as strong as of old, however, on the subject of non-compulsory education, and adds a long passage (pp. 176–184) to the former edition on this subject. He also makes a good point (p. 205) with regard to the arrangements for extinguishing fires in Berlin.

Another notable feature is the decline of Mr. Spencer's optimism since 1850. "The Evanescence of Evil" is transformed into "The Diminution of Evil." And he omits the passage in which it was maintained that "the ultimate development of the ideal man is certain,—as certain as . . . that all men will die."

It is interesting to find that Mr. Spencer still maintains his opposition to state control of coinage. He notes Jevons's criticism and endeavors to meet it, adducing also the authority of Bagehot (p. 224). One would like to know more precisely what Bagehot's view was.[1]

Individualism is apt to strike one as a little hard-hearted. But there is one pathetic remark in this volume. In the original edition he said that many of the poorer classes are "injured by druggists' prescriptions and quack medicines." He now inserts a note to add that "the infliction of such injuries is not peculiar to quacks. During the last four years I have had occasion to consult seven medical men, and six out of the seven did me harm!" It is high time that socialism should be abolished!

[1] It should be noted that Professor Bastable, in his article on "Money," in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," seems also to agree with Mr. Spencer on this point.

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To most people, no doubt, the main interest of the present edition will consist in the light it throws on the connection between Mr. Spencer's earlier ideas and his later theory of evolution. This connection is indicated by a number of useful notes.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

CRIME AND ITS CAUSES. By William Douglas Morrison, of H. M. prison, Wandsworth. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

This is a work which, considering its limits and modest pretensions, it is difficult to overpraise. The writer's position as a prison chaplain has afforded him ample practical experience, while every page of the book attests his acquaintance with the scientific literature (chiefly foreign) bearing on his subject. It is a calm and thoughtful study by a writer in whom the deliberate determination to look at things as they are has not extinguished a reasoned faith in the possibility of their amelioration. The work is conceived throughout in a genuinely philosophical spirit.

The chapter-headings of the book will give some idea of its contents: "The Statistics of Crime," "Climate and Crime," "The Seasons and Crime," "Destitution and Crime," "Poverty in Crime," "Sex, Age, and Crime," "The Criminal in Body and Mind," "The Punishment of Crime."

From the point of view of psychological curiosity, the conclusion that heat, whether permanent or temporary, has some direct (as well as much indirect) influence in stimulating crime, will be found one of Mr. Morrison's most striking results. More important from a practical point of view is his disproof of the popular notions,—(1) that crime is mainly due to destitution or poverty; (2) that education is a certain cure for crime; (3) that crime is actually in course of rapid disappearance under the influence of education and other civilizing agencies. With regard to the first of these points, he shows conclusively that but a very small proportion of the world's crime is due to poverty. One of the exceptions is the existence of a small amount of vagrancy and petty theft in old men no longer able to earn the full union rate of wages; and he urges that trades-unions should relax their rules in favor of elderly or infirm members. With regard to the second, he shows that the educated classes commit fully as much crime in proportion to their numbers as any other class, putting aside the professionally criminal class, which is admittedly ignorant. (Mr. Morrison should, perhaps, have raised the question whether this class is not chiefly recruited from the most uneducated class of the community.) Under the third head, he contends that the apparent decline of crime in this country is due to (*a*) the number of juvenile offenders now confined in reformatories and industrial schools, and so temporarily incapacitated for crime, (*b*) to the tendency to pass lighter sentences. It would be absurd to put forward such facts as any refutation of a sober socialism; but they tend to disprove the optimistic theory of Mr. Belfort Bax's work in the same series, "The Ethics of Socialism," where an attempt is made to show that the "Criminal Law under Socialism" would be all but unnecessary. Still less is this practical and scientific student of crime disposed to "object to the repression of crime by organized brutality." He is "reactionary" enough to believe in the efficacy of punishment when sufficiently severe, and when supplemented by directly moral-

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izing agencies, of which *moral* education is, no doubt, one. According to the judicial statistics for England and Wales, imprisonment is successful after the third time in about eighty per cent. of the cases annually submitted to the criminal courts. He is no less emphatic in the assertion that there is a class who are practically irreformable, and the principal reform recommended in our penal system is, that a distinction should be made between these two classes.

"A society based upon the principle of individual liberty is a society of which the members are supposed to be gifted with the virtues of prudence, industry, and self-control; virtues of this nature are, indeed, essential to the existence of such a form of society. Unfortunately, a certain portion of its members do not possess them, even in an elementary degree, and no amount of seclusion in prison will ever confer these qualities upon them. Imprisonment, to be followed by liberty, however rigorous it is made, is, accordingly, no solution of the difficulty; the only effective way of dealing with the incorrigible vagrant, drunkard, and thief is by some system of permanent seclusion in a penal colony. All men are not fitted for freedom, and so long as society acts on the supposition that they are, it will never get rid of the incorrigible criminal." When will parliaments and judges give up the absurd system of going on passing, time after time, sentences which experience has shown to be incapable of reforming the criminal, or of protecting society against him?

We should, indeed, have been glad for a good deal more in the way of practical and detailed suggestion from a writer so well qualified to speak with authority upon the matter. We should have liked both suggestions for the reform to existing law and advice as to its practical administration: most judges and magistrates might learn something even from what Mr. Morrison has given us. He does not appear to be anxious for the abolition of capital punishment, but assumes that the tendency of the age is in that direction. We should have liked to hear his views upon the still more disputed question of corporal punishment. He has nothing to say on the subject even in relation to juvenile offenders, with whom he admits that the effect of a first imprisonment is simply to dispel the vague terror with which the idea of prison has hitherto been associated. Would not the same be more or less true of many "juveniles" too old to be sent to reformatories, and in fact of most prisoners accustomed to a hard life and imprisoned only for very short periods?

H. RASHDALL.

THE DARKEST ENGLAND SOCIAL SCHEME: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE FIRST YEAR'S WORK. London, E.C., December, 1891.

General Booth's social scheme has now been a year in working, and in this volume we are furnished with an audited statement of accounts, and a description of the different departments of the scheme, and of their actual *modus operandi*. The description is drawn on the same lines as the original book, is as highly colored, and as skilfully calculated to appeal to the sympathies; but there is, perhaps, more emotion in it than fact, though some of the facts recorded are sufficiently notorious and oppressing. It is to the accounts, however, that General Booth's critics will naturally turn for material for finding fault. They will discover that the Salvation Army has handed over to the fund properties of

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the net value of £5000 odd, and that, with the exception of £25,000, which has been reserved for the colony over the sea, the donations of £100,000 have been applied to the starting of the city and farm colonies, and that a grant of £1432 has been made from the fund to the working expenses of the latter and £15,431 to those of the former. This last sum is undoubtedly considerable; but it must, in fairness, be remembered that General Booth has always asked for subscriptions for the working as well as for the capital expenses, and it is too early to form any reliable judgment, based on the figures, of the ultimate financial position of the scheme. Some of the undertakings of the city colony seem to be already in a fair way to be self-supporting, and the land for the farm colony, being in Essex, has been obtained at a moderate price, and may possibly be worked at a profit under spade cultivation, with a market to a large extent secured in itself and in the city colony, while, being in Essex, it has proved comparatively unprofitable under the plough. But of this, again, it is too early to judge, and we are driven back on the general prospects of the scheme regarded in the light of the character of its propounders and the principles on which it is based. The strong points of General Booth's proposal are its insistence on the moral side of social reform, and in this respect it is distinguished from many such proposals which have been made in the past; its connection of the different parts with one another so as to render and derive mutual support; and its possession in the officers of the Salvation Army of a disciplined body of men and women accustomed to deal with some of the lowest classes of society. With such advantages as these the scheme certainly deserves a fair trial; and many of its less welcome features—its noisy advertisement, its exaggerated account of the evils with which it proposes to deal, its depreciation or ignoring of other attempts to handle the same problems on a humbler scale, its overweening hopes and extravagant promises—may be pardoned or neglected. The evil is unquestionably great; the extent and success of the operations of the Salvation Army, despite all cavil and censure, constitute one of the most remarkable facts of the times; and the stress laid on the moral element is of favorable omen. The performance of the scheme may not be proportioned to its promise, but it may, nevertheless, deal with no little success with some of the most deplorable incidents of our modern civilization.

L. L. PRICE.

THE REDEMPTION OF LABOR; OR, FREE LABOR UPON FREED LAND. By Cecil Balfour Phipson. London: Swan Sonnenschein, Lowry & Co., 1888.

Mr. Phipson's book is clearly the outcome of a genuine sympathy with the toiling and suffering mass of men who in wealthy England struggle painfully for a bare subsistence. Its animating thought is that there is something wrong with an economic system which admits of such contrasts, and that this wrong is the result of human institution and not of "Divine ordinance." Hence the writer's main enemies are the "orthodox" economists who regard the existing industrial system as the outcome of necessary laws, and whom he sometimes even seems to hold responsible for much of the existing social injustice. He has been stimulated clearly by Mr. Henry George's theories and proposals, but his book is an entirely independent and original attempt to think out the laws of economic

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phenomena for himself, and the remedy which he is led to propose has little in common either with Mr. George's scheme or with any other proposal, socialist or individualist, with which we are acquainted.

To give a complete account of Mr. Phipson's views, or do justice to his elaborate and industrious arrangement of statistical results, would be impossible within the limits of the present notice. We confine ourselves to his fundamental propositions.

Mr. Phipson begins with the theory of exchange. "Wealth" (p. 5) "may be defined, in respect to the individual, as the possession of what is more than sufficient to satisfy his own desires"—a modification of the meaning of the term which Mr. Phipson supports on the ground that "he who produces only what he wants is not a wealthy man." Wealth arises with the separation of the food-producer from the "other-worker," as the author compendiously calls every one who produces anything other than food. This separation becomes more distinct and perfect as civilization advances, and on it depends value, for "value itself is nothing but the relation which all things other than food bear to such surpluses of food as are available for exchange" (p. 24), while food itself does not properly possess value. This truth is "the mighty corner-stone of the entire fabric of human society," and orthodox economy is to be much despised for not having seen it. For our own part, we confess that the new revelation appears to be not so much a "mighty corner-stone" as a simple "derangement of epitaphs," and we are confirmed in this suspicion when we read, on page 32, that man "in his ignorance and pride" "has affixed a value to food by making a monopoly of it," whereas God offered it him freely on the one condition of work. We should conclude from this that food, after all, *has* value in this mundane existence, and as poor Mr. Mill was only trying to find out what happens in this same existence, we do not see where he is wrong.

Book II. passes to the discussion of wages. After rather needlessly slaying the slain wage-fund theory, Mr. Phipson expounds his own view, not, we fear, without some confusion of thought. Wages, he says, are a reward, and "mere life, from an economic stand-point, is not a reward at all, but a right" (p. 65). Surely Mr. Phipson is confounding the ethical and the economic stand-point. However, from this premise he derives the equation of natural wages,—"Food and other Products = Comforts = Wages." The division between food-producers and "other-workers" gives the two "equations of civilization" (p. 68), representing, apparently, the nature of the exchange. We have

1. Food products—food = food surplus;
2. Other products—wages = returns for food.

But are not these equations somewhat tautological? For instance, need we go through a process of reasoning to convince ourselves that if a man produces food and does not eat it all, what remains is a surplus of food? Mr. Phipson is more definite on the subject of capital. Whatever appearances may be, capital is really surplus food, and interest is the "return made by one class of workers for the food produced by another." Mr. Phipson is at his best in his attack on the "economists'" view of interest.

"This discovery by economists that interest was the reward of abstinence was a peculiarly happy one for such as occupied the envied position of a *capitalist.*

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It invested usury with a quasi-religious air of saintly self-denial, and reduced the borrower to the less enviable position of one who was not only civilly liable for debt, but was also under a deep moral obligation to the chastened self-control of the lender."

But his own theory leads him into some difficulties. Capital, consisting mostly of food, cannot be accumulated on a great scale, hence "the modern conception of a capitalist . . . involves either a direct contradiction in terms, or else a complete suspension of the laws here determined." That is, apparently, either the great capitalists of the day must consider themselves non-existent, or Mr. Phipson must consider his theories falsified. Which result is most likely it would be hard to determine.

After laying down that profit is due only to monopoly and not to any labor of the monopolist, and having discussed "cost of production," Mr. Phipson proceeds to recapitulate the results so far obtained. We wish we could agree with him that "the nebulous uncertainty hitherto surrounding" these terms had "been dissipated," and that "the whole body of phrases" had "been resolved into a luminous group of bright particular stars."

In Book III. we pass to the discussion of rent. Land as such has no commercial value, and apart from markets—as in the remote parts of Canada—does not, in fact, pay any rent. But given a market, surplus food acquires purchasing power, and this is what the market value of land represents. True rent = surplus food, and since the purchasing power of this food depends on the proximity of a market, payment of the food in the form of rent takes away none of the "natural or inherent value" of the land. Such payment will arise when "other-workers" are compelled by the fall in "values," which (in the meaning given by Mr. Phipson to the word) is the normal accompaniment of civilization, to occupy land already settled. They will be quite as ready to surrender the marketable surplus of food on this land as to farm outlying land where there would be no market for their surplus at all. And this surrender of the surplus is payment of rent.

The theory of rent leads us to the "remedy" proposed in Book IV. Food is now produced under a form of monopoly, and "wealth confiscates a great part of the surplus product which should go to the producer." The remedy is to be found in "freeing" the land. Payment of the market-rent should make the tenant absolute owner with the right of sub-letting under the same conditions. In each case, the market-rent once fixed is to be unalterable. In this way the constantly increasing value of the surplus produce will go to the producer, while through the sub-letting system the number of producers will be multiplied. This view, of course, assumes that rents will continuously rise. As a matter of fact, this assumption would appear to be untrue, but this is due to the great currency juggle from which we are suffering, and which Mr. Phipson explains with great care and industry. His result is that a valueless token currency should be substituted for the money at present in use, and the issue of it should be carefully regulated with the view of keeping the value of money constant as measured in terms of the staple food-product of the country. This measure would have the collateral advantages of abolishing banking, which Mr. Phipson appears to regard as morally on a level with embezzlement, and of providing the state with a

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source of revenue which will supersede taxation. This being achieved, civilization will resume its normal course.

We cannot follow Mr. Phipson further into the details of his argument. With some originality and much industry, he suffers from his contempt for the work of other thinkers in the same field. Nor does he seem quite clear as to what his own field is. It is often hard to determine, for example, whether he is speaking of what would happen in an ideal state, or of what is happening in nineteenth-century England. At other times his objections to other theories seem to turn on a mere change in the use of terms. We can hardly believe that his panacea, taken as it stands, would carry us far on the way to social reconstruction, and if we are to be convinced of it we must have clearer argument in closer touch with fact.

L. T. HOBHOUSE.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY. By Dr. A. Schäffle. With preface by Bernard Bosanquet. Sonnenschein's "Social Science Series." Double volume.

The value of this book is somewhat impaired by the writer's Teutonic prejudices against democracy, and by his un-Teutonic contempt for speculative philosophy. Dr. Schäffle's sympathies are too obviously with the German monarchy and with orthodox religion to place his criticisms of "forward movements" in ethics and politics beyond suspicion. "Atheism," "republicanism," "female suffrage," "mob rule," haunt him like a nightmare through four hundred and odd pages. On the other hand, his allusions to the "*subjective* speculations of Hegel" show how little he understands the greatest intellectual movement of his own time and country, and send a shudder through his otherwise sympathetic editor. Notwithstanding these defects, the book is extremely valuable as a criticism of social democracy in its strictly logical form by the ablest living representative of State Socialism in Germany, and adds to the solidity of the interesting series in which it appears.

The first part of the work is taken up with a destructive criticism of Social Democracy. It would be unprofitable to follow the author through the ten different charges that he has against it. Their general drift may be gathered from the description of the arch-enemy with which he prefaces his attack. "Revolutionary Socialism," we are told upon p. 17, "involves an absolute and purely democratic collectivism in industry, a popular republicanism in government, the materialism of a superficial science in philosophy, a world-reforming optimism in ethics, and a pure atheism in religion." The conclusion at which he arrives is summed up on p. 111: "For the sake of a nebulous improvisation, a visionary scheme, which bears plainly on its front the impress of the disappointment of all its promises,—for the sake of this, Social Democracy is ready to break in pieces the whole existing framework of society, and with it the happiness of all the propertied classes, and to uproot the whole nation from the ground of its historic development,—an impossible task, a hopeless undertaking."

The chief point of interest in all this is the attempt to show in detail what is, in general, obvious to the philosophic student, that the leading defect of Social Democracy is not its socialism, but its individualism. "Collectivism retains as its essence individualism, twin brother to (*laissez-faire*) liberalism." The family

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is to be no more; the State is a piece of mechanism, "a means of attaining equal happiness for every creature that wears the human face;" humanity is merely "the entire mass of human individuals, not an organic combination of peoples;" the old world, industrial and social, is irretrievably bad. Nothing that is healthy can have its roots therein; nothing, accordingly, will serve the Social Democrat but a complete overthrow and a fresh start from a new year of grace. Finally, "God is not;" "the world and we ourselves in the world are left to get on as best we may with the sole help of 'science.'"

The second section, which is by far the most interesting, is taken up with a sketch of that "Positive Social Policy" by which the writer hopes to be able to construct a barricade against the abomination of desolation. The means are chiefly three: (1) the more thorough organization of labor and capital in their respective encampments; (2) positive legislation for the protection of labor and the equable adjustment of the respective claims of land, labor, and capital upon the product of industry; (3) reforms of law in the domain of the ideal life of the people, the home, the school, the public press, art, science, and religion. The chief interest for the English reader will probably attach to the second of these divisions. The treatment throughout is extremely suggestive. We have passed in rapid review schemes to promote a peasant proprietorship, in which, like Aristotle, the author devoutly believes as the beginning of political wisdom, savings-banks, compulsory insurance, protection against industrial crises, reforms in taxation, the eight hours' day. In the discussion of the last (pp. 248–274), the distinction is drawn between legislative labor time (under which may be classed the "hygienic labor day," in specially arduous forms of labor) for the *protection of labor*, and a universal eight hours' day as a *means of securing a higher hourly wage* for the same eight hours' day, and the *employment of more laborers* in full-day shifts. It is impossible here to reproduce the reasoning by which the writer tries to show that the hoped-for rise in the hourly wage is extremely problematic, while any permanent decrease by this means of the proportion between employed and unemployed is not to be hoped for at all. To avoid giving an increase of wages to the diminution of profit, "some part of capital, like labor, may choose to 'play.' Part may be diverted to pass beyond the bounds of Europe. It may gain extensive victories by forming coalitions. It may, by limiting production, turn aside the pistol which the universal eight hours' day points at its breast, since it would thus keep no more workmen than formerly. It may raise the price of commodities, thus diminishing real wages. . . . Capital, in any case, will do all in its power, by sterner application, sharper control, improved and increased machinery, to get more done and in a shorter time than before." The same line of argument is brought to bear against the expectation that such a measure would decrease the number of the unemployed, even in the first generation. In the second generation things would be as before.

The next section is occupied with a criticism of the "Industrial Memorial," which has been put forward by the Social Democrats in the German Reichstag for an Imperial Labor Parliament, with its satellites of a labor bureau, labor boards, chambers, and courts of arbitration. In the discussion of this memorial and of the counter-proposals of "positive policy," there is much that is

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suggestive on the representation of special interests and the whole question of a second chamber.

The book ends with an ambiguous compliment to Social Democracy. It is "the spirit which, by negation, brings positive good to pass." "When once it has fulfilled its mission of stirring up positive social policy all along the line, it will then have brought it to pass that even the proletariat will leave the dream-dove of the future to brood upon the roof of the Socialistic state, and will sit down contentedly to pluck the fruits of reform, now well within its reach, and brought there mainly by the driving force of the attacks of Social Democracy."

The book reads fairly well in its English dress, though the details of its toilet bear manifest signs of haste, and leave much to be desired.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

POVERTY: ITS GENESIS AND EXODUS. By J. G. Godard. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

In so far as it is a sketch of the causes of poverty and the possible means of preventing it, this book is sufficiently comprehensive and forcible to be interesting, but as an argument in favor of democratic socialism it is worthless. The author holds that poverty is chiefly due to three causes,—waste, unequal distribution, and insufficient production,—and after examining these he maintains that any attempted remedy for the evils of the present state of society which does not tend to the establishment of democratic socialism is a mere palliative, and that the position of the individualist who admits these evils and yet has no drastic remedy to propose is untenable.

Apparently, Dr. Godard's belief in the working power of socialism is founded on his faith in democracy,—a faith which can only be justified by proving the moral and mental superiority of the less educated classes,—unless, indeed, there is some magical virtue in organization. Thus, he says (p. 83), "It is the social organization of labor which must be brought about. . . . We have scarcely any instance of such organization at present, for large masses of the wage-earners are still practically excluded from the franchise." And his passion for equality, no doubt, makes the current objections to socialism, other than those which are purely economic, seem "mere inconveniencies," "insignificant" to him, and so he never seriously meets them. He does, indeed, attempt to answer the moral difficulty dwelt on by Mr. Leonard Courtney, viz., the immorality of confiscation; but his appreciation of it appears to be somewhat dimmed by his not distinctly perceiving to what extent confiscation is necessary. Thus, he says (p. 102), "The purchase-money for the land and capital required for organizing industry on socialistic principles would in the first instance be obtained by loans, the interest on which would be paid out of taxes levied on the incomes derived from monopoly. And, as socialized industry extended, production for private profit would necessarily diminish until ultimately it disappeared, and this would result in the gradual lowering of the rate of interest, . . . and at length the loans would be wiped out by payment in consumable goods as they were demanded." How the rate of interest is to be thus lowered, unless collective industry is so efficient as to accumulate capital at a much faster rate than private industry, is not clear. Again, the author seems to be somewhat misled by his own expression that "rent

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and interest are a tax on labor," and in so far as this is the case confiscation naturally appears to him equitable, and also easy.

Mr. Godard says that "The vast majority of criminal acts proceed directly or indirectly from a desire to obtain or keep possession of wealth," and that "our criminal code has been a disgrace to a professedly civilized nation," and hence he infers that as democracy advances crime will diminish. He also says that the present industrial system unduly fosters the military spirit, and that most of our recent wars have been due to financial causes provoked by capitalists. These and other such crude assertions are given without any facts to support them and very little attempt at proof, and hence are of no value in an argument. But we do not expect much detailed reasoning in a book of so large a scope and so small a size.

A. D. PEASE.

THE PURSE AND THE CONSCIENCE. By H. M. Thompson, B.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

The upshot of this book is apparently as follows. Most people desire to make the world happier, and in order to do so take, as their proximate end, justice tempered by mercy. As concerns the distribution of wealth, this end tends to be attained in our present economic system just in so far as competition is really free, and in so far as we are guided in our business pursuits by a higher motive than mere greed. It is therefore our duty to perfect our economic system by removing as far as possible all hinderances to the freedom of industry, such as bad laws, insufficient provision for education and health, fluctuations in the value of gold, and sudden changes in the method of production. Also, we must raise our standard of right conduct by inculcating chivalrous honesty, generosity, and a sense of responsibility towards others in all business relations; and, finally, we should encourage a perception of the true value of wealth, and of the worthlessness of mere possession. This means of bringing about an ideal state of society seems slower and less effectual than that of introducing a new system of industry, such as Socialism or Communism; but this is not really the case, since these systems are impracticable, in that they provide no sufficient stimulus to work, nor any guide to the kind of work most useful to the community.

The author's style and method, if not his thought, are so confused that it would be impossible to make his meaning clear by quotations, or by attempting to follow the order of his ideas. Thus, in his introduction (p. 6), he says his book "deals with the connection between two sciences,—that of economics and that of ethics," and again that it "has been written in advocacy of facing differences of opinion concerning the facts of the problems of poverty, and the methods of grappling with them and of endeavoring to discover which are right." These two statements, so far as they are intelligible, seem hardly consistent, but at any rate they lead us to expect some sort of scientific investigation, and not mere controversy, such as the argument in chapter iii. against Socialism, nor again such a summing as this, however we interpret it,—"Shortly, I do not suggest that ethics be confined to the field of economics. I merely urge their extension thereto."

In any discussion, however slight, of "the connection between ethics and

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economics," we may fairly look for a definition of at least one ethical ideal, and for some analysis of the mutual relations of moral and economic forces, but, instead of giving this, the author (pp. 14–15) tells us that "our investigation is that of the connection between monetary affairs (!) and considerations of right, irrespective of whether right be involved in an attempt to be just, or in a more extended attempt to be generous," and that therefore "it is not incumbent on us here to pin ourselves down to any rigid definition of justice" (or, we might add, of any other ethical principle!). Again, instead of a careful consideration of the meaning of the freedom of industry and of the suggestions that follow from this meaning, he talks in a vague, unintelligible way about "a number of economic forces existing side by side with, but in themselves independent of, the competitive system in relation to which we have ethical duties" (p. 87).

But surely it is unnecessary to discuss the value of this book as a scientific production, when we find such fallacies as that involved in the discussion on the "justice" of "the competitive system," where the author entirely ignores the difference between total and final utility, or in his statement (p. 141) that "there is no particular merit in investment" (as compared with spending on luxuries), since "it is equivalent simply to postponement of action."

Again, in so far as Mr. Thompson's book is controversial, it is futile, because the author neither makes clear his own premises nor understands those of his opponents. To condemn his argument against Socialism we need only point out that it is a double *ignoratio elenchi*, since no Idealist would accept his interpretation of Justice, nor any Fabian his definition of Socialism; that "it seeks to reward services to the community, not proportionately to their value as estimated by the public opinion of the community, but proportionately to the endeavor made in rendering them."

But, although Mr. Thompson's book is hardly likely to clear up "the chaotic confusion that exists in many minds concerning points which are fundamental," it may perhaps indicate a *via media* to those who wish to find one between collectivism and a blind belief in economic laws as precepts or as unalterable facts, and it may suggest the desirability of clear thinking and consistent conduct to those who are not in the habit of reading larger and better works.

This book is distinctly below the level of Messrs. Sonnenschein's "Social Science Series," and the editors must exercise more care in future if they wish to keep up its excellent reputation.

A. D. PEASE.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF MONEY. By W. Cunningham, D.D. London: John Murray, 1891.

There is something appropriate in the inclusion of Dr., or, as we may now call him, Professor, Cunningham's book in the first batch of *University Extension Manuals* which Mr. Murray is publishing; for the author, as he tells us in his preface, was "one of the pioneers of the University Extension Movement in 1874," and his subject should appeal to nearly every extension student. Perhaps, indeed, the most permanent and important result which may be expected to flow from the revived interest now widely felt in the extension of university teaching is that the teaching should prove to be "missionary," not merely in the sense

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of diffusing a taste for intellectual culture, but also in that of relieving the monotony and elevating the tone of material pursuits, by nurturing an enthusiasm for moral ideals. This ethical intention is disclosed in the very title of Dr. Cunningham's book, for, although the subject discussed is, as he says, *Capital in its Relation to Social Progress*, the title "The Use and Abuse of Money" is selected in order to "lay stress on the element of personal responsibility." It is not merely the sound instinct of the extension lecturer for a popular and attractive title,—an instinct which has led to the provision of a very full and careful syllabus or analysis of contents,—but it is also a deliberate ethical purpose which has dictated the name of the book and the mode of handling the subject. To this insistence on the presence of a moral element in economic questions the historical training and leanings of the author naturally lead; for, while he recognizes with a generosity and sobriety not always evinced by adherents of the "historical" school of economists the legitimacy and advantage in their due place of deductive trains of reasoning, he insists on the importance of approaching the question of the growth of capital from an empirical stand-point, and he endeavors to accord a full recognition to the "human, as opposed to the mechanical, element, in economics." In the first part of his manual he discusses some of these points of a more general character, and he traces the progress of society from a time when industry was possible with little, if any, capital, in the modern sense of the term, to a time when a capitalist era has arrived in all its fulness. He even looks forward into the future, and advances some sound criticism on socialistic proposals for controlling and administering capital. At present there is scope for national, for private, and for municipal management; and material welfare, though it may be abused, may still be used so as to afford the opportunity for moral progress. In the second part of his manual he passes from the consideration of "Social Problems" to that of "Practical Questions" connected with the formation, the investment and use, the replacement, and the direction of capital. In both these parts, while proceeding in the main on the traditional lines of the ordinary text-books, he does not lose sight of moral considerations; but it is in his third part, on "Personal Duty," that he reaches that more specially ethical treatment to which the other parts have led up. The scholastic condemnation of what was unfair was, he shows, comparatively a simple task, because the Schoolmen could generally fix the direct responsibility for wrong-doing, and could isolate single transactions. We have a more difficult work to perform; for, with the increased complexity of modern trade, responsibility is often indirect, and transactions are seldom isolated. But there are none the less duties with regard to the mode of employing capital, the rate of return upon it, and the enjoyment of wealth. Some businesses are positively immoral, some are legitimate in themselves, but their consequences involve nice moral questions; and an ideal is needed, which should be expressed in terms of personal motive, and not merely in external circumstances. It may be our duty to inquire into the purpose for which a loan is needed, or into the possible misuse of goods produced by a manufacture in which we engage. Is it right, for example, to encourage extravagance in a government by lending to it, or to exact interest, which may in course of time prove to be extortionate, from Egyptian fellaheen? Or, again, is it right to manufacture that which may be often misused, and in such a

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way that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to guard against this? And once more, if a man, from scruples of conscience, wishes to withdraw from such a business, should he wind it up to his own loss, or sell his interest to some other man? And, lastly, is it right, or is it wrong, to enjoy property which was originally acquired by means which do not approve themselves to the conscience? Similar questions suggest themselves about the sort of return on capital and the enjoyment of wealth, and are discussed by Dr. Cunningham with candor and judgment. He furnishes abundant food for careful reflection, and his manual should certainly succeed in the aim which is mentioned in the preface. His book is, he says, "intended for those who are already familiar with the outlines of political economy,"—and from this point of view it is, perhaps, in some places a little too difficult and advanced for the ordinary extension student; but, he proceeds, "it is meant to help them to think on topics about which every one talks,"—and for this object it is, we think, admirably designed.

L. L. PRICE.

THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. By James E. Thorold Rogers. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1891. Second edition. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.*

The fact that this, in some respects the most important, work (next to the "History of Agriculture and Prices") of the late Professor Thorold Rogers should have passed into a second edition in a comparatively short time, is a proof of the interest taken in the economic side of history by the general public. The present edition is apparently merely a reprint, in a cheaper form, of that of 1888, as the author's lamented death has made alteration impossible. Its appearance is, however, opportune, for we have had quite enough of theoretical economics lately, and the tendency towards metaphysics, to say nothing of mathematics, in the province of this science is as marked as ever. "Many years ago," runs the preface to these lectures, "I began to suspect that much of the political economy which was currently in authority was a collection of logomachies which had but little relation to the facts of social life." Now, the relationship of theories to facts is a most important part of economic science, and it is the lucid explanation of this relationship which makes this volume so peculiarly useful at the present time. The facts of his day were never out of Professor Rogers's memory when he was discussing economic questions. Hence his lectures, incorporated in this volume, have a special value for us of this generation, for nearly all of them refer, directly or indirectly, to current social questions. Thus, chapter iii., "On the Cultivation of Land by Owners and Occupiers," recalls to our notice some most important and generally forgotten truths, such as "The success of agriculture measures the extent to which other industries than agriculture can subsist," and "The agriculture of a country is the chief home-market of a country, and the trade with one's fellow-countrymen is the safest and least risky trade of all."

A most curious and interesting chapter, both ethically and economically, is that on "The Social Effect of Religious Movements," wherein the results of the teaching of Peacock, Wickliff, and Wesley upon the economic development of their respective periods are admirably summed up. This chapter stands, as it were, by itself; and between the others it is difficult to discriminate too nicely. But if we were

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asked to name the lectures which bear most specially upon problems of the present, we should select those on "Metallic Currencies" (ch. ix.) as bearing on bi-metallism; ch. xvi., on "The History of the Protectionist Movement in England;" ch. xxi., on "The Theory of Modern Taxation;" and the best chapter in the book, on "The Policy of Government in undertaking Service and Supply," as bearing directly upon topics like purchase of land by Parliament for national purposes, state railroads, and other questions not remotely connected with certain socialist proposals. Thus it will be seen that the book appeals directly to those who are trying to face and solve the many difficult social and economic problems of our times; and, even though one may disagree with some of the conclusions drawn in its pages, one cannot fail to recognize the enormous value of the appeal to facts, both of the present and of the past, to which it gives utterance, wherein the only hope of salvation for the political economist lies. For the student of social science, for the politician no less than for the economist, this volume is indispensable, and we heartily welcome the appearance of a second edition, whose moderate price places it now within the reach of all. H. DE B. GIBBINS.

ESSAYS, REVIEWS, AND ADDRESSES. By James Martineau, LL.D., D.D., etc. Selected and Revised by the Author. Vols. I.–IV. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. (pp. 527, 576, 579, 608.)

These four volumes, in which Dr. Martineau has collected all the more important essays, reviews, and addresses which have issued from his pen during the sixty years over which his literary activity has extended, appear very opportunely after the publication of the three elaborate works by which the author's rank in the philosophical world will finally be determined. The future historian of philosophy will find in these collected writings an interesting and valuable clue to the inner development of Dr. Martineau's characteristic ideas. We are told in the Preface that some few of the earliest of the author's philosophical essays have been omitted, "as too pervasively steeped in the spirit of a discarded philosophy;" the "discarded philosophy" being the necessarianism of Dr. Priestley and the associational psychology of James Mill.

Vol. i. is made up of personal sketches, admirably drawn, of Dr. Priestley, Schleiermacher, Comte, etc., and also three political essays. In vol. ii. are collected those essays which deal more especially with historical and ecclesiastical subjects. Though all the volumes contain matter of interest to the philosophical student, it is in vol. iii. and the first half of vol. iv. that the more direct and important philosophical utterances are found. The first part of vol. iv. includes a striking series of college addresses, and the well-known papers on "Modern Materialism," in which Professor Tyndall's Belfast address is so acutely criticised. It is in vol. iii., however, that the philosophical reviews are contained which first established Dr. Martineau's reputation as at once a powerful thinker and a master of literary form. In the first part of vol. iii., headed "Theological," is the paper entitled "Science, Nescience, and Faith," in which Mr. H. Spencer's "Agnosticism" is critically discussed, and also the paper on "Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought," which did so much to allay the panic which the Dean's Bampton lectures had occasioned in the theological world. In the "Philosophical" section of this volume are reviews of Mr. J. S. Mill's

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logical doctrines and of Professor Bain's psychology, and the volume closes with a remarkable paper on the question "Is there any Axiom of Causality?" which was originally read before the Metaphysical Society, and afterwards appeared in the *Contemporary Review.* Whoever wishes to enter into the heart of Dr. Martineau's philosophy should make himself thoroughly acquainted with this essay, for it is in his conception of the nature and origin of the idea of cause that the pivot is found on which his chief metaphysical and ethical ideas turn. Locke, as is well known, gave two explanations of the idea of cause: in one passage referring it to reflection on the order of phenomena, and in another appearing to derive it from the consciousness which the mind has of its own causal activity. Berkeley adopted the latter of these explanations, while Hume fastened upon the former, treating cause as nothing more than phenomenal antecedence. From Hume this notion of cause as a mere relation among phenomena passed into the Kantian philosophy, and thence into German idealism, so that now Neo-Hegelians, like the late Professor T. H. Green, declare that to call God the cause of any event is an unmeaning expression. It is characteristic of Dr. Martineau's philosophical system that he entirely rejects this view of cause, and maintains that "the axiom 'every phenomenon has a cause,' instead of meaning 'every phenomenon invariably succeeds another phenomenon,' really means 'every phenomenon springs from something other than phenomenon.'" In this paper and elsewhere Dr. Martineau argues that this "something other than phenomenon" can be nothing else than "will." This exposition of the idea of cause places Dr. Martineau in antagonism with both the sensational and the rational idealists, but it is only against the former that the criticisms in these volumes are directed. Our space will only allow of a glance at Dr. Martineau's fundamental ethical teaching, which is found in vol. iii., in reviews of Dr. Whewell's moral treatises, and much more fully in the second volume of the "Types of Ethical Theory." The previous ethical doctrine most akin to that of our author is that given in Butler's celebrated three sermons on human nature; but the bishop's ethical psychology falls far short of Dr. Martineau's more consistent and elaborate analysis of man's moral consciousness. According to Dr. Martineau, conscience passes judgment not on outward acts, but on inward springs of action. As human nature develops, higher springs of action necessarily arise, and it is the distinctive feature of our author's ethical theory that he maintains that on the juxtaposition in consciousness of two or more springs of action we intuitively discern that one is of higher ethical rank than the others. "All human beings," argues Dr. Martineau, "when their consciousness is fairly interpreted, as infallibly arrive at the same series of moral estimates as at the same set of rational truths; so that it is no less correct to speak of a universal conscience than of a universal reason in mankind; and on this community of nature alone rests the possibility of ethical science." But while our author thus rests the discernment of first principles in ethics on immediate intuition, he at the same time finds a legitimate sphere for the calculation of consequences; for when the conscience has sanctioned certain principles of action there often remain several possible ways in which the ethical injunction may be executed, and the choice between these various means must be determined by an appeal to the canon of consequences. Whatever judgment may be passed as to the soundness of this ethical theory, there can be but one opinion as to the

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high psychological value of Dr. Martineau's elaborate analysis of human springs of action. It is the opinion of the present writer that the metaphysical and ethical ideas set forth in these eloquent volumes will amply repay careful reading, and that the arguments by which they are supported must be fairly reckoned with in all future attempts to give a satisfactory *rationale* of man's moral consciousness. C. B. UPTON.

EIN LEBENSBUND. Erzählung aus der Zukunft. Von Julius Baumann. Frankfurt a. M.: Koenitzer's Verlag, 1891. Pp. 112. Octavo.

The author of this tale—well known and esteemed as a professor of many years' standing at the University of Göttingen and as an able philosophical writer—has produced a story in which philosophical reflection and theory overshadow the narrative; a fact which justifies us in discussing his work here. Indeed, the story as such does not in the least lay claim to any independent artistic value; it merely serves to bring about certain situations which permit the author to express his thoughts in a more varied and attractive way than would be possible in a purely theoretical treatise. For still another reason the work comes within the province of this JOURNAL. The author wishes to sketch the outlines of his philosophical system, not as a purely personal and individual view, but as a result of the modern method of scientific thought. But is science the only controlling element in our lives? This question must be answered in the negative, for our age is everywhere deeply engrossed in a dualism of the scientific and the religious world of thought. Both have naturally arisen in the cause of civilization; both stand to-day sharply opposed to each other on account of their many irreconcilable claims. The religious world has its organization in its ecclesiastical fellowship; nor does science, for her own purposes, lack corporate union; but so far it has done little for the cultivation of higher ideal interests, for a common spiritual and moral elevation. The thought of pursuing knowledge, not merely as an end in itself or for purely practical purposes, but to make it the foundation of our entire view of life, still seems strange in many ways even to the civilized nations. Religion still occupies the position that should be held by a popular philosophy. As a system of metaphysics for the people, religion is everywhere found at the side of science, but in a way and with the help of formulas which, emanating from a non-scientific view of the world, unavoidably clash with our scientific habits of thought. Up to a certain degree this condition exists and may be felt everywhere; but it is much less natural in a country like the United States, where the Constitution places no obstacles in the way of the complete individualization of religious creeds, than it is in Germany, where the ruling hierarchy, by means of outward pressure, keeps the best mental energy of the nation within the bounds of traditional and antiquated creeds. These conditions must be kept in view in order properly to appreciate the real purpose of the author. The "League of Life" (*Lebensbund*), which he undertakes to describe, is the model of a free society, which shapes its life and the education of its offspring in an ideal form, not upon a foundation of historical belief, but upon one of living knowledge. Science is constantly being reproached with the fact that it brings the thought of man to no conclusion, and offers no goal to his life. Baumann endeavors to show here that

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this poverty is merely imaginary; that the scientific world, if we properly utilize it, contains just as full powers of consolation and of elevation as does the religious. He shows us the spiritual material with which such a society, established upon purely rational thought, would need to work, and at the same time shows how it is to be applied to the different circumstances of life in which, under present conditions, the priest takes the place of a speaker. With this in view, he gives us extracts from religious discourses given before the league,—from funeral sermons, initiatory addresses, marriage discourses; he gives examples of the devotional services of the league; he develops its theoretical starting-points, the fundamental ideas of its morality, its relation to religion and the state. Baumann's "League of Life" is nothing else than a picture of an ethical society whose tendencies are not confined to merely practical morality, but whose members are at the same time joined by a common theoretical view of the world. And such a community of thought, which naturally must not become petrified dogma, but must leave plenty of room for individual freedom, seems to me also the absolute condition for the existence of such unions, as well as a necessary result of them. For this reason we recommend this suggestive work to the attention of the leaders and members of existing ethical societies.

FR. JODL.

PRAGUE.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892.

HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC. By Bernard Bosanquet, LL.D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892.

THOMAS CARLYLE. By Professor John Nichol. London: Macmillan & Co., 1892, pp. viii, 248.

THE REAL JESUS. By John Vickers. London: Williams & Norgate, 1891, pp. 314.

CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM. By F. Marshall, M.A. Leeds: Richard Jackson, 1892, pp. 30.

THE FALLACY OF SAVING. By John M. Robertson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892, pp. ix, 148.

CORRECTION.

In the translation of Professor Gizycki's review of Dr. Martin Keibel's work entitled "Die Religion und ihr Recht gegenüber dem modernen Moralismus" (July number), the expression which occurs several times, viz., "supernatural," should have been "extra-human," Dr. Keibel's point being that the source of religion is *extra-human* (*aussermenschlich*), but not *supernatural* (*übernatürlich*). We make this correction at the request of Dr. Keibel, with the full consent of the reviewer and translator.

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THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.*

He will teach "a blinding superstition," said Theophrastus Such, who teaches "that a theory of human well-being can be constructed in disregard of the influences that have made us human." If modern thought has any new truth to contribute to the inherited stock of ethical wisdom, it is because we are in a position to study more minutely than was possible in earlier days, and to interpret more exactly, the forces and conditions by which our human nature has been wrought. We shall find them to be not altogether different in kind from those that were recognized by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. Indeed, the Greek conceptions were truer than some later ones. Most of the ethical systems that have been constructed since the Protestant Reformation have dealt directly with the individual, and have attempted to work from the individual to society. In this they have been not wholly wrong. Centuries of suppression of individuality by Church and State had obscured one-half of moral truth. Men needed to be reminded that the individual, once he comes into existence, has a value in and for himself, and must be counted as a force reacting on society. But to the extent that ethical systems have assumed the individual as an independent starting-point of social and moral phenomena,

* This paper is in substance the concluding lecture of a course on "The Theory of Social Progress," delivered by Professor Giddings at the School of Applied Ethics, in July, 1892.

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they have been radically untrue. The Greeks never failed to see that all rational life is a product of social conditions. To the Greek, says Butcher, "'The man *versus* the state' was a phrase unknown; the man was complete in the state; apart from it he was not only incomplete, he had no rational existence. Only through the social organism could each part, by adaptation to the others, develop its inherent powers." Nevertheless, this doctrine of the creation of man by society was by no means completely thought out in the minds of those writers who first formulated it, and those who last concerned themselves about it left much to be added by the students of a later time. Aristotle's comparative study of one hundred and fifty-eight different communities, which enabled him first among scientific investigators to show in detail how and why the good life can have existence only in the organized state, was a theoretical no less than a practical advance beyond the speculative insight of Plato. In like manner, our modern study of social progress is an advance, both theoretical and practical, beyond the work of Plato and Aristotle, and beyond the philosophy of man as it stood when post-Kantian idealism had achieved in Germany its task of reviving Hellenic moods of thought. The assertion demands, perhaps, a single word of explanation. They misapprehend the work of science who oppose it to speculative philosophy, as if one must choose between them which god he will serve. It may be that our modern science can discover few great truths of which at least some glimmerings were not seen in ancient Greece. The very doctrine of evolution is in that sense not new. But the mission of science is a patient conversion of insight into sight; of dialectic into knowledge. Our advantage is not in a surer conviction than Aristotle held, that he who can live without society must be either a beast or a god; it is in a minute and relatively precise knowledge of those slow but certain processes of biological and social change by which the transformation of brutality into humanity is effected. And we cannot afford to despise this more perfect knowledge, as but a tedious elaboration of ideas long since familiar and accepted. It is itself a new factor in the social process. In the fateful game of chess with the

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unseen antagonist of Mr. Huxley's picture, it enables man to play with the cool and calculating joy of one who knows the meaning and the end of every move; knows, too, that on the other side the play, though real and relentless, is always just, patient, and fair.

Therefore, chief among the relations of cause and effect in the wonderful process that has made us human, is one that brings together, in a complete truth, the partial explanations that we owe to Athens, with other explanations, no less partial, that have been worked out in our own day. The action of a social medium upon intelligence and character on the one hand, natural selection and survival on the other,—these influences together have created human faculty. There came a time in the long struggle for existence, as Mr. Wallace has shown, when mental resource counted for more than physical strength. But anthropoid apes and simian men, we have every reason to suppose, acquired mental resources through their social habits, which multiplied experiences and made tradition possible. The intelligence that association created has never ceased to depend on association for perpetuation and growth. Deprived of comradeship by circumstance or law, men go back to the brutality from which they came. Wilfully rejecting companionship, they learn, with Manfred, that man is not yet qualified to act the part of god:

> . . . "There is an order
> Of mortals on the earth, who do become
> Old in their youth, and die ere middle age,
> Without the violence of warlike death."

Therefore it has been the creatures best equipped with social habit and its products that have won and maintained supremacy in the ceaseless contention with physical nature and living enemies. Society is a means to a perfectly definite end,—namely, the survival of living creatures through a progressive evolution of their intelligence and sympathy. There can be no sociology worthy of the name which is not essentially an elaboration of this central principle. The notion that society is an end in itself amounts to an unthinkable proposition. At

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the same time, the intelligence and the fraternity that association creates react in their turn on society, making it more perfect as a working organization, nobler and purer as a medium of individual life. Thus the interpretation of man as a progressive ethical being, and the interpretation of society as an ever-changing plexus of relationships, must proceed together. It is not enough to know with the philosophers of Greece that without society and social duty there can be no individual moral life. They understood well the problems of social order and the nature of personal worthiness. They knew that excellence is essentially a fact of organization: Plato's demonstration that justice in the state and goodness in the individual life are neither more nor less than the co-ordinated play of mutually dependent and mutually limiting activities, in proportions harmonious with one another, and in perfect subordination to the unity of the whole, has never been equalled, certainly never surpassed, in ethical analysis. They were familiar, too, with a thousand aspects of social and of individual change. But they did not combine these elements into a synthetic conception. They were unable to unite the static with the dynamic factors of their problem, and so arrive at the peculiarly modern notion of a moving equilibrium. And therefore they failed to achieve an entirely true and sufficient philosophy of either man or the state. For life is not the whirl of a constant number of jugglers' plates, balanced on the sword-points of the players: it is a whirl in which new plates and new motions appear at every instant, compelling ever most delicate readjustments throughout the entire system, and yet without once disturbing seriously the approximately perfect balance of the whole. The large and difficult conception, then, to which we must attain is that of a world in which there can be no true ethical phenomena except through a process, at once progressive and orderly, of mutual modifications and adaptations of man and society by each other; in which each acquires, stage by stage, a more delicate complexity of organization. Of the many implications of this conception we must now examine some of the more important.

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In philosophy of every school the term personality stands for the highest synthetic product of mental evolution. True personality is a well-unified, self-conscious mental life, harmonious within itself, capable of indefinite expansion, and sympathetic with surrounding life because realizing and comprehending in itself the manifold possibilities of life. It is the type at once of the concrete and the universal. One who thoroughly understands this will never make the mistake of believing, on the one hand, that utility is the fundamental word of ethics, or, on the other hand, that ethics can be complete without including utilitarianism. The fundamental word of ethics is integrity,—wholeness. There can be no utility apart from a consciousness capable of wants and satisfactions. The integrity, the unity, the internal harmony of that consciousness is therefore the first necessity. The strongest ethical terms, as right, truth, obligation, stand in direct relation to integrity rather than to utility. The joy of activity also, including the supreme satisfaction that one may find in self-sacrifice, is related to integrity first of all, for it implies the consistent action of the whole personality; while utility is a quality not immediately of conduct as spontaneous activity, but rather of its reactions. Therefore if integrity and utility come into direct conflict, utility must for the moment give way; since self-conservation is preliminary to self-expansion; and because the vitality and the qualities of conduct, by which all its own consequences are conditioned, are governed by its internal unity of purpose. But there can be no enduring integrity without development, no permanent conservation without progress. Therefore ethics cannot stop at integrity. It must expand into utilitarianism, and work out the laws of that cumulative happiness which is the reward and the confirmation of well-doing.

Put this conception of personality side by side with our view of intelligence as a product of social conditions. Is it not evident that personality in this philosophical sense comes into being only in the relatively perfect society, which has passed beyond the limitations of tribal existence, and even of a narrow nationalism, into a sympathetic relation to mankind

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in all its varied phases of development? If so, it is a product of progressive as distinguished from both stationary and anarchistic, or disintegrating, society, and the theory of personality can be worked out only in terms of a theory of social progress.

In detail this means that a society in which the highest type of mind can appear is one that has had, first, such a vigorous ethnical or national existence, and second, such varied contact with surrounding peoples, that it has become plastic without losing its distinctive character. In the nomenclature of evolution, it has acquired internal mobility without losing cohesion. By admixture of bloods a variable but not unstable physical nature has been produced. By numberless comparisons of one mode of civilization with another, a mental temper at once critical and catholic has been created. Prosperity and a rapidly-increasing population have constantly brought the young and enterprising to the front in the conduct of affairs. Selection has weeded out those who could neither learn nor forget. Force and authority in the social organization have so far given way to spontaneous initiative that the individual can find scope for the development of his latent powers, but not so far as to permit disintegration. Contact and converse being the conditions of progress, its phases are an increase of material well-being, an inclusive sympathy, a catholic rationality, and a flexible social constitution, adapting itself readily to changing conditions, yet of enduring strength. And since the conservation of energy is a fact of social as of physical phenomena, the essential nature of progress, beneath all conditions and phases, is a conversion of lower—that is, more simple, imperfectly organized—modes of energy into higher. Economic activities transform the energies of physical nature into social force, of which there is no other source whatever, since artistic, religious, educational, and political activities are but a further transformation of the results of economic effort. In the medium of all these activities is moulded their final product, the human personality, which could come into being in no other way and under no other circumstances.

Such are a few of the sociological facts that underlie ethical

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problems. It is interesting to reflect that in a vague way the great truth which they contain, that without social progress there can be no human personality, and, therefore, no ethics, has always been present in popular consciousness. The experiences of individual life, of course, afford a basis for it, since the years from childhood to maturity are normally a period of increasing personal power, in which every ambitious man believes that he was born to accomplish some desirable transformation of the community. But social experiences in the mass have doubtless built the superstructure. Studies in ethnology and comparative religions are pointing to the probable conclusion that faith in progress has been an essential element in every religious belief. Under some circumstances it may be the only element. Charity-workers in the slums of Paris and London report that an undefined, shadowy belief in a better state of things is the last trace of religious consciousness discoverable in whole classes of the very poor. What has been the genesis of the conviction? Everywhere social advance has been brought about through successive waves of conquest. Naturally enough, in the minds of the conquerors the good order, the right order, has been identified with the new order of things which they have sought to establish. The evil order has been the old way of life that was followed by the subjugated enemies who are now reduced to serfdom. Good spirits are those who favor the plans of the enterprising and successful, in whose control are the shaping of public policy and the dictation of orthodox belief. It is true that orthodoxy is no sooner born than it turns conservative and seeks to maintain itself against further change. But the effort is vain. Another conquest, or a new generation, brings new men and new issues to the fore, and a new orthodoxy stands ever ready to crowd the old relentlessly to the wall. The conquered and oppressed, on their part, have a doctrine of progress also. It is a faith in a future in which justice shall be done, when they shall be delivered from their captivity and in their turn put their ruthless enemies under foot. In time a closer intercourse and a finer feeling soften and blend these conflicting faiths into a belief in the ultimate happiness and perfection of all classes.

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Crude and even visionary as it may be, this perennial faith in social progress is the motive power of moral life. Science must rectify it at a thousand points, but the very first word of an ethical science that is not charlatanism itself must be an unequivocal declaration that such faith *in se* is the beginning of righteousness. The first law of life is a law of motion. In society, as on the street, the preliminary duty is to "move on." The nation that has no further reconstructions to effect, no new ideals to realize in practice, has completed its work and will disappear before the warfare or the migrations of more earnest men. But the moving on must be developmental; mere change is not evolution, but confusion; and the nature and limitations of an evolutionary process, imperfectly recognized as yet in ethical discussion, are practically unknown to popular thought. It is here, then, that the rectifying work of science must begin. Human society is not a something-for-nothing endowment order. The vision of a completed society, lacking neither material comfort nor any moral excellence, in which foolishness, want, and suffering could linger only as dim memories of an imperfect past, has had a strangely persistent fascination for speculative minds in every age. Common sense has never accepted the dream for reality; for common sense is a sceptic from the beginning. Philosophy has doubted if evil be not inherent in the nature of the world, and therefore ineradicable. But doubt and scepticism have fallen far short of reasoned demonstration from experience that the vision is inherently absurd. Yet the elements of the demonstration that science has been patiently working out in recent years are simple enough. The available energy of society at any given moment is strictly limited in amount. The total can be increased only by parting with some, in the thought and labor by which larger stores of physical energy, contained in the natural resources of the environment, are set free and converted to human use. All progress, therefore, is conditioned by cost, and if the law of conservation holds good in these matters, as we have assumed that it must, the cost will increase with the progress; not, however, necessarily in the same ratio as the gain, since

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riper knowledge should enable us to get more from physical nature with a given expenditure of human effort. In this simple form the limitations of progress present an economic rather than a moral problem, and need not detain us at the present time. But since society is an organic aggregate, the cost of progress takes on various complications, out of which grow ethical problems that are both grave and difficult. As was shown in the illustration of the moving equilibrium, society, as an aggregate that is simultaneously losing and absorbing motion, must experience an incessant rearrangement of its parts. This means two very important things: First, there can be no social gain that does not entail somewhere, on the whole community or on a class, the break-up of long-established relations, interests, and occupations, and the necessity of a more or less difficult readjustment. Second, the increase of social activity, which is the only phase of progress that most people ever see at all, may so exceed the rate of constructive readjustment that the end is disorganization and ruin.

For the further examination of these propositions let us translate them from physical terms into the language of feeling. This is legitimate, because the destruction of familiar relations and the necessity of establishing new ones are known immediately in consciousness in terms of hardship or suffering; while any disorganization of social or individual life involves the pain of moral retrogression. The limitations of progress, then, are these: First, there can be no social progress, and therefore no evolution of ethical personality, except at the price of an absolute, but not necessarily a relative, increase of suffering. Second, if the increase of social activity, which is one phase of progress, becomes disproportionate to the constructive reorganization of social relationships, which is the complementary phase, the increase of suffering will become degeneration and moral evil.

Such limitations are not a cheering aspect of social progress, but their reality is fully established in historical and statistical fact, and they sharply define our ethical obligations. The first of these sobering propositions has to be made a shade

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darker still. The suffering that progress costs is borne for the most part vicariously. The classes who are displaced, whose interests and occupations are broken up by the relentless course of change, are not the ones who secure the joys of richer and ampler life. That which enormously benefits mankind is too often the irretrievable ruin of the few. For illustration, one need not be confined to the familiar facts of the wasting of barbarian peoples before the advance of civilization, or the sacrifice of life in national self-defence. The history of industrial progress affords examples quite as striking, and essentially more significant, since they show that after society has settled down to the quiet occupations of peace the fundamental conditions of its development remain unchanged. In reviewing them the sociologist expects to find that the minority which thus suffers the pains of progress is composed mainly of the most unprogressive elements of the population, and he is not disappointed. But he finds evidences also that to some extent the sufferers are recruited by victims of pure misfortune; neither their nature nor their conduct has been the cause of their undoing.

When in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the growth of towns, money payments, and the commutation of week work loosened the bonds of custom and law that had held the serf to the manor, the entire commonwealth of England experienced an economic prosperity never before known. Population and wealth increased, and the free tenants, as a class, rose steadily in social position. They could cultivate more or less land, or engage in trade and obtain municipal charters. But the economic equality of an earlier day had disappeared. The growth of population brought men into the world for whom there were places enough, and more than enough, but not places already allotted to them in the social order. They were places that had to be discovered by intelligence and enterprise, qualities that are not possessed by all men equally. The full virgate of land was no longer secured by customary law to each family. Since the energetic and strong could control more, the easy-going and weak had to get on with less. In the towns the far-seeing and forehanded

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quickly monopolized trade and the more profitable crafts. And so, while this comparative freedom of enterprise stimulated activity in a hundred ways that made England as a nation richer and stronger, it destroyed the old economic footing of the less competent members of society, and left them to struggle on, thenceforth, as a wage-earning class.

Two hundred years later, in the sixteenth century, society was again transformed by the results of geographical discovery. Free capital and foreign commerce quickened industry and thought into intense and brilliant life. "It was indeed a stirring time," writes Hyndman, obliged to admit that this period, which he calls the iron age of the peasantry and wage classes, was, nevertheless, one of marvellous progress in other respects. "A new world was being discovered in art and in science in Europe as well as in actual existence on the other side of the Atlantic. . . . Never before had so great an impulse been given to human enterprise and human imagination." But the splendor had its price, a price that socialists like Hyndman have superficially described and most imperfectly understood. Political integration had been going on. The struggle of contending factions had been costly, and the re-established national life, with its manifold activities, was more costly. Barons discharged the bands of retainers that were no longer needed in civil strife. To better their fortunes they enclosed common lands that had been freely used by the yeomanry, and began evicting tenants to convert agricultural lands into the sheep pastures that required little labor and returned a quick money income from sales of wool in Flanders. Now, the misery of these displaced people, forced into wage labor and vagabondage, was not due to any actual lack of land or of industrial opportunity. There remained land enough and to spare, notwithstanding enclosures and evictions, had it been used rightly; the development of manufactures and commerce had only begun. If they had had the knowledge and will to cultivate arable land more intensively, they could not have been driven from the soil; if there had been a free mobility of labor, they could have found employment quickly in the best instead of tardily in the worst markets,

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as too often happened; if the organizing ability of employers had been greater, the best markets would more quickly have found them. But the social value of land had become too great for their wasteful methods; they had to change or go. That knowledge might increase, that freedom to go and come might be established, that the organization of enterprise might become more perfect, it was necessary that just these economic and social changes which accomplished so much ruin should take place. Consequently, if the world was to become a larger and better place for the alert, on-moving many, the sacrifice of the sluggish had to be.

The industrial revolution at the close of the eighteenth century occasioned displacements of labor that bore more distinctly the character of misfortunes to those who were injured by them. No degree of skill, enterprise, or assiduity could have enabled the handicraftsmen to hold their own in competition with power-machinery and the steam-engine. They could do nothing but leave their shops to wind and weather, and begin life over, on new terms, in factory towns. How many thousands of them never fully re-established themselves, how many succumbed to illness or even to actual starvation before economic reorganization was fairly completed, the reports of parliamentary inquiries bear witness. Yet an unprecedented increase of population was proof that, on the whole, the masses of the people had never been so prosperous. Before 1751 the largest decennial increase had been three per cent.; before 1781 it did not exceed six per cent. Then, all at once, it rose, decade by decade, to nine, eleven, fourteen, and finally, between 1811 and 1821, to eighteen per cent. At the present time the displacement of manual labor by machinery is incessant, and less than in any previous period is the suffering visited on the least valuable portion of the population, since not infrequently it is men of a higher standard of life who are forced out by the competition of a lower type. Nevertheless, so enormous has been the net gain from improved methods of production that the consequences of displacement are immeasurably less serious than they were a century ago.

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The chances of finding re-employment quickly are, for competent men, far greater than they were at any former time, and the period of search is made endurable by accumulated savings and varied forms of aid. All in all, industrial history discloses a progressive diminution of the proportion of inevitable suffering mixed with the gains of progress. But the absolute increase remains. The personnel of the displaced class changes more rapidly than in earlier times, but the class, as a class, is endlessly renewed. As a class, it can never disappear so long as progress continues.

Such, in its simplest statement, is the law of the cost of progress. "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." Whatever augments well-being destroys some livelihood. As an abstract proposition, no well-informed student of social phenomena would call this truth in question. But, unfortunately, the law-makers, the social reformers, and the moralists have not bound it upon their fingers nor written it upon the tables of their hearts. They legislate, reform, and advise, forgetful that their wisest endeavors can be at the best only "something between a hinderance and a help;" and the world goes on, therefore, not only deceiving itself with dreams, but wasting its resources on impossible undertakings.

For this principle is one that would make the instant quietus of many vain questionings if it were an ever-present element in our thinking. The poor have been always with us. Must they be with us always? Or may we hope that economic prosperity and social justice will one day mete out comfort, if not abundance, to all? Not unless we can attain "finality in a world of change." Not unless there is a definite limit to the intellectual and moral progress of the race; for the conditions that would eliminate poverty from the earth would infallibly terminate the life that is more than meat, in society first, and afterwards in individuals. Unless all men could be made equally prudent, equally judicious, neither an increase of wealth nor changes in its distribution could prevent the occasional sweeping away of possessions by the social rearrangements that progress demands. The relative dimensions of poverty will contract and its misery will be alleviated,

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but there is no reason to believe that it will ever wholly disappear.

Will multitudes of human beings remain always in practical subjection to individual or corporate masters? Can we not abolish economic slavery as we have abolished legal bondage? Aristotle's argument that slavery inheres in civilization has shocked the sensitive and amused the shallow, while both have quoted it to show what foolishness a philosopher can teach. But to the wise it will ever remain a profound though mournful truth. Essential slavery has been aptly described as the estate of a man who "can't get any freedom." We have changed the legal conditions under which millions of men and women perform ill-requited tasks of daily toil. To some extent we have diminished the total magnitude of their misery, if not in every individual case its extreme intensity. But we have not enabled them to get actual freedom. We have made it unlawful to buy and sell their persons. The master can no longer obtain control of the laborer's time and strength, and therefore of his freedom, from any legal principal but the laborer himself. The laborer cannot even sell his own freedom in perpetuity. But he can sell any portion of it, or all of it subdivided into portions, for a limited period of time, or for his whole life subdivided into periods. Practically, therefore, any man or woman may sell his or her entire freedom for life, and practically thousands of both men and women are compelled by hunger to make the sale on terms that are personally degrading. Yet that interpretation of this melancholy fact which attributes it to the wickedness and greed of a capital-owning class is a tissue of economic and sociological fallacies. Another interpretation, which explains it as unavoidable misfortune, becomes a perversion of history when, in the desire to prove that the world has grown better, it assumes that ancient legal slavery was a consciously-devised oppression. Neither oppression nor greed has been at any time the first cause of legal bondage or of economic dependence. Both are secondary causes, induced by experiences with a slavery already existent.

Modern civilization does not require, it does not even need,

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the drudgery of needle-women or the crushing toil of men in a score of life-destroying occupations. If these wretched beings should drop out of existence and no others stood ready to fill their places, the economic activities of the world would not greatly suffer. A thousand devices latent in inventive brains would quickly make good any momentary loss. The true view of the facts is that these people continue to exist after the kinds of work that they know how to perform have ceased to be of any considerable value to society. Society continues to employ them for a remuneration not exceeding the cost of getting the work done in some other and perhaps better way. The economic law here referred to is one that has been too much neglected in scientific discussion. It ought to be repeated and illustrated at every opportunity, for at present it stands in direct contradiction to current prepossessions. We are told incessantly that unskilled labor creates the wealth of the world. It would be nearer the truth to say that large classes of unskilled labor hardly create their own subsistence. The laborers that have no adaptiveness, that bring no new ideas to their work, that have no suspicion of the next best thing to turn to in an emergency, might be much better identified with the dependent classes than with the wealth-creators. Precisely the same economic law offers the true interpretation of ancient slavery. In strictness civilization did not rest on slavery. It was not in any true sense maintained by slavery. The conditions that created the civilization created economic dependence, and they are working in the same way, with similar results, to-day. Ancient civilization accepted the dependence and utilized it in the crude form of slavery. Modern civilization accepts and utilizes it in the slightly more refined form of the wages system. Certain great social tasks of creative organization have always confronted our race. The enforced effort to achieve them has been history's great competitive examination. The slaves and serfs have been those who have failed. The first great necessity was social unity,—the power to act together in a disciplined way,—and the first slaves were those who could not create a sufficiently coherent social organization to sustain a

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growing civilization. They had to make way before others who were equal to that great achievement, and they became slaves not solely nor chiefly because of a conqueror's tyranny, but primarily because slavery or serfdom was practically the only economic disposition that could be made of them. To-day social unity has been in good measure established, and the world has entered on yet larger undertakings. The condition and assurance of freedom to-day is the ability to devise new things, to create new opportunities, to make not only two blades of grass grow where one grew before, but to make a hundred kinds of grass grow where before grew only one kind. Accordingly, the practically unfree task-workers of this present time are those who, unaided, can accomplish none of these new things. They are those who might do well in old familiar ways, but who have nothing to turn to when their ways cease to be of value to the world. To live they must force depreciated services upon society on any terms that society can continue to pay. They are unfree task-workers not because society chooses to oppress them, but because society has not yet devised or stumbled upon any other disposition to make of them. Civilization, therefore, is not cruel. It is ever supporting and trying in many ways to utilize the wrecks and failures of its own imperfect past.

But it may be said: All these negative conclusions are based on the assumption that the régime of individualism is to continue. Might not redemption from poverty and dependence be possible under the reign of a beneficent socialism?

Two systems of socialism have been proposed, if we classify them according to plans of organization, and two if we classify with reference to a proposed division of wealth. According to one plan industrial administration would be centralized; according to the other it would be decentralized. Either of these systems might be communistic, incomes being made equal throughout society, or either might be non-communistic, the services of different men being valued unequally.

Decentralized socialism would merely substitute competing communities for competing private organizations. It would follow that some communities would prosper more than others,

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and that some, therefore, would presently come under subjection to the others. A centralized socialism would probably attempt to establish a rigid and final system of occupations, in the hope of preventing industrial derangements. If successful, the attempt would make an end of progress. If no such attempt were made, men would be thrown, as now, from time to time, out of that ideal arrangement in which each did the work to which he was best adapted, and therefore, if rewarded in proportion to their services, the unfortunates would receive, as now, only the pittance that would barely support life. The one difference would be that society in its corporate capacity would assume the responsibility of finding new work for them; but, rewarding them according to performance only, it would practically have them in absolute subjection. They would only have exchanged masters, and slavery to individuals for slavery to society.

If, vainly hoping to escape from this dilemma, society should not only assume the responsibility of finding new opportunities for the displaced, but should undertake to compensate them for the buffetings and losses that they had suffered by reason of industrial changes, and regardless of their resulting worth to the commonwealth, it would radically transform the character of its socialism. Rewarding no longer according to service, the socialism would become communism. Men of unequal power to work and to use, of widely varying capacities to enjoy, would share alike the common product of their labor. Only one result could follow. Men of animal natures, having as large incomes as men of a higher mental and moral development, would spend inevitably a disproportionate share on the grosser sorts of gratification. Materialism of life, with all its moral debasement, would be the unprofitable substitute for economic hardship. Income can never be greatly disproportionate to the social value of a man's work, talents, culture, and virtues, without degrading him. If it be said that at present many men whose whole social value is of the slightest do have, in fact, fabulous incomes, which socialism would diminish, the reply is that there are not, accurately speaking, many such men, and that there would be no apparent advan-

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tage in substituting a systematic breeding of dull sensualists for the sporadic genesis of more brilliant debauchees. Be that as it may, the men and women of this class exemplify and verify the law. Their lives lend the sting of truth to the saying, "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!"

Shall we then conclude that an unrestrained individualism, eagerly working out those social changes that seem advantageous to their promoters, can achieve limitless progress, and that only harm could come from any checking of the rate or intensity of its activity? Shall we assume that the inevitable costs of progress in economic loss and human suffering must be uncomplainingly borne by those on whom they fall, because all private reforms are utopian, and all public regulation of industry or assumption of its losses in accordance with any form of socialism or communism would be worse than folly? Must we acknowledge that society has no moral responsibility for the consequences of the processes and changes by which its own well-being and ethical life are maintained? Shall we give ourselves over to the belief that *laissez faire* is the last word of social science and the first law of ethics? Assuredly and most emphatically, no! Nothing in the conditions of progress as set forth in the foregoing study so much as hints at other than negative answers to these questions. On the contrary, if the law of evolution as exemplified in human society has been rightly understood, we shall be prepared to find certain very real limitations of the number and extent of the social, political, or industrial metamorphoses which, within a given period, can combine in genuine progress. We shall look to discover a growing necessity for integral social action. We shall expect to hear the ethical consciousness of humanity declaring that society is morally responsible for the costs of its existence.

In dynamic phenomena of every kind results are a function, as the mathematicians express it, of time. With a given amount of energy you can go in an hour or a day a given distance. Prolong the time, and you can increase the distance. In the inconceivably complicated dynamic phenomena of life,

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growth, organization, development, are all functions of time. Force the rate of transformation, and you simply prevent the establishment of some relations of integration, differentiation, or segregation, necessary to complete organization. And if organization is incomplete there is a limit to the life-possibilities of the organism. It can perform less and enjoy less while it lives, and its dissolution will begin earlier. Society on a great scale, as the individual life on a smaller scale, exemplifies all these laws. If social evolution is to continue, and the ethical life of man is to become larger and richer with increasing happiness, social organization in the future will be not simpler than it is now, but immeasurably more complex. In its larger being individualism, socialism, and communism will not be the mutually exclusive things that they now seem to be. There will be not a narrower but a wider field for individual effort, not less but more personal liberty. At the same time, more enterprises will be brought under public control, and more of the good things of life will be distributed, like the sunshine and the air, in free and equal portions. The displaced men and women will be more quickly re-established than now, their services will be made of greater value, and society will assume a larger portion of the burden of their misfortunes. All these things are implications of the second of the limitations of progress to which attention has been called,—namely, that if the increase of social activity becomes disproportionate to the constructive reorganization of social relationships, the increase of suffering will become degeneration and moral evil. Some of the facts in evidence must be briefly noted.

Dazzled by the magnificent results of material progress already achieved, men throw themselves into the great enterprises of modern life with the zest of an ambition that knows no bounds. The rate of industrial, professional, political, and intellectual activity becomes proportionate to the swiftness of electricity and steam. The intense struggle for success causes three great demographic changes which profoundly modify the social conditions of existence.

The first is a phenomenal increase of population following

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an enormous production of wealth. We have already seen how improved industrial conditions in England, in the first part of this century, were followed instantly by an unprecedented increase of population. At the present time the increase of population in England and Wales by births in excess of deaths is not less than one thousand souls daily. The expansion of the population of the United States from 3,929,214 in 1790 to 62,622,250 in 1890, while the population of Europe, in spite of enormous emigration, has been rapidly multiplying, is a phenomenon that Longstaff accurately describes as absolutely unique in history.

The second change referred to is a rapid concentration of this increasing population in large cities, where the great prizes of worldly success are striven for and won. This movement and its consequences are already attracting the serious attention of sociologists to the grave problems they present. Of the 1000 daily births in excess of deaths in England and Wales, 408 are born in the seventy-six largest cities and towns, 592 in the country, but only 437 remain in the country-places of their birth; 112 migrate to the cities, and 43 to foreign lands. In the United States in 1790, 3.35 per cent. of the population lived in cities of 8000 or more inhabitants. Now 29.12 per cent. live in cities of equal or larger size, while in the Atlantic coast division, comprising the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, more than one-half of the population are urban inhabitants. This means that population is flowing into the cities much faster than the reorganization of the manifold phases of town life, including municipal government, is making urban conditions as wholesome as those of the country. The result is that constant drain upon the fresh vitality of the country to meet the incessant destruction of vitality in the towns which makes the depopulation of rural sections so grave a matter for the future of civilization. "By a curious perversion," says Longstaff, "the advantage of towns is said to be 'life.' There is in truth more life in a given space, more high pressure, more rush; but it is the rush of a clock running down."

A displacement, in certain industries, of men of a relatively

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high standard of life by cheaper men of a lower standard, more rapidly than the better men can find places in industries requiring relatively intelligent labor, is the third demographic consequence of intense activity. The normal displacement, as has been shown, is of the dull, mechanical, non-adaptable man by a more versatile competitor. But industries are not all of the same character. Some are more progressive in their methods than others because they contribute to the satisfaction of constantly developing wants, which create a varying demand, while others minister to wants that are relatively stationary. In some, therefore, the high-priced man is the cheap man; in others the low-priced man is the cheaper man. Economists who have contended that high wages mean a low cost of labor, and those who have affirmed the contrary, are alike half right and half wrong. They have been observing different classes of industries. Under a perfectly uniform, self-regulating circulation of labor, the versatile man, of the high standard of life, would displace the cheaper man in one class of industries, and the duller, cheaper man would displace higher-priced labor in the other class. Under normal progress the major displacement would be of inferior by superior men. But unless economic evolution, creating new wants and varying demands, and reorganizing industry to supply them, is going on more rapidly than the growth of social unrest, or of those political policies that so often force vast hordes of destitute people into migrations that have no definite destination, as in the case of the Russian Jews, there may be a cruel and ruinous substitution of the lower for the higher grade of workman, prematurely and far beyond normal limits. It would not be unfortunate that the Irishman should displace the native American, that the French Canadian should in turn displace the Irishman, and that finally the Hungarian or the Pole should displace the French Canadian, if the men of the higher standard of life could immediately step into industries of a higher grade. But when this is not possible, when they can live only by sinking to the level of their more brutal competitors, it is an evil of great magnitude.

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Under such circumstances the intense competition of the struggle for success, due partly to ambition, but primarily to the quickening rate of industrial and social transformation, piles up in the community a frightful wreckage of physical and moral degeneration. Every sociologist, every statistician, has been struck with the seemingly anomalous fact that suicide, insanity, crime, vagabondage, increase with wealth, education, and refinement; that they are, in a word, as Morselli says, phenomena of civilization. But the fact is not altogether anomalous, after all. These things are a part of the cost of progress, forms that the cost of progress takes when the rate of social activity exceeds the rate of constructive reorganization. Quicken the pace of a moving army, and the number of the unfortunates who will fall exhausted by the way will be disproportionately increased. Besides quickening the pace, let discipline lapse and organization break up, and the number of stragglers will be more than doubled. Increase the strain of any kind of competitive work and derange the conditions under which it is done, and the percentage of failures will rise. That this is the far-reaching explanation of the physical, intellectual, and moral degeneration that we behold on every side, notwithstanding a marvellous multiplication of all the influences that make for good, is not to be doubted by one who will patiently study the facts recorded in moral and vital statistics. Thus, the number of suicides in Italy was 29 per 1,000,000 inhabitants in 1864, when her people were just entering on a new and larger life under national unity; in 1877 it had risen to 40 per 1,000,000. In France, in 1827 the number was 48 per 1,000,000; before 1875 it had risen to 155. In England a rate of 62 in 1830 had risen to 73 in 1876. In Saxony a rate of 158 in 1836 had risen to 391 in 1877.* Is it any wonder that Morselli, from whose laborious

* Later figures, given by Maurice Block ("L'Europe Politique et Sociale," deuxième édition, 1893, p. 460), are as follows: Italy, 1888, 53 per 1,000,000 inhabitants, 1889, 47 per 1,000,000; France, 1889, 212 per 1,000,000; England, 1889, 80 per 1,000,000. In Massachusetts the proportion was 69 per 1,000,000 in the period 1851–55, and 90.9 in the period 1881–85. *Vide* "Statistics of Suicide in New England," by Davis R. Dewey, *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, June–September, 1892.

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monograph these figures are taken, says that "in the aggregate of the civilized states of Europe and America the frequency of suicide shows a growing and uniform increase, so that generally voluntary death since the beginning of the century has increased and goes on increasing more rapidly than the geometrical augmentation of the population and of the general mortality"? Elsewhere he says, and his figures prove, that "it is those countries which possess a higher standard of general culture which furnish the largest contingent of voluntary deaths," and that the proportion of suicides is greater in the condensed population of urban centres than among the more scattered inhabitants of the country.

The phenomena of insanity follow the same general laws, with the difference that the abnormal loneliness of isolated country districts, drained of their population and social resources by migration to the cities, is as deleterious as the overcrowding and fierce competition of towns. According to the figures of the Eleventh Federal Census, the inmates of public asylums and hospitals for the insane are 2.10 per 1000 inhabitants in the North Atlantic division and 2.25 per 1000 in the Western division. It is in these sections that life is most intense. In the North Central division the ratio is 1.28 to 1000, in the South Atlantic division the ratio is 1.27 to 1000, and in the South Central division it is only 0.71 to 1000. Some allowance must be made for the larger number of deranged persons not committed to public institutions in some sections than in others, but this will not greatly affect the interpretation of the figures, an interpretation fully borne out by the researches of specialists. Maudsley, for example, says, "I cannot but think that the extreme passion for getting rich, absorbing the whole energies of life, predisposes to mental degeneracy in offspring, either to moral defect, or to intellectual deficiency, or to outbursts of positive insanity."

That crime is an effect of poverty it is no longer possible to believe, since it varies independently of poverty, and directly with other social conditions and with the strain of progress. Thus, serious crimes, including theft, are not more frequent in poor than in wealthy countries. On the contrary, in England

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the trials for theft are 228 per 100,000 inhabitants annually, while in Ireland they are but 101, in Hungary 82, and in Spain 74. Everywhere, too, crimes are less frequent in winter, when the hardships of poverty are most grievous, than in summer, when they are more easily borne. Again, crime is not a monopoly of the poor, since all classes contribute to our jail and prison population in very nearly exact proportion to their total numbers, and Professor Falkner has shown that in the United States serious crime is more frequently committed by the native than by the foreign-born. On the other hand, keener competition is everywhere followed by increasing criminality, as is most strikingly shown by the statistics of criminality among women. The crimes of women have been heretofore in small proportion to the crimes of men, but with the opening of hundreds of new industrial and professional opportunities to the sex hitherto shielded from the fiercer contentions of the social life-struggle, the figures of arrests and commitments of women show a sad increase. "In all countries where social habits and customs constrain women to lead retiring and secluded lives," says Morrison, "the number of female criminals descends to a minimum." In Greece, in 1889, there were only 50 women in a total prison population of 5023. In England, on the other hand, women constitute 17 per cent. of the whole number of offenders, while in Scotland, where the industrial emancipation of women is most complete, no less than 27 per cent. of the offences tried in criminal courts in 1880 were committed by women, and in 1888 that percentage had risen to 37.

Of the rapid increase of vagabondage with social unrest and industrial evolution, but a word need be said. Professor McCook, of Trinity College, Hartford, who has made an exhaustive study of this question, finds that we are supporting in this country an army of 48,848 tramps. At the lowest estimate, it costs to feed these absolutely worthless wretches $7,938,520 a year. Adding their hospital, jail, and prison expenses, the total becomes $9,000,000.

The end of these things would be social disintegration and paralysis but for a reaction that they start in the public mind.

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The ethical consciousness of society is aroused and unified by such evidences that civilization and progress are not an unmixed good. The demand becomes daily more imperative for a public and private philanthropy that shall be governed by the results of scientific inquiry; which shall work no longer at cross purposes, but merge their plans and efforts in a unified policy to ameliorate, so far as possible, conditions that man can never wholly remove, but which he can easily make worse. How far can the demand be met?

The practical solution of the problem depends on a difficult combination of two very difficult things. The first is to convince one set of people that society ought to assume the costs of its progress, and, so far as possible, take openly the responsibility for replacing the displaced. This is the element of truth in socialism. We have, indeed, made some progress in this direction. Practically and theoretically society admitted the obligation when, in the reigns of the Tudors, it began to supplement private and ecclesiastical charity by systems of public relief. In a hundred forms of legislation and administration, in public education, in the multiplication of asylums and hospitals, in a thousand modes of private beneficence, the duty is being more adequately discharged by each later generation. But we are yet very far from comprehending its full extent. We realize but faintly how far the incompetent and impoverished have been made such by social movements that have cut them off from any possibility of personal improvement. The second difficulty is to convince another set of people of the fallacy of a cardinal socialistic notion,—namely, that industrial derangements can be prevented in a progressive world; to convince them, therefore, that at all times a portion of mankind must be relatively useless to the community, and, for that reason, relatively poor; and that their greatest possible utilization and compensation depend on their being held for the while in practical subjection to other individuals or to the commonwealth.

We have heard a great deal in recent years about Christian socialism, and one of the most interesting developments in the ecclesiastical world is the growing belief that Christianity

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ought to prove its pretensions by demonstrating its power to solve social problems. It is curious that in all this discussion the most important single doctrine that Christianity has to contribute to social science has been forgotten or ignored. The doctrine referred to is that of the distinction between those who are free from the law and those who are under bondage to the law. The key to the solution of the social problem will be found in a frank acceptance of the fact that one portion of every community is inherently progressive, resourceful, creative, capable of self-mastery and self-direction, while another portion, capable of none of these things, can be made useful, comfortable, and essentially free, only by being brought under bondage to society and kept under mastership and discipline until they have acquired power to help and govern themselves. If one should say that we all believe this doctrine,—that it is in no sense new,—the necessary reply would be that we nevertheless habitually disregard it in every matter save the juridical distinction between the law-abiding and the criminal. We accept *laissez faire* as the expedient rule for all men and all industries alike, or we denounce it as bad for all alike. We advocate socialistic methods for the entire field of industry, or we pronounce them impracticable for any part of it. We denounce compulsory education for any class in the community, or we insist on forcing it on all classes. In all which sayings and doings we confound unlike things, and show ourselves irrational in the last degree.

What, then, in concrete detail, are some of the ethical obligations placed upon individuals and upon society by the conditions of social progress?

The law that the progressive, self-governing members of society should lay on themselves must include at least three groups of duties. First, they must resist, personally and in their influence, the tendency to subordinate every higher consideration to that mere quickening of competitive activity which so easily goes beyond its normal function of means to end, to become an irrational, unjustifiable end in itself. Especially in the education of children who are seen to be ambitious should everything that savors of competition be

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absolutely put away. The competitive examination of such children is nothing less than essential crime, essential insanity, essential idiocy, for all these things will be among its results. Second, they must resort more freely, as fortunately they are beginning to do, to country life, and especially must they provide the conditions of country life to the greatest possible extent for children, not only their own but those of the city poor. Third, they must cultivate that true individuality in the consumption of wealth, which is not only the mark of genuine manliness or womanliness, but which surely acts on economic demand in ways that give a competitive advantage to the higher industrial qualities of men whose own standard of life is high.

The duties that society must discharge in its relation to the general conditions of progressive activity, and to its members who are undeveloped or degenerate, fall also into three groups. First, society must assume the regulation of international migration. Each nation must be made to bear the burden of pauperism, ignorance, and degeneracy caused by its own progress or wrong-doing. Society must also assume the regulation, by industrial and labor legislation, of those industries in which free competition displaces the better man by the inferior. Perhaps in time some of these industries may advantageously come directly under public management, as socialism proposes. Second, society must act on the fact that a proportion of its population must be always practically unfree, by extending compulsory education to the children of all parents who are unable or unwilling to provide in their own way a training that the commonwealth can approve. This education should be as perfectly adapted as knowledge, money, and sincerity of purpose can make it, to the work of fitting the children of the poor for life in a changing, progressive world. Third, society should enslave, not figuratively, but literally, all those men and women who voluntarily betake themselves to a life of vagabondage. The time has passed when food and shelter should be given by kindly sentimentalists to the tramp, or when the public should deal with his case in any partial way. Every tramp within the borders of

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civilization should be placed under arrest and put at severe, enforced labor under public direction.

These are the positive obligations of individuals and of the state that seem to be disclosed by a study of social progress. But we must not forget that the same conditions impose a negative duty also, an obligation of restraint. For all reform, all philanthropic work, is itself a phase of social progress, and, like all others, has a cost in effort and suffering. Therefore, if philanthropic reform is hurried, or pursued by too radical methods, it may convert the absolute increase of evil, which progress costs, into a relative increase, and so wholly defeat itself. Those distinguished Italian students of criminal anthropology, Lombroso and Laschi, have lately pointed out that political crime (the crime, that is, of those who unsuccessfully resist governmental authority) consists essentially in the attempt to accomplish in crude and violent ways desirable changes or reforms for which society is not yet ready. Devotion to the cause of progress these authors propose to call by the scientific name philoneism; the dread of change is misoneism. Society is, on the whole, misoneistic; therefore we can mend its ways but slowly. For, whatever happens, we must keep in touch with our fellow-men, remembering always the fine, true words of Marcus Aurelius: "The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the superior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, co-ordinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has brought together into concord with one another the things which are the best."

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DID THE ROMANS DEGENERATE?

A PHYSICAL organism passes through the stages of growth, degeneration, and decay. It is not uncommon to compare the life of a nation to that of a physical organism. We speak of the infancy of a nation, its maturity, the period of its decline, and its death, in a manner which seems to imply that the failure of vital force in a nation is as inevitable as in a tree. This would be simple enough, were it true. We are forced, however, to introduce confusion into this simplicity, by admitting moral ideas. A nation is very unlike a physical organism. The force which binds the individuals of a nation together in one body is not material, but moral. A nation is one by virtue of common ideas, feelings, faiths, and customs, and by virtue of its power to make the common ideas effective in laws and forms of government. If nations degenerate, their degeneracy is a moral degeneracy. By this is not meant degeneracy of moral character, for character, strictly speaking, belongs to individuals alone, and not to any group or body of individuals. The deterioration of a nation would be a degeneracy of common ideas, the replacing of noble faiths by those less noble, a lowering of moral standards, a general lightening of the sense of personal responsibility, the debasement of the intellect and character of a majority of the people. The result of such a process would be the dissolution of the body politic. It would bear some analogy to the death of a plant or an animal. Do nations thus deteriorate? If so, what are the causes of the deterioration? Is it an inevitable thing, due to the constitution of man's nature and the circumstances of national development? Or is it the result of free and responsible action, so that moral forces may prevent it?

The first question is, "Do nations deteriorate?" It must not be answered hastily and without careful discrimination.

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Were the Jews led captive to Babylon inferior to their ancestors whom Moses brought out of Egypt? Were the Greeks whom Alexander conquered less noble than those who defied the Persian power? The descendants of the Romans who drove out the Tarquins bore the oppression of such monsters as Nero and Domitian. Had the nation degenerated? Are we, the people of the United States to-day, below the level of life and thought on which this nation stood a hundred years ago? Let us not say yes too glibly to these questions. That a nation once victorious is afterwards itself conquered does not prove degeneracy. There may be other causes of defeat. A decline in certain things does not imply a general decay. Tragedy among the Greeks reached a high point of excellence, which it did not long maintain. It does not necessarily follow that the Greeks to whom Demosthenes spoke were inferior to those who listened to Pericles. Is England to-day worse than the England of the sixteenth century because the Elizabethan drama is unmatched? The corruption of a class, or of a number of individuals, does not prove deterioration of a nation. Especially is it true that a nation cannot, at any period of its history, be judged by the characters of its ruling monarchs. Henry VIII. was brutal, Charles II. a rake, and George IV. a dandy, but the English have never at any time been a nation of brutes, nor rakes, nor dandies.

Do nations deteriorate? The question can be answered only by a careful examination of facts in their relations. Rome has been from the days of her own historians a favorite instance of national degeneracy. The moral decay, the corruption within, which rendered her an easy prey to the wild hordes of the north, are a never-failing subject for eloquence. Let us try to follow the development of Roman life, the changes which took place from age to age in ideas, feelings, beliefs, manners, customs, and laws, and thus to determine whether the nation was constantly sinking to lower levels. This is a difficult task, as a glance at the nature of our sources of information will show. There are parts of inscriptions, mutilated works of art, incomplete and sometimes corrupt manuscripts of historical, scientific, and literary works, bits of

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antiquarian research, and a mass of untrustworthy tradition worked over avowedly to glorify the past. Of this testimony, that of the actual monuments of antiquity, the remains of buildings, tombs, statues, pictures, coins, and inscriptions, is by far the most trustworthy. When we come to search Roman writers for information, it is well to remember that no man's view of his own times or the times before him can be accepted without qualification. The Romans, moreover, were a moralizing, rhetorical, satirical people. In reading their works for light upon the condition of the nation, we must always beware of an ulterior purpose. Like Livy, the writer may be pointing a moral; like Cicero, gaining a case; like Tacitus or Juvenal, adorning a sentence or heightening a satirical effect. The spirit of Tacitus and Juvenal is so deeply tinged with national pride and class-prejudice that they sometimes condemn in the strongest terms changes in law or custom which merit approval rather. In determining what ideas of right and wrong are characteristic of a given period, how much weight shall we attach to the writings of moralists? There is always a gulf between the teachings of philosophers and the moral standards of the multitude, and another gulf between the beliefs of the multitude and their conduct. Yet the philosopher's teachings are in a sense representative of his times. As the doctrines of Martin Luther could not have been preached in the fourteenth century, so the doctrines of Seneca could not have been preached in the Rome of Cato.

We are to follow the development of Roman life from earlier to later times and mark the evidence of growth or decay. Under Roman life we shall include not only the life of the city but that of the Latin race, and also, to some extent, that of the kindred Italian races throughout the peninsula. While the city of Rome undertook to govern, through its municipal organization, all Italy and all the world, the true spirit of the nation must be sought and found in Italy as a whole, from the birthplace of Vergil in the north to that of Horace in the south.

The early inhabitants of Latium were poor, and lived a rude and simple life. Agriculture was the principal occupation.

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The citizen, with the aid of a few slaves, tilled his field. His wife superintended the work of the household and spun and wove wool. The house was small and rude, without carpets, with bare, unwhitewashed walls. The food was chiefly vegetable, with pork as an occasional delicacy. It was customary to bathe once a week in the wash-house adjoining the kitchen, but soap was unknown till the time of the empire. There were no barbers in Rome before 300 B.C. Writers of later times often refer to their ancestors as unshorn and unkempt. If we may trust the statement of Juvenal, it was customary to comb the hair only on special occasions.

When a child was born, the father decided whether he would rear it. If he decided in the negative, the child was killed or exposed. Children were taught at home, the girls to spin and weave, the boys to plough and sow. They were also taught reading, writing, and counting, sometimes by their parents and sometimes at school. Schools are spoken of as existing at a very early time. They were private enterprises, since the state took no care of education. The teachers were generally slaves or freedmen, held in little honor. Much of their time was given to the use of the rod.

Literature and art did not exist among the Romans of the time we are considering. Horace places the rise of Latin literature between the first and second Punic wars. The early Romans, Cato says, did not honor a poet; if a man devoted attention to that art, they called him a tramp.

The games of the circus and certain primitive dramatic entertainments served to amuse the public on their numerous religious holidays. Tradition assigns the building of the Circus Maximus to Tarquinius Priscus, and the establishment of certain sports to Romulus. The Romans never ceased to take pleasure in the races and other contests of the circus. The dramatic entertainments were of two kinds, the Atellanæ and the Mimes. Between these two the Romans made a very marked distinction, but the difference would seem to have been more in externals than in essential character. The former were acted by masked citizens of rank and reputation. The latter were enacted by slaves or hired performers, often by women,

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and the mask was not used. Both were rough and ready improvisations, burlesques full of satirical humor, coarse, clownish, and obscene.

Gladiatorial games, Valerius Maximus says, were first exhibited in Rome in 264 B.C., when Marcus and Decimus Brutus hired gladiators to fight at their father's tomb as a religious ceremony. They are commonly supposed to be of Etruscan origin.

A strong and simple religious faith existed at this time in Italy. We find the elements common to primitive religions, —an element of nature-worship, an element of ancestor-worship, offerings of adoration, propitiation, and expiation, bloody sacrifices of animals and even of human beings, a belief in omens, charms, and incantations. The savage first sees divine power in nature, then attributes it also to the revered dead; wishes to win favor and shun wrath, and conceives of certain means as adapted to that end. Some deny that human sacrifices were offered by the early Romans. They would explain later undoubted instances of the practice as developments of base superstition under foreign influence. This position is hardly tenable. It is improbable that the Latins were in this unlike other races. Sacrifices are of two kinds, —the *hostia honoraria*, or offering of adoration, and the *hostia piacularis*, or expiatory offering. Even if gladiatorial combats are of Etruscan origin, it is probable that in Rome as well as in Etruria they took the place of an earlier custom of sacrificing prisoners of war at tombs as *hostiæ honorariæ* in worship of the dead. It has been said that expiatory sacrifice was but a form of criminal justice. This may be true in those instances in which one who had committed crime was slain. But what shall we say of the old Italian custom of the *ver sacrum?* This was surely human sacrifice in all its simplicity and all its cruelty.

The original Roman idea of government was perfect equality of civil and legal rights for Roman citizens, the patricians, supposed descendants of the thirty clans; for all other persons no civil or legal rights whatever. Foreigners, women, children, plebeians, and slaves might have some moral claims to fair

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treatment, but civil or legal rights they had none. Equality of right existed among citizens, and the king was merely one chosen to represent all. As soon as kings began to assume anything more, the citizens arose and overthrew the monarchy.

We come now to look at Roman law, a matter having so important a bearing upon our investigation that it must be dwelt upon a little more fully. Roman law was of three kinds,—*fas*, *jus*, and *boni mores*. Most of the so-called laws of the kings were rules of the *fas*,—that is, of religious duty. One who violated these rules was pronounced accursed, and might be killed by any who met him. This very primitive kind of justice soon fell into disuse, and offences which were merely *nefas*—such, for example, as selling a wife—ceased to be punished. Thus, *fas* early lost the force of law. *Jus* was *jus moribus constitutum*, or common law, and *lex*, or statute law. By far the greater body of law was *jus moribus constitutum*. The so-called *boni mores* scarcely merit the name of law, for the censor's rebuke never had the force of a legal condemnation. The code called the XII. Tables, formed in 451 B.C., put into permanent and definite form the customary law of the land. Let us now consider the bearing of the law upon foreigners, plebeians, debtors, women, children, and slaves. The original theory was that "a man sojourning in a foreign state was without the pale of law and at the mercy of that state and its citizens." His property might be taken and he might be enslaved. Growing trade and intercourse with foreign nations soon modified this theory, and foreigners were allowed a certain degree of protection. That they long remained at a great disadvantage compared with citizens is shown by the declaration of the XII. Tables that no undisturbed occupation for any length of time could establish a foreigner's right to hold property if a citizen chose to claim it.

Plebeians, though of Latin blood, were foreigners in the eyes of the members of the clans, and their original position, therefore, was that of foreigners. The details of the long and bitter struggle by which they finally obtained full civil and legal rights are too well known to need to be recounted here.

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Before they acquired such rights some of them were fain to content themselves with such substitute as the institution of the clientship afforded, attaching themselves to a patrician patron, who was bound by rules of *fas* and *boni mores* to protect them, and who exacted certain services from them in return. This was a kind of vassalage.

The procedure against the insolvent debtor was by the XII. Tables as follows. When a judgment had been obtained, he was allowed thirty days in which to pay; then the creditor might seize him and bring him before the magistrate. In default of payment, the creditor was then to take him home and fasten him in stocks or fetters; after sixty days' imprisonment, the debtor was brought before the magistrate on three successive market-days, that opportunity might be given for some friend to redeem him. In case no such redeemer appeared, his person was forfeit to the creditor or creditors, who might sell him and divide the proceeds.

Children were absolutely in the father's power. He could kill or sell them at his will, and dispose of their property as he saw fit. This was the case not only during a child's minority, but as long as the father lived. No man, however old, was free or could hold any property until his father died. The case of the daughter was still harder, for upon the father's death she passed under the control of a guardian and never became free. It is probable, though not certain, that in the earliest times the only form of marriage recognized as legal was *confarreatio*, or religious marriage. It carried important consequences to the woman. She passed from her father's rule to that of her husband or her husband's father. Her person and her property were entirely at his disposal. Before the law she stood upon a level with her own children. Plebeians, since they were not citizens, and since the religious ceremonies of the *confarreatio* were not permissible to them, could not contract legal marriage. After the limited civic rights granted them by the so-called Servian reforms, their unions were recognized in law, though they could not intermarry with patricians. It is not unlikely that about this time arose the civil marriage called *coemptio*, a symbolical purchase.

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It also transferred the woman from her father's to her husband's power. Before the time of the XII. Tables, a third kind of marriage, called *usus*, had come to be recognized as legal. This was by consent of the parties, without prescribed ceremony. The woman thus married, if the relation was uninterrupted, also passed, as in *confarreatio* and *coemptio*, into her husband's power. If, however, she absented herself for three successive days and nights in a year from her husband's house, she, while lawfully his wife, yet remained a member of her father's family: her husband had no control over her or her property. A wife married by *confarreatio*, *coemptio*, or uninterrupted *usus* was said to be *in manu*, in the hand of her husband. If the *usus* was broken she was not *in manu*, but remained *in patria potestate*.

Roman law regarded marriage as a civil contract, terminated at any time by consent of the parties without legal process. The law, when it touched the subject at all, merely adjusted financial questions involved. It is very likely that the religious marriage was originally regarded as dissoluble by the husband only, and that in case of certain specified offences on the part of the wife. We have no certain information on this point. Whether the wife *in manu* had the same freedom of divorce as the wife not *in manu* is also open to doubt.

A slave was a piece of property. The law took no cognizance of him under any other aspect, and set no limits to the disposal which might be made of him as property.

Let us now estimate the Roman life of this period. In material conditions, personal habits, amusements, education, literature, religion, government, and law, it was an age of rudeness, narrowness, hardness, coarseness, and cruelty. The historians who are wont to dwell with admiration on the morals of early times, and to trace the degeneracy of succeeding ages, tell us that we must not judge the primitive Romans by that portion of their customs embodied in their law. They say that the early Romans were pure and free from vice and crime; that they did not love vile or brutal amusements, offer human victims to their gods, rob plebeians, break the marriage bond, beat their wives, kill or sell their children, or abuse their slaves.

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It is said that sacred and revered customs forbade these things. And when, in later times, the law began to prohibit human sacrifice, to punish cruelty to slaves, to protect women and children, and to regulate divorce, these authorities tell us that it was the introduction of evil practices, hitherto unknown, which led to the enactment of laws before unnecessary. There is no proof of these statements. There is no surer way of judging the intellectual and moral level upon which a people stands than by customs embodied in law. What the law forbids is what the moral sense of the community condemns. What the law allows is what the moral sense of the majority does not strongly condemn. This is especially true of common law, and to a great degree of statute law also. The enactment of statute laws is seldom due to the necessity of checking the growth of evil practices; it is commonly due to the fact that growing enlightenment condemns practices once general and not disapproved. Is it because cruelty is increasing or because it is decreasing that we have laws punishing cruelty to animals which our ancestors did not have?

As a representative of the old Roman character it is customary to refer to Cato, who, living in a time of transition, stood for the ancient and the national against new ways adopted under foreign influence. "He was regarded by contemporaries and by posterity," says Mommsen, "as the true model of a Roman burgess." Let us look at Cato, then. He made a stand against the growth of luxury by having no carpets or whitewash in his house and allowing no meal to cost more than two shillings. He gave his son the narrow traditional training in accounts and household economy. The religion which he inculcates is superstitious and calculating, a method of avoiding loss and making gain by ceremonies, charms, and incantations. His business methods are hard, unscrupulous, and greedy. He made money by speculating in the slave-market, and treated his slaves with great cruelty, selling the old and sick, exacting double tasks, lashing so severely for slight offences that a slave in fear of his displeasure hanged himself by preference. His favorite weapon in a political contest was vile personal abuse. He was occasionally drunk. He

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had no respect for women, regarding them as "chattering and senseless gossips, who should be ruled strictly and kept at home." He thought a wife a necessary evil, and the morals which he shamelessly inculcates are those "too common in slave-holding communities."

Having considered early Roman manners and institutions, let us now follow the changes which took place. We mark first that increase in material prosperity and softening of the conditions of life which always accompanies advancing civilization. The historians hail this advance with such language as this: "Luxury prevailed more and more in dress, ornaments, and furniture, in buildings and at table." "Above all, this new luxury appeared in the appliances of the table." Reading on to learn what this alarming growth of luxury was, we find that the "Romans who had hitherto partaken of hot dishes once a day now had them twice. Hitherto the women of the household had attended to the baking and cooking, but now in the better houses a special cook was kept." There were now carpets or hangings, silver plate, couches with bronze ornaments. Pork and vegetables were no longer the only food. Various kinds of meat, fish, salads, and fruit were served. Baths and barbers were known in all the towns. Shall we call this luxury, or civilization? With improved methods of agriculture and the growth of trade and manufactures life ceases to be bare and rude, beauty and refinement adorn the homes of men. Is there, then, no such thing as sinful luxury, a wickedly extravagant expenditure in indulging tastes and appetites? There is, indeed, and it is due not to the too great production of wealth, but to the imperfect distribution of it. This is the difficulty to-day, and it was still more an evil in the great slave-holding states of antiquity, especially at Rome, where law and government and custom so favored the accumulation of much capital in few hands. The magnificent marble palaces, the rich robes, the silver plate, the gardens and statues, the feasts of rare dainties, strike us with horror because we remember the suffering multitude. What we condemn is the selfishness which can take forty per cent. interest from the poor and gorge itself with good things

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upon the proceeds. At the same time, increase of wealth is good, the palaces and statues and silver and viands are good. Material prosperity is inseparable from the rise of humanity to higher levels. Italy contained a larger proportion of comfortable homes in the time of the emperors than in the time of the kings. It is a mistake to view the changes in the style of living as tokens of degeneracy.

The first advance in education was the introduction of the study of Greek literature. About the same time the Romans began to translate from the Greek, and to produce Latin plays and epic poems formed after Greek models. The Latin version of the Odyssey by Livius Andronicus was extensively used as a school text-book. In addition to the elementary schools, those of higher grade, called schools of rhetoric, were established. The time came when scarcely a provincial town was without such a school. Whereas Cato enumerates oratory, agriculture, law, war, and medicine as constituting a liberal education, Varro, nearly a century later, includes grammar, logic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, medicine, and architecture. Many young men now studied at Athens and travelled through Greece and Asia Minor. Under the empire the state began to concern itself with public instruction. Vespasian paid eight hundred and fifty pounds a year to Latin and Greek rhetoricians in Rome. Hadrian founded the Athenæum, the first known public institution for higher education with salaried teachers. Philosophers were appointed to lecture in all large cities, and were paid partly by the community and partly by the emperor. Public libraries were established. The book-trade was large, and books were cheap.

In literature and art the Romans never produced very much of the highest value. The strong native impulse was lacking. They studied, translated, adapted, composed, and corrected. They became zealous devotees of culture, and tried to be literary and æsthetic, with a certain degree of success. Of imaginative power and passion little appears; more in Lucretius and Catullus than in the Augustan poets.

In the matter of amusements, the races of the circus re-

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mained in favor; gladiatorial combats ceased to be a religious ceremony, and took place in the amphitheatre. While it is horrible to think of these bloody spectacles as giving pleasure, it was a step in advance when they were no longer offered as worship. No Roman moralist before Seneca condemned these shows as cruel. Cicero commends them as "the best discipline against fear of death and suffering that can be presented to the eye." We are reminded in this connection by a writer in the Encyclopædia Britannica that it is now only half a century since bear-baiting was prohibited in England, and that we are only now attaining that stage of morality in respect of cruelty to animals that was reached in the fifth century in respect of cruelty to men. Constantine in 325 prohibited gladiatorial combats, but they did not cease entirely till about one hundred years after that. There is nothing in the persistence of these sports to show that the Romans as a nation were more brutal or degraded in later than in earlier times. The people of two centuries before Christ may have taken quite as savage a joy in these butcheries as the people of two centuries after Christ. The increased frequency and magnificence of the games were due to increase of wealth and leisure. Seneca's protest and the efforts of Marcus Aurelius to mitigate the horrors of the arena at least show some advance.

Upon the stage a regular drama largely took the place of the farce and mime. This drama was not a native development, but a foreign importation. Livius Andronicus translated and adapted Greek plays. Nævius not only translated, but undertook to found a Roman national tragedy. His plays did not long succeed in holding the stage. More popular was the later Attic comedy as worked over by Plautus and Terence. The morality of these comedies is low, but, from what we can gather with regard to the farce and mime which amused an earlier age, these plays are on a higher level. Near the end of the republican period the native Italian mime was revived and developed and became a favorite entertainment. Such artists as Syrus and Laberius gave it form and plot and elevated it to the dignity of the drama. Cruttwell, in his history of Roman literature, attributes this popularity of the mime in

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the late republic to growing depravity, and then expresses surprise to find that the fragments remaining from Syrus and Laberius, "so far from betraying any concession to the prevalent depravity, are above the ordinary tone of ancient comic morality." Should we not rather, then, conclude that there was no prevalent depravity, and that the mimes of Syrus and Laberius are free from the vileness of the earlier mime because the public taste was improving?

As we found in early Roman religion the elements common to primitive religions, so we shall find the usual course of development of religious ideas with modifications due to peculiarities of race and circumstances. The tendency to formalism and to making gain out of pious observance, common everywhere, seems to have been strong among the Romans. Mommsen says, "Latin religion early became shrivelled into an anxious and dreary round of ceremonies." He also says that "the naïve popular faith was superseded by an enlightened stoical supernaturalism." If this was the influence of Greek philosophy, Cruttwell well expresses the influence of Greek religion when he says, "Greece completely undermined the general belief in the state religion, substituting for it the fair creations of her finer fancy, or, when she did not substitute, blending the two faiths together with sympathetic skill." "Belief in the state religion undermined" and a "naïve popular faith superseded by an enlightened supernaturalism,"—this is the growth of scepticism. And what is the growth of scepticism? Some are wont to think it the decay and death of religion. In many an individual it doubtless is so. But that growth of scepticism which we see in nations is not, I venture to assert, the decay of religion, but its purification. It is the decay of certain forms of thought and the rising of the human mind to nobler conceptions. When a national faith perishes, it never perishes utterly. Error falls away, and truth is seen under new aspects. If Cicero did not put faith in charms and in the efficacy of ritual to avert financial loss, as Cato did, he had a far higher idea of divinity and of humanity. If in Juvenal's time the dim underworld was a fable for babes, yet many believed that there is an undying spirit in man, though it is

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not ferried over Styx in Charon's boat nor frightened by the bark of Cerberus. The form changes; the essential truth remains. An age which could utter such thoughts of God and man and duty as are spoken by Seneca and Marcus Aurelius was not far from ready for the brighter light of Christian truth. From the half-savage propitiation of dreaded powers by human blood to Seneca's dim notion of the fatherhood of God is upward all the way.

We cannot follow minutely the changes in government, but in general it may be said that there was a steady progress from the idea of exclusive privilege towards the idea of equal rights for all. Plebeian, Italian, provincial of alien blood, even freedman, all at last obtained some measure of justice and recognition. The overthrow of the so-called republic must not be regarded as the failure of popular government, but as the downfall of class-government. The concentration of power and privilege in the hands of an aristocracy cannot anywhere endure. The wielding of irresponsible and inalienable power too surely corrupts many members of the ruling class. The oligarchy, then, had to fall. And, since the Italians knew no better how to form a truly democratic government than did the French a century ago, a Cæsar appeared in due time and set up a rule which bore the same relation to the senatorial government as did Napoleon's empire to the privileged power of the grands seigneurs. It was, upon the whole, a better government,—more honest, more wise, more public-spirited. It is true there were bad emperors,—Tiberius, Nero, Caligula, Domitian,—though some of them perhaps were not so monstrous as Tacitus depicts them. Under monarchy there is always danger from bad rulers. But a monarch is more likely to rule in the interest of the public than a nobility are. They are sure to rule in their class-interest. Augustus, Vespasian, Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines gave a prosperity to the Roman world which the quarrelling and greedy nobles had not given for some centuries.

We will now consider changes in the condition of women, children, and slaves. It became not uncommon for fathers to emancipate their grown-up sons and daughters. By early

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custom, if a man sold his son into slavery and the master freed him, the son went back under his father's power. The XII. Tables declared that if a father sold his son three times, or his daughter once, the son or daughter was then free from the father. This provision was now used as a means of breaking the bond of *patria potestas*. If a man wished to make his son independent, he went through the form of a fictitious sale thrice repeated. Even where sons and daughters were not emancipated, custom gradually relaxed the bond, so that a considerable degree of liberty was allowed to sons and daughters in mature life. The law, however, remained unchanged until imperial times. About the time of Augustus a law was enacted allowing a son to hold as his own property acquired by military service. This right of holding property was further extended under Constantine and succeeding emperors. Though exposure of infants was practised until Christianity ended it, a father could no longer put his children to death. He could sell only quite young children, and that only if he was too poor to maintain them.

Those forms of marriage by which a woman was transferred from her father's family to that of her husband, and was absolutely subject to him, passed out of use. Almost all married women remained under their fathers' power, and as fathers ceased to exercise this power strictly and allowed their daughters to conduct their own affairs, women became free. It has been said that this freedom, together with other debasing influences, corrupted women, so that the Roman women of later times were monsters of vice and profligacy compared with the Lucretias and Cornelias of early ages. If we form our idea of Roman women from Juvenal and Martial, we must certainly think this true. These writers purposely select the worst and then exaggerate. Let us look rather at some of the women whom Tacitus and Pliny show us,—at Agrippina, the wife of Germanicus; at the wife and mother of Agricola; at Pliny's Calpurnia; at the noble Fannia and Arria. There was the wife of Seneca, too, and the wife of Marcus Aurelius, and countless others. Any one of these is equal to Lucretia in virtue, and far superior to her in knowledge and

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refinement. Whether Lucretia is a historical personage or a traditional ideal, what is she? She is a woman who could spin wool and be faithful to her husband. And these others were fit companions of philosophers and statesmen. Compare the way in which Cato speaks of the best women whom he knew with the way in which Tacitus and Pliny speak, and you will not doubt that women in later times were more respected. Perhaps they were more worthy of respect.

The following changes took place in the law concerning slaves. Early in imperial times the master's right to compel slaves to fight with beasts in the arena was taken away. Antoninus Pius empowered city prefects and provincial procurators to receive a slave's complaints of cruelty and to sell cruelly-treated slaves to other masters. Hadrian deprived owners of the right to kill or torture slaves at will, or to sell them to keepers of gladiatorial schools. Constantine made the intentional killing of a slave murder. Slaves were even granted something like legal marriage, their unions being regarded as lasting and indissoluble.

We have now considered the early customs of the Romans, their material condition, amusements, education, religion, government, and their treatment of the weaker members of society, and have traced the changes which took place in each of these things. In which do we not see constant improvement rather than degeneracy? It remains to answer two questions: whence has arisen the common impression that the Romans became very corrupt? and to what was the downfall of Rome due, if it was not due to internal decay?

The impression of a general depravity has arisen partly from the evident and frightful depravity of certain individuals in all classes. There were persons in the age of Nero who were more wicked in certain ways than any persons were or could be in the age of Numa. As a man can be vicious as a brute cannot, so a civilized man can be vicious as a savage cannot. It is well known that we teach the heathen new vices. It does not follow that civilization is evil, but merely that that which is a savor of life unto life to many may be a savor of death unto death to some. We look at a dissolute and reck-

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less noble like Catiline, at a ruler like Tiberius, at a high-born woman fighting beasts in the arena, at a city rabble clamoring for bread and games, and forget that a majority of the Italian people may not have been like these, but may have been as far above their ancestors in moral judgment and conduct as these individuals were below them.

Again, we are misled by Roman writers. After the manner of many moralists, they idealize the olden times and lament modern degeneracy. Now, in every age and in every land there are those who do this. The careful student of history must see that such comparisons are fallacious. No age can see itself in its true relation to other ages. When Roman writers declare that the times are corrupt, we must suspend our judgment. Horace, when singing the praises of the good old times, is fain to admit that a sudden transfer to the age of the unkempt Furii and Camilli might be undesirable.

The erroneous interpretation of changes in law to which I have referred above has helped to strengthen the false impression. For example, it is stated that cruelty to slaves increased from age to age. The only way to prove this is to bring forward well-attested instances in which the old-time masters treated their slaves humanely, and, moreover, such a number of instances as to show that humane treatment was general. The mere absence of recorded instances of cruelty proves nothing. The necessary evidence is lacking. Whatever inference can be drawn from comparing Plautus and Cato with Cicero and Seneca tends in the opposite direction. It is argued that the enactment of laws punishing cruelty to slaves shows that such cruelty was on the increase, and that such laws now for the first time became necessary. This is pure assumption. Considering such slight evidence of facts as we have, we may rather conclude that such laws were enacted because public opinion ceased to sanction cruelties which it formerly sanctioned.

To what, then, was the downfall of Rome due? I shall adopt by way of reply to this question the words of Professor Toy in his recent book called "Judaism and Christianity:" "The great empires of the old world perished, not

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through internal moral-intellectual decay, but by outward pressure. They fell apart through insufficient political organization, and succumbed to the violence of stronger powers." To quote once more from Mommsen: "The Roman commonwealth was planned as a civic community. It broke down by its unnatural enlargement." We may say, then, that the attempt to govern a world by methods suited for governing a municipality failed. The changes of administration introduced under the empire partially repaired this failure, and might have enabled the Roman dominion to endure, had it not been for attacks from without. The unnatural institution of slavery, and other social and legal arrangements favoring large accumulations of wealth in the hands of a few, further weakened the state. It is small wonder that such a structure fell to pieces under the fierce onset of a foreign foe.

We conclude that the Roman people formed no exception to the law of development, which is from the lower to the higher. We may not go so far as to adopt Gibbon's extravagant language when he says, "If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus." But we may see, with Professor Dyer, in the latter days of paganism, "amelioration and purification as well as a growing superstition and a gradual decay." Some losses there are, doubtless, but the gains are greater than the losses. Out of death comes life, and always higher life for evermore. There is no death of nations perishing utterly by the mere waning of vital force. Old thoughts, old faiths, old ways, decay, that better thoughts and faiths and ways may take their place. And even when some violent catastrophe lays low a nation in the dust, even then its spiritual treasure is not lost, although the form of national existence is destroyed. All the best which it has wrought out lives again in the new growths which spring up from the old root. And so it was with Rome.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PRACTICAL LIFE.*

THERE is a remark we frequently hear from any one who is forced into a corner in argument: *That is all very well in theory*, he will say, *but it does not hold good in practice.* It is a poor retort, but it generally serves its purpose, and acts as a sort of closure by turning the conversation from the point at issue, and, like other cant phrases, it really deserves a little consideration. The alleged opposition between theory and practice may arise in almost any walk of life, and in connection with any branch of knowledge; even though I draw illustrations to-night from those subjects of which I am least ignorant, I think the questions which are raised are not without interest for every class of students.

I.

To begin with, we may at once admit that we are all inclined to play the part of the practical man, who is suspicious of mere theory, in some matters,—*e.g.*, in trifling ailments. Every one of us who catches cold is, unfortunately, able to fall back on past and similar experience, and each of us has a favorite, and probably a different, remedy,—Turkish baths, Himrod's powder, whiskey and water, or whatever it may be. Each of us relies on the experience that this specific did us good before, and confidently tries it again. Now, this simple and familiar instance serves to show why the practical man, who protests, perhaps, that he has no book knowledge, is apt to be so abominably bumptious. He is quite confident that his opinion is sound and right: it is (1) directly drawn from personal experience,—he is clear that a Turkish bath did cure his cold; (2) much of his knowledge refers to matters that recur, since ordinary experience is recurring experience; and (3) his

* An introductory lecture to the students of the Evening Classes at King's College, London, October 7, 1892.

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knowledge is in a form in which he can apply it readily; he can go and take another Turkish bath.

Now, the rule-of-thumb man—or the practical man, as perhaps he prefers to call himself—does not trust the general principles which he reads in books and speaks of as theories: we may use the word in the wide and vague way which popular usage sanctions* for any sort of generalization. What goes beyond his own experience, or rests on facts of which he has no knowledge, does not appeal to him with the same force. The practical man prefers to act on his own experience, and for this he is not to be blamed; for I venture to say that wherever we have direct personal experience of our own we are right to trust to it; we do well to regard it as our best guide and to follow it. But that need not lead us to fall into the practical man's error of disparaging and scouting all that he calls "theories." For, however highly, however justly, we rate our experience, we must yet have recourse to "theories" in a threefold fashion,—sometimes to correct our experience, sometimes to supplement it, and sometimes to point out where we may and where we should not apply it.

1. It is useful to be able to correct our own experience by comparing it with that of other people collected and expressed in general terms. For, after all, we may be quite mistaken in the way we interpret our own experience and assign some particular reason for occurrences that fall within our own knowledge. The commonest illustration will serve. A man awakes with a headache and general indisposition for the labors of the day; he attributes it to the salmon he ate at dinner; it may have been something else. Or he abuses his host, and says the champagne must have been bad; but it may have been the quantity, or the combination of drinks, that affected him, rather than the quality. And in the beginnings of all branches of science the same sort of thing is found; the history of medicine is full of instances of useless remedies resting on misinterpreted experience. It is by comparing our own experience with that of other people, as expressed in a

* Jevons, "Elementary Lessons in Logic," p. 275.

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general form, that we can *correct* our experience and see whether we have interpreted it rightly or not.

2. But besides this, even if we interpret it aright, the experience of each one of us is so very limited,—how limited we rarely realize. It is limited in *space.* There was a man of whom I have heard in Nottinghamshire who discontinued the donation he had regularly made for a time to a missionary society; when asked as to his reasons, he replied, "*Well, I've travelled a bit in my time; I've been as far as Sleaford, in Lincolnshire, and I never saw a black man, and I don't believe there are any.*" Indeed, "the world is so full of a number of things" that none of us can have personal experience which is in any sense exhaustive.

And our personal experience is also very limited in *time.* The body of human knowledge into which we may enter has been built up so slowly, by so many generations of men; the facts about the sun and the earth which are taught to infants at elementary schools are by no means matters of direct personal experience. It took thousands of years of skilled observation before the data were accumulated which give us our knowledge that the earth is like an orange and goes round the sun. These every-day statements—what we call elementary knowledge—sum up the inherited experience of many generations of human beings, and far transcend the information which could have ever been accumulated in the span of a single life. To trust to our own personal experience is wise and right, but to disparage and neglect "mere theories" is to renounce our part in the great heritage of wisdom and knowledge which the human race has gradually and toilfully got together.

If the importance of relying on past experience is obvious in a science like astronomy, it is also great, though not perhaps so obvious, in such a study as economics. We are apt to think that the modern conditions of industry and trade are so unlike anything that went before them that we can afford to neglect the wisdom of the past, that we may brush it on one side as merely irrelevant, and rely solely on personal experience. It is true that modern problems are in a sense perfectly new, and are in many ways very different from those

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of other days, but it is also true that if we wish to understand what is sometimes called the play of social forces we shall have to turn to the past rather than to the present. And for this reason: there are many influences that work very slowly; of some social changes we cannot see the full results in a single generation. It is only gradually that the various effects which have been brought about in different directions become apparent, for society is so complicated that it is impossible to forecast how some seemingly minor modification may affect the whole. It is familiar enough that if you have a ramshackle old house and wish to introduce some modern improvement, to put in a bath-room or fit it with electric light, you may bring the whole thing about your ears; and in patching the framework of society there is a similar danger unless one goes warily. It is only by looking at the history of society in the past that we come to realize how very complicated it is; how true it has been that the unexpected always happens.

The rapid spread of the influenza and the threatenings of cholera have recently awakened us in England to the possibility of our country being ravaged by some plague, as it was in by-gone days, and notably by the Black Death in the time of Edward III. About half the population of this country was swept away by the plague. It is easy to say that according to Malthus's law the gap would soon be filled up, perhaps in five-and-twenty years, though I am by no means confident that the recovery in mere numbers was very rapid. But, after all, the question of mere numbers is not so very important; the interesting matter is to trace out how that sudden shock, due to such unexampled mortality, affected the structure of society, the employments and comforts of the people. And if we examined it in detail, we should find that the sudden blow set agoing a series of changes and readjustments which continued for generations. If we wish really to understand the full influence of this epidemic, we must take account not only of its immediate and temporary but also of its ultimate and permanent results; and this is all the more necessary since in some ways the ultimate results were the very reverse of the immediate and apparent effects of the plague. The first change

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which occurred, while the epidemic was still raging, was a sudden and rapid rise of wages, so that the day-laborer got far more by his work than before. But this was gradually followed by the introduction of a new order of things; men would not continue to pay these new rates for work in the fields, and so they took to pasture-farming instead, to save the labor bill. The development of sheep-farming at the expense of tillage seems to have been set a-going as a consequence of the Black Death, and it went on with more or less rapidity for two centuries and a half; it was by far the most important effect of the Black Death, though there is little evidence that it was observable within a generation of the fatal year of mortality.* And note the ultimate effect on the laborer: high rates of wages led to a smaller area of tillage and less frequent opportunities of employment, so that the day-laborer in the time of Elizabeth was in all probability quite as badly off as he had been in the earlier years of Edward III.,—perhaps worse off. The ultimate effects on wages were quite opposite to the immediate and apparent effects.

So far for the social effects of a visitation which lay beyond human control, at any rate in the then condition of society; but the distinction between the immediate and the ultimate results of social changes is also noticeable in connection with legislation and the administration of law. The reasons for passing some measure may be good, the objects in view right and wise; it may secure these objects; but so complicated is society that it is also sure to bring about further and unexpected changes, perhaps for good, perhaps for evil. Here, too, we must learn to recognize that the ultimate effects of a measure may be different from, perhaps directly opposite to, its immediate and apparent results.

During the latter part of the eighteenth century there was a very general feeling that the Poor Law was administered with unnecessary severity, and that the action of the overseers was penurious and cruel. There was, in consequence, a certain reaction in favor of greater laxity in administration; and

* Early instance in Cullum, "Hawsted," 217.

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this showed itself in the passing of an act in 1782,* when certain discretionary powers were given to the guardians which gave greater opportunities for out-door relief. Later, in 1795, under what seemed the pressure of a temporary emergency, the Berkshire justices, and soon after the justices generally, began granting out-door relief very widely and systematically in the form of allowances to supplement wages. From various causes, among others a wool famine, spinning was scarcely obtainable and was very badly remunerated; and the allowances were probably intended to serve as a substitute for the women's contribution to the family economy. But in the course of a very few years it was found that what had begun as a temporary emergency had to be continued, and became the normal condition of the laborers, with the worst possible results. The effect of this allowance system in sapping a spirit of independence was most grievous, and the country was in danger of being ruined by the increase of pauperism. But even while we look back and join in the general chorus of condemnation of the old Poor Law as it was latterly administered, we may see how hard it is to blame those who took the steps that led to these disastrous results. They desired to remove the immediate pressure of poverty and to keep whole families from starving; they succeeded in accomplishing what they aimed at, and they are not to be too harshly blamed because they failed to see that the ultimate result would be to permanently degrade and pauperize the laboring class. The men who made the error did not live to see its full results, but it is for us to distinguish their reasons for making the change, from the unexpected results of that change in the law. We may thus learn, by the recorded consequences of their mistake, to be careful how lax administration of the Poor Law may foster rather than relieve pauperism.

Where, as in all social phenomena, movements are slow and gradual and far-reaching, it is of special importance that we should not be content to rely on our impressions, however well founded these may be. We want to enlarge our individual experience of the depreciation of silver, or of the in-

* 22 Geo. III., c. 83, § 32.

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fluence of trades' unions; we form impressions of what is obvious, but by referring to the recorded experience of others we get a grasp of what is not obvious, but yet may be of first-rate importance.

3. There is also a danger that the merely rule-of-thumb man will try to apply his knowledge to cases where it is quite irrelevant. One of my parishioners, who found that Sequah's oil relieved her rheumatism, thought it worth while to take it internally, in the hope of curing cataract. This may seem an extreme case; but it is true that the merely practical man has no criteria as to the limits within which he may usefully apply his knowledge. He hardly considers how far the new case is on all fours with the old one. It is the man who is accustomed to group and weigh evidence drawn from any sources and from wide experience, and whose intelligence is trained by the process, who can formulate the conditions under which it is possible to apply one remedy with good hope of success. Alike in regard to correcting his impressions, to supplementing his experience, and to applying his knowledge, the rule-of-thumb man may gain immensely if he is willing to test and amplify his opinions by aid of book-learning and theories.

II.

The accumulated experience of the human race is, then, a vast field from which we may draw in order to supplement our personal experience and to help us to guide our action. But we cannot draw on it hap-hazard; we must select what is relevant to the business in hand. We need to attend to some particular subject, and that means that we leave its surroundings out of account and deal with it as abstracted from other circumstances. The rule-of-thumb man habitually argues from one concrete case to another, but all science is more or less abstract, since attention is directed to some group of phenomena which coexists with other phenomena in fact and in actual experience, but which must be separated from them in thought,—as light coexists with but may be studied apart from the study of heat. The scope of each empirical science is the range of human experience of which it takes cognizance.

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In some sciences the process of abstraction is carried much further than in others; and different sciences differ very much from one another in the ways in which they are connected with, and can be brought to bear on, human conduct. There are three different points in this relationship which we may consider in turn.

1. For one thing, a practical object of some kind or other has very often been the chief motive that has prompted to the pursuit of a science; indeed, this is probably at work very obviously in the early stages of all sciences. The practical object may be illusory, but it none the less affords the motive which has stimulated men to make real and permanent progress. Thus, the early development of astronomy was closely connected with the mistaken expectations of astrology; the first advances in chemistry were urged on by the hopes of adepts who might succeed in the transmutation of baser metals into gold. Again, philology has profited greatly from the labors of those who have studied African or Polynesian languages and reduced them to writing, with the practical object of using them as instruments of instruction.

So, too, with economics. It is interesting to notice how many of the great economists of by-gone days, both English and foreign, have been influenced by direct practical aims. Many of them were consciously endeavoring to find the best means of increasing the revenue: it was so with Petty, and it was so with Quesnay. Adam Smith, too, wrote with a direct practical reference in regard to the trade of the country, and especially its trade with France. Malthus thought out his doctrine of population with reference to the condition of the country under the influence of a badly-administered poor law; and the theory of rent which goes under Ricardo's name was developed in connection with practical difficulties about bounties on corn and a high price of provisions. A practical interest has been apparent all through the progress of classical political economy; and it is not too much to say that the phenomena of the exchange of wealth would never have attracted such special attention if it had not been for the practical interests connected with them.

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It is also true, I think, that the general and increasing apathy about economic science at the very time when social questions are coming so much to the front is due to the general suspicion that economics has little practical bearing. This suspicion has been partly fostered by the language which has been employed by Cairnes and others. Some writers have been inclined to treat economics as if its reasoning were entirely hypothetical; by so doing they are able to present their reasonings in a form in which they have universal validity and have the character of strict demonstrations. But while there is this gain in the form of the science, there is, as Senior long ago pointed out, a very serious loss from casting the whole science into a shape in which it is merely hypothetical. The connection with actual life is lost, and the science seems to be merely in the air. Now, while hypothesis and hypothetical speculations may be necessary and useful instruments of study, as they are,* and I should be the last to depreciate them, positive economic doctrine rests on human experience, and must be built up, like other empirical sciences, by empirical methods. In so far as it is treated as merely hypothetical, it has, indeed, demonstrative certainty, but it has lost touch with actual life. If economic science is little regarded by practical men, it is partly because economists have been so much inclined to cast it in such a form that they can employ mathematical methods. Such reasonings have high and transcendent validity, but no direct relation to actual life. Of course, economic science is still less reliable when the hypotheses are not plainly stated, and it is not clear whether the reasoning is merely hypothetical or is positive doctrine which rests on a basis of experience. Such confusion as this justifies not merely apathy on the part of the public, but distrust.

Still, whether the existing apathy is the fault of modern economists or their misfortune, the science which deals with the exchange of material wealth, and therefore with the con-

* I have dwelt elsewhere on the importance of hypothesis and of what I call pure theory as *instruments* of study. *Vide* Address to Section F, British Association, Cardiff, 1891, *Economic Review*, January, 1892.

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ditions of its production and the terms of its distribution, is of first-rate importance. It is only one aspect of human affairs, but it is an aspect which ought not to be neglected. Nor is there anything degrading, as some folks seem to think, in concentrating attention on this side of human affairs, so long as we remember that it is not the sole aspect. To take the most extreme case: godliness has importance for the life that now is; it has an economic importance; not less truly it has promise for the life to come. We may try to estimate the economic influence of the Christian religion, as, for example, in the works of the monks of the West, or at other times when there has been a clear advance of a definitely Christian civilization. The importance of the Christian religion as an economic force, either in the individual or the community, is a perfectly legitimate subject of study; those who engage in it need not be in the least blind to the supernatural and eternal worth of the Christian Faith. And so of anything else: we need not suppose that material goods are the one thing worth having; we may be perfectly clear that they are often wasted and misused. Wealth only offers opportunities of advance in art and science and much else, but it does offer opportunities. And the science which considers the material and physical conditions of social well-being deals with a subject which is of immense practical importance. Errors in regard to this may be fraught with terrible misery for generations to come.

2. Different sciences differ in character, and some are much more directly applicable to practical life than others. The very abstract sciences apply to a great many different things, and are widely useful, but it is not easy to deduce practical maxims directly from them. Arithmetic applies to all sorts of things, but a man who is quick at figures can hardly deduce from that science a method of book-keeping or land-surveying; the applications of chemistry are much more direct. In fact, it is a familiar piece of logic that the wider a conception is, the vaguer it is; the more it applies to, the less it has in it.* If a science is very widely applicable, it is difficult to build

* Jevons, "Elementary Logic," p. 40.

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maxims upon it. Till the time of Ricardo, as I have pointed out, economics made no pretensions to be a very widely applicable science; in its earlier days, writers avowedly dealt only with the circumstances of their own nation, and at the beginning of this century they kept their attention closely fixed on material wealth. But within the last few years there has been a decided movement in another direction. The new school, of which Professor Marshall is the acknowledged head, devote themselves to expressing principles in their widest form. Ricardo's doctrine of rent is expanded into a form in which it becomes applicable not merely to land, but to every variety of differential advantage for production.* In the same way economic theory is treated, not as concerned with material wealth at all, but as a sort of branch of psychology which gives us a machinery to aid us in reasoning about such motives of human action as are measurable, whether they are concerned with material wealth or not.† Now, there may be great interest in working out theories of this kind, and I do not venture to say a word which would seem to disparage such studies, but I wish to point out that when economic doctrine is formulated thus, it does not serve so readily as a guide in practical difficulties; it is harder to frame maxims with its help. And thus in a second way the new school are inclined to give economic doctrine a character in which it is divorced from actual life, and are, to my mind, themselves to blame for the general apathy they sometimes deplore. They may, of course, be ready to state opinions on practical questions,—in favor of a large increase of out-door relief, or anything else. But such an opinion is necessarily put forward as a mere *ipse dixit*, and no serious attempt is made to supply any scientific foundation for it.‡

3. Various sciences differ from one another, too, in another matter that is closely connected with the question of practical applications: some study forces which human beings can

* *Economic Journal*, ii. 512.

† "Present Position," p. 15.

‡ Compare the paper read by the Rev. W. M. Ede at the British Association (Section F) in Edinburgh.

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direct and control easily and accurately; other sciences are devoted to the study of forces which are to a much less extent under human control. In a physical laboratory the various physical forces can be brought to bear in greater or less amounts with precision; but there are other forces which we have no such means of regulating, and among them are those with which economical science is concerned. Economic science deals with forces in human nature, with human skill and enterprise, with human care in providing for the future, and so forth. Its scope, according to the best tradition, is limited to the consideration of those forces so far as they are concerned with material wealth; but it studies the operation of human powers and is pre-eminently a moral rather than a physical science. It has on the one hand to describe the character of physical limits to wealth, and on the other to study the conscious efforts of human beings to overcome physical nature. Now, the forces of human nature are at the best very unruly; the energy and foresight that are brought into play in the production of wealth are not easy to measure accurately, nor can we either call them into being at will or apply them as we please. The forces of human nature, whether in individuals separately or in society generally, are far less directly under the control of other men than those of physical nature; and political economy is contrasted with the experimental sciences in regard to the facility which there is for putting its doctrines into effect.

This seems to me to be a matter that is too little thought of in many practical schemes for the improvement of the people; it is neglected by individualists and socialists alike. Socialists sometimes speak as if the state could control all the powers of production in the interest of the community, but they never show how the state is to secure the continued exercise of human energy and human foresight under changed conditions. In a similar fashion there are those who speak as if letting men severely alone were a certain means of calling forth their best qualities; but neither this nor even some modest encouragement will insure their becoming thrifty. You cannot compel them to be provident by merely abolish-

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ing out-door relief, nor call forth national thrift by floating a scheme of compulsory national insurance. It is pre-eminently in such cases as this that we see how what looks well on paper may yet be utterly unfeasible; we have no direct and complete control over the forces that are required to bring about the new condition of things which we wish to see introduced.

III.

So far I have tried to show that an appeal to science is desirable, since it corrects and supplements and assists our personal experience; I have tried, too, to distinguish between different sciences, and to show that they do not all lend themselves equally to practical application. I come now to the broad feature which distinguishes the sciences of human nature (or moral sciences) from the physical sciences, in regard to the possibility of practical application.

Of course in all empirical sciences and studies we have to do with generalization,—general statements of human experience. But there are generalizations and generalizations. The forces of physical nature have remained practically unaltered during the whole range of human life on the globe; the world has continued to go round the sun in the same sort of way, and we are justified in taking our generalizations about chemistry or physics as true for the whole past and whole future of the human race. With regard to studies which investigate human nature and human society it is different; for human society and human nature are constantly changing. As has been well said, history never repeats itself; hence our generalizations in regard to the forces of human nature only hold good for a longer or shorter time; they have no real pretence to universality. Even such a generalization as Malthus's doctrine of population, though more carefully based than any other economic generalization, would not justify us in any prediction with regard to the population of the globe, in the same way as we might predict eclipses of the sun and moon a hundred years hence. Not only is it impossible to foresee the conditions of the time, but it would be rash to assume that the force of the reproductive instinct would be precisely

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the same then as now. Human nature is constantly changing, and therefore our generalizations never hold good universally in human experience, but are only true for a longer or shorter period of human experience. This is a most important difference between empirical generalizations about physical forces—physical laws—and empirical generalizations about the forces of human nature. Personally, I think it would be wise if economists would mark this distinction by speaking of their empirical generalizations as generalizations, and not introducing the term economic law, with all its false implications of universality. And this may help us to see the limits within which we can rightly look for guidance to political economy.

1. We can rarely argue any single case out satisfactorily on general principles. The complication of society is very great, and the steady and continuous change renders it improbable that the principles we have derived from the past apply directly to society in the present. Even within the last three hundred years the character of English pauperism has changed enormously. The events which led to its increase three hundred years ago have very little resemblance to the circumstances which tend to its increase now. For example, drink is commonly spoken of now as one of the chief causes of pauperism. But in the time of Edward VI., when there was a panic on the subject of pauperism, drinking was at all events not a characteristic English vice; it appears to have been of no practical importance at all in connection with pauperism. Taking this period of three centuries in one country and with reference to one social question, we may see that it has entirely changed its character. All social problems are necessarily more or less new; they have to be investigated as new cases, involving new circumstances and new complications, even when they have certain features in common with those of by-gone days. We may examine the economic problems of the past if we have a mind to, but ancient philosophers could not discuss modern problems; not even the wisest man can be so far-seeing as that.

2. Again, there are many social problems which we cannot solve by means of political economy; they are too large, and

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involve elements of which it does not take account. There is much misery among those who are destitute of the comforts and necessaries of life; but their case cannot be remedied by economics alone. There can be no abolition of poverty unless there is first the abolition of human frailty and human sin. Political economy does not take account of all the factors that are requisite if that is to be accomplished. And hence we may say that political economy cannot show us how to realize any ideal we may cherish, even with regard to man's material welfare; we have no experience of an ideal society either in the past or the present, and a science which rests on experience has not the adequate data. All that it can do is to give us warnings as to dangers against which we must beware. It cannot show us how to make everybody happy and comfortable; it can call attention to difficulties in connection with any particular scheme for making people less unhappy and more comfortable than they are. It can at best give negative rather than positive guidance; it can warn us from long-continued or from recent experience as to things that are likely to diminish the material opportunities of human well-being, or that are likely to weaken those forces of human nature on which the maintenance of material welfare depends.

a. Political economy shows us the difficulty with which the total wealth of the nation or of the world can be increased, and therefore shows that there are limits, not hard and fast, but practical limits, to the wealth that is available. If we spend it in one way, we cannot have it to use in another; if we expend it in ways which do not increase the total wealth of the world, we probably divert a large sum from those employments that add to wealth. If we have to increase our army and spend an additional £17,000,000 a year on soldiers and ammunition, we shall have to burden some class in the community, either a laboring, or trading, or other class, to pay for it. In fact, we cannot eat our cake and have it. Material wealth gives the opportunities of well-being, and if we as a nation use our material wealth without seeing that it is replaced, we are sure to suffer somehow. Where the suffering may fall is another matter, but suffering there must be.

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b. Again, political economy shows us the nature of the forces in human nature which make for the maintenance and increase of material welfare; it shows us, too, how easily they are weakened or destroyed. Mutual trust is the basis of our credit system; what a little rumor will serve to shake the credit system! Self-reliance, foresight, self-help, these are the secret springs of recent material progress; but a badly-administered poor law served to sap them all in a most disastrous fashion.

3. To take one special case: a great deal of interest has been recently excited by Mr. Charles Booth's proposal to provide pensions of five shillings a week for every man and woman who reached the age of sixty-five years. To this two objections have been urged, both of which seem to me well founded:

a. The cost would be very heavy.

b. The certain prospect of a pension would check habits of thrift and tend to encourage recklessness.

a. The sum it would cost is large. Mr. Booth estimates it at £17,000,000. This money would have to be raised by taxation; additional taxation would almost certainly react somehow on the condition of trade, and prove a discouragement, if not a positive burden, to our industry. Just as in India the solemn question arises how far it is wise to impose a heavy additional burden on the next generation of Indian ryots in order to prevent some additional lives from being lost by starvation in a famine year, so the question must be faced how far it is wise to burden the resources of this country, and ultimately the laborers of this country in *some* way, in order to provide pensions for the aged.

But, further, it is possible that the scheme would be costly in another way. It is not clear that the money would be well administered. There are some aged persons who have no need of this assistance, to whom it would come as an extra boon. There are many who are so frail that they require nursing or attendance as well as food and shelter; to them the pension would be useless. There are others who cannot be trusted with relief in the form of money, and who would

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grossly misuse their pensions. It seems a mistake to burden the tax-payer with raising a large sum, much of which would be needlessly expended, and some of which would be grossly misused.

b. There are, of course, no definite data for saying how it would react on the habits of the mass of the people. So far there has been comparatively little effort on the part of the working-classes to provide for old age; but it would be disastrous if anything were done to check the attempts which have been successfully begun by several of the Friendly Societies. That it would tend in this direction seems most probable.

Now, facing these dangers, I should like to point out how by a very slight modification of the scheme the dangers would be minimized. I should propose that the pension should be paid at the rate Mr. Booth proposes, but subject to two conditions:

1. That the pensioner was not in possession of an income from other sources equivalent to £25 a year.

2. That the pensioner had never during his or her working life, say from fifteen till sixty-five, been the recipient of parish relief in any form, including medical relief.

a. This would undoubtedly reduce the cost of the scheme immensely; a large number of persons would be excluded from the benefit of the scheme, but their lot in life would not be seriously worse because of that exclusion. Still more it would reduce the chances of waste in the expenditure of the fund; it would not be deliberately given to those who were quite out of the reach of want, nor to those who had during their working days incurred the taint of pauperism. If some deserving persons were excluded from the benefit, a very large proportion of those who would be most likely to misuse the money when it got into their hands would be excluded from enjoying it.

b. As to the effect on self-reliance. In the form proposed it would give little temptation to want of thrift. A pension would be given as the reward of a thrifty, self-reliant life, and the fear of losing a pension would keep many persons from coming

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on the parish in temporary emergencies; it would tend to discourage able-bodied pauperism, and this is half the battle, as Mr. Loch points out.* Nor would it offer the same discouragement to thrift as out-door relief does at present; the artisan who saved could have the full benefit of his savings, unless they were exceptionally large, and yet claim his pension as well. While I am doubtful whether any scheme of national insurance would successfully compel people to be thrifty, I believe that such a scheme of national reward might encourage thrift to an extraordinary extent.

Here we are not wholly without experience. I can only allude to it. There are certain parishes in England where charities are left to those parishioners who do not come on the rates; there are others where doles are made to all, and the church-wardens have no power of applying this discriminating test. As the vicar of one of these latter parishes, I feel that these doles are distinctly pauperizing; from what I can learn of neighboring parishes, I feel confident that the restricted gifts have quite different effects; they seem to confer a real boon, and to do little if any harm. But I would not rest the case on mere personal impressions. I feel that the opinion of a skilled observer like Arthur Young, at the time when pauperization was proceeding most rapidly, is of the first importance. He believed that much might be done to check it by a similar but different measure. He suggested that if allotments were given to the laborer subject to the condition that they should be forfeited on any application for relief from the rates, it would stimulate self-reliance. The great thing seems to be to keep men from getting into the way of looking to the parish instead of bracing themselves to struggle on without its aid, either by their own individual efforts or with the assistance of provident associations. It may be worth while to add that the distinction on which I lay stress is incorporated in the recent Danish legislation with regard to provision for old age.†

The modification thus suggested only carries somewhat

* "Old Age, Pensions, and Pauperism," p. 40.

† Spender, "The State and Pensions," p. 106.

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further restrictions which Mr. Booth has himself proposed in connection with the universal pensions; and the proposal in this modified form would be far less open to the two fundamental objections; it would not be nearly so costly, while it would be more effective, and instead of checking it would probably stimulate thrift. In so far as this expectation was realized and it called forth more self-reliance, it would help to pay for itself, while by removing the most "deserving" cases from their care it would enable the guardians to be more strict in administration; and it would meet the real evil. It is a hardship, which is perhaps chiefly felt in rural districts, that an old man who has always been industrious and is past his work should have to end his days in what are at best uncongenial surroundings. It is little better if he is dependent on the forced and grudged contributions of his children and their families: not every daughter-in-law has the kindly disposition of a Ruth, and it is hard to a proud old man to sink to depend on charity, even if it is the charity of his children. The state may well make men independent in their old age if they have kept themselves independent in their working days. Nor is it thereby incurring a new obligation, but only discharging the old obligation more wisely. Since the time of Elizabeth, at least, there has been an avowed recognition of a national duty to maintain the impotent poor, and the man who is past his work falls within that term as much as the man who is disabled from any other cause. To the industrious poor maintenance may well be given through the post-office as a pension, while for the pauperized poor proper maintenance can only be secured by taking them into the poor-house.

If this line were adopted, the persons who were maintained by the state would classify themselves; there need be no arbitrary tests to distinguish the thrifty from the unthrifty. That some folks would be driven by misfortune to forfeit their pensions is true; that others would draw pensions who might be more fitly maintained in workhouses is also true; but we cannot frame a scheme that will mete out poetic justice in every particular case; we do wish to devise a means by which the nation may most wisely fulfil its recognized duty of pro-

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viding for those who really are "impotent poor." In attempting to face that problem now we have an administrative system in the post-office, which renders it possible to fulfil part of this national duty by means of national rather than parochial organization. It is possible, too, to provide for the industrious poor without forcing them to give proof of their destitution and thus exposing them to all the shame of poverty. It is possible to do all this without any relaxation of the strictness with which relief is meted out to those who have fallen into and continued in poverty through idleness or vice. Mr. Booth's scheme, as modified, seems to me to be on the face of it not unwise in theory, and I can only hope that it will be presented in a detailed form and earnestly examined before it is condemned as impossible in practice.

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GERMAN CHARACTER AS REFLECTED IN THE NATIONAL LIFE AND LITERATURE.*

[Theme.—General conception of the nation and the national individuality. Means to a knowledge of the latter.

Development of the subject:

1. The language. Origin of the early German language. (Significance of the law of accent; other innovations.) Development of the language. Law of signification. Stock of words. Later history. Tendencies towards a written language. (Significance of the same.)

2. The mythology. (Relation to mythology in general.) Origin of German mythology. General observations. Three myths. Idea of the runes. Humor in the mythology. Christianity and the Germans. The Reformation. Enlightenment. Atheism.

3. The poetry. (Meaning.) General character: poetry of spiritual struggle; character of this struggle; its insolubility (individuality and subordination in their mutual relations). Effects of this universal characteristic. Details: (*a*) Form (history of form; struggle for form; its significance as a model). (*b*)

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* This paper is one of a series of character-studies of which Professor Pfleiderer's article in the October number is the first. The series is intended to embrace studies of national character, of character as modified by professional life, and so forth.

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Choice of subject-matter. (*c*) Motives ("zwîvel;" emphasis laid on the "unconscious" element; origin of the characters; history of development and its significance). (*d*) Delineation of the characters. (*e*) Technique (the epic; the drama; the lyric).

4. Choice of heroes. General observations. Arminius. Charlemagne. Barbarossa. Luther. Frederick the Great. Blücher. Theodor Körner. Bismarck. Common features. Influence.

5. The history. The end constantly in view. Internal history. External history. Explanation of the contrast.

6. Art. A national formative art never developed among the Germans. Reasons.

7. National life. German festivals. Christmas and its meaning. German happiness.

8. Other expressions of national life. General observations. Reading in Germany.

9. Relations to other nations. Impression made by the Germans as a nation; as individuals.

10. Foreign opinions. What the Germans were called. Tacitus. The Middle Ages. Montaigne. Voltaire. Madame de Staël. Carlyle. Napoleon. Renan. Taine. The latest generation.

11. Domestic opinions. Earliest times. Humanism. Sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The eighteenth century. Klopstock. Lessing. Herder. Goethe. The nineteenth century. Börne. Heine. Romanticism. Political students. Nietzsche. Summary of these opinions.

Conclusion. Necessary rejection of a concise formula for a description of national individuality. National psychology. Prospects.]

THE task of expressing in brief the individuality of even a single person is a difficult one, and the danger is nearly always present either of writing in a stiff, academic fashion, or of falling into caricature. The difficulty is immeasurably increased when an attempt is made to describe within a very small compass the characteristics of a great nation, whose eventful existence has lasted throughout a thousand years. Nevertheless, relying on the indulgence of my readers, I venture to delineate in a brief sketch the character of German national individuality.

The term "nation" conveys the idea of a comparatively large number of tribes, and testifies to an intimate connection between them in the achievement of a common language and literature, in a unity of purpose in religion and politics, as well as in an ethnographical condensation from the standpoint both of outsiders and of members. It is impossible to

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go beyond these apparently very weak determining features without doing violence to the actual facts of the case; for the fiction of a common origin for all parts of a nation is destroyed by the admission of foreign elements into it. Nobody will deny to the descendants of Slavic families in the noble and princely German houses their right of membership in the German nation, and only infatuated Chauvinism will dispute as to the same in regard to the Semites in Germany who have been educated in complete accord with German ideas. Less, still, is the conception of nationality coextensive with town-union; the German-American may still be considered a part of the German nation. Finally, community of language is also not a determining feature, though very nearly so. The learned circles of the fifteenth century, who almost forgot the language of the court in their exclusive use of Latin, and those of the eighteenth, among whom German was entirely disused in favor of French, did not therefore cease to be German; a colonist who adopts and grows accustomed to the language of the natives does not take on their nationality. In like manner other attempts will fail which set out to determine by means of a single trait the limits of nationality. It it is only from a comparatively large number of criteria—such as those referred to above—that a conclusion can be drawn; and these criteria must be of such a character as to permit the grouping around a permanent national core of a number of elements which, exhibiting the national traits in the decreasing series, effect a gradual transition to other nationalities.

The idea that each nation is characterized by certain peculiarities is an old one, and has been but lightly disputed by a "doctrinaire" method on the basis of superficial theories concerning the equality of all men. In Germany Herder, and later Wilhelm von Humboldt especially, tried to grasp the conception of national individuality more clearly. Philologians and historians, as well as philosophers, have made valuable contributions towards the attainment of this end. Ethnology so far has not succeeded in finding a positive scientific foundation for these individualities, and since (as mentioned above) the conception of a nation is not an ethnographical

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one (like *race* or *tribe*), a solution of the question must not be expected from this science, although it may render important service in obtaining results.

All evidence affecting the body of the nation under consideration stands at our disposal as a means of obtaining a knowledge of national individuality. The elements of this evidence are essentially the following: language, mythology, poetry, the heroes and representative men set up as such by the nation, the nation's history, and, finally, and least trustworthy of all, domestic and foreign opinion.

The Germans are especially fortunate in the unbroken chain of evidence which they possess, and equally unfortunate in their central position, exposing them as it does to so many influences injurious to their individuality, and making both foreign and domestic opinion partisan, the former through hostile, the latter by friendly, contact. In the former particular the Slavs and Kelts, for example, have the disadvantage of the Germans, while in the latter point the Spaniards are more fortunate than they.

Among these elements language claims the foremost place, because it has the broadest national basis. On the one hand, parts of the nation that have neither an active nor a passive share in the national literature or history contribute towards the development of its language, and on the other hand, foreign influence, although considerable, is less so in this than in any other field.

The German language is the result of the logical development of certain dialectal peculiarities, probably characteristic of the Indo-Germanic stock of languages while still undivided. Wilhelm Scherer in particular attempted to explain these peculiarities according to a national psychology. The most important old-German innovation is the achievement of the law of accents. Up to that time the accent in a word had been *free*,—*i.e.*, in certain uses of the word it fell upon the significant syllable,—the stem; in others, upon the modifying syllable,—the suffix (Greek μήτηρ, but μητρός); now, without exception, it fell upon the stem. This innovation may undoubtedly be explained psychologically as a strong action of

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the logical impulse. That part of the word which gives it its meaning meets with decided preference. In opposition to the constantly changing favor of other languages, an unalterable regulation is carried out in German, which permanently subordinates the syllables of declension to the superior stem-syllables. Another peculiarity is also manifested here. According to the original mode of speech of the Indo-Germanic peoples, preserved by the Greeks and especially by the Hindoos, the *sentence* was the unit of language. The word had to adjust itself to the sentence and to suffer certain changes according to its relation to it. The Germans, however, now make the single *word* the unit. It becomes fixed and retains its form independently of that of the sentence; the so-called "*Sandhi*," the modification of the word through its position in the sentence, is almost entirely neglected by the Germans (in contrast, *e.g.*, to the Greek καθ' ὅλου instead of κατὰ ὅλου). An individualization of the word is thus achieved by which it henceforth takes up an independent position.

The consequences of this important innovation are to be seen, first of all, in a greater activity in the destruction of neglected endings, reaching its highest point in the English language; second, in the immediate substitution of the principle of pure logic in a sentence for the original one of euphony in phraseology and metre. Pindar shows the perfection of the common Greek principles of language in his hymnal verse, when he neglects the purely logical relations of words in favor of a magnificent harmonious structure of periods, so that he does not hesitate even to break off a strophe in the middle of a word. The alliterative verse of the Edda, again, is merely the culmination of the general Germanic principles of language, since it neglects euphony entirely for the sake of an energetic and effective development of what is significant.

The other innovations in the primitive German language are not equally significant. Still, in the rejection of countless forms preserved in other languages (*e.g.*, the dual, the aorist, and the future) there is reflected a certain restriction to that which is logically necessary,—a utilitarianism in speech, springing from the same source that gave rise to the law of

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accent. Outwardly this economy is manifested for the most part in a restriction to two categories: singular and plural but no dual, present and past but no particular time of the future, likewise but few fine distinctions in the past. In conjugation there are two large classes, the "strong" and the "weak" verb; and finally there may be cited in illustration of this point the complete decay of older formations (the present in *mi*, reduplication, etc.).

A similar decisive *bipartition*—a marked characteristic of German individuality from early times to Goethe (who explained all scientific problems on the basis of "polarity,"—*i.e.*, the constant use of antitheses like "expansion and contraction"), or to Bismarck ("friends of the empire, enemies of the empire")—may be recognized in the development of meanings. The German is especially fond of forming new words through the negation of old forms, even where positive expressions for the idea are already in existence ("*unschwer*" instead of "*leicht*"); he enjoys summing up connected conceptions in so-called "twin forms" of an antithetical nature. Two words, originally merely varying shades of an idea, are forced into opposing meanings, and again words having entirely different significations are made useful by means of an approximation in form to existing antitheses (Anglo-Saxon *heofen: geofen*).

The wealth of words in a language is determined in three ways,—by the rejection of old forms, the formation of new, and the adoption of foreign ones; the preservation of words that would otherwise be lost may be considered a fourth element, though one of less importance than the others. Preservation and rejection of old material are probably determined first of all by considerations of sound, and not of sense. In contrast to this element the development of new conceptions is characteristic (like *gut* and *übel*, *mild*, *treu*, *Adel*, *Ehe*, *Eid*, *Gott: cf.* the introduction to Kluge's "Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache"). This phenomenon testifies to a care in observation, which discovers and names conceptions before unknown; they are usually either of a social or of an ethical nature, the former appearing early among all nations, and the latter developing among the Germans with remarkable

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rapidity. An energetic assimilation of foreign words is also noticeable at a very early stage in the history of the language (Latin and Keltic expressions, especially those of an industrial or military nature), a movement continuing throughout the entire history of the German tongue in varying phases.

A decided centripetal tendency rules the German language thus constituted. The disposition is early manifested to develop an harmonious, literary language on the basis of the dialect of an important part of the nation, with the co-operation of the other dialects. In general, the most gifted and the most important tribes (Swabians, Bavarians, also English and Scandinavians) develop a literary language earliest and most clearly, while the other tribes (Low-Germans, Frisians) do so hesitatingly and in an incomplete form. That which is true of the tribes may also be predicated of the epochs; the most brilliant periods come nearest to the ideal of a common national language, built up from the various dialects. These periods—the times of the Hohenstauffens, of the Reformation, and of the revival of Germany, 1740–1870—mark the climax of a literary development as well: in the first instance, of German poetry, in the second, of German prose, and in the third only, of both poetry and prose. The cause for these brilliant periods lies in the fact that in these instances the superior example of certain personalities or tendencies worked in opposition to the too wide-spread individualism in local and personal habit of speech. At the same time the strength of the common language is significant as a symptom of a time of strong national feeling, while the rank growth of foreign expressions in the seventeenth century testifies to national weakness; the disintegration into innumerable dialects and local tendencies is indicative of an epoch of "particularism" of thought.

The history of the development of one language for the entire nation is characteristically German, inasmuch as it was not influenced by a fixed centre as in England, nor even as in France since the time of Richelieu by a central authority, the Academy. The voluntary co-operation of strong guiding personalities is manifested here, as everywhere else, as the

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method most conformable to German taste and most productive of fruitful results. (The joint work of Goethe and Schiller represents this great type in a most brilliant form.) It also becomes evident here that a restraint exercised from above in a purely spiritual field is more repulsive to the German nation than to any other; all attempts made by rulers to influence the language in its development were unsuccessful (*e.g.*, the language societies of the seventeenth century, the exertions of Frederick the Great, etc.).

The history of the German language up to the present time is, on the whole, the result of the logical evolution of the peculiarities manifested in the isolation of the early Germans: hence it manifests a remarkable consistency, not seriously impaired by slight variations in particular points (dialect and literary language, introduction of foreign words, and purity of language). The ascendency of logic over harmony, of significance over beauty, as well as the isolation of the single word and the tendency to bipartite divisions, remained fixed. Various results follow therefrom: (1) In the law of sound: in the stem-syllables the sounds are confined within comparatively narrow limits of variation, while the suffixes constantly shade from one form into another. (2) In the law of declension: the peculiar isolation of the Germanic languages in the midst of related tongues by the transfer of the declension to the stem-syllable (*Vater*, *Väter*). (3) In syntax: a rich development of conjunctions, a remarkable freedom in construction of sentences, and an arrangement of words frequently lacking in harmony. (4) In the law of meanings: a superabundance of nice distinctions (*e.g.*, *gut*, *brav*, *edel*, *bieder*, *tüchtig*, etc.). (5) In the formation of words: a characteristic preference of compounds to derivatives, and in this particular the voluntary union of subordinates is found preferable.

The tendency of the German language to fix upon the complicated as the more highly developed idea is worthy of notice as a characteristic peculiarity ("*einfältig*" (silly), "*schlecht*" (bad), which really are synonymes of "*einfach*" (plain), receive fault-finding significations).

In close relationship to language stands mythology. Just

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as language is merely the sum of the names of all perceivable things, so mythology is the sum of the names of the secrets suspected, believed, and finally concluded to reside behind these things. In the same way that language is the result of a common national exertion in regard to distinctions among every-day phenomena, mythology may be considered the product of the joint labors of the earliest thinkers and poets in regard to the characteristics of the sublime and the supernatural.

The principles of Germanic mythology are not yet clearly laid down. It is quite certain, however, that the early Germans took a fairly well developed germ of their religion with them from the "cradle of the race," and it seems a characteristic feature that they limited the province of the chief god of the Indo-Germans, the god of heaven (Zeus, Jupiter), to war (Tyr), and subordinated him to the god of irresistible powers of magic, of wisdom, and of the storm—Odin. Here the spiritual element is given the preference over the corporal, just as was found to be the case in the Germanic metre founded on the principle of accent, according to which the light, emphatic syllables were given more force in a sentence than the less accented heavy syllables (which are the most important according to the quantitative principle). It is questionable to what extent the rich development of the old Germanic mythology on northern soil may be utilized for a criticism of the Germanic nature in general. The minute classification of certain orders of supernatural beings, however (giants and dwarfs, goblins, etc.), seems a product of the German stock in general, while the evolution of the new god of physical strength, of thunder, and the god of farmers—Thor—into the chief Scandinavian god is of purely local origin. The genealogical and other relations of the gods, here as everywhere else, are to be attributed rather to learned systematization than to the original national belief. Among the various myths the characteristic ones are those concerning Odin's store of runes, the myth about Walhalla, and that in regard to the end of the world. All three tales have been explained in modern times as modifications of Christian legends; but even were this

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theory to be verified,—which does not seem at all probable to me,—still, the very fact of their adoption, and the meaning which they have acquired in the Edda system, would prove their connection with the spirit of the nation. The rune was a most important conception in the old Germanic faith: it signified "the mystery of a thing," its true essence, described by Kant as "the thing in itself." Every object and every person possesses a rune; whoever becomes master of it has the thing to which it belongs at his disposal or the person in his power. By dint of long-continued struggles and laborious schemes the highest among the gods has become master of all runes, and hence master of all creatures and things. The deeply significant import of this myth requires no elucidation. Walhalla is the seat of heaven to which the heroes who have fallen in combat are carried by the "battle-maidens." This conception is common to many mythologies. The significant point in this particular form lies in the circumstance that the dead in Walhalla pursue their existence unchanged, revelling and fighting just as on earth, while the vast crowd of those that have died in other ways vanishes in the gloomy realm of shadows. The great seer, Goethe, in making the bold statement that Nature owed him the continuation of his existence after death, since he had struggled and worked throughout his whole life, gave a most beautiful interpretation to the old Germanic thought. The end of the world means the destruction not only of mankind, but of the gods as well, and is not brought about by the sin of man, as in the Deluge and in the legend of the Last Judgment, but by that of the gods. While it seems natural to the Germans that the world should fall with its rulers, like a company with its commander, still, a god does not cease to be the object of moral criticism. An ethical idealization of the ruling gods is rigidly avoided, for it would prove a hinderance to the free will of independent man. A new, more beautiful life will rise out of the ruins of this world. This idea proves the existence, even in those early times, of the invariable characteristic of German thought,—a union of dissatisfaction with the present and optimistic descriptions of the future.

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The religious practices in sacrifice and liturgy present no features of special importance, with the exception of those arising from the conception of the runes (a symbolic use of words or signs). A peculiar disposition to combine humor with the most sublime conceptions is, however, worthy of notice. The divine lords, Odin and Thor, are put into comical situations. Thor especially, like Herakles among the Greeks and the Hindoo Pushan, is a favorite figure for grotesque representation (Hamarsteimt; Harbardeljòp). A desire to approach the gods in a pleasant and more intimate fashion cannot fail to be recognized here. Connecting old and new again, we may be reminded of Goethe's daring and magnificent humorous representation of deity in the "Ewige Jude" and in "Faust." Certain pictures by Rembrandt may also be remembered in this connection.

There are many indications of an early development among the Germans of a critical attitude towards the gods. Heathen disclaimers of all gods are mentioned early; shameful deeds of the heavenly powers are recorded without displeasure. The ease with which Christianity was introduced among the most advanced tribes—the Franks and, earlier still, the Goths —may perhaps be connected with these facts, while more backward Germans—the Saxons most of all—opposed the new religion stubbornly. Among the Anglo-Saxons, who stood far in advance of the other tribes in civilization, in poetry, as well as in political establishment, a certain *preformation* of Christian maxims cannot but be apparent. A strong assertion of ethical principles, a sentimental weakness, and an elegiac flight from the world, form an active preparation for conversion and train the great missionaries of Germany on English soil. The connection of Bishop Boniface with King Pepin is symbolical of the intimate relations of political and religious power on that soil upon which, in 1648, the principle "*cuius regio, eius et religio*" was to be proclaimed. Furthermore, conversion was accomplished the more easily because the personal, the *human* relations, so to speak, of gods and heroes were of more importance to the Germans than dogmatic definitions. The warrior merely changed his commander.

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As soon as it was possible for him to think of Christ as the chief commander of the host of mankind (the old Saxon "Heliand") the affair was accomplished, and he became a faithful servant of the new master. Friendly relations began to develop. Peter, especially, soon inherited the familiar, jocular side of Thor, and humorous legends placed the saints on an intimate, family-like footing with the believer. The relation of the believer to his tutelar saint was throughout merely the common one of a man to his feudal lord, only in a somewhat higher degree, founded not so much on a realistic conception of the religious relation as on a religious conception of the worldly one.

These relations were also of importance in the Reformation. As far as the purely religious conceptions of that movement are concerned, nothing agitates the Germans more than the desire of pope and clergy to force themselves in as indispensable media between the believer and his Lord, for they desire to communicate with Christ directly. This is not merely a form of pride, but for the most part an absolute necessity for the soul. In like manner, the adoration of the Virgin Mary, in Catholic times and countries, bears not so much the extravagant stamp of the Romance peoples as that of heart-felt gratitude towards the mother of God. Compare the paintings of the old German masters.

When Anglo-French "Enlightenment" produced a new phase in religious development, no change was wrought in the desire for a close, personal relation to the heavenly powers. Step by step the Ruler of the world developed from the tender Father of pious Scriverius into the Loving Ruler of devout Brock and the Wise Teacher of warm-hearted Lessing. The otherwise infelicitous poetry of Wildenbruch, pursuing the same line of thought, treats of the mild "Principal." In Germany the cold abstraction of the "Système de la Nature" was unanimously rejected, and that asceticism marked by gushing sentimentality and exaggerated humility was looked upon with disgust even in countries holding to the old belief. The unconquerable longing of the Germans for a soulful relation with the Ruling Power and an intimate connection with the

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same is testified to by the fact that even the most pronounced atheists could not resist this tendency. Schopenhauer changed love towards God into hatred of the desire for life, but the passionate invectives which he hurled against "cunning nature" are witnesses to a like personal relation towards the latter principle. Hartmann and others transformed "the Unconscious" (*das Unbewusste*) into a being of hatred and enmity, and Nietzsche pursued the "dead God" with personal hate. Heine's much-derided conversion shows how much of the German existed in this Jew: he could not bear to ignore God permanently.

In this sketch of mythological evolution it has been necessary to touch upon poetry repeatedly. Poetry obtains for us a reflection of the national soul more immediately and more clearly than any of the other means at our disposal, since in the majority of its productions, and especially in its most important achievements, it is simply a realization of the ideal world,—the world constantly longed for and sought after by the nation under discussion. In my work on early German poetry ("Die Altgermanische Poesie") I made an attempt to define its isolated position clearly, and finally came to the conclusion that its peculiarity is characterized by the fact that it is the poetry of spiritual combat. The subject of the greatest poems of the Germans—the stories of the gods in the Eddas, Wolfram von Eschenbach's Parsifal, Goethe's Faust—is the struggle for truth, the combat of the soul. The "zwîvel," the doubt and dismay, the discord of two souls in one breast, is felt oppressively, and a victory over the enemy in one's own heart is looked upon with utmost satisfaction. Here again the wisest of the Germans may be taken as our interpreter; in his life of Winckelmann, Goethe has glorified harmony, perfection of equilibrium, the felicitous co-operation of all the powers in a soul, as the most sublime spectacle that the world can offer; he has placed antique integrity in sad contrast to the modern condition of spiritual confusion ("*Zerrissenheit*"). The lesson which he taught for the individual, his great teacher, Herder, preached for all mankind; his term humanity ("*Humanität*") signifies the perfected harmony of all powers peculiar

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to the nation. In this yearning lies the deepest secret of German character. The German is a thorough "individualist," forced to isolate himself as he isolates the words of his language; compelled to seek a personal relation to his God, making of himself and his God a community within a community; constrained to search within himself for a new solution of ancient and eternal problems. There is no other people among whom there are so many miniature states and tiny sects; no other nation has produced so many "characters," nor so many philosophers and careful speculators. Side by side with the inner necessity for isolation, since all association involves dependence, there exists a deeply-rooted feeling for strength of organization, for carefully-arranged ranks of subordination and well-defined lines of demarcation. An antithetical arrangement, carefully balanced and grouped in two divisions, is pleasing to the genius of the language; the mythology divides divine beings into certain classes; in like manner, the German is not comfortable in solitude. He craves a well-defined relation to the whole of which he is a part; looking upon it—the class, the nation, mankind—as possessing superiority, he wishes to bear towards it the inferior but cordial relation of a faithful vassal to a good lord. The sceptic—Odin, Parsifal, Simplicissimus, Faust, as well as Hamlet and the heroes of the latest Danish poets—is the favorite figure in German poetry, because he is typical of the Germans themselves. The history of the Germans is that of the struggle between these two principles: individualism and subordination. The struggle is an interminable one, because the extremes always come in contact with each other. As soon as subordination in various ranks is fully effected, then the community develops into an individual possessing personal peculiarities. The Prussian state, the Prussian army, the city of Vienna, the Swabian School, are not merely ideas, but living organizations which develop peculiarities far beyond the demands of their purpose and end. The community becomes individual to such an extent that it is almost impossible for outsiders to gain entrance. A greater barrier exists between Bavarians and the Prussian bureaucracy than between Frenchmen and

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the English system of officials. And contrariwise, individualism demands subordination. Diogenes, that ancient Greek "character," asked merely that Alexander should not obstruct his sunlight; a German Diogenes would immediately have demanded of Alexander that he should retire into a tub next to him. The individual comes in conflict with his surroundings, since every one feels in duty bound to make a point of showing his distinctive qualities, and for this very reason is hindered as much as possible by the rest in his development of them. Religious sects are proud of the principles peculiar to each, political parties pride themselves on their challenging watchwords, the æsthetic orders on the extreme to which they go. The reconciliation of individualism and community, everywhere secretly longed for, will therefore always remain a beautiful dream, and its realization the constant task of our poetry.

Various circumstances may be traced to this state of affairs: a strong tendency to all kinds of philosophical and didactic poetry, a general inaptitude for the composition of great, unified poems (no German could have accomplished the grace of construction of the "Divina Commedia"), and finally alternations between periods characterized by a stubborn, inordinate desire for originality ("Storm and Stress," "Romanticism," the modern spirit), and those of a monotonous uniformity (Minnesang), the Anacreontic school, pessimistic sentimentality (*Weltschmerzlerei*), as well as oscillations between epochs of comparative local concentration (*e.g.*, the Rhine countries in the Middle Ages, Weimar in the last century) and those in which literary activity is participated in by many, widely-scattered circles (Leipsic, Hamburg, Zurich, etc., in the present).

The history of German literature furnishes the following contributions towards the criticism of national individuality.

In taking up the question of form, the preponderance of logic over euphony must again be considered. This logical predominance is somewhat lessened when poetry and music are brought into a closer relationship (Minnesang, ballads, lyric poetry from Hagedorn to Heine), and again stands out

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clearly in periods in which poetry is especially independent (illustrated in alliterative poetry, political verse of modern times). Alliteration itself is founded upon the law of accent and logical emphasis; it leads to an unqualified supremacy of the substantive by means of which poetry becomes rhetorical in character, while adjectives, being emotional in quality, fall into decay. Alliteration soon leads to a rigidity of mechanical perfection; in Germany it seems almost to have run its course even before Christian poetry, with its rhyme at the end of the verse, easily supplanted it. Since then, this successor has had quite a uniform history. It is characterized in general by a certain comparatively simple primitive form, easily degenerating into mechanical dulness, and holding almost absolute sway for a comparatively long time (the rhyming couplet of Otfried, the doggerel of the period of the Reformation). Such a period is followed by one of delicate bloom, the result of fertilization from the south (in the twelfth century by the Romance Minnesang, in the seventeenth by the fugitive poetry of the French). The flourishing period is in each case the product of a foreign spirit temporarily infused into German poetry. When, on the contrary, these Epigoni imitated the foreign form merely in outward aspect, like Opitz or Platen, a complete development of true poetry was never accomplished. The forms of lyrical poetry are especially important: the epic is influenced by them, while the drama usually borrows its mould from abroad.

It is eminently in keeping with the German character to fall into a lively dispute concerning principles in which questions of form are discussed (the poetical regulations (*die Tabulatur*) of the Meistersingers; Gottsched's fight against rhyme; that of Voss against the sonnet; Jordan's for the alliterative verse). This circumstance may not improperly be looked upon as an involuntary acknowledgment of the fact that metrical form, at least as far as the artificial poets (*Kunstdichter*) are concerned, is not an absolutely necessary development from the subject itself. German poetry has not developed peculiar poetical forms for itself, like the distich or the sonnet. On the other hand, it may be strongly asserted that the spirit in poetry that

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demands an accurate symbolism of form cannot rest content in borrowed moulds (like the French with the Alexandrine metre). For the very reason that form is considered a symbol of matter, it arouses heated discussion (the sonnet is looked upon as antagonistic to a full outpouring of the poetical spirit, while alliteration is in keeping with it). The necessity of complete harmony between subject and form even in impersonal affairs is again manifested in this truth. Voss hated the sonnet as Schopenhauer did the "Unknown." In point of fact, however, the choice of these forms—for in the cases cited a voluntary choice is involved—is symbolic of the public to whom the poetry is addressed, rather than of its matter, for a symbol is only significant as a development from the subject itself through manifest necessity. The sonnet is therefore characteristic of Petrarch, while in Platen's use of it the significant point lies in the fact of his adopting a foreign form. For the public, however, the form is symbolical, for it becomes a pattern for the Germans. In brief, it is representative not of an existing state of affairs, but of a desired end. Klopstock's antique metres indicate the formation of a community desirous of representing the classical spirit on German soil, and the sonnet among the Epigoni signifies the creation of an artificial Italy and an anachronistic Renaissance. Symbolism among the Germans always demands as great significance as that manifested in this case. The coronation of the Russian czar signifies that he *is* what all his ancestors were; that of the German emperor, that he ought to *become* so. The untiring exertions of the Germans, their ethical requirements, as well as the application of these qualifications to existing forms, are all clearly illustrated in this example.

German poetry, in regard to subject-matter, is less naïve than that of other literatures. It strives to be "idealistic" in the literal meaning of the term. Themes and characters permitting of brilliant development are preferred. The people are represented by the prince, and the military order by the captain. For centuries the lower classes are used to fill farcical *rôles* only, as in the Edda and the court pastorals. When the burgher himself comes to be a figure in poetry, he does so

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only because he has attained a higher social rank through oppression of the peasant, and by means of this oppression he strives to manifest his increased importance even in poetry (*e.g.*, in "Twelfth-Night" comedies). At a time when the Romance countries had long since discovered the poetry and the humor of poverty (in their humorous romances), only isolated instances of the introduction of the lower classes appeared among the Germans; even then it was merely imitative, and in nearly all cases a supplementary justification for the hero was deemed necessary (Simplicissimus, Käthchen v. Heilbronn). The strenuous perseverance of social distinctions, sanctioned even by the greatest German poet (Wilhelm Meister), is merely a single illustration of the universal law of sharp demarcations and hierarchical subordination.

In regard to motives, the German demands a psychological interest; a necessity not manifested at an equally early period in any other literature. In Dante's poem, *e.g.*, every man possesses a certain quality by which his place in heaven or in hell is determined (this is also true, *mutatis mutandis*, of Corneille and Racine and even of La Bruyère), while the German is interested for the most part in the inner struggle, the contest of the two souls, the "zwîvel" noted above. The struggle either is a development from within, as in the case of the great sceptics Odin, Parsifal, Faust, or is forced upon a person from without. The Nibelungenlied teems with such conflicts: Kriemhild wavers between sisterly affection and the duty of revenge; Gunther, between love for his spouse and fidelity to his friend; Rüdiger, a German figure of remarkable truth, is torn by the conflicting duties of visitor and vassal. The great and well-beloved dramatist of the nation more than any one else fell heir to these characters. The Maid of Orleans succumbs to the conflict of the simple girl with the divine instrument; Wallenstein is constantly agitated by the varying demands of ambition and conscience; Tell is compelled to adjust his peace-loving nature to the stern necessity of tyrannicide. Goethe, on the other hand, loves to depict this struggle as taking place between two persons. Götz and Weislingen, Tasso and Antonio, Prometheus and

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Epimetheus, are two sides of an individuality made up of a remarkable harmony of opposites developed in Goethe himself. Other poets have represented this conflict in the style of antique fables,—placing a man between two women of contradictory natures, bringing out his own duality of nature in his relations to them (as Wieland and Grillparzer have done). Lessing's favorite theme is the mastery of such contradictions, in which he in turn symbolizes the antithesis in a man and a girl (Minna von Barnhelm, Nathan).

The psychological conflict may, then, be considered the favorite theme of German poetry, not, as in Corneille's "Cid," an intellectual reconciliation of two points of view, but the continuous strife of natural passions. The emphasis laid upon the "unconscious," the involuntary element, that which is striven against in vain, is an especially characteristic feature of Germanic poetry. The idea that man is merely the toy of the powers contending within him, just as was really the case in Germany during the Thirty Years' War, is continually manifested throughout German literature, from one of the oldest, if not the very oldest, Edda songs, in which the betrayed maiden laments her inability to resist temptation, to Goethe's Fischer, "*halb zog es ihn, halb sank er hin;*" from the god Thor proclaiming war against the world in his uncontrollable passion, to the deified power of the "Unconscious" of the pessimistic philosophers. Psychological studies, therefore, make their appearance remarkably early; they are to be found in the last songs of the Edda and pre-eminently in the Icelandic romances. Nearly all of them possess a feature in common: the description of the formation of character. The terrible woman who is the cause of Siegfried's death explains her change from a tender maiden into a fury. German poetry has at all times excelled in the delineation of such development. While Romance poetry recognizes only finished characters, and at its best rises into pathological analysis only, the psychological study pursued in German literature has succeeded in depicting how a tender father, simple and retiring in nature, may develop into the murderer of his daughter (Emilia Galotti), how a peaceful huckster may be changed

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into a wild incendiary, the terror of the country-side (Kleist's "Michael Kohlhaas"), or the change from an honorable man to a criminal (Otto Ludwig's "Erbförster"). For this reason the Germans have proved themselves masters in the history of evolution, even in matters outside the realm of poetry. In France (and Italy) the philosophy of history describes merely how types succeed each other according to certain laws (like the cultured type of Vico and the legislative one of Montesquieu). The Germans were the first to understand the changes within the limits of the subject itself, both as far as mankind is concerned (Herder) and for organic creatures in general (Goethe). The Germans are peculiarly adapted for historical investigation (witness Savigny, Jacob Grimm, Niebuhr); for where the historians of other nations, however brilliant, merely look upon a whole train of events, the German directs his attention to the really historical moment, the true turning-point, selecting it as the important phenomenon. They take delight in the investigation of border-lines,—the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times, etc.,—since this psychological polarity is of great importance in their own state of constant doubt. Goethe, the greatest intellectual hero of the Germans, manifests most clearly how his conception of nature as constantly oscillating between a state of systole and diastole is a reflection of his own periodic alternations between spiritual calm and confusion. In Lessing, likewise, the fluctuations of his own soul between sociability and retirement are reflected not only in characters like Tellheim and the Dervish, but also in the irregular lines of his work on the education of mankind ("Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts"). In Hegel's philosophy of history this periodic Germanic metamorphosis is made universal.

In the delineation of his characters the German poet by no means denies satisfaction to his desire for personal relations. Epithets not only of praise but of ingratiation (*e.g.*, "the good" so and so) soon make their appearance. Wolfram von Eschenbach takes a most active interest in his personages; Goethe falls in love with Adelheid in "Götz von Berlichingen."

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The *technique* of German poetry is not one of its strong points; in this respect it is far excelled by the romances. Either the connections between the different parts are too apparent (as in the "artistic epic" and the works of the romanticists), or else the plan is too stiff and regular (Meistersingers, Hebbel). In the field of the epic especially, the art of easy, flowing narrative is peculiar only to south German artists, probably owing to French influence (Hebel, Gottfried, Keller). The German novel, as a whole, cannot be compared to the English, which excels in abundance of incident, nor to the French romance, which is superior in plan. Incident and plan alike are used only as a means to a loose connection of psychological studies. A German romance is successful only when it treats of the development of an individual (Werther, Wilhelm Meister, der Grüne Heinrich); Goethe's "Wahlverwandtschaften" forms the only exception to this rule. Though often rich in felicitous detail, the German novel never forms an harmonious whole. Directly didactic tendencies are of frequent occurrence (romances of the seventeenth century, Ruodlieb, Auerbach, Heyse, Keller). The same principles may be laid down concerning the drama. Psychological study in this field has been developed to wonderful perfection; not dealing with a single figure only (Schiller, Heinrich von Kleist), as is generally the case in the epic; but showing development in two characters (Goethe), or even in a greater number (Lessing). In comedy, however, where characters in a complete state of development are usually dealt with, and, as a rule, in the historical drama also, German poetry has not attained to the height of Molière or the Spanish dramatists, and naturally not to that of Shakespeare. The German poet feels the strength of his individuality as a disadvantage in such a case. He finds it uncongenial to put himself in the place of another nature without the possibility of modifying it to suit his own views. Hence the frequently ridiculous conversion of the evil personages to the opinions of the good author. The Germans are unsurpassed in lyric poetry, the technique of which seems to consist in a naïve attention to the expression of one's own emotions. No other

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nation can boast of an equal number of peerless songs, and but few can show even single pieces comparable to the best of the popular songs of Goethe, Eichendorff, Heine, Mörike; even poets of less note have put forth remarkable productions of this character. The lyric poetry of the Germans is pre-eminently of a solitary nature. The sentinel (Lyncæus in the second part of Faust), the lonely wanderer (Lenau), the forsaken maiden (Mörike), all give expression to their feelings in song. Chorus lyrics (student songs and songs for a company) do not attain the same degree of perfection, although some of the productions of this kind are remarkably fine, but these are usually rather single parts of a round than true choruses. The German song is very rarely a recital by a single person before an audience (as is the case with Béranger and frequently with Burns). The German lacks adaptability for a performance of this nature. Such a form, besides, is not nearly so well suited to the spirit of the lyric as the mould in use among the Germans; the former has been borrowed from the narration of epic poetry and adapted to the song. (This is clearly to be seen in Béranger's work.)

As a matter of detail, it may be well to mention that Heinzel has most ingeniously interpreted certain forms of very early German poetry and compared them with corresponding Hindoo and Greek poems. The treatment of the refrain in German poetry is also characteristic. It is used preferably in poems of strong action (like the popular poems of Scandinavia, Bürger's "Lenore," etc.), in order to make the progress of the narrative marked through the contrast between the part that is constantly changing and the permanent section. Finally, the disposition to play upon words must be noted (early German poetry; the Silesian School, in echoes, etc.; Goethe and Schiller, at times; Lessing, frequently; Freiligrath), which rests upon a belief in the symbolism of language (Jacob Grimm, Novalis).

All parts of the German nation do not take part in its poetry. Especially in the present, unfortunately, there are regions in which a song is never heard, and even more common are the circles to whom all literature is a dead letter

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(this was the case in the past also). Another, but fragmentary, form of popular poetry exists, which succeeds in penetrating into these nooks and stirring up interest in the circles referred to above. This particular form is embodied in the *choice of heroes*, a phenomenon of the highest importance in the psychology of nations.

Every nation selects objects of special favor from among its worldly or spiritual leaders. The people idealize them into typical figures on the basis of certain qualities; characteristic anecdotes concerning them are eagerly collected, and their names become proverbial. Such men soon come to be looked upon as representative of the nation, but this must be done only with caution. Like characters in poetry, like symbols in general, they must serve rather as models than as illustrations of existing phenomena. A nation of Napoleons or of Tells never existed, but there was a time when the desire of every Frenchman was to be a Napoleon.

Finished models, already in existence, are instrumental in working the change from an historical personage into an historical hero; for instance, analogy, or contrast to old types, especially mythological ones. Emperor Frederick of Hohenstauffen has qualities of the god Wodan attributed to him; General Wrangel allows himself to be depicted as a little Blücher. Through such influence the historical value of heroes is injured; although they can then be used as illustrations of the time only with great caution, they are so much the more valuable as a key to phenomena lasting through several epochs.

Leaving aside the question how far historical personages may be recognized in the characters of very early poetry (as claimed by the euhemeristic conceptions of Odin and others), the first national hero that we meet with is Arminius, the conqueror of Teutoburg Forest. Tacitus tells us expressly that he had long been celebrated in songs. If we suppose that the Roman historian allowed himself to be influenced in his narrative by German accounts,—and the internal evidence of the "Germania" would probably justify us in this supposition,—Arminius became a typical figure very soon. He is a true leader,

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brave, crafty, and ambitious,—somewhat as we picture to ourselves an Indian chief waging a just war against invaders,—standing in the midst of his family like Winkelried, who rushed on the spears of the Austrians, exclaiming, "Take care of my wife and children!" Although the parallels drawn between the historical Armin and the mythical Siegfried do not show that the deliverer of the nation lives on in the national epic, still they may serve as proof that the people soon borrowed and applied to their favorite certain attractive features of the myth. Through his own ambition and that of others he falls a victim to German disunion. The calm patience of the people during the period of carefully-planned inaction, their delight in their hero's sudden outburst ("Zieten aus dem Busch," Blücher), their mating him with Thusnelda, are all illustrations of German character. Arminius is a thoroughly individual figure; his death, alas! was to become typical.

Charlemagne is a favorite personification among the Germans of the righteous judge; the French, however, soon claimed him for their own. The Middle Ages produced innumerable minor heroes, mostly kings and warriors. Barbarossa was the first one of them to become a hero of national importance, and even he is slow in taking such rank. He makes an ideal imperial figure, in which qualities of both great emperors, Frederick I. and Frederick II., are combined; he stands in contrast to Arminius—just as the "twilight of the gods" is the companion-piece to creation—as the national deliverer of the future, still a captive biding his time until, breaking his chains, he may show himself in his might and found a new kingdom. In him is embodied the German virtue of patient preparation for a deed, which is so wonderfully combined with the impatience of hope.

We do not meet with a national hero of the first rank again until Luther. A warrior in a spiritual cause, he finally achieved truth after a period of serious doubt, but even later he was not spared inner struggles. The German people see him also in the midst of his family, devoted to music, conversing and taking counsel with his friends. They behold him in other situations as well: in the Reichstag at Worms, boldly stepping

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forth, an individual against a great number; on the Wartburg, engaged in solitary labors, not retiring before the devil. The historical picture may be clearly discerned in the popular conception. The passionateness of the great man, his stubborn one-sidedness, as well as his defiance in combat, his humor, his conscious strength, his humility towards God, are all embraced in the national picture of Luther. How far removed is this intensely vigorous, unusual figure from the abstract and conventional types to which the heroes of Romance nations—Dante or Savonarola—were reduced!

Next, Frederick the Great,—an invincible warrior one against many, like Luther; full of humor, possessing many of the national qualities, surrounded by faithful followers, like Luther. On the other hand, a righteous judge (*e.g.*, the incident of the mill of Sanssouci), like Charlemagne; a solitary recluse in his old age. The people are acquainted with many of his characteristics. The snuff-stained vest, the crutch, the crooked little hat, all help to make up the idea of him; but very many essentials are wanting in this picture. In the popular mind Luther is represented in his entirety, while of Rheinsberg, of Voltaire, of the moods and the despair of the king, of his magnificent work as a colonizer, of his exertions towards bringing about the unity of the empire, there is no record in the popular imagination.

The hero of the war of liberation is Blücher: old, bearded, gruff, in conscious contrast to "scribblers," misusing the German language in a high-handed fashion (like Frederick the Great),—in every way the typical cavalry general, just as Kleist has described him in the character of Kottwitz in his "Prinz von Homburg." He, too, is full of humor and obstinacy, and has his faithful comrades (Gneisenau). Next him, though belonging to a somewhat narrower circle, Theodor Körner, the beautiful singer and hero who died for his country, succumbing to superior strength.

Our great poets have not come to be national heroes in this sense. Neither Lessing nor Goethe forms a part of the active contemplation of the whole nation like Luther or Blücher; even Schiller exists in the national thought merely as an ab-

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stract figure, the pale, lifeless author of his works, without any details to fill out the picture. The people do not see him in any particular situation. At best, it might be said that the Goethe-Schiller group forms a part of the popular conception; but here, too, there would be danger of over-estimation. To persons of culture, naturally, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, and, it may be, even Kant and Alexander von Humboldt, and a few others, are living conceptions. This fact, however significant as far as the state of our culture is concerned, is of no value in a judgment of the national character.

The only truly popular hero of modern times is, unquestionably, Bismarck. Kaiser Wilhelm and Moltke are looked up to with pious gratitude; the first Chancellor alone has awakened an intense interest, which seizes eagerly upon minute characteristics, sayings, and anecdotes concerning the man. Though far outshining Blücher in originality, he bears many points of resemblance to the latter: his decided rejection of theorists; his grim humor; his comfortable habit of drinking; his long pipe; his outward appearance in general; his sturdy figure and white moustache. He, too, is a good father, but this side receives but little attention from the people. It is doubtless true that popular imagination in our time, which is so poor in power of artistic creation, is much influenced by the formative art. Rauch and Menzel founded their idea of Frederick the Great on the popular conception, just as Ritschl and Spangenburg did that of Luther; while to-day, on the contrary, artists like Lenbach, monuments, and photographs aid in forming the national idea, since now likenesses are distributed so much faster as well as farther by means of newspapers, oil-paintings, plaques, and even cups. In spite of all this, however, certain situations are ever present to the nation. They see Bismarck alone, walking or on horseback, gazing thoughtfully before him; they think of him side by side with Napoleon after Sedan; in the midst of his great comrades in the victorious entry. It matters little whether the people dictate the characteristic moment to the artist or whether they borrow it from him, so long as the hero is shown in a significant situation. The Bismarck of popular concep-

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tion, however, is not the whole Bismarck. The people fail altogether to recognize the diplomat, the man of passionate argument, the good, practical farmer. His figure is seen only in high relief like that of Frederick the Great, not completely rounded like that of Luther.

In looking over this short list of the most important national heroes of Germany,—to which Joseph II. of Austria might be added,—the recurrence of certain characteristics is remarkable. It is always the warrior who is interesting, whether battling with arms, words, or schemes, and pre-eminently so when facing a superior power. The people do not like to leave him in complete solitude, like Napoleon, or Nelson,—Blücher's English counterpart,—or like Dante or Garibaldi. A true wife is placed beside him, faithful friends and vassals surround him, giving expression to the personal interest of the Germans, and taking a part like that of the chorus in classical tragedy. Nearly all these figures are beheld in varying situations, characterized either by solitude or by enthusiastically affectionate surroundings, just as Lessing and Goethe and the traditional Frederick alternated between these modes of existence. German heroes are not considered in pairs, a method so congenial to French love of symmetry (Corneille and Racine). Blücher and Gneisenau are not placed next one another as equals; the hero leads, and his trusty friend follows him at a long interval. Furthermore, the German nation loves a wealth of individual and eccentric characteristics: the king's crutch, Bismarck's slouch hat, form an essential part of the picture. The nation delights in humor, in stern repulse of theoretical deliberation, and again in certain details, almost mechanical in character, like the snuff and pipe; the Germans never find it at all congenial to idealize their heroes into incomprehensibility. The Alsatian Kléber, in pronouncing that hyperbole of hyperboles to Napoleon, "General, you are as great as the world!" spoke to a hero of the *French* nation. The German heroes are not abstractions, but vigorous personalities. It is perfectly immaterial to a Romance people whether a square be named Piazza Cavour or Piazza dell' Indipendenza, whether the name of a street be Rue Colbert or Rue du Com-

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merce; abstractions are so much alive to them, and personalities so abstract, that they shade into one another imperceptibly. In Germany a street would never be called Concord Street; even Peace Avenue (Friedensallee)—although the usual guardian angel makes the idea clearer by means of a palm—is formed after a French model. But a square, a ship, or a child, in being christened Bismarck, is dedicated not to an abstraction but to the living image of a complete personality overcoming inner contradictions by humor and activity. The German is thus an idealist in his hero-worship, but at the same time thoroughly realistic in his conception of a hero.

This feature of German character is not an altogether good one. The Germans have not unjustly been reproached with the fact that their treachery is often as remarkable as their good faith. Arminius was forsaken, the aging Prussian king saw popular approval vanish like smoke, and Bismarck was also left in the lurch by it. The relation between hero and people is a warm, personal one, and therefore subject to depressions unknown to the more abstract attachment of the admirers of Napoleon or Byron, of Gladstone or Disraeli. The hero must daily earn the love of the people anew. If even a god was not safe from criticism, as shown in the Edda, how could a hero possibly expect to be so privileged? The fashion of a persistently uncritical hero-worship, like that lately imported from England (Carlyle) and from France, which was tried on Richard Wagner and Bismarck, is thoroughly un-German and out of keeping with the national character. The German nation has always taken pleasure in applying honest tests to its heroes; it may, perhaps, have loved their very weaknesses, but it has never sought to deny that such exist; and when the great Frederick receives a sharp answer, according to the anecdote, the people, far from growing indignant, are highly delighted.

From the facts brought out in the above discussion, the history of the German people may be deduced *a priori*. Two important elements make up the national life: a positive one of energetic ambition, of untiring national spirit, and a negative one of a never-ending conflict between individuality and

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subordination. The great mind of the people is constantly, but by no means feverishly, active. The nation learns eagerly from its Romance neighbors, becomes piously absorbed in Christian doctrine, seizes upon the idea of the *imperium* with delight; with deep earnestness is the eradication of old evils undertaken; new forms of religious devotion, of art and poetry, of music, of science, are eagerly sought after, in order that sore temptation may be withstood through ceaseless activity. The nation listens breathlessly to the words of its great poets, and is thrilled with the task of recreating the empire. In advance of all others it seizes zealously upon any task set by time for mankind to do. The imperfections of the Church are recognized and the problem of their removal is solved most thoroughly by this people. Enlightenment, coming from England, spreads over France, but it is not until its appearance in Germany that it becomes the subject of practical legislation and an agent in active life. The Roman Empire lay dead, and the whole world was filled with the pestilential exhalations of the huge, decaying body. German hosts helped to clear the air, and the Middle Ages arose on the purified soil. The new world in its virgin strength demanded colonists from the old. Germans emigrated to America in vast numbers, and, aided by the inhabitants of similar stock, formed a new nationality. Every new science draws recruits from Germany while other nations still hesitate to give it its approval, as clearly manifested in the beginning of the century in the support of the new historical and philological methods. Every great poetical movement meets with sympathy,—Minnesang, Humanism, the *estilo culto* (which is merely the desire to enrich the poetical world with individual gems), Realism. There is no other nation so just to foreign talent; foreign heroes are honored, foreign literatures studied, and foreign records collected. Among no other people do fiercer struggles in a spiritual cause take place. Since Byzantine days there has been no such contest in behalf of the unattainable as that waged by those of evangelistic inclination for details of dogma. The violence of learned polemics among the Germans is notorious. It is a community of *in-*

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dividuals that is always affected, and therefore in every case the man feels himself attacked personally. Lessing unsheathed his sharp sword in battle for spiritual treasures; a question of principle—that of the professorial oath at Göttingen—roused all Germany. This would be scarcely understood outside of Germany. It is because the German, though easily yielding in externals, considers his inner conviction his greatest treasure and will not subordinate it to any power. "My house is my castle," says the Englishman, while the German asserts, "Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott." His God to whom he, with a few associates, has confided himself, his idealism, his faith, his individual conception of the world, or of a passage of Horace, are all equally unassailable. When attacked on all sides he retires into himself, and from the vantage-ground of his individuality again conquers the world.

This truth is illustrated in the glorious internal history of the nation, richer than any other—with the possible exception of the Italian—in heroes and in valiant deeds, and its external history is scarcely to be matched in point of sadness with that of any other nation (again the Italians may possibly form an exception). It is characterized by the conflict of brothers in the migrations of the nations, in the Thirty Years' War, in 1866. It is characterized by the sacrifice of many thousands for ends afterwards abandoned,—the supreme right of investiture, the subordination of Italy. We see the war of princes against the emperor, of cities against the nobility, maltreatment of the peasants by the nobility, of citizens by the petty princes, the largest empire of the world subjected to the scorn of the nations for centuries, the noblest of peoples harassed by petty tyrants. What are the reasons for such phenomena? A love of firm organization, ominous in its strength, is characteristic of the German; affairs of personal interest are of too much consequence to him, and abstract matters lack importance, for he is an idealist in *feeling*,—not, like the Romance nations, in *conception*. The sharp line of demarcation between "of us" and "not of us" finds daily application, while the conception of nationality remains without realization; this attitude is explanatory of the strife among brothers. Again,

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sacrifice for the sake of a principle is natural to the German, because principle is considered a part of the *ego*. The defenceless condition of Germany for centuries was due to the fact that the various tribes and ranks were unable to subordinate their individuality to a common whole; the people were abused by petty lords because no one ventured to step out of his province,—that of an inferior. Prejudiced by his own individuality, the Prussian beheld in the Austrian merely the non-Prussian; the Guelph seemed to the Staufer only the adversary of his own great idea; in the emperor the prince beheld the power threatening his splendor; and in his extortioner the citizen found nothing but the master set over him. Werther, Faust, Hölderlin, Lenau, alike turn to God, complaining bitterly and petitioning to be released from the restraint and the curse of their individuality, desiring to be absorbed in the whole. Absorption in the nation is likewise the ardent but ungratified desire of all its members. They appear to be nearer than ever to their goal at present; a great movement has bespoken the advent of the new epoch prophesied in the Edda. It is most earnestly to be hoped that all the separate forces of the nation may finally unite to produce a perfect harmony.

If we leave foreign talents out of the discussion, it may be asserted that art never reached such a state of development among the Germans that it could be of use as a means of judging the national character, as has been the case with poetry and history. The fault lies in the lack of patrons; for Germany never possessed a true aristocracy, since nothing between the humblest and the highest station could be tolerated; an atmosphere favorable in every particular has always been wanting. German art is in every case merely part of the art of the period, characteristic of the same, but scarcely of the nation. Early German art and modern German music perhaps form exceptions to this rule. Still, Dürer and Sebastian Bach are representative rather of Protestantism than of Germany, and their fellow-artists, Holbein and Händel, succeeded in finding a new home in England, the other stronghold of Protestantism. Art cannot be characteristic of a nation unless it has been

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qualified for an expression of the national temperament by a course of long and careful development. The early art of Greece was not national in the sense in which this term is applied to the time of Pericles, for it was still too dependent on foreign models. The formative art of Germany never rose above this grade: the individual obstinacy of artists prevented the development of a fixed tradition which would gradually raise theme and conception, color and drawing, to a high state of perfection. In consequence, Germany has had single painters of great talent, but the Schlüters, Corneliuses, Menzels, Böcklins, though they may be looked upon as fitting representatives of Germanism, are, as far as German art is concerned, not pinnacles of greatness, but rather isolated bowlders. Artists of mediocre talent only, form schools (like Düsseldorf; Piloty). The fact that a broad, national, flourishing period of art never existed, such as those of Italy, Holland, France, and England, is in itself sufficiently characteristic. It is a proof of the defiantly independent attitude of the nation. Every one wishes to be a Prometheus and form men in his own image, even though another model be far preferable. It is likewise indicative of an underestimation of outward form, which failed to win for art, even in a flourishing period, patrons like those of other countries, and of a restless energy always commencing anew and permitting the whole history of art to be lived through again in the life of every painter of importance.

The conclusions reached here concerning art are equally true for other forms of national life: owing to the nature of the people, and in part to unfavorable outward circumstances, these forms have not developed freely enough to warrant conclusions to be drawn from them as to national character. This fact holds good even of the national life. Checked by unfavorable climatic circumstances, it has been still further limited since the seventeenth century by the inordinate desire manifested of asserting governmental authority. Still more evil is wrought by an obstacle lying in the nature of the people,—a certain intolerance, or at least a want of tact in entering into the feelings of others. How frequently the child on the street is heard to say, "I am not going to play with you any more"!

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No great event is commemorated without the formation of separate leagues; no celebration takes place without unfriendly demonstrations. National participation in an event—like the interest in the University races in England—is inconceivable. Genuine popular festivals are possible only in Switzerland, and perchance in those parts of southern Germany open to Romance influence,—the same regions in which true story-tellers are to be found,—and also in Vienna, influenced as it is by the many foreign elements in its composition. Through the absence of a feeling of personal confidence, and frequently in spite of its presence, an uneasy reserve tends to thwart the avowed purpose of informal gatherings of congenial spirits,—namely, the absorption of individual thought and temperament into the prevailing spirit. Great events, it is true, have succeeded in producing genuine demonstrations, general in their nature,—the Sedan festival in the first years of its establishment, some celebrations in honor of the emperor, etc.,—but traditions of this nature have always failed of permanence. Christmas is the national festival of the Germans; people greet one another, without distinction, in an exalted holiday mood; but the celebration itself is divided up and clusters round thousands of Christmas-trees. Nevertheless, it is a peerless holiday, made beautiful by a delight in giving and receiving common to rich and poor alike. The long and careful deliberation, the well-planned surprise, the pleasant air of mystery surrounding the days preceding the festival, the delight in the cosy room decorated for the occasion while a snow-storm beats unheeded against the window-pane, are some of the pleasing features of the celebration. This holiday may, then, be considered a symbol of German happiness in general: the simple joys of the family circle, the pleasures of giving and receiving, and the thought of the highly venerable origin of the festival. German felicity may be limited in its nature, but, in compensation, it is a home product; unassuming in character, it is deeply penetrated by a feeling of duty and has been consecrated by the serious thoughts devoted to it. Similar conclusions might be deduced from many of the phenomena considered in folk-lore (a method established by Germans like

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Möser in the last century and Riehl in the present one), from the dress of the Germans, their style of living, of eating, and especially of drinking, their sociability and manner of entertainment, their love of travel, their choice and use of favorite books. This investigation would, however, lead us too far, without bringing out any essentially new points. An inner contradiction in existing phenomena asserts itself repeatedly. The German considers it of great importance to be master in his own house, nevertheless he prefers to rent his dwelling, while in England even the poor man endeavors to own his home. He favors large gatherings and enjoys little circles in their midst. Few nations, perhaps none, possess a finer literature, and no civilized country has worse readers; their reading is inattentive, unfeeling, hasty, and without discrimination. Statistics of the dissemination of literature would set forth disgraceful facts. Still, there is a good side to this state of affairs. The German does not read the national classics, as every Frenchman and Englishman does, because details seem unimportant to him in comparison to the whole. He is conscious of so intimate an acquaintance with Schiller that he considers a more thorough knowledge of his works superfluous. At the same time, nowhere else can there be found so devoted and so absorbing an interest in great writers and so pious a penetration into the minds and souls of men of genius. Warmth of partisanship frequently leads to almost ridiculous hostility towards the opponents of great men. No other member of the German nation was attacked so violently from all sides as Chief Pastor Goeze, for, although it might have been supposed that Lessing had provided sufficiently for his punishment, a certain satisfaction was felt in helping to heap up insults upon him. This devotion is by no means confined to learned circles; intellectual men are frequently met with that know nothing of Goethe (if by "knowing" is meant something more than the ability to mention titles and cite quotations); but, on the other hand, the poor sempstress who knows Lenau perfectly, or the mechanic who is well acquainted with the whole of Uhland, is by no means a creature of the imagination.

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In their relations with other nations the Germans are fond of a peaceful existence. The German tribes that took part in the migrations of the nations were almost forced by necessity to conquer the Roman Empire; for centuries after that they coveted nothing but Italy, partly because it lay within the idea of the *imperium*, and partly because of a pathetic, sentimental longing for the land of beauty,—a sentiment to be compared with that of a rugged warrior who seeks to win a captivating maiden. At the same time they made many conquests with spiritual weapons, but in actual war they never did more than assert their rights, and frequently failed to do even that. Nevertheless, they never met with the favor of their neighbors either as a nation or as individuals; however, very few nations do stand high in the estimation of the surrounding ones. The German is seldom an object of love as conqueror and administrator, or as immigrant and guest. Alsace has even to-day more admirers of everything French than there are friends of old Prussian rule in Westphalia. The fault lies in the fact that the Germans are prone to neglect form; they are conscientious, thorough, and reliable, but they fail to hold the power of kindness at its true value. Therefore they do not hold together for a long time, even when abroad, and, becoming isolated, they are completely swallowed up in the strange life,—a catastrophe strenuously avoided by the English and the French in foreign countries. Here, too, may be seen the evil effects of exaggerated independence: by accommodating themselves more to the life of the foreign nation they would meet with greater favor; by entering more into the lives of their compatriots in a strange land they could assert themselves more strongly.

The next point for consideration is the opinions of outsiders, —individuals and nations. If merely all the most important pieces of foreign criticism could be collected, we should have a large and interesting addition to the history of culture. Our discussion will, therefore, have to be reduced to a minimum.

The name used for the Germans by their neighbors is in no way characteristic. They are called "the men of battle," or

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"those whose language cannot be understood;" this style of appellation is used for many nations by those surrounding them. Mythological representatives of Germanism—as Cadmus represents Egyptian influence among the Greeks—are unknown to me. The invectives of hostile people are without value.

The first great critical student of the Germans is Tacitus. His account has a tendency to be sentimentally political, but is nevertheless faithful and, in regard to facts, reliable. The Germans are represented in his narration as leading a life of rude simplicity, somewhat as the Samoyeds were regarded by the philanthropists of the last century. Details, however, are not lacking in his description. He makes prominent their want of unity, and hopes—alas, that his wish should have been fulfilled!—for its continuance; he speaks of their reverence for woman, their respect for social organization (princes and priests), the spontaneous character of their divine worship. While other barbarians are inordinately fond of ornament, the Germans, Tacitus declares,—probably not with perfect accuracy,—despise all show. Their isolated mode of life is emphatically referred to: "They spend whole days, almost in a state of nakedness, before the hearth fire."

Later authorities complain of the savage character of their language and their demeanor. It is a specially noteworthy fact that the Emperor Julian in the fourth century denounced their singing as an intolerable growl, and an Oriental geographer of the tenth century described it in similar terms. Even in this particular there seems to have been a lack of unity, of "*concentus*," and while every voice followed its own inclination, the chorus degenerated into a roar. All authorities praise the people for courage, contempt of death, fidelity, and love of liberty.

Throughout the Middle Ages there was a complete lack of that wide-reaching glance which comprehends entire nationalities in their essential features. With the introduction of Humanism, the significance of such criticism became manifest. In the opinion of Montaigne, the Germans were fond of drink, quarrelsome, and noisy, but, on the other hand,

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brave and faithful. Gradually the former opinion prevails. Walther von der Vogelweide makes the Pope speak of the "stupid Germans," and finally the belief became universal that the Germans were a nation of barbarians, without the power of deliberation or judgment. As long as this opinion was held only of the nation as a whole it was not resented; but when the Jesuit Bouhours maintained that no German could be a *bel esprit* there followed a burst of wrath against Gallic arrogance. Nevertheless, even Voltaire thought of the Germans as Samoyeds, only now the children of nature were reproached with filth and barbarity, where formerly their moral purity and their independent spirit had been admired (Voltaire's "Candide").

Mme. de Staël was the first one to *rediscover* the German soul; her brilliant work, "De l'Allemagne," forms a fitting counterpart to the "Germania" of Tacitus. As with Tacitus, a political tendency and a sentimental bias color the work, but otherwise her observation is clear and just. She praises the sincerity, love of toil, honesty, and depth of the Germans, and criticises their lack of form, their isolation, their want of tact.

Carlyle's criticism was of a more general and more abstract nature; he preached Teutonism as the religion of sincerity and lauded Goethe as the climax of Teutonism. At the same time he did not fail to perceive the weaknesses of the Germans, particularly of the learned professions,—circumstantiality, verbosity, absent-mindedness ("Sartor Resartus"). He fixes quickly and surely upon the German heroes; but he was by no means free from a romantic bias of vision. It may probably be asserted with truth that Mme. de Staël was the first foreigner to *understand* the Germans, Carlyle the first to *love* them.

In Napoleon there was curiously combined a romantic esteem for the nation of Werther with a decided contempt for the nation of ideologists. On him, however, was the greatness of the nation to be proved. The people rose like one man; the great necessity of the time succeeded in bridging over all social, local, and political differences. To the as-

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tonishment of all, the nation of dreamers was found to be a great people.

The result was wonderful. Even though Goethe had gained a leading position for German poetry, and Humboldt for science, still the German community as such was only now admitted into the fraternity of great nations. Carlyle's conception of Germany, divested of its prophetic spirit, passed into France, where Renan and Taine now proclaimed German idealism, German scientific method, and German depth of thought. Through the influence of the great war, this opinion again met with a severe shock. While Renan wavers between a conception of the Germans as a nation engaged in dreams and as one occupied with fierce contests, the new generation in France, England, and Italy is beginning to comprehend the German nation in its entirety. A judgment of German character formed at present, though lacking entirely in benevolence, would otherwise not be unjust.

The evidence supplied by German opinions of the Germans can also be given but a hasty glance. At first the tribes treated one another with scorn, unconscious of the bond of unity existing between them. With the spread of Humanism they learnt from the Italians to use well-known events in the lives of famous ancestors as a means of self-laudation. The Reformation found the Germans filled with the consciousness that in their simple honesty they had been the dupes of Rome, denying themselves much for her selfish benefit. Now patriotic invectives against the Germans began to appear. Goethe once made the assertion that the Jews could never have been of much account; their prophets were constantly reprimanding them for their shortcomings. Among the Germans, as well as among the Jews, however, this fact proves the high moral earnestness of the admonishers of the people, and their ability to produce such prophets was a point in favor of the nation.

During the sixteenth century the nation looked upon its love of drinking and brawling with indulgent irony rather than with moral indignation. By the seventeenth century the objects of the prophets' indignant invectives had multiplied:

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luxury, immorality, and, most of all, a predilection for every thing foreign, are mercilessly lashed. The satirists Dedekind and Scheidt wrote in a laughing mood of the new national saint, "Le Grobianus," but now Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch, Logau and Gryphius, find their mockery almost choked by tears. After the degeneration which followed the Thirty Years' War, the necessity of a refinement of morals was keenly felt. Leibnitz, Christian Weise, and Thomasius recommended copying French elegance. Gellert, having become imbued with the French spirit, became the tutor for Germany, and a rococo doctrine was thereupon preached.

Under the influence of the victories of Frederick the Great, German national pride was again aroused, and the strong points of Teutonism once more became prominent. Klopstock renewed the Arminius cult of the German Humanists, Lessing struggled against the ascendency of French poetry. Both of them recognized with deep regret the disintegration of the German nation. Herder attempted to go even more deeply into the German nature, seeking explanations of its character in new sources (ballads, language). Goethe and Schiller were too cosmopolitan in thought to see more in the German nation than a community of individuals making but slow progress towards an ideal. Goethe, especially after his return from Italy, complained of German lack of form, of the isolation of German scholars, of the bungling methods of their artists, of the language itself, changing his point of view entirely from that held by him as Herder's pupil in the "Götz von Berlichingen" period. In this way the greatest man of his time set the bad example of a one-sided, unjust estimate of the German national character. Just as philosophical pessimism had acted towards the idea of God, attacking it with weapons of hate, political pessimism now acted towards the fatherland. Börne is the most passionate and Heine the wittiest among these scolding and mocking critics. Even foreigners scarcely debased the national spirit to the extent to which Germans themselves carried this degradation. The Romanticists, although they continued to praise the Germany of antiquity, had scarcely a better opinion of their own time

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than these critics. Germany was continually made to suffer by comparison. Goethe heaped abuse upon it because it was not Italy, Hölderlin because it was not Greece, and Börne because it was not France.

The right of national individuality, apparently, failed to find recognition in the very nation of individualists. As if a great people had not as good a right to its peculiarities as every writer or shoemaker!

Slight tendencies towards a new form of Chauvinism,—represented principally in Jahn, who was also the first to attempt to fix definitely the conception of nationality (*Volksthum*)—are soon checked by powerful criticism. The philosopher Nietzsche may serve as an illustration of this departure, by his change from a prophet of Richard Wagner, so decidedly national in his methods, to the anti-Teutonism and the love of France of a man of 1830.

What do all these critics find objectionable in Germany? There are two principal classes among them: æsthetic and political cavilers. The æsthetic critics reproach the Germans with lack of form, unamiability, gruffness of manner,—in short, barbarity; while the political grumblers complain of undue submissiveness, lack of self-respect, and slavishness of nature. After allowing for the exaggeration natural to honest enthusiasts for beauty or liberty, both these charges will be found to mean the same thing,—overestimation of inward significance, undervaluation of outward form. The German is frequently impolite because he does not allow himself the time to clothe his convictions in an agreeable form, especially as he lays no stress upon the latter; this, however, by no means hinders him from being very sensitive to the actions of others. He frequently sadly disregarded political liberty, because he knew his liberty of *thought* to be safe from attack. These are faults, it is true, but the untiring exertions of the Germans are busy at the task of overcoming them. Form is beginning to be observed ("Rembrandt als Erzieher"), a decided liberality in political opinions is developing. Besides, faultless perfection can be expected here as little as anywhere else. In this connection may be quoted the saying of one of the best repre-

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sentatives of the German character: concerning the search for truth, Lessing says, "Possession is meant for God alone; we must be content with striving."

In this discussion, we, too, have had to content ourselves with an *attempt* at covering the subject. Phenomena of importance in a study of national psychology have merely been referred to and received no more than passing mention. The study of national psychology was, indeed, first pursued by German scholars. Herder, Humboldt, Lazarus, Steinthal, laid the foundation on which the structure of an exact science of nationality was to be raised. It was but natural that the psychological bent of the German mind—always one of its chief characteristics—should incline the nation towards the consideration of the individuality of the community: In psychological insight the Germans far surpassed the Romance nations, who always identified a character with a particular quality. In like manner, the German study of national psychology stood far in advance of the naïve characterization by epithets common in former times,—"the faithless Phœnician," "the cunning Armenian."

To conclude this hasty enumeration of typical features with a generalization would, therefore, be particularly unsuitable. Some general principle might perhaps be deduced, but little would be gained thereby. The national individuality is too wide and too significant to be contained in a phrase, a representation, or a formula. The saying "By their fruits ye shall know them" may most aptly be applied here. A deeply significant language, a great mythology, a magnificent collection of poetry, and a history rich in great events testify to the soul of the German people; through these media it will continue to prove its existence in the future. For centuries to come, may the German nation continue to be an invaluable and honorable member of the family of nations and develop the essential features of the national character!

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BOOK REVIEWS.*

THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. Vol. I. By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892. Pp. xii, 572.

This volume includes the first three parts of Mr. Spencer's ethical system, viz.: Part I., The Data of Ethics; Part II., The Inductions of Ethics; Part III., The Ethics of Individual Life. It is to be followed by a second volume containing the other three parts, viz.: Part IV., Justice (already published); Part V., The Ethics of Social Life, Negative Beneficence; Part VI., The Ethics of Social Life, Positive Beneficence. The last two of these parts may be expected to add considerably to the materials which we possess for judging of Mr. Spencer's system as a whole, and until these are published it would be premature to attempt to form any final estimate of the value of his contributions to ethics. The present volume does not add much to what we already know; and it may be sufficient for the present to give a brief summary of its general contents.

Part I. is already known to everybody, and it is here republished without alteration. Part II. is mainly occupied with the working out of contrasts between the ethical ideas of peoples at different stages of development, and especially of the one great contrast between the ideas of peoples at a military stage and those at an industrial stage of civilization. The latter are for the most part assumed to be well known to the reader, the former are illustrated as only Mr. Spencer can illustrate, by long series of quotations from various authors with regard to the opinions and sentiments of savage tribes and nations. The general conclusion which Mr. Spencer draws is (p. 467) that, "where the predominant social co-operations take the form of constant fighting with adjacent peoples, there grows up a pride in aggression and robbery, revenge becomes an imperative duty, skilful lying is creditable, and (save in small tribes which do not develop) obedience to despotic rulers is the greatest virtue; at the same time there is contempt for industry, and only such small regard for justice within the society as is required to maintain its existence. On the other hand, where the predominant social co-operations have internal sustentation for their end, while co-operations against external enemies have either greatly diminished or disappeared, unprovoked aggression brings but partial applause or none at all; robbery, even of enemies, ceases to be creditable; revenge is no longer thought a necessity; lying is universally reprobated; justice in the transactions of citizens with one another is insisted upon; political obedience is so far qualified that submission to a despot is held contemptible; and industry, instead of being considered disgraceful, is considered as, in some form or other, imperative on every one." If any one should think that these truths are not a very profound result to come out of over one hundred and fifty well-filled pages, it may be added at least that the illustrations which are given of them are often

* After this number the *Book Reviews* will appear in larger type.

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highly interesting. Mr. Spencer also makes some good hits. Thus, he remarks (p. 317) that "Dr. Moorhouse, advocating a physical and moral discipline fitting the English for war, expresses the wish 'to make them so that they would, in fact, like the fox when fastened by the dogs, die biting,' and says that 'these were moral qualities to be encouraged and increased among our people, and he believed that nothing could suffice for this but the grace of God operating in their hearts.'" Or take this, evidently intended for Carlyle (p. 400): "Complete truthfulness is one of the rarest of virtues. . . . Exaggeration is almost universal. . . . And this habit sometimes goes along with the loudest denunciations of falsehood. After much vehement talk about 'the veracities' will come utterly unveracious accounts of things and people,—accounts made unveracious by the use of emphatic words where ordinary words alone are warranted; pictures of which the outlines are correct, but the lights and shades and colors are doubly and trebly as strong as they should be." This is excellent, but its moral effect is a little weakened when we find Mr. Spencer a few pages later (p. 403, note) describing the Greeks as "people guilty of so many 'atrocities,' characterized by such 'revolting cruelty of manners,' as Grote says, who were liars through all grades, from their gods down to their slaves, and whose religion was made up of gross and brutal superstitions." Could Carlyle have much heightened the color of this?

Mr. Spencer thinks (p. 470) that the facts adduced in this part of his work ought to "dissipate once for all the belief in a moral sense as commonly entertained." But he is pessimistic enough to add that he does not expect that they will. One would have thought that even Locke's arguments had been sufficient for this purpose. After all, where are the believers in the moral sense? They must surely be a feeble folk and dwell among the rocks, like the coneys. At least they do not seem to stray much into literature in these days.

Part III. of Mr. Spencer's book seems to me much more important. He here seeks to apply his principles to individual conduct; and though most of what he says is already contained in some form in other parts of his published writings, yet the summary now given is certainly of great interest. Mr. Spencer discusses the various duties of the individual under the headings Activity, Rest, Nutrition, Stimulation, Culture, Amusements, Marriage, Parenthood. Some of these—notably the last two—have, as Mr. Spencer remarks, a distinct social bearing; but it would evidently have been impossible to draw any absolute separation between purely individual and social obligations. Mr. Spencer's remarks under these various headings seem to me to be particularly valuable when he touches upon physiological considerations. This is a department of ethical study which he has made peculiarly his own; and anything which he says on this aspect of conduct ought to be regarded as carrying considerable weight. Thus, his views on work, sleep, food, drink, and recreation, though not perhaps containing anything very novel or original, and though their interest is in general rather physiological than ethical, are certainly worthy of attention. I think Mr. Spencer exaggerates when he says that ordinary morality takes no account of these things, except to the extent of recommending asceticism. It is true, however, that (setting aside the question of drink) ordinary morality attaches comparatively little importance to these matters. In this it seems to me that ordinary

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morality is to some extent wise; for it is certainly not desirable that men should adopt valetudinarian habits, weighing their food like an apothecary and measuring out their enjoyments by the hour-glass. Neither, however, does Mr. Spencer recommend this; and indeed all that he says on these matters appears to me highly judicious. There can be no doubt that he deserves praise for the careful attention that he has given to this subject.

On the subject of culture, also, his remarks are equally interesting, though perhaps less convincing. "Taken in its widest sense," he says, "culture means preparation for complete living." It includes (1) necessary knowledge, (2) "all such development of the faculties at large as fits them for utilizing those various sources of pleasure which nature and humanity supply to responsive minds." The first kind is absolutely enjoined as a moral obligation. With regard to the second, "only those who accept hedonism can consistently advocate this exercise of intellect and feeling which prepares the way for various gratifications filling leisure hours." Why? Surely a man may recognize the importance of developing and exercising all his faculties, even if he does not regard pleasure as his supreme end. Nay, may he not consistently regard pleasure as having a certain value for its own sake, even if he does not believe that it *alone* has value?*

In the chapter on culture, Mr. Spencer insists once more on his favorite doctrine that "the first requisite is to be a good animal," and in this connection addresses some words of warning to students at Girton and Newnham. He thinks, however (p. 521), "that an adequately high culture, alike of men and women, might be compassed without mischief were our *curriculum* more rational."

In the chapter on marriage there are some criticisms (apparently weighty from the physiological point of view) on the Malthusian (*not* neo-Malthusian) remedy for over-population; while the chapter on parenthood contains a vehement plea for individual responsibility as opposed to our modern socialistic methods. Into the discussion of either of these questions it would be impossible to enter in such a review as this. I may content myself with remarking that the effort to provide a fair general education for every one, and to insist on its being made accessible to every one, does not appear to be fairly characterized as an attempt "to repeal by Act of Parliament a law of nature!" This, however, is Mr. Spencer's emphatic conviction. "A system," he says, "under which parental duties are performed wholesale by those who are not the parents, under the plea that many parents cannot or will not perform their duties, —a system which thus fosters the inferior children of inferior parents at the necessary cost of superior parents and consequent injury of superior children,— a system which thus helps incapables to multiply and hinders the multiplication of capables, or diminishes their capability, must bring decay and eventual extinction. A society which persists in such a system must, other things equal, go to the wall in competition with a society which does not commit the folly of nurturing its worst at the expense of its best." Perhaps. Carlyle also—certainly

* Mr. Bosanquet has well said of Hedonism ("History of Æsthetic," p. 391) that "it takes upon itself the hazard of exclusiveness. Other theories do not profess to exclude it, but it professes to exclude them."

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no friend of Mr. Spencer—ridiculed our modern educational machinery as one of the marks of a mechanical age, and thought that we were losing our individuality.* Thus we have at least two prophets of evil, sufficiently vociferous, against our modern socialism. But is it so certain that the sense of individual responsibility varies inversely with the sense of national responsibility? And is it so certain that to give every one a fair chance is to foster the worst at the expense of the best? It does not seem to me that Mr. Spencer has proved this.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

ETHICA, OR THE ETHICS OF REASON. By Scotus Novanticus, author of "Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta." Second Edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1891.

Although this book (now acknowledged to be by Professor Laurie) is nominally a scientific treatise on Ethics, it is largely—in fact, predominantly—concerned with Psychology. And the author would no doubt admit this with readiness, and would justify his treatment by the consideration that the ethical end has to be found by an elaborate examination of man's nature. "The end of every existence is itself" (p. 284), therefore to find out the *end* of man it is necessary to ascertain what man *is*—what *ought to be* being thus determined by reference to what is.

As regards Professor Laurie's psychological view, it seems to me that he has not quite made up his mind whether to prefer the old twofold division of mental phenomena into passive and active, or the later threefold division into cognition, will, and feeling. On the one hand, he appears to recognize reason, volition, and feelings; but on the other, he blends will and reason, contrasting them, as active and formal, with the passivity of feelings. This reduction of will and reason to a kind of confused joint-faculty, of which each seems in turn to produce the other, is at first sight a startling novelty in psychological analysis; it is at the same time the most distinctive feature of the author's psychological scheme. But it comes, I think, to little more than a peculiar way of expressing the analysis of psychical factors into active and passive—as seems tolerably evident when we consider his use of the term *Feeling*, which is applied not only to pain and pleasure, but also to what are frequently called *Sensations—i.e.*, psychoses differing from one another in intellectual characteristics, but supposed to resemble each other in that they are passive or recipient. If the "identification" of will with reason does not mean more or other than that in cognition or intellection there is *activity* on the part of the Subject, then I should admit the "identification;" but I think that the truth intended is much better conveyed in the doctrine expounded by Dr. Ward (art. Psychology, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Ninth Edition), where we find attention and volition classed together as the activity of the Subject which *attends* to objects (things, ideas, or movements) presented to it, and *feels* pleasure or pain. This way of looking at the matter

* See especially his Essay on "Signs of the Times." Oddly enough, Carlyle is here at one with the Political Economists also—his great bugbear. See, for instance, Chalmers's "Christian and Civic Economy of Large Towns." It is interesting to compare this with Father Huntington's article on "Philanthropy and Morality," in the October number of this JOURNAL.

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has much more applicability to facts and much more explanatory efficacy than schemes which do not explicitly recognize the psychological Subject. And another of its advantages is that it avoids the absurdity of talking about *pure activity* and *pure passivity* as though they were substantial entities of which the one owes its arrangement or "organization" to the other—as a net owes its reticulation to the knots or connections by which the constituent loops are formed and held together. It is evident enough that, in any case we can suppose, where two factors are concerned there must be both activity and passivity on the part of each.

If the identification of will and reason has some different meaning to that above suggested, I am unable to see what it can be, other than the undisputed and indisputable proposition that the faculties of will and reason may be exercised simultaneously. In any case, I think that the phraseology used by Professor Laurie is unfortunate, since it tends to blur the highly important distinction between "undistinguishable resemblance" and "individual identity" (cf. *specie tantum* and *numero tantum*), which has been so clearly explained by the scholastic logicians, by Whately, by Mill, and by Dr. Ward. Yet failure to keep the distinction clear, even to recognize it at all, continues to be a source of confusion; and of this the book before us furnishes illustration.

Professor Laurie "dismisses as the personal property of the Intuitionalist" the expression "moral faculty." He, however, admits a "moral sense"—*i.e.*, "a feeling of the quality and character of feelings and emotions, and therefore of motives of conduct." To speak of will as *free* is in his view "a tautology;" but if, as he affirms, "the freedom of each thing consists in its being truly itself," then, since nothing can ever be anything but itself, the will, like all other things, must be free. But to say that the will is free in this sense, whether or not tautological, is certainly unimportant.

Passing on to the more purely ethical questions, we are told that "the task of the moral philosopher is to find the true good for man." Now, "self-realization for any organism is 'the good' for that organism. Man has to find 'the good' for himself. He is an end to himself." "Self-realization is possible only through the constant presence of the formal (the idea) in the real—of will in feeling, and its perpetual supremacy in that domain. The sovereignty of the 'idea' in man is the supreme end or purpose of his complex existence." "Life in all its fulness and abundance is the self-realization of man,—his function." Man's "specific function . . . is to find the law in himself for himself by himself, and to actualize that law in conduct." "Special excellences of the philosophic and æsthetic life" are "always desirable, and in truth the ultimate and ideal function of man." "The good for man is self-realization. In other words, Man lives to fulfil himself, to develop in activity *all* his powers, and this in their most excellent activity. Altruism is not his end, save in so far as altruism is embraced within the conditions of egoistic completeness." "The *ultimate* function of man . . . is the dominancy of will and personality; free movement of will in knowing and affirming, and free movement of the same will in actualizing its affirmations, *i.e.*, in volition or doing." "The good for man is harmony (which is fulness of life)." Again, we are told that the *chief* good for man is "*Fulness of Life achieved through Law by the action of Will as Reason*

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on Sensibility;" and that "the dominancy of will-reason and of the law thence emanating is the *supreme* good for man; because it is the idea of him." And "identity with self is the prime content" of this idea.

As to the relation of self-realization and law, we are told that law is sought as the "*prius* of self-realization." Again, "the only happiness possible for man always *attends on the fulfilment of Law*,"—"it is law in doing which he [man] necessarily seeks." "It is the moral law and duty to it that man seeks." But law is constraint, and, according to Professor Laurie, self-realization, which is the end, is essentially realization of will, which is essentially freedom. However, we will pass over this difficulty (if it is a difficulty).

Supposing realization or organization of self, or fulness of life, or fulfilment of function, to be accepted as the ethical end, how is any man to know when he has attained this end, when (in other words) he has found the law of his organism? "To suppose that there can be any external standard of the law of an organism is absurd,"—the only evidence that it has been found "is in feeling—the feeling of harmony." "Reason . . . must, in its search for law in the sensibility, refer itself ultimately to sensibility, in order that it may know when it has found the law." The self-realization or good of man is "guaranteed by a sense of harmony." "Harmony is the universal and necessary predicate of self-realization or the Good, . . . in conscious beings it must be *felt*," etc. (It is not explained how all this is to be reconciled with a sentence on p. 37: "Feeling in and through reason, *guaranteed by reason* as a system of ends,—this is morality.")

Now, "as the ultimate criterion of the ascertainment of law is a *feeling* of harmony, the ultimate criterion is happiness"—for "a feeling of harmony is happiness." But though this is the criterion,* the end is the law of harmony. However, if nothing more definite is told us about the end, we seem *practically* to be in the position of the hedonist, who accepts happiness or pleasure as end. Indeed, we are actually told, on page 70, that "the end of volition is . . . the *satisfaction* of individual reason itself."

Let us go on to ask what precise ethical guidance is afforded us. Self-realization, under any of the notions suggested, must be acknowledged by any one who has considered the subject to be too vague a conception to be either scientifically or practically useful. Indeed, this seems to be allowed by Professor Laurie himself. For what is the *self* whose realization is spoken of? If it is merely the self that has been, is, or will be (and it appears to be this), the realization of *this* self cannot be an ethical end unless we maintain that *what is* is *what ought to be*—in which case ethics seems superfluous. But if the self is the self that *ought to be*, then of course it is clear that the whole ethical question, *What* is it that ought to be? still remains to be answered.

Perhaps, however, we may get help by turning to the consideration of "finite virtues." We are told that though undoubtedly "the ultimate end of man is life in the ideal" (self-realization), yet the obligation to live the ideal life is less

* Cf., however, p. 187: "The standard is objective: Not what I should *like* to do, but what I *ought* to do while keeping in view the supreme ethical end for all human beings and for society at large;" and p. 287: The idea of a total is "always silently operative in man as an ultimate standard of conduct."

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stringent than the obligations to mere temperance and justice, because (p. 195) it is these "finite virtues" which "make life possible, and are the pre-conditions of ideal perfection itself," or (as is elsewhere said) because they are primary, and superior quantitatively. We are, however, provided (also on p. 195) with another reason for the less stringency of obligation of the ideal life as compared with "finite virtues,"—namely, the claims of the ideal life are only self-regarding, whereas the claims of justice concern others as well as self. This seems to be in conflict with the general ethical doctrine of the work, that the end is realization of self; still, that the author means to lay stress upon it is evident from his going on to say, on p. 196, that "when there is a conflict of duties—*i.e.*, a conflict between the ideal life and finite virtues—there can be no doubt where the supreme obligation lies,"—viz., with the finite virtues.

Is precise and adequate guidance to be obtained from a consideration of the virtues of temperance and justice, which are the only finite virtues discussed at any length? Temperance is identified with self-control, and is described as action which considers the future as well as the present of the agent. It is also defined as "appetitive justice," or justice in the region of appetition. Negative justice is said to be "a balance of the altruistic and self-regarding feelings within the man," "the fundamental relation of one person to other persons in community," "the freedom of each citizen to realize himself consistently with the freedom of every other." "The obligation of justice is an obligation of reason, giving the rule to the complex of inner feeling with a view to harmony or non-contradiction."

Positive justice is "a conscious positive desire and effort to help others to realize themselves" (with a certain limitation). Justice generally is "the peace of harmony"—"equality as subject to a higher end than that contained in any particular desire." Justice is "the moral law," "the idea in relations." "In this idea of relations—justice—lies the law of conduct, by which we mean the law of motive; in this lies moral obligation." Justice "embraces all the social virtues" (p. 170); it is "an expression for the *law* of man's inner organism as ascertained by reason."

But we learn later that justice is "an elastic idea;" and that since "the heart of justice is an altruistic emotion," it is "impossible for the term 'justice' to preserve any hard and fast definition."

All this seems to leave us with as little distinct guidance as the notion of self-realization itself; even supposing the difficulty as to the relation between the ideal life and finite virtue to have been cleared up, we find no consistent definite systematic account either of the ideal life itself or of the particular virtues. And to complete our disappointment, we are told at p. 288 that the attainment of self-realization is, for finite beings, "manifestly impossible."

E. E. C. JONES.

ETHIK. Encyklopädische Skizzen u. Literaturangaben zur Sittenlehre. I. PRAKTISCHE ETHIK. Von Georg Runze. Berlin, 1891: Carl Duncker. Pp. viii, 274, 8vo.

The treatise on ethics, which Herr Georg Runze, professor at the University of Berlin, has begun in the volume before us, though at first sight unusual,

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nevertheless starts from very correct premises, and is decidedly meritorious in its execution. It is an undeniable fact that in ethical literature the speculative and fundamental questions stand decidedly in the foreground, and in the existing treatise are especially considered. But this method of treatment is prejudicial to ethics, which is thus deprived of a great part of its practical effect. For it is a peculiarity of ethics that it proves the correctness of its principles on the one hand by successful explanation of the real facts of moral life, and on the other hand by their ability to furnish a criterion and a standard of action in the innumerable and difficult questions of actual life which underlie moral direct judgment, and by virtue of the direct feeling and individual reflection involve an appeal to the ripe, comparative judgment of science. It is true that most treatises on the fundamental questions of ethics include a practical part, which undertakes to apply to the concrete conditions of life the theoretically developed conceptions. But the larger the amount of material involved, the more inevitable is it that the selection is regulated by the individual choice of the author. Rarely do these treatments of the subject vouchsafe an adequate conception of other views and of the differences that exist, and this lack is all the more perceptible because the various treatments of the history of ethics are occupied more with the differences of the theoretical basis than with the practical application to the matter in hand. Even such newer works as the books of Ziegler and Köstlin, which explicitly hold out the promise of a remedy in this direction, still stand too far removed from the threshold of the present to be able to compensate for the lack of a systematic treatment of ethics.

Runze's book undertakes to set these defects aside. Its arrangement suggests a middle ground between simple bibliography and an independent theoretical discussion of the questions likely to be raised in the sphere of applied ethics. Divided into three parts of eighty-six paragraphs in all (the individual, the community, and the inter-relations between the individual and the community), no essential question of applied individual and social ethics will be found wanting in the rich material of Runze's book. Asceticism, suicide, slavery, the emancipation of women, to take a few subjects at random, are treated here, as well as marriage and prostitution, honor and the duel, luxury and the care of the poor, etc. The treatment of the chief points is as follows. The author, in the first place, briefly puts together a number of definitions and propositions relating to the subject; secondly, in a more elaborate form, he gives a critical sketch of the most important of the ideas and opinions that have been brought out in the attempted solutions of the problem in ancient and in modern times; and he closes with a list of the literature bearing upon the question, not stopping short at monographs, but referring also to works of a more general character in which the special point in question is discussed.

For the most part he confines himself to modern literature, whereas older works—*i.e.*, those going back beyond the eighteenth century—are only exceptionally mentioned. The abundance of these bibliographical references, and also of the "Thesaurus Controversiarum Ethices," which precedes and to some extent rests upon the bibliography, is quite extraordinary, and cannot be too highly commended. The author has extended his search even to periodical literature to a great extent. If Runze is to be criticised at all, it is because he has given

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too much rather than too little. As a catalogue for all pertinent questions regarding ethics, the book is absolutely indispensable, and will be valuable for a long time, not only for the student of ethics in the narrow sense, but also for pedagogues, theologians, clergymen, jurists, lawgivers, statesmen. The fact that one does not everywhere sympathize with the author's own views does not diminish the value of the book as a work of reference, highly stimulating in its character. The clearness and purity of the moral sentiment are in any case to be highly commended, even though the judgment of the author is not always able to cut itself loose from a certain bias for traditional opinion. The author having in an earlier work, entitled "Grundriss der evangelischen Glaubens- u. Sittenlehre," set forth his fundamental conceptions of ethics, does not dwell upon them in the present volume. It is perhaps this combination of ethical principles with dogmatics in Runze's teaching that accounts for what appears to me from a scientific and philosophical point of view the greatest defect in his work,—namely, the absence of a thorough criterion for practical judgment and for decision in regard to the countless controversies which are treated of in the book. This circumstance reduces the book to the level of a mere catalogue, a mere collection of material, and makes even the author's own decisions in many cases appear merely as utterances of individual emotion, and not as the result of objective investigation. It must be regarded as a useless undertaking to attempt at the present time to treat of the most difficult social ethical problems, without acknowledging openly that which alone can be, and as a matter of fact always has been, a standard of judgment, namely, the principle of welfare and of development. The Christian or Evangelical idea of life is not at all adapted to such an investigation, for it contains no criterion according to which the social value of actions and regulations can be ascertained, and merely offers a certain collection of standards, which do not suffice to decide the complicated conditions of the present time, and themselves stand in need of justification.

FR. JODL.

PRAGUE.

THE MORAL INSTRUCTION OF CHILDREN. By Felix Adler. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Pp. xi, 270. Vol. XXI., International Education Series.

It is generally agreed that the moral aim—the building of character—should hold a high place in the work of every school. But from this point forward there are diverging opinions. One says the whole scheme of school training necessarily implies moral training: there is not a subject in the curriculum whose acquisition does not involve constant exercise in the virtues of industry, veracity, perseverance, and so forth. Moreover, the whole machinery of the school is a discipline in punctuality, regularity, or achievement. Besides, the subject-matter of instruction itself, especially the literature and history, is rich in illustrative moral lessons. In its lessons and its discipline, therefore, a well-ordered school gives adequate attention both directly and indirectly to the moral instruction of its pupils. Additional moral instruction is therefore superfluous, and is likely to be worse than superfluous—positively harmful—if through needless repetition or want of tact it becomes tedious.

A second class of teachers and thinkers admit the necessity of explicit moral

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instruction, but deny the possibility of teaching morals not based on religious sanctions. Now, our schools are supported by public funds. We are also thoroughly committed to the permanent separation of church and school interests. If moral instruction is necessarily religious,—and that means sectarian, as Dr. Adler shows,—then moral instruction in the public schools is impossible.

But there is a third party, who assert that specific moral instruction is necessary, and that unsectarian moral instruction is possible. Of this party Dr. Adler may be called the leader in America.

One must admit the ethical resources of the subjects of study in the curriculum, and of the marvellous influence of the teacher's daily contact with his pupils. That the teacher's intellectual culture, judgment, and taste, the fine feeling and good sense revealed in all his dealings in the school-room and on the play-ground,—that these influences tend powerfully to the formation of moral habits is conceded. What, then, is the function of specific moral instruction? Dr. Adler replies, "The function of moral instruction is to clinch the habits. The function of moral instruction is to explicate in clear statements, fit to be grasped by the intellect, the laws of duty which underlie the habits. The value of such intellectual statements is that they give a rational underpinning to moral practice, and, furthermore, that they permit the moral rules to be applied to new cases not heretofore brought within the scope of habit." This view elevates the intellectual element in moral training into its proper place. Much good is no doubt accomplished by properly utilizing every chance opportunity to inculcate moral lessons; but unless such opportunities are made subservient to a methodical plan, our moral instruction, like all other unsystematic procedure, must involve important omissions and serious shortcomings. The will depends upon feeling and intelligence. Both elements are important. A true moral training must take note of both. The proper consideration of separate acts and duties makes plain what is right, cultivates love for and desire to do the right, and makes clear the way in which worthy ideals are to be realized. In other words, the effect of specific moral instruction is twofold: it develops efficient motives, and points out the way of successful realization.

The five introductory chapters of the present work constitute Dr. Adler's solution of the problem of unsectarian (non-religious) moral instruction, and the remainder of the book deals with the material to be employed in moral instruction and many practical suggestions concerning the use of this material in the primary and grammar grades respectively. There is also, in a brief appendix, a lecture on "The Influence of Manual Training on Character."

In the first lecture the author defines his position and his aim: "Is there not a way of imparting moral instruction without giving just offence to any religious belief or any religious believer, or doing violence to the rights of any sect or of any party whatsoever? . . . The answer as I conceive it is this: It is the business of the moral instructor in the school to deliver to his pupils the subject-matter of morality, but not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give his pupils a clearer understanding of what *is* right and what *is* wrong, but not to enter into the question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided." And further on: "There is a body of moral truth upon which all good men, of whatever sect or opinion, are agreed: *it is the business of the public schools to deliver to their pupils*

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this common fund of moral truth. But, I must hasten to add, to deliver it not in the style of the preacher, but according to the methods of the pedagogue,—*i.e.*, in a systematic way." This statement by itself does not, however, convey the author's exact meaning. Dr. Adler's pedagogic insight and his experience as a teacher enabled him to realize that something more than a clear statement of what *is* right and what *is* wrong is necessary in order to cause the pupil to choose the right. Accordingly, in the chapter on "The Efficient Motives of Good Conduct" we find the necessary supplement to the position taken in the paragraph quoted above. He says, "To sum up, let me say that the wise teacher will appeal to the taste, the intelligence, and the feelings of his pupils; that he will touch these various springs of conduct all the time, and get from them all the help he can. . . . The moral motive is the highest; it is really the only sufficient motive. Pray understand me well at this point. I should say to the child, It is wrong to lie. That is sufficient. It is wrong; it is forbidden; you must yourself acknowledge the truth of my words, because you despise yourself when you have told a lie. But in order to strengthen your weak resolution, to confirm you in well-doing, let me show you that it is also contrary to self-interest to lie, and likewise that it is disgusting to be unclean, and that a wrong done to another causes pain."

In chapter iv. we learn what that body of moral truth is which it is the teachers' function to transmit to their pupils: "The topics of which moral instruction treats are the duties of life." But systematic instruction in duty involves a classification, and classification seems to lead back to the religious or philosophical basis which it has been decided shall have no part in the presentation. A classification based upon the objects to which duty relates instead of the sources whence it emanates avoids the apparent dilemma. On this basis "the whole field of duty may be divided into three main provinces,—those duties which relate to ourselves, those which we owe to all men, and those which arise in the special relations of the family, the state, etc." This, together with the principles that "the moral teaching of a given period should be made to fit the special duties of that period," and that "in every period of life there is some one predominant duty around which all the others may be grouped," yields the order of the topics in a programme of moral instruction adapted to the advancing spiritual and intellectual growth of the pupil from his sixth to his fourteenth year. This programme comprises the use of fairy-tales, of fables, of stories from the Bible and from the classics, for the primary grades, and for the grammar grades lessons on duty. These lessons are the duty of acquiring knowledge, the duties which relate to the physical life, the duties which relate to the feelings, the filial duties, the fraternal duties, and the civic duties.

This classification for purposes of instruction is well chosen and practical. Yet one serious defect ought not to go unnoticed. The author nowhere emphasizes the importance and the high pedagogic value of appropriate illustrative material selected from daily life. The illustrations intended to carry home a moral or to start discussion are occasionally drawn from biography and history, but chiefly from fiction,—in all cases from the world of books rather than from real life. Surely the traditions and the daily experiences of every home, of every school, and of every community are too important in this regard to be overlooked. They

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are rich enough in illustrative material of the highest value to make the collection and systematic classification of such material of the greatest practical interest, to say nothing of the effect which the gathering and sifting of such material, for subsequent use at a period sufficiently remote, would have upon the teachers. For these reasons the absence of direct emphasis upon the indispensable material for moral instruction afforded by every-day experience is very striking.

In all other respects the pedagogical value of the whole book is very high. Both in system and in presentation it is thoughtful, sympathetic, and practical. We find the freshness of tone and the originality of treatment that spring from personal contact with the problems of moral training and actual trial of the means proposed for their solution. The book is not a manual for class use. It will be most valuable to those teachers who seek guidance but do not care for specific directions. Its great merit lies in its suggestiveness. Those teachers who teach by *co-operation—i.e.*, who work *with* the pupils in the attainment of a given insight, whether intellectual or moral—will find Dr. Adler's book stimulating and instructive in a very high degree.

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

FREEDOM AS ETHICAL POSTULATE. By James Seth, M.A., George Munro Professor of Philosophy, Dalhousie College, Halifax, Canada. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, 1891. Pp. 48.

In this essay Mr. James Seth seeks to vindicate freedom against scientific determinism on the one hand and absolute idealism on the other. Both of these theories he holds to be the destruction of the basis of the moral life, the one "depersonalizing" the ego into nature, the other into God.

But we can hardly regard the essay as a very mature contribution to the subject with which it deals. It seems to us to begin where it should have ended, and to end where it should have begun. Instead of first investigating wherein freedom really consists, and then, from that stand-point, showing the inadequacy of other theories, the writer does the latter, by taking for granted that conception of freedom as the freedom of indifference, which in the last few pages he shows to be not the real category of moral life. Compare these two passages taken from the earlier and the later parts of the essay, the one a criticism, the other an exposition: "The absolute idealist of the Neo-Hegelian type, believing as he does in the evolution of divine reason in the universe, finds in the life of the self the manifestation or reproduction in time of the eternal self-consciousness of God. Now, such an account of the self appears to me to deprive us of freedom. If I am but the vehicle of the divine self-manifestation, if *in myself*, in my own proper selfhood or personality, I am nothing, it is illusory to talk of my freedom" (p. 21); (2) "Freedom itself, as it is generally understood, is not the ultimate or highest category of our life. . . . 'After all, free-will is not the highest freedom.' . . . Perfect freedom consists in the entire surrender of the human will to the divine, in such a surrender as does not mean the loss of human personality, but rather its perfect fulfilment and realization in the identification of man's will with the Will of God" (pp. 44, 45). These two passages are not only superficially, but really, contradictory of one another. And should Mr. Seth hold that there is no such inconsistency, since, in the

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theory of absolute idealism, man is but the *vehicle* of the divine life, while in his view he can freely identify himself with that life, then we would remind him that man as a moral being—and he is nothing if not moral—cannot be the *vehicle* of anything with which he does not identify himself, and, as Kant puts it, while nature may be ruled by law, man can only be ruled by the *idea* of law. And that, we are safe in affirming, has been held by every absolute idealist worthy of the name.

It would not be fair to say that Mr. Seth is a trimmer, but it would be fair to say that he coquets with theories—such as those of Professor Fraser and Professor James—which, being apologetic towards all, are little respected by any. As Professor James says, in a passage quoted here, "Indeterminism offends only the native absolutism of my intellect,—an absolutism which, after all, perhaps deserves to be snubbed and kept in check" (p. 28). Mr. Seth, it is only fair to say, makes a valiant effort to get beyond this "half-way house," but in his conclusion he finds rest only there: "The ultimate reconciliation of divine and human personality may well be beyond us; but I do not see how either conception can be given up" (p. 47).

All this seems to us to arise from the fact that the philosophical categories are taken as data with which we must start without examining into their nature or genesis. As a consequence they are loosely grasped; at least none of them is grasped so firmly as to be *forced* to reveal its relation to its apparent opposite. God, the world, and man are separate and independent terms, which must neither be mixed nor separated. "The 'I' must be something in itself, in its own proper selfhood or personality." All, we may reply, that "I" can be "in myself," "on my own account," is—nothing at all; if anything, a fool in my own right. The whole problem of our moral life is not to find how much we have or are "in ourselves," but how *little* we have and are in ourselves, and how much of ourselves there is in that other that is not another. You are as little likely to capture the secret of freedom and personality by applying the forcing-pump to exhaust what of the world and of God there is in us, as you are to capture the secret of life by putting the living being in the same circumstances. There may be a difficulty in understanding the mystery how God can be all and man yet be free, but it is a mystery in the same sense as that in which we say that the simplest things are the most mysterious. That is the basis of our life; it is the light in which alone we can see a single fact in our lives truly. The real difficulty is not to see human and divine personality together or to understand them together, but to see or understand them apart. And instead of saying that "the chief guarantee of a worthy view of God is a worthy view of man," and that it is through the conviction of his own superiority to nature that man reaches the conception of One infinitely greater than himself (p. 47), we should naturally reverse the terms and say that it is because God is in us that any view of ourselves at all is possible. It is really by a kind of *tour de force* that in the end God, man, and the world are thrust forward into the arena together, and the lion has his mouth muzzled that he may lie down in peace by the lamb.

As a result of this it might be shown that Mr. Seth, having gone upon the basis of accepting contingency or indifference as the fundamental idea in the

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conception of freedom, regards all determinations of this primitive freedom in action as *limitations* of it. The grand moral limitation is "individuality itself," and it is limited in other ways, by economy of spiritual force, by continuity of the moral life, and by fixity of character. Yet it is asked, "Is not character after all but a garment in which the spirit clothes itself, a garment which clings tightly to it, but which it need not wear eternally?" To this we can only answer, we fear there are some garments like a Nessus shirt. The ego is not something independent of a character, it is nothing save as it expresses itself in that; "in itself" it is "as good as nothing."

On other points we cannot dwell. To say that Kant's vindication of freedom "is little better than to tell a prisoner that outside his prison is freedom, and he has only to think himself outside to realize that he is free, and that Kant has succeeded only in proving that God rather than man is free" (p. 13), may be true, but can hardly be taken without proof. And absolute idealism may be true or may not be true, but it certainly does not imply that "the freedom belongs to God, and the necessity to man."

On the whole, it would seem that philosophical categories loosely held are, like nettles, apt to sting. ROBERT A. DUFF.

NATURAL THEOLOGY. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1891. By Professor Sir G. G. Stokes, Bart., M.P. A. and C. Black, 1891. Pp. viii, 272.

Without form and void; we cannot otherwise describe the character and contents—or want of them—of this book. It seems unfortunate that Sir George Stokes should, of his own choice, have stepped out of that sphere of work in which he occupies a deservedly honorable position, into one which, by his own confession as well as the result's confession, he has never specially studied.

We have read this book conscientiously through for the sake of discovering the reason for its existence, and, we are sorry to add, have not found any. Had it been entitled "Table-Talk" we should have known what to expect, and could then have understood that "desultoriness and want of system" of which the author is keenly sensible. But not only is there no substance here,—that might be excused in view of the numerous engagements of which the author tells us, —there is not even an attempt at orderly and methodical treatment; and that surely every reader has a right to demand. For any one who wishes to know Sir George Stokes's opinions on the Science of Things-in-general, this volume will be a valuable one to possess. For a treatise on Natural Theology we shall require to look elsewhere.

Of one thing in these lectures we consider that we have a distinct right to complain,—the covert attempt to elude that provision in Lord Gifford's will which requires that in the discussion of these questions no appeal shall be made to any tribunal save that of reason. No less than sixteen times does the author allude to the cramping effect of this condition upon his exposition (sometimes at considerable length), and in each of these places he tells us with an apologetic word that the arguments he has just used the terms of the will do not allow him to rely upon. This naïve way of informing us of the positions he is *not* allowed to take up would be refreshing were it not so often repeated.

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We are far from saying that this volume is destitute of merit. It is something to have from so eminent a scientist the assurance that *he* still believes in a personal God and holds by the Christian religion. It is something to know his opinions—unreasoned though they may be—on all subjects, from the Evolution of this Universe to the morality of quack advertisements, for it is true that the unreasoned opinions of the wise carry more weight with them than the elaborate arguments of ordinary men. But yet we incline in the main to hold by the old proverb that "the cobbler will achieve most by sticking to his last."

ROBERT A. DUFF.

A HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC. By Bernard Bosanquet, M.A. (Oxon.), Hon. LL.D. (Glasgow), formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1892. Pp. xxiii, 502.

A journal of ethics is not the place in which to look for a full and adequate criticism of this book. Its first interest is for the student of general philosophy; its second, for the lover of the beautiful. But the true relation of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good is itself a question of first-rate interest for ethical students, and so much light is cast upon this by Mr. Bosanquet's powerful book that no one interested in moral problems—even though he be neither student of philosophy nor lover of the beautiful—can afford to leave it unread.

The analysis and criticism of "The Moralistic Principle" in the æsthetic writings of Plato and Aristotle (pp. 18 to 22, and 36 to 38); the treatment of the relation between "Beauty and Pleasure" (pp. 50 to 54); of "Beauty for Beauty's Sake" (pp. 430 to 431, especially the trenchant note, "Art for Art's Sake is a silly Notion," etc., p. 431); the quotations, in a context which forms in itself a criticism, from Mr. Ruskin's "Stones of Venice," on the relation between work and workman (p. 452); the comments upon "the criticism passed by popular writers upon Mr. Ruskin, that he turns æsthetic into ethics" (p. 453), are all instances of the direct and vigorous treatment of the relation between art and morals. But these are not the only nor the chief sources of the illumination on this point which Mr. Bosanquet's "History" affords us. To grasp the true "Aim of Art" and the "Essence of Beauty" is a long step towards grasping the aim of life and the essence of goodness. To be put, in our reflection on beauty, in the right attitude towards reality is a powerful though indirect aid towards the attainment of the right attitude in our reflections on goodness. Moral questions, moreover, are apt with most people to lead to philosophical questions, and to those who find themselves, by the way of ethics, brought face to face with philosophical problems of incomparable difficulty, this book will come as welcome help. The old problems are presented from a new point of view. To approach them through a new subject-matter is to bring a whole new world of experience to bear upon their difficulty.

Mr. Bosanquet says in his preface, "Besides professed students of philosophy, there is a large and increasing public of readers who are genuinely attracted by a fairly clear and connected exposition of any philosophical science, the subject-matter of which comes home to them, be it Logic or Ethic, Sociology or the theory of Religion. Such readers are approaching philosophy through the

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subject-matter that already interests them, instead of approaching the particular subject-matter simply because it is an integral part of philosophy. I confess to cherishing a hope that, in spite of the defects which deprive this book of the charm that a more skilful writer might have given to such a subject, many intelligent lovers of beauty will be glad to make acquaintance, through it, with the thoughts of great men upon this important element of the spiritual world."

The book is well calculated to realize the "hope" Mr. Bosanquet "cherishes." It is difficult. But its difficulty is not from any "defect" which "a more skilful writer" might have avoided, but from the difficulty in many parts of the subject-matter, and from the intense condensation of the style. This latter is doubtless unavoidable in a treatise which aims at a handling, thorough and effective so far as it goes, of every important point in a subject of so wide a range. The reader of average intelligence and culture is apt, it is true, to be haunted by an uneasy consciousness of sayings dark with an excess of light which he cannot make his own for want of the necessary reflecting surfaces of previous knowledge. "I will not let thee go except thou bless me" must be his attitude to many a pregnant paragraph. If he wrestles hard he will get the blessing; and it will be worth the wrestle.

It must be left to thinkers of Mr. Bosanquet's philosophic calibre to estimate the full philosophic value of the book. The average reader does not know which to be most grateful for: the sympathetic appreciation of beauty; the masculine width and decisiveness of touch by which true and false values are discriminated between; the brilliant and suggestive treatment of separate parts, —*e.g.*, The Renaissance; Fate and Character; The Tragic; The Ugly; The Future of Art;—or the luminous philosophic teaching of the whole. In another world and by a widely different method Mr. Bosanquet does for us the work which T. H. Green set before himself in the introduction to his "Prolegomena to Ethics;" he achieves the reconciliation of the consciousness which expresses itself and finds itself in art, with the consciousness which demands a rational explanation of the universe as a systematic whole. He leaves us with inspiring and heartening words:

"A comparison with the great epochs of the past may give us hope. Our finest spirits feel to-day much what Aristophanes felt when he attacked Euripides, and when it seemed to him that poetic art in its noblest sense had departed to the world below. So a Renaissance critic might have felt, with greater justice, after the death of Michael Angelo. It is true that in the last hundred years, although certain reservations are to be made, such as I have pointed out, with reference to music, language, portrait-painting, and poetic art, yet the discord has cut deeper than ever before, and the popular art-tradition is interrupted. But the mind is stronger to day, and the self is fuller, and we know that it lives by movement and not by fixity. The deeper discord can therefore be borne, and is a testimony to the strength of the life which it does not fatally maim. Naturally, it will take a longer time to resolve, and we cannot anticipate in what shape the resolution will come. But in spite of all hostile conditions, man is more human now than ever he was before, and he will find out the way to satisfy his imperious need for beauty."

The student who tackles Mr. Bosanquet's "History of Æsthetic" will do so

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with best hope of success if he first studies the same author's translation of "The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art."* This little book, by the great skill with which difficult terms are translated, furnishes us with what almost amounts to a commentary on the work translated. The "Introduction," together with the little essay bound up with it, forms the most admirable introduction to the study of Idealistic Philosophy.

M. S. GILLILAND.

ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY. By Edward Caird, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow; late Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford; author of "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant." 2 vols. Glasgow: Jas. Maclehose & Sons, 1892.

These two volumes contain Professor Caird's articles on "Cartesianism" and "Metaphysic," reprinted from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, essays on Dante, Goethe, Rousseau, and Wordsworth, which have previously appeared in magazines, a lecture on "The Problems of Philosophy at the Present Time," which was originally delivered to the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh University, and a lecture on "The Genius of Carlyle,"—the last alone hitherto unpublished.

The article on "Cartesianism" contains an account of Malebranche and Spinoza as well as of Descartes, and should be read in connection with the author's great work on Kant, to which, indeed, it may be regarded as a historical introduction, dealing with the first phase of the problems of modern philosophy. The article on "Metaphysic" is likewise to a great extent historical, not in the sense of being an antiquarian catalogue of the opinions of philosophers, but according to that conception of the history of philosophy which treats it as an integral part of philosophy itself,—"philosophy taking its time." The article falls into four divisions, dealing respectively with (1) the relation of metaphysic to science in general, (2) its relation to the special science of psychology, (3) its relation to logic, (4) its relation to religion and the philosophy of religion. We are much indebted to Professor Caird and to the publishers of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* for allowing us to possess in small compass and read in a comfortable form what is probably the best brief, and yet fairly complete, exposition of the "idealist" position in philosophy.

Here, however, it is well to refer rather to the literary essays, which appeal to a wider audience and which are at the same time no less philosophical in character than the *Encyclopædia* articles. "Philosophy," it is said (in the lecture on "The Problems of Philosophy"), "in face of the increasing complexity of modern life, has a harder task laid upon it than ever was laid upon it before. It must emerge from the region of abstract principles and show itself able to deal with the manifold results of empirical science, giving to each of them its proper place and value" (p. 226). And not only in regard to the sciences, but in regard to literature and art and every department of human life, the philosopher must descend into concrete detail if he is really to be serviceable to his age. Many even of those who cannot, or will not, follow Professor Caird in his exposition

* "The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art," translated, with notes and prefatory essay, by Bernard Bosanquet. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

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of "Hegelian" or "Neo-Kantian" metaphysics, will appreciate the breadth and soundness of judgment which he brings to bear on the special problems of literary criticism and interpretation. But in his case literary criticism is consciously based on philosophical principles, and not on unreflective intuition or insight. Hegel's most indubitable service to thought was his renewing the claim of philosophy to concern itself with the whole realm of nature and human endeavor: like Plato, in order to understand the human mind he turns to where it is "writ large," looking outward to the manifestation of it in society, art, religion. This endeavor after concreteness and objectivity suggests at once the affinity there is, in spite of all difference of form, between his work and that of Goethe; and, because of this affinity perhaps, Professor Caird's essay on Goethe seems to us, if we had to choose, of all these essays the most completely finished and satisfactory. But the same "objective" standards of criticism appear in all of them. There is much discussion among literary and art critics as to the canons of their craft; and there are always some ready to maintain that we never can get beyond subjective impressions. A modern French critic, M. Anatole France, has defined criticism as "the narrative of a soul's adventures among masterpieces." On criticism of the frankly impressionist sort—which is just the most elementary type of criticism, "I like this, I don't like that"—no judgment can be passed except in the form of a judgment on the "soul" of the critic. But if we take the definition as expressing what criticism is *at the best*, we might confidently ask the reader to judge of Hegel's philosophy by the thoroughly sane, sober, and yet sympathetically appreciative criticisms passed by his disciple on writers and teachers such as Goethe, Wordsworth, Carlyle,—all of them apt to excite blind worship or equally blind indifference or aversion. Professor Caird can admire Goethe without being unjust to the Middle Ages, and he can admire Dante without being inappreciative of the naturalism and Hellenism of Goethe. The moralist and the artist are apt to differ in their estimate of literature. Mr. Matthew Arnold, who was both, allowed the moralist in him to silence the artist, when he said that poetry was essentially a criticism of life; but his own artistic instincts kept him from carrying out that narrow definition to its terrible consequences. Professor Caird expressly avoids any such one-sided principle. "It cannot be denied," he says, in the essay on Wordsworth, "that, in poetry, the form is the first thing. *Its* function is pure expression for its own sake, and the consideration of what is expressed must be secondary. The Muses would undoubtedly prefer a good bacchanalian song to Zachary Boyd's metrical version of the Bible. Yet, after all, we cannot reckon it a great poetic advancement to write the best possible drinking-song. Perfect, or relatively perfect, expression being given, we must ask what is expressed, and we cannot give the name of sacred poet to the 'idle singer of an empty day,' but only to him who can express the deepest and widest interests of human life; nay, only to him who is in sympathy with the progressive movement of mankind, and who can reveal to us new sources of thought and feeling that have not before been touched. The only poetry that, in the long run, 'humanity will not willingly let die,' is that which contains not mere variations on the old themes, but 'things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme.'"

To take another illustration of the manner in which a philosophical principle

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saves from one-sided criticism, Carlyle's way of laying exclusive stress on the worth of "facts," disparaging the work of creative imagination in comparison with them, and yet saying, as he does, that "the infinite is most sure of all facts," implies a confusion of thought, the truth and the limitation of which become apparent when seen in the light of the idealist view of the relation of the real and the rational. "The only ideas worth attending to are those which have been and are realizing themselves in the world, even through the very appearances or 'facts' that seem to obstruct them" (p. 261).

The essay on Rousseau presents the same characteristics of the philosophical and historical spirit in criticism; and in the essay on Wordsworth the fundamental identity in the message of Rousseau and Wordsworth is very subtly traced. But (to make one adverse criticism, or rather suggestion) is it quite fair to say of Rousseau that he has no conception "of any union of social and individual liberty which does not involve the suppression of one or the other, of any organic unity of society in which the freedom of the members shall be consistent with the unity of the body politic"? (p. 129). To the present writer it seems that Rousseau in the *Contrat Social* (as distinct from the earlier "anarchical" writings) is struggling towards such a conception: his "*moi commun*" is just an endeavor to express, with somewhat defective phraseology perhaps, that very idea of a universal element in the individual for which the great German idealists found a more adequate metaphysical basis. "Rousseau," says Professor Caird, "represents in its ultimate one-sidedness the principle of Protestantism" (p. 134). True; but in another aspect of his teaching is not Rousseau leading men away from the narrow individualism of his age? As Professor Caird himself recognizes, he "was not a pure individualist, but based the greatness of the individual on the fact that the *raison commune* speaks within him, and that he can be made into an organ of the *volonté générale*" (p. 185). Rousseau has been judged too much merely in the light of the discipleship of Robespierre and St.-Just (cf. p. 106). It might well be argued that he found truer and more appreciative disciples in Germany than in France. His influence is great, not merely on a transitory phase of German literature, but on the leaders of German philosophy, as has been recently shown in detail in an excellent work by R. Fester (*Rousseau und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie*: Stuttgart, 1890). Yet it is just these more intelligent disciples who have helped to make Rousseau seem merely the prophet of a past age and not even the false prophet of our own. As Professor Caird says, speaking of the way in which Dante sums up mediæval ideals, "One thing there is which [systems of doctrine] cannot survive,—viz., being thoroughly understood and appreciated; for the intelligence that has fully appreciated them has *ipso facto* grown out of them and beyond them" (p. 2).

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

THE MODERN STATE IN RELATION TO SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. By Paul Leroy Beaulieu, Member of the Institute, Professor at the Collége de France, editor of *L'Economiste Française*. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891. [Social Science Series.]

This book is certain of a welcome from the opponents of extended State action; and every page of it contains some remark which will be suggestive to

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the reader, whatever his opinions may be, though the ideas suggested may not always be those that the author intended. M. Leroy Beaulieu lays stress on the antithesis, familiar to students of Mr. Herbert Spencer, between the State, with its coercive power, and spontaneous associations, which use merely the force of persuasion (cf. pp. 53, 56). It is true that the State acts by means of policemen and soldiers, whereas a church threatens only spiritual penalties, and a trades-union threatens only economic penalties, *where the State is sufficiently strong to prevent them doing anything more* (a qualification that is generally overlooked). But an effective excommunication or "boycott" may mean starvation, and the difference between imprisonment, with food, and isolation, without it, is not quite correctly called a difference between compulsion and persuasion. Of course the power which a "voluntary" association actually can exercise depends on the condition of public opinion; but does not the power of the State depend on the same thing in the long run? Does the modern democratic State differ, except in degree, from a "voluntary" association? It may, *e.g.*, be quite as easy for a medical man to emigrate, and voluntarily to join a new State, as to violate professional etiquette.

M. Leroy Beaulieu denies the allegation that the vices of the modern State are the same as those of joint-stock companies. One of the advantages of the joint-stock company over the modern State is that the former is, as a matter of fact, an aristocracy, or a limited monarchy (p. 133), whereas the modern State suffers from "electoral bondage,"—*i.e.*, except for the directors, the company may be less of a voluntary association than the State! M. Leroy Beaulieu does not seem to consider whether those dependent (whether as customers or employés) on a powerful company possessing a practical monopoly are worse off than those dependent on the State; or, rather, he does refer to one part of the question with remarkable candor:

"It is in times of crisis that the elasticity of free associations is thrown into strongest relief. It is then necessary to strike sail and to curtail expenses. Joint-stock companies can and do rise to this necessity, and they do so both rapidly and safely. . . . From 1882–83 to 1888, for instance, the large railway companies [in France, I presume], disturbed by the diminution in their receipts, spent all their ingenuity in making economies, and succeeded in curtailing their expenses. . . . They did not take on a single fresh employé; they lowered mechanics to the level of stokers, and stokers to that of simple auxiliaries. The loan societies do the same; many of them suppress a large number of useless branch offices, reducing by one-half the places they occupy. . . . The State, especially the elective State, is absolutely precluded from acting in this way" (pp. 140, 141).

That is true. A State cannot keep up its dividends by dismissing half the population; but some persons may think that a merit in the State. One does not wish to suggest that States should imitate the unsuccessful and badly-managed private companies (of which the advocates of "voluntary co-operation" say curiously little). The only point is, who ought to suffer by necessary economies? And even M. Leroy Beaulieu himself says, "The State is the natural guardian and protector of the weak, who have no one to support them" (p. 160). Yet he is terribly alarmed lest the State, as an employer of labor, should set an example of shorter hours,—an example which he thinks would be sure to be followed

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(pp. 152, 153). At least he thinks such examples more likely to be "pernicious and disturbing" than useful.

As is the case with most opponents of extended State action, a great many of M. Leroy Beaulieu's arguments are valid only against excessive centralization (cf. pp. 8, 146, 154), although in one place he clearly recognizes the "trinity" of national authorities, provincial authorities, and municipal authorities (p. 68). He also points out the evils of a shifting civil service,—which is surely not a necessity of the modern State. The value of his criticisms on defects in modern States is, however, somewhat impaired by his complete want of sympathy with democratic institutions, or, in fact, with "free government" of any kind. "The modern State in general represents the highest triumph of the momentary infatuation of the majority of the nation" (p. 105). This assumes that a vast number of persons are all possessed of the same "infatuation" at the same time; and yet these so easily infatuated individuals can be trusted to manage voluntary associations without State control! "The modern State, the State based upon election, cannot, by its very constitution, be impartial; it runs counter to its very definition, since it is a government by a party" (p. 113). Must we not add, "checked by the other party"? M. Leroy Beaulieu has himself laid stress on "the enormous services which parliamentary obstruction renders to the nation" (p. 107).

The translation is well done, on the whole; but there are a few very un-English phrases,—*e.g.*, "The fundamental difference between *the* society and the State." "Its [the State's] claim is, that the man who occupies one of the posts in its employ belongs to *him*, body and soul." "Library," meaning "bookseller" or "publisher," is not a translation at all. The Franco-Prussian War is assigned to 1570–71. "*Tin Aufang War die That!*" is a very corrupt reading.

D. G. RITCHIE.

REDE ZUR ERÖFFNUNG DER REAL-KURSE FÜR FRAUEN. Helene Lange, 1889.
UEBER FRAUEN- UND LEHRERINNEN-VEREINE. By the same author. Vortrag. Zweite Auflage, 1892.
"NOT." Vortrag. 1892. By the same.
DIE FRAUENBEWEGUNG IM BEWUSSTSEIN UNSERER ZEIT. Vortrag. 1892. By the same.
UNSERE BESTREBUNGEN. Vortrag. Zweite Auflage, 1892. By the same. (Berlin. L. Ohrmigke's Verlag.)

The efforts directed towards fundamental changes in the training and education of women, with a view of enlarging woman's sphere and her purpose in life, meet with but little encouragement in Germany. Such efforts arouse resistance either active or passive, when not calling forth decided contempt. It is only very slowly that a change is making itself felt, and it seems inevitable that such papers as the above should exercise some influence in that direction. The authoress embodies the ideal culture of woman, which she is striving to make universal and real in its best and noblest form. These lectures are neither declamatory effusions nor productions of an idle enthusiasm or feminine vanity. They are able pleas, filled with a glowing inspiration for the cause which they advocate with strong logic, clear understanding, and ripe insight. Fräulein

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Lange proceeds from ethical postulates, and her aim is directed towards ethical ends. The right of woman to that complete intellectual development which can only be attained to-day through access to the higher avenues of knowledge, the right to determine for herself the limitations and aims of her nature and not to have them foisted upon her by man, forms the starting-point of her argument. She shows how losing sight of this right, and the inadequate education of women resulting therefrom, have already led to great evils within our present civilization, and are bound to be followed by much greater ones, with the increasing seriousness of the social problems that present themselves for solution. The old conditions of life, which confined the entire activity of woman to the affairs of the household, have, at least among the well-to-do classes, entirely disappeared. What the women and girls of the higher classes at present learn hardly suffices even for the domestic duties of the present; and still less is their training adapted to furnish the possibility of a really useful social activity to women who are placed beyond the struggle for existence. These views, which are set forth in an especially interesting and impressive manner in the lecture entitled "Not," lead the authoress to demand a thorough reform in the entire education of women and girls, not merely for the sake of an intellectual purpose, but as a means to the moral elevation of the race, to the widening of the mental horizon, to the carving out of a useful career and the doing away with the demoralizing "drone-life." In close connection with this is the second leading thought of the authoress, namely, to intrust, to a much greater degree than at present, the new education of women to the hands of women themselves. In this way a twofold advantage will be obtained: it will enable the new education intrusted to women as its supporters and agents to proceed very differently from the present system in the hands of men; and by creating a need for the utilization of the hitherto unemployed energies of woman, a step will be taken towards the solution of the difficult economic side of the woman question, and an independent position will be provided for many of those to whom the activity of married life is denied.

What I particularly value in these addresses of Fräulein Lange is the absence of all Utopian exuberance, despite the greatest ardor and enthusiasm for the possible and attainable. I should like to direct attention to two points which seem to me especially noteworthy. In all these pleas for reform there is not a word regarding universities. I believe I am correct in interpreting the silence of the authoress on this point as due to the fact that she considers university education—that is, scientific and professional studies—as open only to a minority, and therefore as not entering into the general social and ethical objects of woman's education. And similarly from various indications the conclusion may be drawn that, although Fräulein Lange has in mind, for the reform of the higher teaching of girls, some equivalent for the "gymnasium," she does not propose to place our daughters into "gymnasia" under the guidance of women,—a proposition which indeed is calculated to inspire one with fear. However, these are pedagogical questions which cannot be touched upon here.

FR. JODL.

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ENGLISH SOCIAL MOVEMENTS. By Robert Archey Woods, Lecturer at Andover Seminary, Boston. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. vii, 277.

This book seems to be primarily intended for Americans, whom it invites to "watch closely the remarkable progress England is making" in the remedying of her social conditions; but probably many persons in England may gain some information from its pages. A wide and careful survey is made of the chief English social movements which have shown some distinctive activity during the last ten years. The old and new trade-unions, workingmen's clubs and friendly societies, co-operation, the various socialistic organizations, university settlements, university extension, and the social work of religious bodies and of charitable and philanthropic societies, are dealt with in connected form. The book is descriptive and sympathetic, rather than critical. It is inevitable in a work of the kind that supplementary material would be necessary to bring the account down to date, even for the comparatively short period that has passed since the book was written. For example, the formation of two local Fabian societies is mentioned on page 61; but by May 9, 1892, forty-two had been formed.

Is it worth while to call attention to one or two slight errors? We in England do not speak of "graduates" of Cheltenham Ladies' College (p. 110); and Professor A. R. Wallace, the author of "Darwinism," spells his "Russel" with one l (p. 67). A little scepticism may be felt on this side of the Atlantic about the story of Mr. John Morley and Mr. Sidney Webb (p. 57).

The author points to the university extension system as "the most promising means of bringing the fruits of culture to the workers," who have "the desire at least that those who follow them may come into privileges which they themselves have failed of." He also looks with well-grounded hope to the increasing number of university men who incline to be specialists in political and social science.

The author's point of view is sufficiently illustrated from the following remarks, which occur in the concluding pages of his book, and which probably meet with such general agreement as to call for little comment: "There is a deep unity which binds the social movements together." "Already the large activities of the English people are beginning to run according to the lines of a real social organism. . . . From the old universities are going out efforts which unmistakably suggest the nation organized for culture. The House of Commons and the city governments express more closely every year the public interests of all the people. Out of the toiling majority there comes a great impulsive rising which shows that the period of confusion and chaos in the industry of the nation is almost at an end."

Perhaps little more is possible or desirable in our time than a continuance of these specialized social activities in their implicit relations,—relations which will gradually become clearer. Even the philosophic effort "to see life steadily and to see it whole" scarcely escapes the characteristic of a specialized interest, and claims the concentrated labor of experts. When will there arise from the people the common breath of a religion which will be a new philosophy of life transfused into poetry?

T. F. HUSBAND.

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ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY: being the first volume of "Elements of Economics." By Alfred Marshall, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Cambridge, sometime Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co., 1892. Pp. xiv, 416.

This work of Professor Marshall (1) is intended to replace his *Economics of Industry*, published in 1879, and is an abridgment of *The Principles of Economics*, published in 1890. It is in no sense a second edition of the first-named work. The abridgment of the *Principles* has been effected, as the author explains in his preface, by the omission of the more difficult passages in the larger work, rather than by systematic compression. Compared with the *Economics of Industry* of 1879, the new work has gained immensely in clearness as well as in fulness and originality. The only criticism of its plan which can fairly be offered is that the title of the book, "Elements of Economics of Industry," suggests a specialization that the execution of the work does not offer. What we have is rather an elementary treatise on economics in general than a special treatise on the economics of industry. Although the title is thus not rigidly descriptive of the contents, this is not altogether a disadvantage in a text-book, because it avoids specialization at too early a stage. As regards method, the influence of the tendency to regard economic conditions from an ethical and sociological rather than from what may be described as the commercial stand-point is very manifest. This appears even in the arrangement of the subject-matter. Such an arrangement is a departure from the convention established by Mill, and followed by Sidgwick and almost all other economists, in placing consumption first and production and distribution afterwards. This innovation, which has been urged from time to time by economists of lesser note than Professor Marshall, is very significant. It means that economics is becoming more and more one of the sciences concerned with life, and less and less one concerned merely with commodity. Professor Marshall deals frankly with the demand for more leisure, which in all civilized countries is being made with increasing emphasis. A passage in the chapter on "The Influence of Progress on Value" puts the case for the biological and ethical as opposed to the commercial view with admirable brevity and strength: "When the hours and general conditions of labor are such as to cause great wear and tear of body or mind, or both, and to lead to a low standard of living; when there has been a want of that leisure, rest, and repose which is one of the necessaries for efficiency, then the labor has been extravagant from the point of view of society at large, just as it would be extravagant on the part of the individual capitalist to keep his horses or slaves overworked or underfed. In such cases a moderate diminution of the hours of labor would diminish the national dividend only temporarily. . . . And since material wealth exists for man, and not man for material wealth, the fact that inefficient and stunted human lives had been replaced by more efficient and fuller lives would be a gain of a higher order than any temporary material loss that might have been occasioned by the way." This, of course, takes no account of the means by which this increased leisure is to be obtained. It may be pointed out as an omission that no connected account of the influence of legislation upon industry is given, nor an estimate of the effects of past legislative reduction of the hours of labor nor of future probable attempts to effect such a legislative reduction. The chapter on

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"Trade Unions," though very welcome, is rather out of its place. In Professor Marshall's scheme for his larger book the subject of "Combinations," including labor combinations, is left over for his second volume. In some ways it is unfortunate that this was not done here also, for, valuable as the chapter is, it has necessarily been written at a time when opinion about labor combination is in a state of flux. The record of trade-unionism since it ceased to be looked upon as practically a conspiracy against the law is as yet too short for definite conclusions on inductive grounds as to the effect of labor combinations upon wages. Moreover, the emergence of the new unionism has brought into existence factors the direction of whose action is scarcely as yet capable of determination. Some may think also that Professor Marshall gives exaggerated importance to certain objections to trade unions and that he underestimates others. The points for and against trade-union action have, however, never been put with greater force or clearness, nor have the opponents of trade unions experienced so fair and adequate treatment at the hands of any economic writer during the past quarter of a century. The tendency in public opinion as regards trade unions may perhaps fairly be described as general approval and particular disapproval. The trade union would model itself in accordance with the general drift of commercial opinion if it never encouraged a strike and if it used its powers simply to keep men quiet. While this view is, of course, one-sided, it may be at once admitted that the dangers of the future lie not so much in the contest betwen capital and labor, although that also has its dangers, as in the contest of unions of trades working on the same or contiguous industrial planes. The strike of union against union is becoming frequent both in this country and in America, and the question arises whether, given even an approximate equity as regards the distribution of the product between capitalists and laborers in a particular group, the result of organization on both sides, there may not arrive a condition in which highly-organized groups may be practically leeches upon the rest of the community.

JAMES MAVOR.

THE EFFECTS OF MACHINERY ON WAGES. By J. Shield Nicholson, M.A., D.Sc. New and Revised Edition. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892.

The interest of this book is, of course, mainly for the economist. But it has also an ethical interest, inasmuch as it is one of the most striking instances of the modern method of economic study in which barren abstractions are as far as possible avoided, and problems are studied from the point of view of their bearing on human well-being as a whole. The book is in the main a reprint of an essay published in 1878, but several improvements have been made. Perhaps the most striking remark bearing on general economic philosophy is that on pp. 133–134 bearing on the doctrine of *laissez faire*, with special reference to the theory of Mr. Herbert Spencer. "This dogma," he says, "first enounced at a time when the laws affecting industry were so bad that the greatest license conceivable would have been better, was naturally received with great favor; it was supposed to be perfectly verified by the success of free trade, and has since been supported by a misinterpretation of the theory of evolution. Under the influence of this theory the followers of Mr. Herbert Spencer feel inclined to trust to

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'survival of the fittest' to bring about the best state of things possible. But this is trusting to the lower instincts to do what reason, 'the highest of all instincts,' is unable to perform; it is an optimism more degraded and less justifiable than the fatalism of enervated Orientals." I am not sure that this criticism is quite fair. Reason cannot be justly described as an instinct; and there are many cases in which it is safer to trust to instinct than to reasoning, especially the reasoning of the average man. Still, Professor Nicholson appears to be quite right in regarding it as a mere superstition to suppose that in the complex activities of a human society the action of our natural impulses is to be relied on to produce beneficial results; and his remarks on this, as well as on many other points, are significant of the great change that has taken place in the attitude of English economists on this subject. J. S. M.

THE FALLACY OF SAVING. By John M. Robertson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. ix, 148.

While the writer of this volume shows very considerable ingenuity in attacking a conception of an important economic doctrine which is very prevalent, we cannot refrain from expressing the opinion that that doctrine is somewhat misunderstood.

The object aimed at by the person who saves is to secure the right to a larger or more desirable future good by denying himself present gratification. The fact, which is undoubted, that a given effort will produce a greater result mediately than immediately, is his justification for adopting this course.

Additions to capital, if utilized in production, cause greater results to the same labor, or equal results to less labor.

Whether we consider savers as individuals or in the mass, their present restriction of the less necessary parts of their possible consumption may be expected, failing miscarriage, to enable them to enjoy in the future a larger consumption with no greater labor, or, what is now very prominently before the public mind, to continue to consume as much as now, while devoting less of their time to physical or mental toil.

We quite agree with Mr. Robertson, that it is not desirable continually to restrict the consumption of the whole nation to those goods which are produced with the greatest ease, but we think we are not in disagreement with the best modern economists in believing that present saving should be regarded as having for one of its principal aims the attainment in the future of the right to consume economic goods of higher orders, ministering to higher needs. If Mr. Robertson succeeds in convincing his readers that saving is simply a means to an end, the end being the future gratification of (let us say) æsthetic tastes, he will not have written in vain.

If we have not misunderstood him, however, he advocates a policy which would result in a system of producing for immediate consumption only,—that is, deliberately casting on one side the control of processes of production which, though involving long delay, have as a recompense a largely-increased produce.

The reckless spendthrift policy is, we opine, even less beneficial than the excess of parsimony. The suggestion, which occurs repeatedly, that a wholesale destruction of serviceable commodities would be good for the community

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because of the necessity for replacing them, and the consequent employment for labor, is repugnant to others than theoretical economists.

The logical conclusion that the nation would be benefited by such destruction of wealth as would leave us in the state of savages, without the natural resources usually available to them, cannot reasonably be accepted.

We sympathize somewhat with the author's desire to see the national debt rapidly paid off. We fail, however, to appreciate the necessity for adopting the measures which he recommends in order to achieve this in a space of time so brief that intervention in a very active war shall be the only means available to save the state from the evil effects anticipated by him as a consequence.

Further, it is not clear that the policy of old-age pensions requires, or will profit by, the support of such theories as those advanced in this volume, and those others of Messrs. Mummery and Hobson to which appeal is made.

A. W. FLUX.

METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL REMUNERATION. By David F. Schloss. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892.

This little book contains not only a mass of pertinent facts drawn by the writer from all available trustworthy sources, including his own observation, but acute reflections on the same, showing no little power of logical analysis. The chapters on piece-work are a good example; but perhaps the best of all is the section on the "Sweating System." Mr. Schloss shows first of all the vagueness of the common definitions of "sweating." He does not, indeed, deny that there is such a thing; and, after his sifting, it comes to mean such a "hard driving" on the part of an employer (whether sub-contractor or not) that the employed work beyond their strength and for minimum wages to his profit. But Mr. Schloss denies that there is any "system" of sweating as a method of industrial remuneration, and especially that it can be identified with the system of sub-contract.

There will be difference of opinion about the views here taken of co-operative production. Our author tends to the conclusion that when a member of a well-organized trade society the workman is better off as a wages-earner than he would be under any system of copartnership of labor, to say nothing of profit-sharing. Mere profit-sharing may be allowed to savor of patronage rather than of democratic self-government and self-help; and even the most ardent advocates of co-operative workshops will allow that none of them can be sound that are not built on a basis of trade-unionism.

J. BONAR.

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RECENT ECONOMIC LITERATURE.

1. POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Charles S. Devas, Examiner in Political Economy at the Royal University of Ireland; author of "Ground-Work of Economics," etc. (Manuals of Catholic Philosophy.) London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892. Pp. xvi, 578.
2. DIGEST OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOME OF ITS APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By G. Vesian Pick. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. xii, 156.
3. PUBLIC FINANCE. By C. F. Bastable, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Dublin; Examiner in the University of London. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1892. Pp. xx, 672.
4. THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS. By C. F. Bastable, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Dublin, etc. London: Methuen & Co., 1892. Pp. vi, 216.
5. THE STUDENT'S MARX. An Introduction to the Study of Carl Marx' Capital. By Edward Aveling, D.Sc. Lond.; Fellow of University College, London. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. xvi, 180.
6. THE MODERN FACTORY SYSTEM. By R. Whately Cooke Taylor, F.S.S., F.R.Hist.S., H.M. Inspector of Factories; Author of "Introduction to a History of the Factory System from the Earliest Times." London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Limited, 1891. Pp. x, 476.
7. FACTORY ACT LEGISLATION: Its Industrial and Commercial Effects, Actual and Prospective. Being the Cobden Prize Essay for 1891. By Victorine Jeans. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1892. Pp. 96.
8. THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND IN 1844: with Preface written in 1892. By Frederick Engels. Translated by Florence Kelley Wischenswetzky. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. xx, 300.
9. THE SOCIAL HORIZON. By the Author of "Life in our Villages." London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. iv, 164.
10. THE IRISH PEASANT. A Sociological Study, Edited from Original Papers. By a Guardian of the Poor. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. x, 154.
11. TWO THOUSAND YEARS OF GILD LIFE; or, An Outline of the History and Development of the Gild System from Early Times, with Special Reference to its Application to Trade and Industry; together with a Full Account of the Gilds and Trading Companies of Kingston-upon-Hull, from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Century. By Rev. T. Malet Lambert, M.A., LL.D., Vicar of Newland, Hull, and Chairman of Hull School Board. Hull: A. Brown & Sons, 1891. Pp. xii, 414.
12. CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL ESSAYS, No. 5. The Influence and Development of English Gilds, as illustrated by the History of the Croft Gilds of Shrewsbury. By Francis Aidan Hibbert, B.A. St. John's College, Cambridge, Assistant Master in Denstone College. *Thirlwall Dissertation*, 1891. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1891. Pp. xii.

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13. THE STORY OF KING EDWARD AND NEW WINCHELSEA. The Edification of a Mediæval Town. By F. A. Inderwick, Q.C., Author of "Sidelights of the Stuarts," "The Interregnum," etc. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Limited, 1892. Pp. xvi, 220.

(1) Mr. Devas has been known for some years as the author of the ingenious and original "Ground Work of Economics." The present volume is an excellent general text-book. In plan and execution it is, like the other work of the author, highly original. The scientific economist will find much that is suggestive to him in the clear statements of many points which the ordinary text-book generally passes over rather flimsily; but the special attraction of the book is the prominence which it gives to the ethical aspect of economic questions. There is, as one would expect from the training of the writer, an importance given to the action of external control upon conduct, and to the duty of the state in this connection, that the economist trained in the school of Bentham would be disposed hotly to contest. The real significance of the book lies in the conception it reveals at every point, of the position of economics in the mind of the writer as a science dealing with social life. His chapters on the family and on nations are substantially excellent pleas for regarding production and even distribution as capable of being understood only after study of consumption, including the conditions of social life and the customs and laws regulating these. The device of inserting in small type an account of the "pitfalls," or possible erroneous conclusions from abbreviated statements of principles, is excellent. There is, however, a pitfall into which the uncritical reader of Mr. Devas's work may fall, and that is in suffering himself to be guided in positive legislation, for example, merely by excellence of intention and warmth of sympathy. Some grasp of the complex conditions that must be reckoned with is necessary in addition to these desirable springs of action.

(2) Although the title of Mill's classical text-book is given in full on the title-page of Mr. Pick's "Digest," there is no mention upon it of the name of Mill. The Digest is not a digest of political economy, but is a digest of Mill. Perhaps this was needed even at this late date. If, however, there was need for such a hand-book, now that Mill's book has been superseded for practical class-work by more recent manuals, a digest surely ought to have been accompanied with critical notes, and references at least to points upon which Mill changed his opinions.

(3) The principles and practice of public finance have not in recent years received adequate scientific treatment at the hands of English economists. The subject has indeed been left mainly in the hands of party politicians, with rather disastrous results as regards clearness and impartiality of exposition. In Germany, France, and the United States, on the other hand, several writers of eminence have produced treatises more or less comprehensive and impartial.

The important work of Professor Bastable redeems the reputation of economic students in the United Kingdom from the reproach of neglecting this branch of economic science. No more conscientious and rigidly exhaustive treatise on public finance exists in any language than that he has just produced. Thor-

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oughly able, erudite, and scientific in the best sense, it is a model for all works of a similar kind. Very many points hotly contested in current controversies are put with admirable clearness and judgment,—*e.g.*, the pros and cons of the nationalization and municipalization of land and railways, and the advantages and disadvantages of direct and indirect taxation. Professor Bastable's book must undoubtedly become the recognized classical treatise on Public Finance.

Of less importance, but interesting and effective, is the same writer's "Commerce of Nations" (4). Partly historical and partly theoretical, it deals effectively with the mercantile system and the transition from protection to free trade. The general conclusion of the writer is in favor of free trade, although he fully admits some of the drawbacks of cosmopolitical competition.

Dr. Aveling's "Student's Marx" (5) is an admirable guide to an author in the study of whom a guide is almost a necessity, at all events to the young student of economic theory. It might go without saying that Dr. Aveling is a Marxist of the Marxists. His analysis of Marx is essentially uncritical, but it is very thorough and accurate. Many of Marx's positions have been abandoned by leading socialists, and much of the ground over which he went has been reworked since his day, yet a careful study of Marx is essential to any one who would understand the drift of economic opinion during the last quarter of a century, for although few of Marx's conclusions have found their way into accepted economic doctrine, his influence has made for the awakening of enthusiasm in economic study, and also no doubt very largely to the undercurrent of antagonism to human exploitation which characterizes the writings of those even who are most in line with orthodox economic traditions. Mr. Taylor's "Modern Factory System" (6) is partly an amplification and partly a supplement of his earlier "Introduction to the Factory System." There is perhaps a little too much ancient and rather too little modern history; but what there is of the latter is very well done, and is done by one who is thoroughly familiar with the recent developments of the factory system. One point which is specially worth noticing is the inconsistency observed by the writer between the propaganda of those who object to all forms of what is called, rather vaguely, sweating, and the propaganda in some cases conducted by the same persons in favor of what are called home industries. Under existing conditions industries carried on domestically are really sweated industries, and for the reason that they are domestic industries are supremely difficult to deal with by legislation. Mr. Taylor regards with some favor the probable reaction in the direction of domestic industries as a means of counteracting the development of certain evils apparently inherent in the factory system.

Miss Jeans's essay on "Factory Act Legislation" (7) is a somewhat slight narrative of the series of episodes which led up to the passing of the successive Factory Acts, with a highly colored and optimistic account of the past and probable future of factory legislation.

A translation of Engel's well-known "Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844" (8) is fittingly introduced by a preface written in 1892 by the venerable author himself. Unfortunately, the preface is written with a certain bitterness and extravagance of statement which might well have been avoided.

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"The Social Horizon" (9) is an anonymous essay upon the social changes that appear to be looming in the future. The author has apparently been smitten by Nationalism, although he avows his ignorance of economic literature. There is an excellent tone and a considerable amount of observation, with some lack of appreciation of the complicated nature of the problem he attempts to attack. "The Irish Peasant" (10), also anonymous, is an excellent sociological study. It focuses many points that have run risk of being lost sight of in the stress of the Irish constitutional controversy, and affords much information upon the present economic condition of Ireland that one might look for in vain elsewhere.

Conscientious and painstaking in the highest degree, full of details of mediæval social life, and excellently well arranged, Dr. Lambert's book (11) is not merely interesting as a topographical work, but is full of light upon the early history of association. Dr. Lambert contests the view that the Gild was of English origin. He attempts to prove that the English Gild and the Roman Collegia and Sodalicia are practically identical. The essential features of the Gild are set down as these: (*a*) Fellowship confirmed by an oath or promise; (*b*) Regular contributions; (*c*) Special care for the funeral rites of a member; (*d*) Periodical feast; (*e*) Rules for preserving order; (*f*) The application of the fellowship to the most pressing need of the society of the day,—*e.g.*, police, facilitation of trade, insurance. Dr. Lambert claims that the first five are common to Roman and to English gilds, and that in the last, the adaptability of the gild, is to be found the reason for the unbroken continuity of this form of association. It is impossible to praise too highly the earnestness and thoroughness with which Dr. Lambert has executed his task.

Of less importance, but an interesting special study of gild life, is Mr. Hibbert's account of the gilds of Shrewsbury (12). Although the forms and sometimes even the spirit of the gild system tend to survive after a fashion, they do suffer modification so considerable as to render a faithful account of the gilds of each town in detail of the utmost value to the economic student. There still remains a vast amount of work to be done in this direction. The doing of it is specially valuable now when there seems to be coming over us a wave of enthusiasm for gild action,—a recrudescence of the mediæval spirit. Of similar interest in this connection is Mr. Inderwick's story of the edification of Winchelsea (13). From the dry pages of a roll of the names of land-holders he has repeopled for us in a quaint and charming fashion the streets of a mediæval town with its townsmen of 1292. The variety of occupations, the considerable transferrence from one town to another, the proportionately large official element, and the relatively high development of organization in the mediæval towns are illustrated not in any fanciful manner, but from the records; and the result is as delightful in its kind as the dream of John Ball by William Morris.

JAMES MAVOR.

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REPORT ON THE RECENT LITERATURE OF ETHICS AND RELATED TOPICS IN AMERICA.

1. PHILOSOPHY AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE. An Inaugural Address, delivered March 1, 1892, as Professor of Philosophy in Adelbert College of the Western Reserve University. By Matoon Monroe Curtis, Ph.D. Cleveland, Ohio, 1892. Pp. 53, 16mo.

2. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO PSYCHOLOGY AND TO PHYSIOLOGY. By Joseph Le Conte. Read before the Philosophical Society of Washington, January 30, 1892. Reprinted from the Bulletin of the Society, vol. xii. pp. 19–38. Washington, 1892.

3. THE ORIGIN OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. By Dr. Herbert Nichols. Reprinted from the Philosophical Review, vol. i.: No. 4, pp. 403–432; No. 5, pp. 518–534.

4. PLEASURE-PAIN AND SENSATION. By Henry Rutgers Marshall. Reprinted from the Philosophical Review, vol. i. pp. 625–648.

5. THE CONCEPT OF LAW IN ETHICS. Thesis accepted by the Faculty of Cornell University for the Ph.D. Degree. By Ferdinand Courtney French, Fellow in the Sage School of Philosophy of Cornell University. Providence, R.I.: Preston & Rounds, 1892. Pp. 51, 8vo.

6. THE VALUE OF A STUDY OF ETHICS. An Inaugural Lecture. By James Gibson Hume, Ph.D., Professor of Ethics and the History of Philosophy in the University of Toronto. Toronto: The J. E. Bryant Company (Limited), 1891. Pp. 24, 8vo.

7. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ETHICS. Same author and publisher. 1892. Pp. 40.

8. OUR MORAL NATURE. Being a Brief System of Ethics. By James McCosh, D.D., LL.D., Ex-President of Princeton College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892. Pp. vi, 53, 8vo.

9. PRACTICAL ETHICS. By William Dewitt Hyde, D.D., President of Bowdoin College. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1892. Pp. xii, 203.

1. The Professor of Philosophy at Adelbert College of the Western Reserve University, in his inaugural address, seems to show himself as one intending to bring into the world of his studies not peace, but a sword. Philosophy, he says (p. 3), is to-day in no congenial circumstances. "By Theology and Physical Science, her natural children and associates, she is often reproached, and sometimes severely handled." The public enjoy the brawls thus occasioned. Our author, for his part, hopes to maintain "for philosophy its central position among the disciplines, and its fundamental importance in all intellectual culture." As against theology, Professor Curtis insists that "the human reason protests against its own elimination or expulsion from the concerns of life" (p. 5), and that the "nature of Protestantism tends to lose itself in rational and empirical philosophy, and to surrender the claim that the Bible is the ultimate authority." As against those partisans of the exclusive importance of physical science whose

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"ire" is aroused by a "reference to ontology or metaphysics" (p. 6), the author maintains that "Physical science . . . is in its main principles and features metaphysical and speculative." In philosophy, and, in fact, in all human thinking, "the subjective or introspective method" is to be paramount. Upon the basis of such considerations the author goes on, in a cheerfully pugnacious fashion, to attack a number of the most significant modern doctrines, in particular the doctrine of organic evolution as commonly received, and to sketch his own philosophical programme. The lecture has a decidedly controversial but also a very manly tone. The opinions expressed are frequently rather entertaining as curiosities of our period of transition than important as contributions to reflective insight; but, on the whole, the lecture awakens a decided interest as to the possible future outcome of Professor Curtis's thinking, which has pretty evidently not reached a very permanent stage.

2. Complete maturity, on the other hand, is sure to be indicated on every page of Professor Le Conte's publications. The present address, delivered before the Philosophical Society of Washington, brings together once again, with the author's well-known literary and reflective skill, the results of his life-work so far as they seem to him to bear upon the general definition of the relations between philosophy and psychology. A considerable portion of the paper is taken up with discussing the fundamental differences between the brute and the human mind. Professor Le Conte is already on record as an evolutionist who still recognizes the occurrence of great and stupendously significant transitions in the evolutionary series. It is in man's "spiritual nature," in his reason, in his ethical insight, in his reflective power, in his freedom of will, that Professor Le Conte places the great contrast between his mind and the minds of animals. In consequence, the line of distinction between philosophy and psychology is drawn very wide and deep. Psychology, as a science of the mere natural history of mind, "will eventually be identified with nerve-physiology; but philosophy, which is the science of free, self-conscious spirit, belongs to man alone. There is a psychology in man, too, for man is also an animal; but all the activities of self-conscious, self-determining spirit, such as abstract thought, unselfish love, and free moral choice, and all that flow from these, belong to philosophy. There is, therefore, a comparative psychology, as there is a comparative anatomy and a comparative physiology, and these comparative sciences include man also as a subject-matter; but there is no comparative philosophy." Readers of Professor Le Conte's well-known and most admirable monograph on "Evolution and its Relations to Religious Thought" will recognize the drift and significance of these views. One may disagree; but Professor Le Conte is a man not easily to be disposed of in a critical note.

3 and 4. The attention of students of the psychological aspect of ethics ought to be drawn to the interesting discussion now going on in the pages of our contemporary, *The Philosophical Review*, on the nature and psychological basis of pleasure and pain. The question of the relation of these our "taskmasters"—as Bentham once called them—to the will can never be finally settled until the psychology of the pleasure-pain group of experiences is in a far better condition than at present. Dr. Herbert Nichols, much impressed by the importance of the physiological doctrine of "specific energies," has been led, upon the basis of certain recent experimental

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work of Goldscheider's, as well as upon the basis of observations of his own, to advance the view that there pretty certainly do exist special "pain-nerves" (*i.e.*, sensory nerves which, when excited, give as their specific sensations only pains), and that there also exist, less demonstrably, but very probably, special "pleasure-nerves." With considerable expository skill, and with a wide control of the physiological facts, Dr. Nichols accordingly argues that in the original pleasures and pains, if we could now get at them, we should have, not mere "*qualia* of other mental contents" or "tones" of our experience, but, at bottom, true sensations, capable of being experienced apart from all other sensations, just as colors are capable of being experienced apart from tones. To be sure, these pleasure and pain experiences have now become associated, often indissolubly, with others, and so in mature life they come to appear as mere colorings of our whole experience. But the physiological basis of all our "tones of feeling" are our pleasure- and pain-nerves (whence come the original sensations), together with the associative apparatus of central organs, whereby the excitements of these nerves get interwoven with all the rest of our nervous life, and get their actual and highly-complex relations to our "desires." The speculations on the evolutionary aspects of his theory which fill Dr. Nichols's second paper seem to the present reviewer very questionable; and the general thesis of both the papers so far published is still far from being demonstrated. On the other hand, the papers are certainly important, and, in case further experiment should tend to confirm and extend this "sensation" theory, they may prove epoch-marking. It is much to have risked so noteworthy an hypothesis in so obscure a region of psychology.

In answer to Dr. Nichols, Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall, author of several valuable papers in *Mind* upon "Pleasure, Pain, and Æsthetics," briefly restates, in No. 4 of our list, his own very different hypothesis as to the physiological basis of the feelings in question, and sets forth at some length several objections to the argument of Dr. Nichols as thus far revealed. The "pain-nerves" of Goldscheider and Nichols prove, indeed, to be serious stumbling-blocks in the way of the opponent, whose hypothesis to account for these curious phenomena is itself obviously so far very questionable. But, on the other hand, the more theoretical and speculative parts of Dr. Nichols's doctrine invite rather telling criticism, which Mr. Marshall utters with the greatest courtesy of manner and with interesting vigor and skill. A suspension of judgment as to the theory of pleasure and pain is certainly called for, and it is to be hoped that the next writer of a text-book of ethics will bear this fact well in mind.

5. Dr. French's thesis for the doctorate is composed of four chapters. The first three are historical, and deal respectively with the "Concept of Law" in ancient, in mediæval, and in modern ethics. The fourth chapter sets forth, in some twelve pages, the author's view of the nature of the moral law, its source, ends, and motive. The historical part of the thesis is good, although, in view of the now easily accessible literature, whose careful use Dr. French very constantly acknowledges, this sort of work has been a good deal shorn of its greater difficulties. But Dr. French is an industrious expositor, and many of his presentations of doctrine are well worth reading. The closing and positive chapter is hurried and disappointing. The last sentence of the thesis runs, "That our moral nature should demand of us an absolute self-sacrifice seems impossible to

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believe." Schopenhauer skilfully and deliberately ended the first exposition of his system with the word *nichts.* Dr. French's last three words are almost as ominous, but are possibly not deliberately chosen as last words. As to the sentiment of the sentence quoted, it suggests a curious dimness of mind as to the central issue of all ethics.

6 and 7. Professor Hume's inaugural address on "The Value of a Study of Ethics" deserves more attention than our brief space permits, and we must also regret that it has so long remained unnoticed in our pages. Opening with a general defence of the value and place of ethical study in the academic curriculum, Professor Hume passes to the somewhat familiar topic of the relations of philosophy and science, and then, through the statement of a contrast between theoretical and practical philosophy, prepares the way for a brief exposition of his own programme as a teacher of ethics. Both science and theoretical philosophy, he tells us, despite their otherwise so different points of view, have, in common, a tendency to "hypostatize," the one our ideas of the truth of experience, the other our ideas of the "laws of thought," and so to view the truth "abstractly," as something mysteriously related to us the knowing subjects, as something far off, unknowable, or independent of us, or sundered from us. Either the "non-mental" or the "laws of thought" are thus set up as the ultimate reality, and our ideas of the world become dualistic. But the philosophical study of ethics reintroduces us to the unity of the world, and is thus wisely monistic in its tendencies. Man, as an active being, is a creator of unities because he is a realizer of ideals. He brings together the world of his knowledge, with its abstract laws of thought, and his world of feelings, with its multiplicity of brute facts, and, by setting facts into reasonable shape, he illustrates to himself that this world is one where personality is at home, where the real is not a mass of unknowable data, but where it rather gives us the plastic stuff for ideal work, and where the business of thought is not merely to think ideas, but to direct conduct. These general philosophical considerations open the way to a sketch of some fundamental principles of ethics, which Professor Hume states with considerable effect, although with no attempt at great originality. As a "person," man lives in relation to other "persons." His conduct, therefore, must be essentially public-spirited. He lives in relations if he lives at all, and this he must make the very principle of his ethical life. But, in consequence, "unselfish" conduct, which the moral law counsels, is not conduct which "abandons the claims of personality." "It is unfortunate that many writers are falling into the habit of describing unselfish and generous conduct as 'impersonal.' If we were speaking of a falling stone as acting, we might say that it acted impersonally. When a man sneezes he acts impersonally. What those writers mean is, probably, that a man in his actions should recognize that he, as an individual, does not and cannot exist as a person in isolation from his fellow-men. That he should remember that he is a member of the social life. That he should treat other persons as also persons. . . . But this is not the renouncing of personality. It is simply recognizing the true character and significance of personality. The citadel which ethics must defend is personality. The only defence required, however, is elucidation."

In the essay No. 7 of our list Professor Hume proceeds to apply his ethical

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doctrines to the vexed question of the ethical aspect of political economy. The present writer would be going beyond his province should he attempt to give any special estimate of this portion of Professor Hume's undertaking, in so far as such a judgment would involve well-considered economic opinions. The essay is largely taken up with a sketch of the critical history of the questions concerned. Professor Hume, however, places a great part of the significance of his paper in its effort to contribute "to an organic view of ethics" (p. 36), an effort in which he is not unsuccessful. That "society is an organism," and that the individual is nevertheless not to be lost or forgotten in this organism,—these, as will appear from the foregoing, are Professor Hume's two principal points of view.

8. Dr. McCosh's final statement of the doctrines to whose exposition his life has been devoted has now reached the point where the little volume "Our Moral Nature" follows in order his previous books upon the "Cognitive" and "Motive Powers," and upon metaphysics. When one is entirely at variance with so distinguished a teacher and writer as Dr. McCosh concerning the very beginnings of theoretical philosophy, concerning all the most important doctrines of metaphysics, and concerning all the most significant inductions of psychology, what can one hope to say of a treatise like this, except that it undoubtedly expresses the views of a good man, and of one who for a lifetime has been doing good, concerning certain fundamental virtues? The virtues here set forth are themselves undoubtedly of the noblest. The man who teaches them is also well worthy to be their teacher. But the theory here very briefly suggested concerning their basis and their relations seems to the present reviewer to be, when judged from a purely theoretical point of view, and when considered in the light of the present state of philosophical inquiry, absolutely insignificant. But then the course of a very great deal of modern inquiry seems to Dr. McCosh equally insignificant. It is a case of Lessing's fable of the rings. Let the judge decide.

9. President Hyde adds one more to the already numerous books on practical ethics. This volume is intended as an attempt "both to satisfy the intellect and quicken the conscience at that critical period when the youth has put away childish things and is reaching out after manly and womanly ideals." At the basis of the whole exposition is placed a table of duties and of virtues arranged in columns, and contrasted, after the Aristotelian fashion, each one with the corresponding "Vice of Defect" and with the "Vice of Excess," which occupy their places in later columns of the table. A "Reward" is placed opposite to each virtue; a "Temptation" is also defined corresponding to each; and, finally, a "Penalty" finds in each instance its due position in the last column of the table. The world of the conscience having thus been tabulated, the detailed exposition begins. The text is arranged with formal headings for each topic. The titles of paragraphs, and often a sentence or more at the beginning of a paragraph, are printed in broad type. He that runs may read. The further Aristotelian device of illustrating moral principles by sketching an abstract or typical "character" is often used (*e.g.*, the description of "the sentimentalist" on p. 113). Very various sources of the wisdom of life are freely cited, but there is no unnecessary obtrusion of learning. A great many of the author's own observations escape with much skill that constant danger of seeming too obvious which often tends to render books on these topics such tedious reading. Kant's dove that wants to

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fly in the vacuum escapes from her Platonic and erudite associations in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and flies into Professor Hyde's book (p. 109), to illustrate why the friction and annoyances of our life with our fellow-men are, after all, necessary evils, while the vacuum of a lonely life would be wholly intolerable. This is only one example of the relatively unexpected and therefore interesting quality of our author's illustrations and observations. In short, it is to be hoped that President Hyde's youthful readers will often, if not always, find themselves awakened both to curiosity and to earnestness by his devices.

After all, however, it is the table of the virtues, and of their corresponding rewards, temptations, and vices of excess and defect, with the penalties of this latter—it is this table which, after all, constitutes the real weakness of the book. The special virtues are indeed many, because life, with its variety of fortunes and of accidents, of things and of people, gives us many special tasks. But a table of virtues—it is an old notion, yet to see it formally carried out sets one's teeth on edge. It is, with all its literalness, so false to the spirit of life! To mention one only amongst its unhappy consequences, it may lead one to count over his own virtues, to see how many he has. There are twenty-three virtues on President Hyde's list. Neatness and holiness, loyalty and orderliness, conscientiousness and economy, thus get co-ordinated. It is in vain that our author's text wisely and justly distinguishes these virtues from one another as to their dignity and their scope. There they are in the table, one under another in a column. Let one count over the list. "How many have I of them?" the conscience-stricken youth may say,—yes, almost certainly will say. For tables have a great effect upon many youths. "I have already, say, sixteen out of the twenty-three. Is that enough for my age? When I add the seventeenth, say orderliness (for holiness is evidently hard, and must be left unattained until I am older), shall I not feel proud? My fellow, yonder, can only count up fourteen of the virtues as his own, and some of those he doesn't possess as well as I do." Is not such trifling exactly what this inadequate sort of abstract tabulation tends to produce? One need not, of course, insist argumentatively upon the unity of the virtues for Professor Hyde's benefit. In his chapters on "The Self" and on "God" he eloquently and explicitly announces this unity. Our present point is that an abstract tabulation of the virtues may count for more in destroying the unity of a youth's conception of the moral life than a later restatement of this unity is likely to count in piecing together again the fragments. Why not begin with unity, not announcing it abstractly, but letting a pupil feel it from the first,—not tabulating virtues, but illustrating, now here and now there, how a good man works upon this task or upon that?

It must be remembered that the present objection is a pedagogical, not a philosophical one, for, as said, President Hyde fully recognizes the actual unity of ethics. And as to a pedagogical matter President Hyde's experience must doubtless count, on the whole, for far more than the present writer's opinion.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

Reviews of Professor Wright's book "The Human and its Relation to the Divine" (Philadelphia, 1892) and of Mr. Salter's "First Steps in Philosophy" must be postponed until the April number.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION. By J. F. Herbert. Translated by H. M. and E. Felkin. With preface by O. Browning, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892.

THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN MODERN TIMES. By Professor W. Cunningham. Cambridge: University Press, 1892.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By J. E. Symes. London: Methuen & Co., 1892.

TRUE MORALITY; OR, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEO-MALTHUSIANISM. By J. R. Holmes. Published by the author at Hanney, Wantage, Berkshire, England.

THE EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH ON DISTRIBUTION. By William Smart, M.A., Philadelphia.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1892.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1893.

THE RELATION BETWEEN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS.*

A RECENT writer† has said that "if there is one class more than another which needs preaching to in these days it is the political economists." Without absolutely endorsing this statement, or admitting, as some seem to hold, that political economists have inherited "a double dose of original sin," I think we may safely say that it is of great importance at the present time to have as clear a view as possible of the connection between those classes of questions which we are in the habit of describing as moral and economical respectively. Obviously, before we can profitably consider the relationship between the two, we must understand precisely what is to be meant by each of the two terms in the relationship, regarded by itself. And, unfortunately, this is not so easy as it might at first sight appear. The difficulty arises mainly on the economical side. In spite of the long-standing warfare between different schools of moralists,—a warfare of a far more terrible kind than any that has ever raged among economists,—there is yet, so far as I am aware, no fundamental disagreement with regard to the province of the science. All recog-

* A paper read, in outline, before Section F of the British Association in Edinburgh, August 4, 1892.

† "The New Political Economy," by Henry Rose, p. 12.

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nize that ethics is concerned with the value of conduct in respect of its quality of goodness or badness. There is, indeed, a certain difference of opinion as to whether it is the motives or intentions of our conduct that are to be taken into account; and also as to whether conduct is to be regarded as good or bad simply in itself, or with reference to some supreme end to which it is directed. But these questions are comparatively subordinate. Now in political economy also there is, no doubt, a pretty general verbal agreement that the subject-matter is wealth. There is also a certain rough practical agreement with regard to the nature of the topics that are to be discussed. But I cannot find that there is any precise theoretical agreement with regard to the scope of the science, similar to what we have in the case of ethics. What is wealth? To this question different thinkers have given widely different answers; while some have been content, like Mill, to leave it altogether unanswered, saying simply that in a general way every one knows what wealth is. Now, whether or not this is a serious difficulty (and I think it is) to the student of economics as such, it is at least a serious obstacle in the way of any one who wishes to consider the relation of ethics to economics. Let us look at some of the possible views. We may pass over at once the crude conceptions* of some of the earlier writers who identified wealth with the precious metals, or with agricultural produce; or even the later doctrine of the classical school, who made it include all material commodities useful to man.† There is, I believe, a general agreement that the term must be understood in a somewhat wider sense than any of these. Now the first extension that has suggested itself to many minds is that which consists in re-

* How far it is the case that either of the two crude conceptions here referred to was ever seriously entertained by economic writers, is a question that we need not here discuss.

† Some writers seem still to hold this last view. But it seems clear that economics must take account of many facts (*e.g.*, services, credit, etc.) which are not material. Mr. J. B. Clark, who adopts in his "Philosophy of Wealth," the view that all wealth is material, and interprets it strictly, is led to some paradoxical results. His discussion of the subject, however, is certainly highly ingenious and suggestive.

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garding wealth as including every object (whether material or not) which is useful and capable of being exchanged. But though this definition covers most of the objects that are commonly dealt with by political economists, yet it has been generally felt that it is a bad definition, inasmuch as it gives only an accident of the thing defined.* For even if individuals and nations did not exchange their goods, we should still be able to discuss their relative wealth. Moreover, there are many elements in a nation's wealth, as the term is commonly understood, which cannot, without a good deal of straining of terms, be said to be exchangeable.† Another definition, which seems to find a good deal of favor at present, is that which identifies wealth with value. This, however, would convert economics into the science rather of well-being than of wealth. Such a conversion is suggested by Ruskin, in his famous saying that "the only wealth is life," and by a celebrated German economist,‡ in his declaration that "the beginning and end of our science is man." But it would evidently be too wide an extension of our subject if we were to identify it with the whole science of man. But to identify wealth with value would have this result. Art and morals and science all possess value, all contribute to the perfection of life. Now economics can scarcely set itself to consider all these kinds of value. The attempt to do so would deprive it of its definiteness, and probably end either in sentimentalism or in barren abstractions. This result might be avoided by narrowing the meaning of value to exchange value; but this again, as I have already indicated, seems to be too narrow a conception. There is another view of the scope of economic science which is suggested, if not

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* *Cf.* Andrews's "Institutes of Economics," p. 3, note 7; and Mill's "Principles of Political Economy," Book III., chap. i., § 1.

† *E.g.*, roads, canals, etc. Again, health is not exchangeable, yet it is often necessary to balance health against other goods; and when it is so balanced (*i.e.*, when it is treated as one of many means to the general end of life), it must be regarded as coming under the same category as the other goods against which we weigh it.

‡ Roscher.

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definitely expressed, by several recent writers, especially by those of the mathematical school.* According to this view economics is not regarded as exclusively the science of wealth at all, but rather as the science of measurable motives. A good deal may be said, especially from the point of view of mathematical treatment, for adopting this conception of the scope of the science; but for most purposes it seems to me to be open to the same objection as that which applies to the Catallactic view. The sphere of economic science happens to coincide pretty closely with the sphere of measurable motives, just as it happens to coincide pretty closely with the sphere of exchange; but in both cases this is an accident. Moreover, it is not strictly true. The motives with which the economist deals are, in general, only roughly and approximately measurable; and some motives, other than those usually regarded as economic, are also of this character. And sometimes the economist has to deal with motives which can scarcely even be approximately measured. Also, unless he is to make his science very abstract, he has to deal with a number of questions † which are not directly concerned with human motives at all. All these views, then, of the scope of economic science seem to me to be somewhat inadequate. I now pass to a statement of the view which I am inclined provisionally to adopt.

Many recent writers on economics have made an important alteration in the arrangement of the subject-matter, by placing consumption instead of production at the front. This seems to me a desirable change. Consumption appears to be the fundamental point in economic science; and I think the science might very conveniently be defined with reference to that. It might be defined as the science of consumable goods. Of course this would itself require definition. We might define a consumable good as one that is used as a means of

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* See especially Marshall's "Principles of Economics," pp. 71, *sqq.*

† *E.g.*, the law of population, the principle of diminishing returns, etc. Here we are concerned with material facts or with natural tendencies, not with motives.

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satisfying human wants. But now it might be thought that this brings us back again to the definition of economics as the science of values. This, however, is not the case, unless we understand the term value in a somewhat narrower sense than that in which I have already employed it. In order to make this plain, I must endeavor to distinguish between two kinds of value; and in doing this what I conceive to be the relation between ethics and economics will at once become apparent.

The distinction to which I wish to refer is substantially that expressed by Kant in his contrast between what has value and what has dignity. "In the kingdom of ends," he says,* "everything has either value or dignity. Whatever has value can be replaced by something else which is *equivalent;* whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a *market value;* whatever, without presupposing a want, corresponds to a certain taste . . . . has a *fancy value;* but that which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth,—*i.e.*, value,—but an intrinsic worth,—*i.e.*, *dignity*." The point here is that some things are valued for themselves, and other things only as means to something else. Essentially the same point was made by Aristotle when he distinguished,† somewhat quaintly, between what we praise (or value) and what we reverence (or worship,—*i.e.*, attach absolute worth to). We praise or value that which has a relation to some end. We attach absolute worth to that which is an end in itself. This seems to me to be an important distinction; and I should say that economic science is concerned with that which we value in this narrower sense,—*i.e.*, what we value simply as *means* to something else. Economic goods are in this way distinguished from such goods as truth, beauty, and goodness, which are, in a sense, ends in themselves.‡

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* "Metaphysic of Morals," § 2.

† "Ethics," I. 12.

‡ This view of economic goods is suggested by Aristotle himself. In his "Politics" (I. viii., 15) he defines wealth as "a quantity of *instruments* [*i.e.*,

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To this it may be objected, no doubt, that everything to which we attach worth is relative to some end. Even virtue, it may be said, is a means to the attainment of the supreme good, whatever that may be. Similarly a work of art is a means of æsthetic satisfaction. This is, I think, true; but it does not destroy the distinction between such goods and economic goods. It suggests, however, that it might be better, instead of saying that goods of the former kind are ends in themselves, to say merely that they are inseparable conditions of the end; whereas economic goods are simply means, for which other means might be substituted. An illustration may help to make my meaning clear. Confectionery is valued for its pleasant taste; works of art are valued because they satisfy the æsthetic taste. The former is simply a means. The confectionery is *consumed*, and in being consumed yields the pleasant taste to which it is used simply as means. Anything else that would supply the same taste would serve the purpose equally well. It is not so with the work of art. It is not consumed in order to yield something else. It gives an æsthetic pleasure; but that pleasure is not something left over when the work of art is consumed. On the contrary, the pleasure exists only so long as the work of art is contemplated for its own sake. It may be too much to say that the work of art is an absolute end in itself; but at any rate it is an inseparable condition of the end which it subserves, and not merely a means consumed in order to yield some desirable result independent of itself. Similarly the virtues, such as honesty, benevolence, and the like, may be said to be means to the realization of our highest good. But they are not *mere* means. They are inseparable conditions of the attainment of our highest good. These illustrations may serve to explain my point. To defend it at length would be beyond the scope of the present paper. I must content myself with saying that this view of the scope of economic science is the one that commends itself most to my mind. It

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means] for the household or state." *Cf.* Mr. Ritchie's article on Aristotle in Palgrave's "Dictionary of Political Economy," p. 54.

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is the science of goods that are valued as means, not as ends in themselves, or as the indispensable condition of ends in themselves. Economic goods are consequently goods for which an equivalent may be found. They are valued as means, and anything else which serves the same purpose equally well is quite as valuable. Economic goods are thus, as the Germans say, *vertretbar*, or, as it has been proposed to translate it, *fungible*.* We might even define economics in a broad way, as the science of fungible goods. Moral goods are not of this character. Nothing else can be substituted for honesty, for instance, which will fulfil the purpose equally well—though the attempt is sometimes made.

It will be observed that this view of the scope of economic science approximates in reality very closely to the Catallactic theory. Goods that are valued simply as means are, as a rule, not only fungible, but also transferable. Goods that are valued as ends, on the other hand, or as indispensable conditions of some end, are seldom capable of being passed from hand to hand. But this fact of exchangeability seems, as I have said, to be a mere accident of economic goods; whereas the fact of being valued as a means is of the very essence of such goods.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that, if this view of the province of economic science is to be accepted, it does not furnish us with any rigid division of objects into economic and non-economic. The distinction, like so many others, depends rather on the point of view from which objects are regarded than on the nature of the objects themselves. Thus, even moral qualities, such as honesty, may have an economic value. We may regard them, as we regard the reliability of a machine, as enhancing the value of their possessor, regarded as a means for the satisfaction of human wants. So also, artistic products may be regarded from the economic point of view. A man may value works of art as means of ornamentation or of ostentation. Knowledge, too, may be regarded

* This rendering is suggested by Mr. Smart in his translation of Böhm-Bawerk's "Capital and Interest," p. 254, note 1.

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as mere means; as when it is said that "knowledge is power." But this does not make it the less true that moral, æsthetic, and philosophic values, as such, are distinct from economic values. And the essential distinction seems to be, that the former kinds of values are regarded as absolute ends, or as indispensable conditions of the realization of certain ends; whereas the latter are regarded as mere means.

We shall accept, then, for the present, this view of the scope of economics. Even if any one is disposed to question its adequacy as a final statement of the nature of the topics to be included in the science, it can at least scarcely be denied that, broadly speaking, it indicates in an approximate way what these topics are; and this will perhaps be sufficient for our present purpose. Now looking at economics in this way, we see at once the importance of considering it in close relation to ethics. For we cannot have a right understanding of the means without an appreciation of the end. Now the various speculative sciences, and also the science of æsthetics, may be said to be concerned with objects that are regarded as ends; and consequently it would be of some importance to consider the relation of these, as well as of ethics, to economic science. But ethics is the most important, because it is concerned with the supreme human end. It deals with the *summum bonum;* and this must in a sense include the æsthetic and the philosophic as well as the purely moral good.* Further, if we are right in saying that economics is concerned with means, while ethics deals with ends, it is evident that there must be a grave danger in studying the former without distinct reference to the latter. It is a well-known psychological fact that an object which is at first valued as a means very easily begins to be regarded as an end in itself. This truth has been frequently illustrated in the study of political economy. Money, for instance, at one time tended to be regarded as an end in itself; and at the present time the increase of material commodities is frequently regarded as such an end. In order to

* *I.e.*, it includes both, in so far as they are regarded as objects of practical pursuit.

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avoid any such fallacies, it is important that we should constantly have in view the real end of human endeavor, and recognize clearly that the goods discussed in economic science are merely means to this end.

Having thus indicated the general nature of the bearing of ethics on economics, I wish to bring out a little more in detail the ways in which the study of economics would be affected by the effort to keep the relation between the two sciences constantly in view. In order to bring out the main points at once as briefly and as systematically as possible, I propose to consider them under the following four headings: (1) The Place of Economics in Social Science. (2) The Method of Studying it. (3) The Relative Importance of its different Parts. (4) Its Practical Results. In all these respects I consider that the study of economics is influenced in an important way by ethical considerations.

(1) With regard to the place of economics in social science, what has chiefly to be insisted upon is, that its place should not be too prominent. I am doubtful whether it is desirable to merge economics in sociology. The progress of the sciences requires that they should be kept separate; and I think economics, regarded as the science of relative values, is a sufficiently distinct one. But economics has tended too much to swallow up the other social sciences. The causes of this are, I believe, various. Partly, it is simply a result of the prominence of the industrial side of life in recent times. Partly, it may be due to the prevalence of the Utilitarian philosophy, which has tended to represent all goods as mere means to the production of pleasure, and consequently to reduce all goods to the economic level.* But I think it is very largely due to the fact that economics lends itself more readily than any other aspect of social science to an abstract and mechanical method of treatment. It deals with simpler and more calculable elements; for, as I have already said, it is

* Even Professor Marshall seems to regard all goods in this way. See his "Principles of Economics," especially the note to p. 78. I think Professor Marshall is partly misled by the Utilitarian theory at this point.

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approximately true that the sphere of economics coincides with the sphere of measurable motives.* Now there is always a danger in scientific study that whatever is incalculable should be regarded as unimportant. Science abstracts the calculable elements in things and deals almost exclusively with them; and it is apt to forget that in doing this it is making an abstraction. What we have to insist on, then, is that, while it may be desirable to treat the economic aspect of things independently of other aspects, we must yet remember that there are other aspects of social life not less important; and we must, as soon as possible, get back from our abstraction to the concrete whole. Otherwise, we shall certainly fall into the error of treating mere means as if they were an end. I do not think it is at all involved in this, that we ought to discountenance the abstract study of economics. On the contrary, the more abstract the study is made the more likely are we to remember that it is dealing only with an aspect of life. I think it was partly because the early economists treated their subject in too concrete a way that it got to appear as if it were dealing with life as a whole. For this reason I believe there are great advantages in the mathematical and deductive methods. They enable us to remember that we are dealing with abstractions.

(2) This leads to our second point, the method of economic study. There are, broadly speaking, three ways in which we may study economics. We may ask what is and has been, or what tends to be, or what ought to be. The dominant school of English economists,† led by Ricardo, has devoted

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* *Cf.* Marshall's "Principles of Economics," p. 73. Also Mr. Ritchie's paper entitled "What are Economic Laws?" in the *Economic Review* for July, 1892, p. 364.

† The Germans, on the other hand, have devoted more attention to the other two questions. The Historical School is well represented in England by Drs. Cunningham and Ingram. The Ethical School, stimulated by Carlyle and Ruskin, is also growing in importance. Its work is well represented by Mr. C. S. Devas's recent book on "Political Economy." Mr. Devas holds distinctly (pp. 1, 542–9, etc.) that Political Economy is a part of what he calls "Particular Ethics," the science which deals "with human actions in particular departments." He entirely repudiates hypothetical discussions. This view appears

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its attention chiefly to the second of these questions. And I do not by any means wish to deny that they may have been wise in doing so. The question what is and has been—the question brought into prominence by the Historical School—is a very large and complicated one. In attempting to answer it, we may easily lose ourselves in a forest of unenlightening details.* The ethical question also, what ought to be—the question brought into prominence by such writers as Ruskin—is a very difficult one to answer. Human society, as most of us have now come to recognize, is a slowly-developing organism; and at any given moment we can look only a little way ahead. We can partly see what is and what is tending to be in the immediate future. What we ought to aim at as our ultimate ideal remains to a great extent dark to us. This is, I think, now generally allowed even by the most sanguine of our social reformers. Utopias are discredited, except as suggestions of the direction in which we may hope to move. Consequently, the study of tendencies must, I think, always form a large part of economic science. It cannot be either purely historic or purely prophetic. What we must insist on is merely this,—in the first place, that in studying the tendencies of things we should understand clearly that it is only tendencies that we are studying; and, in the second place, that we should study these tendencies with a constant reference to the question whether they are leading us to good or to evil. Now these conditions have not always been observed. The laws of economics—*i.e.*, the statements of tendencies—have been over and over again confounded with laws of nature and with imperatives of conduct,—*i.e.*, the statement of what tends to be has been confounded with a statement of what must be and what ought to be.† This also was not

to me one-sided; but it brings out a side which has been too much neglected in England.

* *Cf.* Mr. Ritchie's paper to which I have already referred, p. 369. Of course if the science is studied in the careful manner indicated by such a writer as Le Play, this objection is partly obviated. But even then the subject is almost too large and complicated for any one man to undertake.

† On this whole question I may refer to Keynes's "Scope and Method of Political Economy," p. 38; also to the very valuable article by Mr. D. G. Ritchie in

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unnatural. The study of economic science became prominent at a time when the investigators of physical nature had just been achieving great triumphs; and these triumphs had for the most part been achieved by the careful analysis of mechanical tendencies. These tendencies—the laws of nature—are, indeed, capable of being counteracted and changed;* but within certain limits they are so constant and calculable that they may fairly be taken as expressing for us what actually takes place in nature, and as offering us the key to any given situation. It was not surprising that students of social science should have believed that in this department also similar methods would lead to similar achievements. They did not observe that in some important respects the life of a human society differs from the movements of a merely mechanical system. This difference appears chiefly in two respects. On the one hand, as human society is a developing thing, the tendencies by which it is dominated at one time may sink into insignificance in the course of its further progress. This is no doubt to some extent true even of the laws of physical nature; but the changes in the physical world take place, as a rule, in periods of such great length that for most practical purposes they may be neglected altogether. On the other hand, a human society differs from a mechanical system also in another respect,—viz., that changes in the former are, to some extent, influenced by the mere knowledge of the tendencies by which it is determined. Nature will not alter her ways from the consciousness that we are looking on and understanding her; but a human society which understands its own laws is likely to act differently from one which does not understand them. Not only, therefore, are the tendencies of human action altered by the gradual course of development, but the mere knowledge of these tendencies may itself in-

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the *Economic Review*, to which I have already referred. See also Venn's "Empirical Logic," p. 561, *sqq*.

* Unless they are accepted in a purely hypothetical sense, as explained by Mr. Ritchie in his article, "What are Economic Laws?" pp. 366–67. But it is generally assumed, in stating natural laws, that the hypothetical conditions are at least approximately realized.

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volve an alteration of them.* The mere study of economic science may make economic science untrue.

But if it was thus an error to treat the tendencies of man's social and economic life as if they were laws of nature, it was a still graver error to treat them as if they were moral imperatives or expressions of what ought to be. This error seems to have been originally simply a part of that general error which is involved in the idea of conformity to nature. There was no more favorite notion about the time of the French Revolution, when our modern political economy was in its infancy, than that the ills of social life are due to a departure from the laws of nature, and that they could all be readily cured if we would but consent to let nature have a free course. Now it is evident enough that there is an element of truth in this. *Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.* There is no good in contending against the ultimate tendencies of natural forces. If we elude them on one side, they will come upon us all the more overwhelmingly on another. When we are dealing with such powers, it is best to find out as soon as possible the line of least resistance and let nature have her way. And it is true enough that in the lives of civilized peoples, as distinguished from what the Germans call *Natur-Völker*, there is a constant tendency to depart from this position of equilibrium, to get out of touch with the demands of nature, and so to expose ourselves to an inevitable retribution. But this is only partly true. The progress of humanity involves a continual destruction of old methods of adjustment, but it involves at the same time a continual readjustment on a higher level. We lose, for instance, the adjustments that have been made in the form of instinct, in order that we may gain the higher adjustments of reason. While, then, it is true that we must conform to nature, it must be remembered also that the nature to which we must conform is *human* nature; and that means, in the last resort, the nature of reason. Consequently, it can never be a complete argu-

* *Cf.* Venn's "Empirical Logic," p. 575, where this point is brought out in a very interesting way.

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ment in favor of any line of conduct, that it is in conformity with natural tendencies,—*e.g.*, with the tendencies of self-interest. These tendencies may be evanescent, and may give place to others which are in no degree less natural. A society which is beautifully adjusted to the tendencies of self-interest may be at a much lower level than one that is in conflict with these tendencies, but which is on the way to a higher adjustment on the basis of mutual help. This is, I suppose, sufficiently evident to us now; but it was not so evident to the earlier economists. They saw that there were certain strong tendencies at work in the society around them, and it appeared to them desirable that the whole society should be adjusted to these tendencies, so as to allow them to operate freely. And this is an error from which men are not even yet entirely free. Even now it is common for newspaper writers to speak of the "laws of political economy," as if they laid down rules for our conduct instead of merely analyzing powerful tendencies, to which it may or may not be desirable that we should allow full scope.

What we have to insist on, then, is that while it is no doubt of the greatest importance to analyze the tendencies that are at work around us, we must carefully distinguish this analysis of tendencies both from the statement of what *must* be and from the statement of what *ought* to be. And, from an ethical point of view, we must insist further that the study of tendencies must be accompanied by the question whether they are tendencies towards good or towards evil; and if they are towards evil, either wholly or partially, there must be some effort to ascertain the remedies. It would, I think, be a gross libel on the political economists of the past to say that this has not in any degree been done by them; but I do not think it is going too far to say that they have generally given far more attention to the analysis of tendencies than to the consideration of the desirability of the results to which they are tending, and that they have very often seemed to think that their work was exhausted by such analysis,—that the question what ought to be was fully answered as soon as they had discovered what tends to be. Fire tends to burn down houses; and when

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they are finally demolished there is a state of equilibrium. On the other hand, if we confine the fire in grates and interfere with it by meddlesome hose and buckets, we are not allowing nature to have free course. Nevertheless, we seem to be justified in maintaining that it is not true that fire *must* burn down houses, or that it *ought* to burn them down. The laws of political economy are just like the laws of fire.

(3) The next point on which I wish to touch is the relative importance of different parts of economic science. The chief departments of theoretical economics are generally said to be production, distribution, and consumption, to which are sometimes added exchange (including the theory of value), and the consideration of the sphere of government. Of these main departments it seems to be now admitted that the earlier economists attached relatively too much importance to production. This was largely due, as I have already indicated, to a confusion of means and end. The accumulation of material wealth came to be regarded as an end in itself instead of a mere means to human well-being. This error is, however, now generally recognized, and the problem of distribution receives a fair share of attention. The poverty of individuals is considered as well as the wealth of nations. The action of Professor Marshall, in placing the abolition of poverty, rather than the increase of wealth, as the foremost problem in economics,* seems to me to be in itself, from an ethical point of view, a great step forward.

But if it is important to give the distribution of wealth a prominent place along with production, it is, perhaps, even more important to insist on the prominence of consumption. I have already indicated that this seems to me to be the central point in economic study; and, indeed, this view appears to be gaining ground among recent economists, chiefly, I suppose, through the influence of Jevons.† The neglect of

* "Principles of Economics," pp. 2 and 96.

† Perhaps Jevons, by a natural reaction, emphasized too much the desirability of studying human wants before we go on to study the activities by which these wants are satisfied. For our wants are largely created or modified by our activities; and consequently it would be scarcely possible to study Consumption with-

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this subject among the earlier economists is due, I believe, to the same confusion of means with end to which I have already frequently referred. The accumulation of wealth came to be regarded as an end, and it was almost entirely forgotten that wealth is valuable only in order that it may be consumed. The older economists were so much occupied with the refutation of the "spendthrift fallacy" that they seem to have almost forgotten that there is also an ascetic fallacy. The ideal which they seemed to suggest is, that every one should accumulate capital as rapidly as possible and consume as little as possible. I observe that several writers have recently been led to attack the old economic doctrine on this point; * and certainly it seems to be very one-sided. They did little more than show that consumption is not to be regarded as a good in itself. They did not supply any principles for discriminating between that kind of consumption which is good and that which is evil. Of course there have been moralists who have taught that all consumption is of the nature of an inevitable evil, and that the happiness of life is to be attained by, as far as possible, getting rid of our wants and "making our claims a zero." Even Adam Smith seems to have thought that the poor were to a great extent compensated for their lack of comforts by the fewness of their wants. But this is true only in so far as the wants of the rich are artificial and foolish. To suppose that it is, as a general rule, desirable that our wants should be few is to fall into a common fallacy,—the fallacy of supposing, because a posi-

out reference to Production. See Marshall's "Principles of Economics," Vol. I., pp. 147–8. Jevons's exaggeration on this point may be compared with his somewhat one-sided opposition of the doctrine that Values are determined by Utilities to the older theory, that they are determined by Cost of Production. But in both cases Jevons seems to have been fundamentally right.

* See especially Mummery and Hobson's "Physiology of Industry" and Robertson's "Fallacy of Saving." Attention had, however, been previously directed to this aspect of the subject by Malthus, Dr. Chalmers, Mr. R. S. Moffat ("The Economy of Consumption"), and others. Among recent writings on the importance of the study of Consumption, special reference may be made to a pamphlet by Mr. William Smart on "The Effects of Consumption of Wealth on Distribution" (published by the American Academy of Political and Social Science).

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tive state is partly evil, that a negative state would be all good. It was this fallacy, I believe, which lent its chief interest to the idea of the "noble savage." It was the same that lay at the root of Wordsworth's praise of childhood, and of the Buddhist conception of *Nirvana*. When any condition of life is empty of evil, we easily imagine it to be full of good. But this is a serious error. On the whole, it seems clear that so far from the absence of wants being a compensation for a condition of poverty, Lassalle was rather right in insisting that the "accursed absence of wants" (*verdammte Bedürfnisslosigkeit*) is an aggravation of the evil condition of the poor. To have wants is to have hopes, and to have hopes is to be in the way of progress. It is true that some of the most characteristic movements of recent times—those led, for instance, by the great prophetic teachers, Carlyle, Emerson, Ruskin, Thoreau, and Walt Whitman—involve as one essential element a simplification of our modes of life, and an effort to get back to more natural conditions; and I am very far from wishing to throw any doubt on the wisdom of such endeavors. But if these efforts would involve a restriction of our wants in some respects, they would imply an extension of them in others. What is desired is not to suppress wants, but to direct them wisely.

Now even when the importance of consumption is fully recognized, there is a danger that it may be treated from an inadequate point of view. Recent ethics has advanced from Utilitarianism to the theory of development; but economics shows a certain tendency to remain at the older stand-point; partly, I suppose, because the Utilitarian view furnishes a simpler basis for calculation. Now the prevalence of Utilitarianism has, I think, led to an unsatisfactory method of treating the problem of consumption. Utilitarianism regards the feeling of pleasure which accompanies the satisfaction of our wants as a supreme end in itself; and consequently considers the satisfaction of all sorts of wants as equally desirable in so far as they are productive of equal pleasure. Of course, even from the Utilitarian point of view, some satisfactions are more transient than others, some are less universally distrib-

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uted, and some tend more than others to bring disagreeable accompaniments and consequences in their train. But so long as this is all that is to be said, it is apt to appear that all this may very well be left to the calculation of each individual for himself; and thus the full importance of the study of consumption does not appear. Each one is on the whole the best judge of his own pleasures; and if each one looks after his own, the pleasures of the aggregate will be fairly well secured. The idea of development has helped us to escape from this point of view. It has enabled us to see that it is not merely the pleasure of the aggregate that is to be aimed at, but the satisfaction of those wants whose gratification helps life forward. From this point of view, the study of consumption becomes of much greater importance. It is, I think, only another way of putting the same thing to say that the idea of development suggests a new way of looking at the theory of values. Nearly all the recent speculations on this subject, interesting and important as they are, are, in my judgment, to some extent vitiated by the fact that they have regard only to subjective and not to objective values.* Of course this is right so long as we are concerned only with exchange values, since these are influenced simply by subjective preferences.† But when we are considering the intrinsic values of goods, their worth with reference to human well-being, it is important to remember that objective value is not necessarily identical with subjective. The two would no doubt be ultimately identical if the Utilitarian philosophy were correct; for then the objective value of goods would mean simply their pleasure-giving power; and this would be decided by the preferences of individuals,—though even then, of course, there would be a distinction between the preferences of individuals at a given time and the ultimate pleasure received. There

* The Austrian writers discuss objective as well as subjective values. But they use the term "objective" in a different sense from that in which it is used above.

† But, of course, even subjective preferences are in the long run affected by the intrinsic nature of the objects desired, and by the results which the attainment of these objects entails. Human obstinacy cannot go on forever "kicking against the pricks."

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might be a miscalculation even with regard to pleasure. But if the development theory of ethics is correct, the distinction is still more important; for then objective value has no direct reference to pleasure at all, but to the power of different kinds of objects to promote self-realization.

It is chiefly in connection with this side of economic study that the work of Mr. Ruskin seems to me to have importance. He rightly claims for himself* that he has the advantage over most economists in having a knowledge of art, and thus being able to appreciate one of the supreme ends of life to which economic goods are merely means. The student of ethics might claim a similar advantage. I admit, of course, that the attempt to work out the conception of intrinsic value with any detail would involve us in serious difficulties. But political economy is a serious science, and must not neglect a question merely because it is difficult. If, indeed, any one cares to maintain that the treatment of this question belongs rather to economic philosophy† than to economic science, and that it is desirable to keep these two studies separate, I should not care to dispute this. But the student of economic science must at least remember that his subject is incomplete unless the problem of intrinsic values is dealt with by some one. It is chiefly the entire ignoring of such problems that has brought economic science into disrepute.

In dealing with the problem of consumption from an ethical point of view, it seems clear that there would be two main considerations that would have weight,—(1) the importance of the wants which are satisfied in the act of consumption; (2) the effect of the supply of the means of satisfying these wants upon the life of the producer. With regard to the first of these, it is evident that a complete discussion of it would

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* Preface to "Munera Pulveris." Mr. Ruskin's treatment of the subject, however, seems to me to be vitiated by his theory of "intrinsic value." On this subject I have said all that appears to me necessary in my "Introduction to Social Philosophy," p. 303, *note*. See also Smart's "Introduction to the Theory of Value," p. 4.

† Or to what Mr. Keynes calls *the ethics of political economy*, "Scope and Method of Political Economy," p. 36.

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require a full answer to the question, What are our higher wants, and what are our lower ones? In a general way we might answer this by saying that our higher wants are those objects that we require for the satisfaction of the permanent self as distinguished from perishable desires; for the satisfaction of the social self, as distinguished from the merely individual self; and for the satisfaction of the rational self, as distinguished from the self that has not yet arrived at the clearness of reason,—in general, those objects that contribute to raise the *quality* of our lives, and not merely to add to the *quantity* of our enjoyments. But any attempt to work this out in greater detail would carry us too far afield. Similarly, with regard to the second point, the effect on the life of the producer, this would involve a discussion of the chief ends to be aimed at. Some of these, such as health, leisure, and the like, would be obvious enough. Others, such as the development of artistic tastes and the like, would require fuller discussion. The important thing, however, in my judgment, is merely to recognize the need of such an investigation. Once the need is fully recognized, the working of it out in detail will very soon follow.

(4) This leads us naturally to our concluding point,—the practical application of economic doctrine. Political economy, as Professor Sidgwick has made clear to us, is an art as well as a science; and it is chiefly in its aspect as an art that it comes in contact with ethics.* The theoretical side of economics must always be largely occupied with the consideration of facts and tendencies. The practical side goes beyond this. Having ascertained the facts of economic life, present and past, and having ascertained the direction in which various tendencies are leading us, we have still to ask, Where do we wish to go? To what extent are we to accept the given facts?

* *Cf.* Keynes's "Scope and Method of Political Economy," pp. 58–9. It seems to be a mistake, however, to suppose that it is only in its aspect as an art that political economy is affected by ethics. The question as to the relative importance of different parts of the theoretical study depends on ethical considerations. Moreover, in actual study, it is almost impossible to keep the art and the science entirely separate.

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To what extent are we to try to change them? To what extent are we to allow ourselves to be borne along by the stream of tendencies that is operating upon us? To what extent are we to try to develop other tendencies that will check or destroy those that are already in operation? It is here chiefly that the full importance of the discussion of consumption and distribution comes out. In considering what we ought to aim at, we must be guided, on the one hand, by our view of the values of different goods, and, on the other hand, by our conception of ecònomic justice. The former may be regarded as partly a theoretical inquiry; and as such we have already referred to it. The latter has direct reference to our practical conduct.

Now the inquiry into the nature of economic justice is, of course, an ethical inquiry. Our view of economic justice will depend on our view of men's ethical relations to one another. It will depend largely on the general view which we take of a human society,—whether we regard it as a mere aggregate of individuals or as an organic whole. Here again an important difference will be observed between the Utilitarian philosophy and the philosophy of development. The Utilitarian philosophy, which was the prevalent creed of the last generation, represented society as simply an aggregate of individuals;* and the supreme good of society was simply the aggregate of their pleasures. The philosophy of development, on the other hand, has familiarized us with the idea that society is to be regarded as an organic whole. This has an important influence on our conception of justice. So long as society is regarded as a mere aggregate, it is difficult to recognize any common good. Either the individual is regarded as an independent unit, possessing private property of his own, over which he has exclusive control; or, if any corporate good is acknowledged, it is merely a collective good. We have either what Professor Foxwell calls a "soulless individualism," or an abstract humanitarianism, in which

* It was one of the many inconsistencies of J. S. Mill that he tried to adopt an organic view of society and yet retain hedonism.

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all particular human bonds are overlooked. The unity of the nation, for instance, as List complained, is neglected. So also is the unity of the family, which has been emphasized by Le Play. While such views are dominant, the conceptions of justice which prevail are those that may be roughly described as the individualistic and the socialistic,—the one emphasizing freedom, the other equality. During the early half of this century, the former had a most baleful preponderance, and there seems now to be some danger that there may be a swing to the opposite extreme. The organic view of society seems to me to carry us beyond any such ideals of society. Within an organic system any absolute freedom of the parts is neither possible nor desirable; neither is any absolute equality of the members. The conception of justice which is applicable to such a society is rather that of a reciprocity of services. Every member in such a society must be regarded as at once means and end. To treat any one as mere means would be to treat him as a merely economic good, or mere thing. As a person he must be treated as an absolute end. But since every one is thus to be regarded as end, it follows that no one can be regarded *merely* as end. If any one were the absolute end, all others would be reduced to mere means. Each one must, consequently, be regarded as reciprocally means and end; and it is chiefly by the application of this idea of reciprocity that we must judge of the justice or injustice of social systems. Whenever we find that in any social system certain individuals are treated merely as means or merely as ends, then we may say at once that there is injustice. It has often been found convenient in economic discussions to take up certain terms that are current in a somewhat looser sense in ordinary discourse, and to apply them to a more special purpose; and I believe it may be well to follow this method at the present point. There are two words that are very often used to describe the evils that are specially to be feared under individualistic and socialistic régimes respectively,—viz., the words exploitation and pauperization. I propose to use these terms to express violations of the principle of reciprocity. We may say that a man is exploited when he is used

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as a mere means, and pauperized when he is treated as a mere end. This use of these terms involves, of course, a considerable extension of their ordinary meaning. From this point of view, it is not merely the imperfectly-trained and imperfectly-organized wage-receivers who are in danger of exploitation, but also the over-pressed business-man whom the struggle for existence hinders from self-development, and in general every one who is made to feel, in Emerson's phrase, that "things are in the saddle, and ride mankind." And what we must aim at here is, as Saint-Simon put it, to get rid of the exploitation of men by combining to exploit nature. For nature may be used as a mere means of social advancement, but not man. Similarly, from this point of view, it is not merely the recipients of out-door relief who are in danger of being pauperized, but every one for whom a life of enjoyment and independence is made possible without social service. Of course, I am far from meaning to imply that under any conceivable social system either of these evils could be entirely abolished. There will always, I imagine, be some who have to sacrifice a certain degree of self-development for the sake of the general good, and there will always be some who receive benefits from society out of all proportion to the services which they render. All that we can reasonably aim at is some not intolerable approximation to that reciprocity of services to which I have been referring. How this is to be affected, it is not my present business to consider. I only call attention to the two great economic imperatives—"Thou shalt not exploit" and "Thou shalt not pauperize"—as indicating two of the most important points at which economic science is touched by ethics.

In order to prevent misconception, however, I may add a few words in illustration of the view which I wish to inculcate on this point. I suppose to the majority of us in recent times the way in which the doctrine of the reciprocity of services, to which I have been referring, has been most forcibly brought home, has been by the teachings of Carlyle and Ruskin. These writers have emphasized the evils of a competitive system, in which the mere mechanical *nexus* of cash-payment

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prevails,* and have pointed us back for example to those earlier methods of service in which there was a definite recognition of reciprocal obligations. Now perhaps what I mean by reciprocity of services will be made clearer when I say that this view of Carlyle and Ruskin does not seem to me to be entirely correct. I am afraid that under the older system the reciprocity tended to be "all on one side." The hiring of a man's services for life—which Carlyle regarded as the ideal method—inevitably means, even under the most favorable conditions, that the person who is hired sinks into little more than a mere means. He gives himself over, body and soul, to the control of another; and, however generous that other may be, he cannot alter the nature of the relationship, so as to turn it into one of genuine reciprocity. The result of this whole system is to lead, in the case of kings, to a view like that of Louis XIV.,—"The state, I am the state,"—or, in the case of subordinate masters, to a similar view,—"The household, I am the household." The *nexus* of cash-payment is an advance upon this, in so far as it substitutes a definite obligation on each side for an absolute surrender on the one hand and an indefinite *noblesse oblige* on the other. For this reason, while I think it important that moral relations should be in every possible way fostered between those who are brought into industrial connection with one another, I do not think it at all desirable that we should return to a reliance on these. Liberty may require eternal vigilance; but I believe it is worth the price. When I speak of reciprocity of services, then, I do not mean to advise a return to those forms of industrial and social life that are extolled by Carlyle and Ruskin. What I mean is rather this. The cash *nexus* is an advance in so far as it frees men from arbitrary relations and establishes definite obligations; but it is unsatisfactory in so far as it leads us to treat men merely as means and not as the absolute end. When the master is only a pay-master and the servant is only a hireling, *both* are exploited. Neither is treated as a human being, but only as an instrument for the

* See especially Carlyle's "Past and Present," Book III., chap. x.

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advantage of another. But the remedy for this, I think, is not to abolish the cash *nexus*, but to establish higher and better *nexuses* along with it. We must recognize—even Carlyle, in his soberer moments recognized—that the *nexus* of absolute masterdom and slavery is no longer possible, and that other small *nexuses* have gone along with it. The *nexuses* of modern times must be of a larger nature,—co-operative societies, religious associations, unions and combinations for mutual help. Such associations must make it their aim to secure that the contract of cash-payment is formed on an equitable basis, and that it is honestly carried out; but in addition to this they must endeavor to secure that the parties to the contract shall be treated as men,—*i.e.*, as ends in themselves,—and not merely as instruments. Economic conditions are made for man, not man for economic conditions; and wherever the conditions of industrial life are found to interfere with the development of men as men, attempts must be made to readjust them. This is the aim, for instance, of such schemes as that of Mr. Herbert Mills or of General Booth. These men perceive that, under the present social conditions, under the system of the cash *nexus*, there are many who are continually falling out of connection; and they are convinced that those who thus lose their *nexus* do not thereby cease to be human. They still remain ends in themselves, and cannot be cast aside like rusty instruments or machines that have been superseded. I do not wish here to pronounce any judgment on these schemes. They may be wise or foolish: to a large extent I believe this can be decided only by trial. But they are an indication of the perennial conviction in men's minds that "a man's a man for a' that;" and that under no conditions is he to be treated only as means.

This illustration ought, I think, to make clear what I mean by saying that every one is to be treated both as means and as end. I must admit that the application of this principle is not easy. It is not obvious at a glance under what conditions a man is being treated too exclusively as means or as end; nor can it be made at once apparent by the accumulation of statistics or by the application of the integral calculus. But I am not

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sure that it is altogether to be regretted that in such matters it should be necessary for us to exercise our reason as well as our understanding, our faculty as human beings as well as our faculty as calculating machines. I admit also that the principle to which I refer is not so clear and obvious as the idea of abstract liberty or abstract equality. It includes these ideas, in as far as either slavery or extreme inequality of conditions reduces some to the condition of mere means to the advancement of others; but when we look at the matter from this point of view, the test of mere liberty or mere equality cannot be immediately applied. We need not, therefore, greatly wonder or greatly complain that the early economists, as well as the early writers on politics and the early socialists, preferred to deal with more abstract principles. It is easier to speak about the greatest happiness of the greatest number or the natural right of freedom; it is easier to say, From every one according to his talents and to every talent according to its works; it is easier to draw curves of demand and supply, and discuss the incidence of taxation than it is to view society as an organic whole, and endeavor to secure that every member of it shall be fairly treated. Abstract thought is easy; concrete thought is hard. But it cannot be doubted that the time has now come to think concretely on these matters. The abstractions of our predecessors have their value: they have made possible a more perfect survey of the whole. But it would be fatal to content ourselves any longer with their partial views. We must endeavor, as far as possible, "to see life steadily and see it whole."

In concluding these rough notes, I must apologize for their inadequacy. But, indeed, however well such a treatment as this might have been done, I suspect it would necessarily leave us with a certain feeling of dissatisfaction. Economic questions have a direct and pressing practical interest; and those who are keenly conscious of the immediate need of economic progress and reform are apt to be a little impatient of any general statements that cannot be directly applied. With this impatience I have a considerable degree of sympathy. I confess, however, that I am optimistic enough to think

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that discussions of this sort are not without utility. The social evils under which we suffer are, I believe, due to a very large extent to an inadequate sense of the greatness and comprehensiveness of the social problem. So soon as people generally are aroused to a full consciousness of this, I have a great faith in the capacity of the human intellect to deal with the problem in a satisfactory way. It will require the cōoperation of many hands. It will require detailed studies of the bearing of economic questions on all sides of social and industrial life. And these problems will require to be worked out with the same strenuous application, and the same scientific impartiality, as that which has already been devoted to the narrower questions of production and exchange. It seems to me that there are abundant signs that a consciousness of the need of such study has already been awakened,* and that there are many who are both able and willing to devote themselves to it. To the good effects of such study I look forward with the most confident hope. We have never been altogether without our prophets and moral enthusiasts; and certainly we have never been without our men of the world who understood the state of the market. If our prophets will become men of the world, perhaps the men of the world also may become prophets. I have a strong conviction that human nature at bottom leans to virtue's side, when it is rightly approached. Want of clearness with regard to the objects at which we ought ultimately to aim, and with regard to the way in which ethical principles are to be applied in the concrete affairs of life, is largely responsible for the shortcomings of our modern civilization. The immediate claims of men's selfish interests have always a certain clearness and definiteness; and unless there is something equally clear to oppose to them they are sure to be victorious. It has been too much the way of economists to give additional clearness to self-interest, and to leave the larger interests as obscure as

* Evidenced by the popularity of the opinions of Carlyle and Ruskin, by the increasing influence of the Historical School, by the attention to the work of Le Play, by the awakening both of the English and Roman Catholic Churches to the consciousness of social problems, and in many other ways.

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before. To remedy this must be the work of those prophetic men of the world to whom I have referred. There seems to me to be abundant evidence that their work has begun. I do not by any means think that their task will be a light one. But it *can* be done, and I believe it *must* be done. So far as I can see, there is nothing of equal importance to be done in the present generation. In the mean time, it is perhaps worth while to remind ourselves from time to time, as I have been endeavoring to do in this paper, of the nature of the problems to which the study of these prophetic men of the world is to be devoted.

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SELF-DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-SURRENDER.

IT is my purpose in the following pages to discuss self-development as an end of conduct, and self-surrender as a necessary means to the realization of that end. Two questions will, therefore, be raised, and some attempt made to suggest the answers to them. (1) How far and in what sense is self-development a part of the moral end, if, indeed, it be such part at all? (2) How far and in what sense, if any, is self-surrender a factor in the process of development, so that he who would become himself as all that he might be must first be able to deny himself as merely that which he is?

The second question is at once the more interesting, the more important, and the more stimulating, because of the greater obscurity of the paths by which it leads. That growth is to some extent self-abnegation is indeed evident. We need only remember how necessary it is to control one strong emotion or sink temporarily one opinion in order that another, equally though not so emphatically our own, may have a chance of life. Persons who cannot do this continue in their narrow-mindedness, and their development stagnates. Such patent observations as these suggest, though but dimly,

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a wide-reaching principle of development into the ramifications of which it will be our business presently to inquire.

But first consider briefly the ulterior question.

I. THE ETHICAL CHARACTER OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT AS AN END.

This is a question that may very properly be raised, for although not only self-development, but self in every form, is a very real and efficient end for all of us, it by no means follows that it is a moral end in the sense of being an object of duty. The idea of duty to self has never seemed to be a very stable one. Most plain men probably believe on the whole that no such duty exists, or at most discover the idea of it only when they want to defend themselves from some unwelcome external claim.

The plain man's idea of duty is, in fact, that it consists in those acts which are due from him to others—to his world; while from the overstrain of too much duty he instinctively protects himself by his natural sane egoism. The more reflective man's moral earnestness shows itself by requiring that a place shall be found for this necessary sane egoism, or instinct of self-preservation, in the general scheme of moral order. But if any man's wife, mother, or doctor wants him to do or abstain from doing something *as a duty he owes to himself*, it will be necessary to prove to him that he owes it to his world as proper care of himself for its service. It is generally easy enough—often too easy—to prove this. No forced idea of duty *to* self is needed to show that a man not only may but ought to take care of himself and improve himself, by wholesome amusement as well as in other ways more directly conducive to his spiritual and physical benefit. The duty he owes to the world through self as the world's servant is only too fatally evident, and earnestness of conscience and fairness of mind are needed to save most of us from overestimating it; though the danger of underestimation is to some temperaments a very real one.

We find, then, instead of that idea of duty to self in which good people have sometimes tried to believe, the idea that it is a duty to be and to keep one's self in the highest possible

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state of efficiency. Now, this is the idea of self-development and self-preservation as a duty,—a duty which we owe not to ourselves, but to that world the service of which is the definition of duty.

Thus, my health, my happiness, my development, and all that makes for my efficiency, may become a considerable part of my duty as well as an important object of my natural desire. The clear perception of this truth tends to the purification of the natural desires through their identification with the moral end. This leads to the habitual application of the ethical standard to our scheme of personal joys; wholesome improving pleasures of all kinds become weighted with a sense of good,—of actual right-doing,—the absence of which from pleasures of the opposite kind makes itself conspicuous to feeling. All the pleasures that are vulgar, degrading, dissipating, wasteful of energy or perverting it,—these are known as light-weights and cannot hold the scale. It is not, indeed, that we choose our ways of pleasure, under ordinary circumstances, with deliberate intent to combine improvement and enjoyment. We do things every day, not because they are good for us, or good for others, but because we like them. But the earnest-minded are distinguished from the frivolous by liking rather those personal good things which have permanent value for body or soul. And the frivolous mind under good guidance trains itself to this higher plane of liking by deliberate intent to improve its talents and tastes.

A side-issue suggests itself at this point. Must a good man be always doing something which more or less remotely can be shown to be his duty? Supposing it agreed that self is not an object of duty, except as the maintenance and improvement of self is due to society, then duty falls into two parts,—(1) the service of others, (2) the maintenance and improvement of self. Is there any part of legitimate conduct—legitimate from the highest and most exigeant point of view—lying outside this double circle of duty? In other words, may the good man take a holiday from being positively good and enjoy himself simply, though he neither needs nor sees any prospect of needing recreation. May I spend August in

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Switzerland, although I am perfectly well, or give myself up to skating in the Christmas holidays, not because I require fresh air and exercise, but because there is ice, it being assumed, however, that there is no positive duty in the way?

To ask these questions is to ask whether in a proper ethical scheme of conduct there is to be any room for play, distinguishing play from recreation as having no permanent end in view, the only end being the enjoyment of the player.

Now, it must be admitted that many earnest people are growing to doubt not only the morality, but even the possibility, of pure play. Hence their resort to games that have a sham object when they require recreation. Having lost touch of the pure pleasures of exercise, they make some pretence of being in earnest about doing or catching something. There is surely a lesson to be learned here, and the lesson is all in favor of preserving our instincts of play. Recreation is needed—is part of duty. Those who preserve their simple playfulness—their joy in wholesome pleasures for the pleasures' sake—can get recreation easily and with the greatest economy, both of money and time. The elaborate apparatus of sham objects is not required by them. Therefore it is economical in more ways than one that human nature should preserve in due measure its playfulness. But this cannot be preserved without an allowance of pure play to all of us. Therefore we may play sometimes. The moral law permits play, because play is part of the scheme by which, in the long run, human energy is maximized. Nor can we allow it to count for nothing that happiness is increased when merriment is abundant. As to the amount of play that shall be allowed, common sense must decide this in each case by the application of the good common rule, that a man should have a holiday when he has fairly earned it, and not otherwise.

Nevertheless, there will generally be at the bottom of the good man's mind a constant, though unobtrusive, idea that the play which he allows himself is, in all its many forms, a part of his scheme of self-preservation and self-improvement, and that these are part of the service which he owes to humanity. The need that he should perform that service becomes

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the more evident when we reflect that, while the development of human faculty is certainly an end to be attained, each person must always be the main agent in securing his own development, and even in preserving his own health. Other persons can help, but less than they are apt to imagine. Each man works out his own salvation, whether of bodily vigor, or intellectual ability, or moral character. It is one particular piece of service that he has to perform. As regards its importance relative to that other part of service which is aimed directly at the good of others, questions arise which are by no means quite easy to settle. Is it better to be doing beneficent work in the world regardless of possible deteriorating effects in self, or better to be so acting under all circumstances as to produce the best results in the cultivation of one's own character? A very old theoretic controversy rages round this point, but here it is not theoretic but practical ethics that concerns us. Which is for each individual the more right course of these two,—should he aim at perfection of character by uprightness in his own walk, or should he aim at the greatest possible beneficence of conduct?

Let us first remark that whatever the *answer* which reason gives, different persons will always *respond* to this question differently, according to their differences of disposition. The mind of objective bent is impatient with the subjectivity—the implied self-consciousness—of the one standard: being drawn instinctively to the interest of conduct and its effects, it is to all intents and purposes oblivious of its own character. The subjective mind, on the other hand, is so keenly alive to differences of tone and level in itself that the idea of placing beneficence of result before elevation of motive shocks and puzzles it. The two belong to different ethical types, and each has its own proper method of moral growth and moral service. The first does righteously by acting rightly, the second acts rightly by doing righteously. Each obeys a law of its own nature which the other should respect, and each is liable to error by inattention to the reasonable considerations which are instinct in the very nature of the other. Each, therefore, needs to listen to the *answer* which reason gives.

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Reason says, first of all, that "both is best," that no action is *perfect* which is not the most beneficent possible under the circumstances, and also the most productive of inner gain of righteousness. This assumes, of course, that the two standards are so much in harmony that when most completely fulfilled they are both fulfilled, and this is implied in the more generally accepted common-sense view that man's character is adapted to his duty in general—that the most beneficent kind of character is the best. So beneficence cannot be maximized in the long run unless righteousness is also, and *vice versa.* And the best is best by both tests, as has been said.

But this does not carry us very far. The perfect action does not puzzle us, but we are puzzled when the outer and inner spheres of duty seem to diverge and conflict. What does reason say to our two disputants here? It seems plain enough that she agrees with both. She says to the one, "Certainly, it is of the beneficence of the act you should think first, because duty is service and service is beneficence; only be careful to know what beneficence is, which is not so easy." And to the other she says, "You also are right; the beneficent act, however wisely chosen, is not good, if you allow yourself to be made morally the worse by doing it. Your care not to be made worse will save you from many a hasty error in the choice of sham beneficences, which are evils in disguise; but its value does not end here. Through all the difficult course of conduct, the claims of character must be upheld, else by the loss of character there will be less beneficence, less duty-doing, less service in the end."

How, then, can the claims of character be sacrificed to those of conduct, when the occasion that demands this sacrifice occurs, and yet character be saved? All depends on the spirit in which the concession is made. This should be a spirit of conscious sacrifice and loss, with a real pang of remorse underlying the conviction of a right choice made. The generous man may be called on to close his hand, the merciful man to harden his heart, and even the truthful man to draw a veil over truth; and evil consequences to character will result, if these things are done in a spirit of gay self-

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satisfaction. It is in the pain and trouble of them that salvation lies. Sister Simplice, in "Les Misérables," tells a lie to save Jean Valjean from his relentless pursuers. It would generally be wrong to do as she did, but in this case it was right, and the good sister had the moral genius to see this. She is herself known as the nun who had never lied, and her word is taken. But we can imagine the horror of that lie to a soul so much bent on preserving its truthfulness. She has done right and knows it; but she does it on her knees at prayer: perhaps she prayed always afterwards that she might be forgiven. It is a sacrifice,—probably the most difficult she has made in her life, though she makes it without hesitation. To such a pure, unsullied soul the telling of a lie is like the amputation of a limb, like parting with a precious part of its own nature. The good sister's excellent sense of right *doing* could not restore the perfect truthfulness she had lost: a lie *had been* impossible to her, and now it was accomplished. It is true she had gained something in her loss: she had discovered in herself and brought out a higher power of self-sacrifice than she had ever known before,—a keener insight into right. But this gain was itself dependent on her sense of loss, or the spirit which made her conscious of the stain on her white robe incurred by the act of just protection required of her.

The whole matter seems to stand somewhat thus: good conduct must be righteous as well as right; but when objective and subjective claims conflict, the former, other things being equal, take the lead. The moral agent, however, in making his choice, takes careful heed to his threatened moral loss; he does not suffer it lightly, but realizes it with pain; he is conscious of it as inevitable loss, a loss causing at once condemnation and approval by conscience. The working of this spirit within him, if it be earnest and deep enough, checks the loss and involves a gain, a growth of character, a deepening of moral motive, a widening of moral insight. He comes out of the conflict scarred, indeed, and saddened, but wiser and better on the whole. Thus the right conduct that conflicts with righteous character may, but only by bring-

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ing us through the furnace of affliction, tend to elevate and strengthen character on the whole. Then, and then only, can it be called good.

And now, having sufficiently considered both the claim of self-development to be regarded as a duty and the nature of that duty, let us turn to the second part of our subject.

II. SELF-SURRENDER AS A MEANS TO SELF-DEVELOPMENT.

We ought to cultivate ourselves. It does not, however, follow that, although the absence of moral deterioration should be a *condition* of all our activity, self-culture itself should form any large part of our conscious aim. The direct attempt to make it such is apt to end, partially at least, in failure. The spectator may watch the skilled mechanic at work in amazed admiration of his manual skill; but he acquired that skill by concentration of his mind on the thing to be done rather than on the skill. Another may admire the intellectual power of the accomplished student, but the student has certainly been thinking of the knowledge he desires rather than of the self-culture he attains. And this principle of objectivity in development is no less, rather perhaps more, true of moral than of intellectual and manual skill. We become better mainly, though not wholly, by seeking to *do* the right deed, and we should fail certainly if we were to aim at our own betterness only. Self-surrender in this sense of absorption in the object chosen is not a rival principle of life co-ordinate with self-development. When carried out effectively and systematically it is development.

The athlete furnishes the most marked apparent exception to this law of subjective development by attention to objective ends. So far as he has a permanent end in view, that end is the acquisition of bodily skill. This is inevitable, because the effect of such deeds as his is in itself transitory except for the gain of skill. But, as a rule, the athlete while at work does not think of this permanent end, but of the immediate effect only, the pleasure of exercise or the satisfaction of the hard deed done, and is as indifferent at the time to the improvement of his faculties as the artist absorbed in

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his picture or the student poring over his books. So even the athlete is not a real exception.

These examples will suffice to illustrate the principle that in general the man develops his faculties by attention to the natural ends of their activity, rather than by attention to them. He develops himself by forgetting himself, by giving himself up to something not himself. And yet, it may be said, he will go wrong—he will indeed fail to secure the ends he proposes—if he forgets himself too much, if he forgets himself in the sense of omitting to secure the end as a real expression of his own activity. This danger is most evident in the pursuit of knowledge. The impatient, unconscientious student contents himself with the acquisition or apparent acquisition of somebody else's knowledge, which, not having thought through for himself, he uses as confidently as if he had really convinced himself of its truth. The conscientious student, on the other hand, while he makes himself acquainted also with the thoughts of others, re-thinks all matter of knowledge for himself. Thus he produces for himself and expresses to others genuine fresh knowledge recast in the moulds of his own mind. He is sincere, therefore he is original; for this recasting of thought, and the issue of all thought in forms of expression fresh from the personal mint, is the marked characteristic of the original man. "The merit of originality," says Carlyle, "is not novelty, it is sincerity."

It is easy, however, to see that the motive here is not desire for the best intellectual development, but rather earnestness in the desire to make knowledge truly one's own. Nevertheless, it is only thus that the pursuit of knowledge secures true intellectual development. And at this point it is well to note the analogy between such ends as knowledge and personal righteousness of motive, since both refer to mental objects which are yet distinguished from the efficiency of the activities which they employ. Thus the expression of moral character, as well as of intellectual knowledge, may have the stamp of originality which marks the activity of a mind that expresses itself, rather than some other, in conduct and in speech.

Originality in this sense is an evident essential of sound

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development, and objectivity of motive is implied even in it. Let us now turn to that opposite and supplementary essential of *docility*, or the power of genuine self-surrender, about which so much has been implied and so little said as yet. Concentration on objects not one's self is one form of self-surrender, and is involved in all personal progress; but by itself it is not enough to secure that the progress shall be on all sides, bringing to light the hidden germs of character as well as making more conspicuous those that are well marked. We are each prone to choose as objects of our labor those subjects of knowledge and purposes of conduct which most attract us in our natural unregenerate state, and which therefore draw out most in us those qualities in which we are already strong. Thus we are apt to become only that which we were in any case pretty sure to become; we *emphasize*, but we do not develop ourselves. Hence the importance of motives under which, for the sake of something or some one else, we undertake work which does not in itself attract us much. Under such motives we follow, not our own instincts which express the stronger self in us, but the lead given to the weaker and otherwise perishing self by ideas of use and duty or by sympathy with friends. Self-surrender proper and its functions in self-development is the central thought to which I wish to draw attention.

When family claims require one of us to put aside work for which he has a taste, in order that some necessary but uninteresting service may be done, the self-surrender develops self just where self is weak; and it may be that even the particular taste for the moment denied may benefit by the enlargement of horizon that comes to those who do not hesitate thus within reason to give themselves up to the lead of their environment. So, also, when sympathy with a friend and interest in his or her ways of life and thought induce us to take up occupations and subjects which do not in themselves attract, we are the gainers by the opening up of possibilities within us of which we knew not. We surrender our mind in feeling or in thought to the lead of another mind, and, becoming in a secondary sense that other, *as well as*

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ourselves, we win a broadening of our humanity by all that the others is and ours is not.

These acts of self-surrender are always going on about and within, and happy are they to whom they come with ease and grace. We know their quality under various names; they are responsive and come to the rescue whenever there is need; they are docile and readily give themselves up to learn from any book or any teacher, sinking their own preconceptions and habits with ease for the time; they are accessible to ideas, however conveyed; they are apt to understand the views and feelings of others, not because they are clever, but because they have this power of giving the mind to another and so becoming the other; they have a gift for friendship and make delightful friends, especially of the kind that listens well, that receives all the confidences and strengthens by pure sympathy. Most of us have had, or have, or will have, some friend or friends to whom we can be all this, but there are some for whom their friendships generally are so characterized.

And all the while this self-surrendering, impressionable, docile, accessible being grows, if also a morally earnest, and therefore original, being, from less to more, becoming, on the one hand, the counterpart of his world of circumstance, because he never shrinks from doing what has to be done, or from thinking and feeling what has to be thought and felt, and becoming, on the other hand, so far a completely developed human being as to be typical or representative, not of the average, but of the whole of his entire social world—a sort of concrete universal. Strong minds, if they *can* do it, surrender themselves thus without fear; they are so sure of their originality that they dare to be docile.

The effect of this self-surrendering habit of mind on the acquisition of knowledge and growth of intellect is specially marked. It is impossible to understand a difficult writer, or one far removed from our own point of view, if we insist on maintaining ourselves throughout at our own centre of thought. An author must be read, a thinker must be studied, in the first place, from his point of view. The mind of the reader must be given to him to follow his lead, opened as wide as it will

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open to receive his thought, cleared for the time from obstructive preconceptions, however vital, while all in our own minds that helps us to grasp the thinker's meaning is brought into prominence. Great patience is sometimes required for this task, and it is often necessary to read a book through once or twice rapidly, though with care, preserving throughout the most humble and even reverential attitude of mind. The kingdom of knowledge has to be received in the spirit of a little child, and thus things hid from the wise and prudent may be revealed unto babes. A critical habit of mind is invaluable, but in early stages of knowledge it is at least as important to be able to put it, in the negative sense, aside. It is, of course, a much cleverer thing to read the difficult author, even as a beginner, in a carping, critical spirit, to gauge all his ideas and test his arguments by comparison with our own ideas and measurement with our logical foot-rule. And it is perfectly true that we have not finished understanding him, have not made the truth of his knowledge our own, until we have either put him through this sifting process, or thought out the matter for ourselves. Nevertheless, the first step is to see what he means, and to see it in the most favorable light. This is what I imagine some "smart" people with unnaturally sharp critical intellect so very often fail to do.

The best well-known example of this gift for intellectual self-surrender is to be found in John Stuart Mill's account of his own growth in thought and knowledge.

Turn now to the moral aspect,—the side of character. In our day many doubt altogether the value, though they grudgingly admit the necessity, of the old-fashioned and once over-praised virtue of obedience. The republicanism of political life has affected life in all quarters; obedience *was* over-preached and indiscriminately praised. *We* are undergoing the effects of a reaction, and obedience is apt to be valued at less than its worth. For what is it? It is the surrender of will, and, within certain well-marked limits, the surrender of practical judgment to the guidance of another. The limits should be well-marked, no doubt, so that the act of obedience should never involve a breach with the prescriptions

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of conscience. The old principle that rebellion against the constituted authorities is only justifiable when for conscience' sake is a sound one. We are not here, however, concerned with the whole question of obedience, but only with the fact that the surrender of will and judgment which it implies gives to the weak part of the latent practical self a chance of development that could not well be otherwise secured.

It is, of course, evident that the source of authority ought to be a good source, and scarcely less evident that for the best effects, it should represent all those principles of action which are most feebly represented in the will of the person who obeys—that sovereign and subject should be supplementary to each other, working together in the subject will the accomplishment of the whole. The position of true, willing, and self-transforming obedience is, moreover, impossible unless the source of authority is felt by its subjects to be generally good and reasonable. Otherwise, it is not only founded on force, but ends in force, and is apt to work transformations of character in a direction opposite to that towards which it points: resistance occurs, instead of surrender.

Besides authority recognized as good, there is influence,—the influence of strong affection or of admiration,—compelling obedience in the most effective, because the most delightful, way. Affection makes a pleasure of even that blind obedience which, without reason or even against reason, may make another's will stronger in me than my own. How this is possible let the psychologist determine. It has probably something to do with that fixation or fascination of the attention by which indications of desire given us by another fill our consciousness to the exclusion of those proper to ourselves. The danger that may lie in friendship of this absorbing sort needs no emphasis. It is dangerous to be under the influence of another if that other is not good,—if the influence is likely to negative the right in us or bring to light the wrong. The remedy for *this* danger lies in a right choice of friends before we allow them to be influences. But, though still within limits,—the limits prescribed by a conscience stronger than any influence is allowed to become,—there is no danger but

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a certainty of gain in yielding to the influence of a well-chosen friend, proved before choosing to be worthy of trust and pledged by implication to observe the limits of conscience.

The principle that friends should be supplementary in character and tastes here suggests itself in an interesting light as having ethical significance. Each by his influence develops that which is weak in the other. We can all find examples in our own experience,—subjects we should never have studied, interests we should never have had, tastes we should never have cultivated, habits of mind that would be strange to us now, had it not been for the influence of some friend to whose thought and will and feeling we had partially surrendered ourselves for the time, and who, though for the most part probably like-minded with ourselves, was strong in some points where we were weak. The happiest relations are doubtless those where each is conscious of using worthy influence and being worthily influenced, and these are the healthiest relations also—healthiest for both. For, though we can hardly call it dangerous to be always under good influence, it is certainly enervating for the one as well as stagnating for the other when the relation is never reversed. Slavery, unrelieved by occasional flashes of mastery, may be a happy, but cannot be a very wholesome, state.

It is more difficult to understand, yet the fact seems indubitable, that even our emotional life, no less than that of the intellect and will, can take on new forms of development because of contact with other minds. We can come to feel, without definitely thinking or judging, as another feels in any set of circumstances rather than as we would naturally feel ourselves. We see the signs and take on the emotional state, which may be an altogether new experience, and therefore implies development for us. Thus we may learn new ways of feeling, may develop the narrow round of emotion that is normally actual in us to include much more which, but for our power of sympathy and willingness to surrender, we should never know. To resist this influence is to resist the grace of human nature working through others in us by

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opening latent springs of feeling in our own hearts. To yield is to surrender the emphasized, limited, familiar self in favor of a wider self, including elements sometimes so strange and unfamiliar that we take it, at first sight, for an outer influence only. To surrender in this sense is to develop.

Yet there is need of reserve. Miscellaneous self-surrender to persons, and even for purposes, is a sort of dissipation, and, if it means an aptness to come under the stronger kinds of influences easily, and to change them often, it is revolting and contemptible. Really strong influences should be rare,—very rare,—and choice; and the minor influences, which may be taken from all for what they are worth, should hold their own with a light hand only.

Nor is it merely with regard to the *number* of strong influences that there is need for reserve. The need is no less as regards degree and kind. The importance of wise choice, and the duty of maintaining the supremacy of the moral ideals over all influence, have already been noticed. But even this is not all. Apart from actual breaches with conscience it behooves us to exercise reserve in self-surrender at all points, just so far as is required by the condition that we should be true to ourselves,—that in all our deeds, thoughts, and feelings we should even in becoming one with others still express ourselves, new self and old self, as a whole. In each of us who is worth much there is a hard rock of central character, not lightly to be displaced, not easily dissolved, and all growth is by accretion to, rather than destruction of, this. In the end the nucleus of character may indeed be so overgrown and changed as to be scarcely recognizable; but the process of change is generally slow, and in strong natures does not take place without resistance.

The practical rule is not hard to understand. Influences and impressions should be allowed to flow in freely upon us, provided we can take them and make them part of ourselves, an extension of the self that we already are. And in all that we do and say as ours we should express *ourselves*, unassimilated impressions dwelling with us silently till they become our own. But no fear of altering the present self should

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be entertained, if the alteration be not for the worse. Self strengthens itself—its limited self—by absorption in the interests that draw it most powerfully; but if it would grow from less to more the means lie in devotion to objective ends, and in surrender to worthy influences balanced by self-respect.

Self-development and self-surrender are not rival principles of the good life requiring the mediation of a shadowy third to keep them balanced and to make them one. But self-surrender is the chief means by which development is accomplished in a well-maintained self.

SOPHIE BRYANT.

LONDON.

THE PRINCIPLES AND CHIEF DANGERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITY.*

No one will suppose that I intend to pass an opinion on institutions or methods of administration in the United States. I hope, before I leave this country, to see something of what is being done in Boston and New York, at least. But to-day I propose to illustrate the principles of charity organization purely by London experience. It is for my hearers to judge how far anything that I say has an application that can interest them.

The principle of our work, as I understand it, is the faith in character,—the faith, if we like, in the ideal. Only it must be faith in that ideal which is the essence and controlling force of the real; not in fancies and sentiments which are simply a failure to cope with reality.

Let us plunge into our subject by asking what our title means. "Charity," it will be said, is alms-giving; "organization of charity," then, must mean "arrangements for the distribution of alms."

This is just what we do *not* mean. "Charity" for us means

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* A lecture given before the School of Applied Ethics at Plymouth, Massachusetts, in the summer of 1892, by Bernard Bosanquet, M.A., LL.D., of London.

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"neighborly service;" "organization of charity," therefore, means "concerted action in neighborly service."

The organization of charity, thus understood, involves two essential factors:

First, there must be a high and definite conception of human welfare, in so far as it can be affected by men's attempts to help their less fortunate fellows.

Secondly, there must be concerted action or division of labor in the light of this idea, and with a view to realizing it, between all persons and agencies that are attempting to do neighborly service.

In other words, it is the general principle of "organization" always to work on a plan, and that a plan based upon respect for character. The great danger is in not having any plan, and therefore interfering with other people's lives,—a most grave responsibility,—without a distinct conception of any good to be done them on the whole. Nothing undermines character so much as these chance interferences. I may illustrate this principle by the external phenomenon, observed more than twenty years ago when the London Charity Organization Society was founded, that enough and probably far too much money was being spent in relief, apparently with the result of increasing degradation to the poor. The idea of the founders was, so far as money was concerned at all, to avoid raising more, but to try if the existing expenditure could not be made to do good instead of harm.

Now, I will try to give a picture of what we mean by "organization;" and I will begin with the work of a "District Committee." There are thirty-nine District Committees in London, one or more for each Poor Law Union; the Society consists of the federation of these committees, with a central office at 15 Buckingham Street, of which I will speak later.

Organization presupposes elements to be organized. What are the elements which we find in an average London district, with a fair mixture of rich and poor?

In the district which I have in my eye there is a population of 90,000. Judging by Mr. Charles Booth's figures, there would be in this population some 3000 "very" poor (say 700

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families) and some 18,000 "poor" (4000 families). Within these (4 to 5000 families, but not including a very large proportion of them at a time) is the field of operations of charity. The comfortable working-class, numbering some 50,000, would only come in its way very occasionally and with respect to its doubtful members, or by unusual misfortune. Operating upon this "poor" population, in all sorts of ways, there are such agencies as these: Four old-established benevolent societies, enjoying the confidence of the resident tradesmen, whose charity is largely done through these societies; six parishes of the Established Church, all of which do relief work by different methods and to different amounts, and some of which have small charitable endowments; three or four Nonconformist organizations, attending in some degree at least to their own poor; and two powerful Roman Catholic churches with the charities belonging to them, and with a branch of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. There are three hospitals in the district, and three more very large ones within easy reach of it. There is a free dispensary (charitable), a newly-established provident dispensary, and a settlement of the district nurses who go out to nurse the poor gratuitously in their own homes. Of course, there are immense numbers of charitable ladies and others who give alms privately, and, in addition to all the rest, there is the tremendous machinery of the Poor Law, with its workhouse and well-equipped hospital ("infirmary") in the centre of the district, and its schools in the country to which destitute children can be sent, and with its out-door relief, medical relief, and dispensary—all under the authority of a Board of Guardians, elected by the inhabitants for this purpose. Then there is the system of publicly-inspected primary schools (whether "board schools" or "church schools") through which much charitable work is done, both bad and good; and there are also the very numerous charities of all sorts and kinds, which, without being especially local, are accessible to the poor of this district as to all the poor of the metropolis.

If such are the elements to be organized, what is the danger in the absence of organization? How does mischief arise

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from these all going their own way, regardless of each other?

We may describe the mischief done in three ways,—as doles, as overlapping, and as the down-grade to pauperism.

Doles.—Though the total expenditure on relief in such a district must be quite enormous, yet each person or agency, looking at the mass of poverty, and ignoring all other workers, feels hopelessly poor,—too poor to act on a plan. An old woman, getting past work, who is, in Charity Organization Society slang, "a pension case or nothing," has been receiving an occasional food ticket or a shilling from some agency, perhaps a church. "What good did you think you were doing by that?" you ask them. "Ah, well, we should have liked to do more; but we are so poor, and there are so many!" So no attempt is made to take hold of, and set on its feet, say, a single family. Want of faith and want of knowledge make a purpose impossible, and the aimless scattering of tickets and shillings continues. Truly, as an old woman who had thus been "helped" remarked to a friend of mine, "You know, sir, that doesn't go into deep things!" No, indeed! All that this practice effects is to create a gambling spirit that watches for windfalls, to encourage the desire to look poor,—for planless charity is not attracted where help is most effective, but where sentiment is most immediately touched,—and to undercut wages. The dole which enables the recipient to underbid a competitor for work makes up the difference to the recipient, but not to the competitor. The tendency in this respect is to sink wages below starvation-point by the average amount of the charitable dole.

This is bad enough; but when you get several agencies bidding for the same poor person, the result becomes positively horrible,—it forces the poor into fraud. This is *overlapping*,—when the same person is helped, ignorantly, by several different agencies; sometimes, alas! by several different religious denominations. It is all very well not to let your right hand know what your left hand does; but if your right is Presbyterian and your left Roman Catholic, and both are

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helping the same person, it becomes advisable that they should interchange information.

Doles and overlapping, together with the careless administration of public or semi-public relief, form the *down-grade to pauperism.* Money is to be had by luck, medical relief is to be had from charity or the Poor Law, out-door relief from the public funds may be got if you are fortunate in your application, and so people become accustomed to "chance it;" not to manage well what they have, not to make provision for so certain a case as ordinary illness, let alone a time of slack work or old age. They form the habit of going to public or semi-public offices to get benefits which they might have provided for themselves. They are not to blame. We confuse them; nothing is so pathetic as the way in which they accept what is as a guide to what should be. But it is they who have to suffer. When thrift has not been practised, and independence of character has been impaired, the end is the workhouse. We can tempt them not to provide for themselves, but we cannot and do not adequately provide for them, except in the "Union."* The great provident institutions which are the creation of the British working-class, and are quite unmatched in the world as proofs of character and administrative ability among the wage-earners, have no chance where unorganized charity prevails.

In such a chaos, what is the duty of a Charity Organization Committee? It is commonly spoken of as twofold, but the first branch of it really includes the second. "Organization" includes all that a District Committee should do in the way of "Relief."

The first and fundamental duty of the committee, then, is to "organize the district." What does this mean? Simply to bring all these people, all these agencies and institutions, into a scheme of concerted action, or division of labor, in order to work upon a plan with a view to raising the whole life of the poor. To act on a plan in every individual case,

* A current term for the workhouse, owing to the fact that several parishes are generally united for Poor-Law purposes.

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and to inform one's self what other agencies are doing and co-operate with them, are really two sides of the same procedure. For each of the institutions is fit for something; there is some want that it more especially can supply, although, in the absence of organization, it is probably (like the hospital out-departments to-day) straining to do something else, and doing it ill or harmfully. By knowing what others can do, the despair which prevented efficient work is dispelled. We try not to scatter our help over the widest possible surface, but to play our part thoroughly, and if we can only help one family to see it through and make it self-supporting. Then something at least is done; but otherwise far worse than nothing is done. Thus, while persuading all whom it can reach of the ethical necessity for thorough work, the committee has to forward the problem in its other aspect, by charting the district, so to speak, and ascertaining *how* all might and should co-operate, and bringing them all together to determine upon co-operation. Endowed charities may be used for pensions, the benevolent societies may divide the district and make the relief more adequate, and exchange information with other charities. "Poor-Law cases" ("unhelpable") that apply for charity may be sent to the Poor Law; "helpable" cases that apply to the Poor Law may be referred to charity. The leaders of the working class in the district should be made friends with; good provident societies made known, their juvenile branches favored, the school-teachers consulted and interested in the thrift propaganda and in all work affecting children; the clergy should be begged—entreated—to co-operate, to give information, to let their district visitors be trained, to avoid wholesale and injurious methods of relief. The careless use of the hospitals should be checked; provident medical institutions established; sanitary law insisted on, and intelligent Poor-Law administration in every way forwarded.

That is what "organizing a district" means. The long and short of it is the transformation of a charitable chaos into an orderly and friendly neighborhood, in which rich and poor consult together and unite their resources with a clear con-

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certed idea, not only for the relief of individual cases, but more especially for the control of general influences. When this is done, if there still are gaps in the array of institutions, they may be filled up. But, usually, there are plenty of workers and plenty of institutions, only, because the workers are untrained, and both workers and institutions are unorganized, little has been done that is beneficial, and everything that is injurious.

The task of administering relief is a secondary part of the duty of a committee, but, as things are, has to be largely undertaken. "Administering" relief must be distinguished from "providing" it, of which I will speak below. It is plain that as the committee becomes fused with the neighborhood, the relief work of the committee passes, as it ought, into the relief work of *the neighborhood in consultation.*

However this may be, all who work for or with the committee, or who advise their neighbors in relief work, should follow certain plain principles. Help should be given exactly as we give it to a friend or relation in a scrape or in misfortune. I do not think that unction and ostentatious "sympathy" are of much use, though in some trying cases the loving care of a good man or woman may make all the difference. As a rule, I should aim at a friendly business-like tone, the tone of a sympathetic lawyer or doctor. I should give no moral intention to the inquiries, but presuppose the duty of helping, if effectively possible, and simply urge that we must have the case all clear before us, if we are to find out what can be done. I do not believe that inquiries thus conducted are painful to respectable people, beyond the pain which is necessarily involved in applying for help to strangers. If the matter is put sensibly before them, they soon understand, I believe, why it is necessary to know all the family circumstances, and they appreciate the possibility that further knowledge may disclose means of help which at first did not suggest themselves. I give an instance which illustrates the nature of thorough help based on thorough knowledge.

A boy, who appeared ill-nourished, was being given halfpenny dinners at school. This was the broadcast help that

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we condemn—too much, because too little. Inquiry showed that the family were most respectable people, but the father, a copper-worker, was unable to work through chest-disease. The wife and one boy were earning something. More than twenty pounds was raised by the Charity Organization Society for this case, with the final result of setting up the family in a different line of work and saving it from pauperism.

It cost money, thought, and trouble, but a family was saved from pauperism. Dinners to the boy would have been useless while the family was sinking lower and lower.*

In case, however, of very persistent ill-luck there is almost always a screw loose in character, and for this reason again it is absolutely necessary to know the history of a case before trying to help. One great chance is to catch people suffering from their first folly, and then they can sometimes be set straight. Want of work through illness breaks down many a family. Illness, which would be transient, is aggravated by want of food, and seeds of delicacy are sown in wife and children at the same time. Now, every English workman, earning decent wages, can secure himself a good allowance for a long period in case of being out of work through illness, by joining one of the great Friendly Societies. The highest payment is about two pounds a year (Hearts of Oak), and secures eighteen shillings a week for six months, and a smaller allowance beyond that time. As a rule, one would not help a man in mere illness who had not done this much for himself, unless, of course, he had saved in some equivalent way. But catch him before the mischief is done, get him to join a good club *and stay in*, and you may have done well to save him from the last results of his improvidence. Refusal, with explanation, is no less important than help. People soon learn why you do and do not help. And it educates them. A charitable agency may be very fairly judged by the character of the cases that come to it. They learn that dirt and slovenliness are no claim to help; that energy and resource are qualities

* Charity Organization Society's Report of Special Committee on feeding School-children, 1891.

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which the helper or helpers will gladly meet half-way; that no agency can supply the needs that spring from lack of forethought, industry, and management.

Relief, I said, is a form of organization. To insure this, we prefer to raise money on the case, and we are condemned, by those who know, if we employ our general funds for relief purposes.* Raising the money required specially on each case, though very troublesome, has immense advantages. *It enforces family ties, and neighborly or other duties*, instead of relaxing them. "Who is bound to help in this case?" is the first question, and members of the family, who may be living at a distance, are often glad to be asked, and to know that by combination of their resources—one giving money, another taking a child, and so on—their relatives are being effectively helped, with no contribution from strangers except advice and arrangement. Again, it *tests work;* on every case, instead of a secretary saying, "we will do this," and drawing money out of the bank to do it, you have to propound a plan of treatment which will secure the approval and adhesion of those who are to help, whether rich or poor. A large general fund at the bank is very dangerous. It makes you independent, and disinclined to press for money and personal help from existing agencies and persons bound to assist. Though we must, for the present, *administer* relief, we certainly ought not to *provide* it.

The question of visiting is not an easy one. Visitors to the same family should not be multiplied, and I think there should be, as a rule, some natural and definite reason for calling,—*e.g.*," provident" visiting to collect sums for provident purposes. The existing visitors—clergy or district visitors—should always be utilized, if possible, when work is to be done in their districts. On the other hand, in order that this should be done, they must submit to training. The reports of an

* To Americans, familiar with the Boston Associated Charities, and the New York Charity Organization Society, this doctrine will seem too elementary to need explaining. But I let the passage stand; the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS is read in England.

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untrained lady-visitor and her advice are often abjectly useless, and to act on them would encourage fraud and all the mischiefs of charity.

As a transition from the work of District Committees to that of the central office, I may mention how convalescent aid is facilitated by the society,—a simple but efficient piece of organization. Great numbers of Convalescent Homes exist for poor people recovering from illness. They differ in climate, in management, in the kind of cases that they will receive. If a clergyman, or other charitable individual, wants to send a poor person to a Convalescent Home, he has first to find out what home will suit the case; then, probably, to go about asking for a subscriber's letter, and then he may find that the home he has chosen has no vacancy for weeks, while another, equally suitable, could have admitted the patient at once. Through a Charity Organization Committee things are differently managed. At the central office in Buckingham Street there is a special secretary with a sub-committee containing medical men, and this secretary, among other duties, has to be in communication with all reliable Convalescent Homes accessible from London, and to secure beforehand in each of them the number of beds which experience teaches him will be needed by the society. When a convalescent case is approved by a committee, the medical certificate, and an explanatory letter, go up to the "central;" the secretary looks down his book for a suitable home at which he has a vacancy, and the admission order is sent back in a day or two at most. When, as often happens, a church pays the weekly charge at the home, or the applicant and other persons together defray it, this is a perfect piece of "organization." An immense benefit has been provided for the applicant in the promptest way, and the society has not contributed a penny except in office rents and secretaries' salaries.

The central office does no relief work. It partly supervises and supplements, as in the above instance, the work of the District Committees, and partly acts as a bureau of statistical and other information, and as a centre of propaganda and inquiry for the general public. Technically, it is the

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"Council" office, the Council being composed of representatives from all the committees; and various standing committees appointed directly or indirectly by Council meet there week by week to control the policy and consider the work of the society. The District Committees in poorer parts of London are subsidized by the Council, and in some cases have the use of a high-class paid secretary, who is an officer of the Council, paid by it, and transferable from place to place at its pleasure. All this, of course, involves much central supervision.

The more public work of the Council office is at times condemned as *doctrinaire*. I often wonder whether its critics know by what a mass of experience it is supported. Eight hundred or nine hundred volunteer workers, besides a dozen or more highly skilled and devoted official secretaries on District Committees, with the forty or fifty "agents,"—men more of the type of clerks than of secretaries, but able and experienced in the life of their localities,—all of them are week by week in the districts gathering the material which pours into the central office in the shape of reports, appeals for advice, notifications of new difficulties or new institutions, answers to circular questions on matters of the day, and notes on prevalent helps or hindrances in raising the life of the poor. No investigation, I should fancy, has ever been initiated, and no policy ever adopted, at the Council office, which has not been pressed upon it again and again by the experience of the district workers. Elaborate reports, with evidence, by eight or nine special committees, appointed by the society, have in each case carried some important social topic into a clearer and more practical stage, from the Report of 1875 on the Housing of the Poor, which had much to do with the passing of Sir R. Cross's Artisans' Dwellings Act, to the Reports on Homeless Cases, School Feeding, Insurance and Saving, the Treatment of the Feeble-Minded, and the Organization of Medical Charities, directed to burning questions of the most urgent importance in 1890–92.

Another branch of work, which by itself might occupy a less energetic organization, is the "Inquiry Work," with the

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resulting "cautionary card." Week by week at the Administrative Committee, on the standing agendum "Inquiry work," the reports of the special secretary and officers—submitted in every case to a volunteer referee—upon institutions and individuals about which and whom information has been asked by intending subscribers, are carefully scanned in respect of their thoroughness and impartiality. Not only are rogues and frauds detected, their public support cut off, and libel actions against that "public defendant" our secretary successfully encountered, but the friendly criticism which subscribers to *bonâ fide* Societies elicit is often of service in bringing about changes for the better in financial and other administration. The "cautionary card" is a list issued yearly to our subscribers of persons and institutions before assisting which it is well to communicate with the Charity Organization Society. Its utility is universally recognized.

As always, the closest grasp of facts gives the highest faith. The workers all know the power of character, and that no conditions will raise the poor, if character is sacrificed, while hard conditions can be transformed with extraordinary rapidity by ceasing to demoralize the wage-earners. In well-known examples this has been done. By abolishing out-relief in one country district of fifteen thousand souls, pauperism was reduced from about one-twelfth to about one-hundredth of the population. This is what all workers know to be natural; it is not necessity, but our folly that degrades the poor. But so low is the faith in character of those who merely write and talk and count, that no evasion is too strange for them rather than the belief of the simplest and most natural facts. "The poor," they first said, "are driven into the workhouse by the refusal of out-relief." The figures were produced, and it was plain they were not there, for the numbers had fallen. "They were driven out into neighboring Unions." Figures were obtained, and the neighboring Unions appeared to have benefited rather than suffered. "They were living on in great poverty and misery." Clergy and residents were consulted, and it was seen that they were doing nothing of

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the kind. They had turned from paupers into self-supporting citizens, as any one would expect.*

All these evasions of fact, and the half-hearted ideals of those who look away from reality, demand heroic measures. Proposals for these latter—such as weekly pensions for all old people over sixty-five, to be paid by the State—all rest on the persuasion that the life of the wage-earning classes cannot be organized on a business footing (taking the whole life from infancy to death as the unit to be provided for), but must in some way be supplemented from without. I do not myself believe such supplementation to be possible, in the sense of causing each man at his death to have had a larger share of wealth than a wage-system pure and simple, with proper unions and thrift-organizations, would have given him. This is for economists to decide. To me it seems to be simply cutting out some elements from the standard of life, by which, more than by anything else, we now, I suppose, consider the wage-level to be determined.

But at any rate the experiment is horribly hazardous, and wholly unnecessary. One can see the barometer of pauperism and demoralization fluctuating week by week in different divisions of the same district according to the administration. Nothing is plainer than that to an extent at present quite indefinite you can make or unmake paupers—not merely technical paupers, but poor and suffering people—at pleasure. The success of labor organization is dependent on a wise policy in this respect. When this shall have been tried to the full and shall have failed, it will be time to adopt a policy of State-supplementation, which will in all probability stereotype such evils of the wage-system as it may find existing.

I do not say that all drastic legislative reforms are bad. The present more advanced state of the dwellings question is due, as I have said, in a large measure to the initiative of the

* The whole story may be seen in Mr. Loch's pamphlet, "Old Age Pensions and Pauperism," in reply to Mr. Chamberlain, and subsequent letters. See, also, Mr. Loch's paper in "Proceedings of Poor-Law Conference for South Wales, May, 1892." All these publications can be obtained from the London Charity Organization Society, 15 Buckingham Street, Adelphi.

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Charity Organization Society; and while futile schemes are being advocated, there are many—too many—needful reforms, well known by all experts to be desirable, which get left. I do say that legislation is all bad if and so far as it makes us forget that society is a structure of wills, and that if we do not look to the soundness of individual character—if we allow it to be perplexed and demoralized by a system of half-earnings, half-pauperism—the whole fabric must fall to pieces.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

THE ETHICS OF AN ETERNAL BEING.

All human laws are fed by the one divine law: for it prevaileth as far as it listeth, and sufficeth for all, and surviveth all.—HERACLITUS.

If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.—PAUL OF TARSUS.

THOSE thinkers who believe in the possibility of ethics, that is, in freedom of choice, and consequent responsibility, hold these two propositions:

1. Human actions, in so far as they are human, that is, rational and deliberate, are actions performed for the sake of certain chosen ends.

2. The ethical character of actions is determined, primarily by these ends, and secondarily by the means chosen to reach them.

Now, all human ends may be included in one or the other of two classes: (1) ends which consist in *having*, and (2) ends which consist in *being*. No man ever acts rationally unless with a view either to having something, or to being something.

The things which a man may *have* are very various,—wealth, honor, pleasure, friends, etc.; but they all agree in this, that they may be taken away from him, without in any way essentially altering his character. What a man may *be* is summed up in the attributes of his three spiritual faculties, (1) intelligence, (2) affection, (3) will, none of which can be altered without altering his character, that is, without making

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him different from what he is. It is in terms of these that all human worth and all civilization must be estimated. Take from a man all that he has, leaving him all that he is, and you have not subtracted one iota of his moral worth.

It is obvious, then, that moral ends must be expressed in terms of being, that is, of intelligence, affection, and will, and not in terms of having. The only relation which having can bear to moral ends is that of means, enabling their possessor to reach such ends. If it be said that there is a third class of ends, not included under either being or having; that a man may act purely for the good of others, or purely for love of God, expecting no return of any kind; this will only show a misconception with regard to the nature of those ends which consist in being. It is the striking peculiarity of these ends that no man can attain them alone. In advancing towards them, he must take the world with him. Intelligence, affection, and will have no meaning save in a world that can be known, loved, and bettered. If a man is wise, he will understand the world; if he is loving, he will love the world, and especially his fellow-men; if he is strong in will, he will better the world. He cannot do otherwise. And he will reach a far better and purer result, if he acts with a view to the plenitude of his own being, in its threefold aspect, than if he has his eye continually on the state of the world, and labors to reduce it to an ideal or fanciful Utopia. He will do better, if his daily and hourly question is, Am I what I ought to be in knowledge, affection, will? than if it is, How can I bring the world nearer to my fancied ideal? In truth, a good man exerts a far deeper and nobler influence by what he is than by what he does. As Schiller puts it,—

> "Noblesse is found in the ethical world too: commoner natures
> Pay you with that which they do; nobler with that which they are."

And, after all, a man's deeds can have no other ultimate end than to increase the plenitude of his own being and of that of his fellows.

Now, since the end of all action is, primarily, plenitude of being for him who acts, it follows that, if such plenitude, once

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attained, could be annihilated by any external power or will, there would be no rational ground for moral action, but at best only for utilitarian or prudential action. The very existence of morality, therefore, implies the immortality of the moral subject, as a being of intelligence, affection, and will. This was clearly seen by Kant, and, indeed, the inner history of humanity shows us that the belief in immortality is bound up with the belief that moral life is a struggle for plenitude of being, or, which is the same thing, unity with God, who is the absolute plenitude of being, in its triple manifestation.

It seems important to insist upon this result at the present time, when the question whether man be immortal is so often, either explicitly or implicitly, answered in the negative, and when so many attempts are made to construct ethical systems on the basis of this negative. I know of no such system that can be called in any degree successful. They are all marred by one or another of three capital defects. Either (1) they confound the prudential with the moral, or (2) they regard the moral law as a blind, mysterious imperative, commanding us to act in a certain way, without telling us why, and, therefore, treating us as irrational beings, or (3) they call upon us to aid in realizing some earthly Utopia of social well-being, without assigning any other reason for so doing than the baseless and ineffective one, that it is right to be altruistic. If we ask why it is right, no rational answer is forthcoming. I am convinced, partly by so many conspicuous failures, but mainly by the force of logic, that no true system of ethics can be constructed, except on the supposition that the moral agent is an immortal being, striving to realize the plenitude of being in himself, and compelled, in so doing, to take intelligent, loving, and helpful account of the whole world, both as a means of reaching his end, and as a sphere for the manifesting of that end, when it shall be reached. A system so constructed satisfies every rational and emotional demand of the individual agent, and at the same time lays upon him the ineluctable necessity of being, in the very highest degree, altruistic.

Assuming, then, that the moral agent is, as such, necessarily

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an immortal or eternal being, whose end is the plenitude of being, manifested as intelligence, affection, and will, let us consider what the ethical code of such a being will be. Obviously, it will be very different from that of a mere temporary being. The man who looks forward to a long life will provide for the future in a very different way from the man who knows that he must die to-morrow. For a stronger reason, the man who knows or believes that he must live forever, will prepare for the future in a very different way from him who believes that his career closes with this earthly life. But, again, a being who may become as if he were not at any moment, and is certain to become so within a few years, can have no rational interest in striving after plenitude of being either for himself or his fellows. Such a being, if he is wise, will not seek to deprive himself of the satisfaction obtainable through his powers as they are, by a laborious effort, which may be interrupted at any moment, to increase those powers. It may, I think, be laid down that the highest rational aim of a mortal being is pleasure; only an immortal being can rationally strive after plenitude of being. If to-morrow we die, then let us eat and drink or otherwise indulge our appetites, passions, or tastes!

The first commandment in the ethical code of an eternal being will read:

BE AT EVERY MOMENT ALL THAT YOU CAN BE, that is, be as wise, as loving, and as strong in will as is possible for you. This differs but formally from the great commandment quoted by Jesus from the book of Deuteronomy: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might;" for loving God means resembling him in his plenitude of being.

The second commandment, a supplement to the first, showing how it may be obeyed, is:

LET YOUR INTELLECTUAL INTEREST, YOUR AFFECTION, YOUR ACTIVITY OF WILL, BE PROPORTIONED TO THE WORTH, THAT IS, TO THE PLENITUDE OF BEING, POSSESSED BY THE DIFFERENT BEINGS IN THE UNIVERSE. There can be no doubt that all immoral actions are due to a false distribution of affection,

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which again is due to a false intellectual estimate of the comparative worth of objects. On the other hand, moral actions are actions springing from affections distributed according to the true worth of things, as estimated by intelligence.

These are the two fundamental and all-embracing moral laws, from which all other moral laws may be derived. *Plenitude of being, in its intrinsic order and fulness, is the end, sanction, and norm of human action.* It is this that settles the question of what is morally high and low. Persons who feel this distinction strongly are often at a loss to answer the question, On what grounds do you call one kind of action higher than another? or, Why do you call the man who spends his life in alleviating suffering or misery a higher being than him who spends it in sensual pleasure? They have generally to fall back upon some subjective feeling, which they claim authority for by calling it the "moral sense;" but the real answer is, that one kind of action or man is morally higher than another, because it or he has greater plenitude of being than that other,—*i.e.*, exhibits more intelligence, love, and will.

We can now readily see what the nature of the moral process is. It consists of three steps:

First. The will, directed upon the plenitude of being, which is its first, final, and only object, incites the intellect to discover the true order of being, in terms of intelligence, affection, and will, or of proximity to these. Now, the will, as will, directs itself upon this object, and cannot do otherwise without ceasing to be will. The very definition of will is tendency towards plenitude of being. This tendency the will never belies, however much the intellect may fail to recognize wherein plenitude of being consists. In every act which man, as man, performs, he seeks fuller being. The man who commits suicide in the desire for annihilation has already ceased to act as a man; whereas he who, like Faust, attempts to do so in order to rise "zu neuen Sphären reiner Thätigkeit" (to new spheres of pure activity), is still, though erring, entirely human. It would, of course, be impossible for the individual intellect to discover the true order of being in a degree sufficient to make moral

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action possible, were it not aided by the long experience of the race, which, through manifold gropings and blunderings, has been gradually discovering the comparative value of things. Even now the process is far from complete, and this is one of the chief reasons why the moral life of the world is still so unsatisfactory. Moral education, to a large extent, consists in imparting to the individual the moral estimates of the race, and, indeed, this is the chief debt that the individual owes to the race. How long it has taken to discover that intelligence, affection, and will are the only things in the universe that have an intrinsic value, and that all other things depend for their value upon their relation of subservience to these! And how little is understood even now of the relative worth of objects and actions! We know, indeed, that in the order of being the Supreme Plenitude, or God, comes first, and that other beings follow in their order of proximity to this; but how poorly we understand this order! The causes which prevent the intellect from recognizing the true hierarchy of beings are mainly two: (1) its dependence for its material upon sense-perception, and (2) its liability to be distracted and confused by the importunate concupiscence of the senses themselves. The former contracts the range of its action, and therefore makes its conclusions partial and imperfect; the latter paralyzes that action itself. When, with these drawbacks, the intellect comes to stamp things with a false value, the will in dealing with them, as so stamped, necessarily acts immorally, since the very essence of immorality lies in dealing with things or beings in a manner inconsistent with their true worth.* When the intelligence has made some advance in arranging the beings of the world on a scale of worth, then,

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*This is admirably brought out by Æschylus in the lines (Agam., 222–24, Dind.),—

βροτοὺς θρασύνει γὰρ αἰσχρόμητις
τάλαινα παρακοπὰ
πρωτοπήμων.

(For what emboldens mortals is the low-minded, pitiful, counterfeit stamp, the first parent of evil.)

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Second. The will rouses the affections to distribute themselves in proportion to the different grades of worth thus discriminated. This is an extremely arduous task, because man's nature tends to develop all kinds of disorderly affections, and it is only by strong efforts of will that he can bring these under control. Here the individual has to stand almost alone, and fight out the moral battle for himself,—a battle which ends only when the inordinate affections are subjected to the rule of the worth-assigning intelligence. It is often maintained that man has little or no control over his affections. If this were true, we should have good reason for moral despair. But it is not true. Man can radically alter his affectional nature by a voluntary direction of serious attention, by what, in other times, was called meditation, and by acting in accordance with the estimates of intelligence, even when it does not carry the affections with it. Meditation is, in our time, so much a lost art, that its moral significance has almost ceased to be recognized. And yet we have the best of evidence, which any one may verify by experiment, that quiet, persistent occupation of the mind with worthy things gradually generates a love for them, while a resolute refusal to let unworthy things occupy the attention, in time induces an aversion to them. But this process is very much accelerated when the person who is striving to "purge" his affections acts, in obedience to his intelligence, as he sees he would act if they were purged. It is this sort of action that constitutes what we rightly call the moral struggle, and not unfrequently virtue, as distinguished from goodness or worth (ἀρετή), the result of that struggle. In Dante's *Purgatory*, which is simply an institution for bringing inordinate affections under the control of the intelligence, we find in every circle just these two means employed: (1) meditation, and (2) right action, which is laborious and painful only because it runs counter to the disordered affection. For example, the proud meditate upon the Lord's Prayer, and go about bowed to the earth with heavy weights; the wrathful meditate on "Behold the lamb of God," etc., and walk about in irritating, blinding smoke, and so on.

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Third. The will having, with the aid of the intelligence, succeeded in making the affections distribute themselves in proportion to the worth of things, now stands in a true and normal relation to these, and therefore, when it acts, acts spontaneously with due regard to this worth. Hence it is now free and, in the strictest sense, good; for, as Kant says, the only truly good thing in the world is a good will. And here, indeed, we must draw a distinction between the moral and the good, between virtue and worth. In modern times this distinction is so far lost sight of, that we frequently hear the exclamation, "Virtue for virtue's sake!" which is as absurd as if we were to say, "Surgery for surgery's sake." "Virtue for goodness' sake," on the contrary, is the height of rationality; for goodness, or plenitude of being, is the sole end of all virtue. This is the reason why, while we say that God is good, we never say that he is moral or virtuous. It is also the reason why we admire virtue and love goodness. Nobody thinks of admiring God. Virtue is only the way to goodness, and we are far from saying the best that can be said about a man when we call him virtuous. The truth is, the virtuous man does good in spite of his nature, the good man by reason of his nature. In other words, with the former, virtue is unnatural; with the latter, natural.

In saying that the virtuous man does good in spite of his nature, we are, of course, using the word "nature" in a restricted sense. The truth is, that every man, in his present condition, has two natures, frequently at war with each other, a sensuous and instinctive nature, which seeks satisfaction without regard to anything but itself, and an intelligent and volitional nature, which includes, and sees that it must include, the whole world in its scheme of self-satisfaction. His duty, as a moral being, is to bring these two into harmony, by subordinating the former to the latter. Let us consider what this means:

Sense, as such, has a very limited range, and hence its correlate, instinct, can be satisfied with very finite things. Intellect, on the contrary, from its very nature, knows no limits; and hence its correlate, will, can be satisfied with nothing less

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than the infinite. If that infinite were unattainable, man's gifts of intelligence and will would be the cruellest of mockeries, and human life the saddest of tragedies. Man himself would be

> "a monster, . . . a dream,
> A discord. Dragons of the prime,
> That tare each other in their slime,
> Were mellow music match'd with him."

Thus it appears that a man's duty is laid upon him by his own nature, which imperatively demands its realization in the plenitude of being. This plenitude is not to be found in the narrow world of sense and instinct, which offers only limited and temporary satisfactions; it must, therefore, be sought in that of intellect and will, which, indeed, are the faculties that make the demand. For this reason, it can only be by belying his nature, as the subject of intellect and will, that a man can withdraw himself from the duty of rising above sense and instinct, and realizing in himself the fulness of God. If a man should say, "But if I choose to shirk this duty which my nature lays upon me; if, closing the eyes of my intellect and binding the hands of my will, I manage to make myself comfortable on the level of sense and instinct, what is there to prevent me? Why am I doing wrong? You may say I miss a great deal; but I shall never know it, and therefore be none the worse," the answer is, "That would be excellent reasoning, indeed altogether unimpeachable reasoning, if your career were bounded by the life of sense and instinct; but you are forgetting the most momentous fact, that it is not, and cannot be, so bounded. While you have sense and instinct to take refuge in, you can turn your back upon the claims of intellect and will; but ere long that refuge will fail you, and intellect and will will prefer their claims unopposed. Then you will find yourself face to face with an inner authority which you will be forced to recognize, which you will be unable to evade, and which you will be conscious of having disregarded. Your goal, the plenitude of being, will be conjured up before you in all its most sacred majesty; your will will crave it with all the infinite force of its nature;

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and it will be beyond your reach. The result will be hell, not indeed a hell of tortured sense and baffled instinct, but the far more awful hell of confused intellect and fettered will, that is, of tormented conscience;* for conscience is, at bottom, nothing but will correlated with intellect." †

This reply shows us the meaning of duty, and suggests the answer to the much-vexed question regarding the nature and origin of ethical authority. The guardians of revelation tell us that the origin of this authority is the miraculously revealed will of God; Kant places it in a mysterious, "categorical imperative;" sentimentalists ascribe it to a "moral sense," and so on. The truth is, it lies in the very essence of our nature, which holds in potence the plenitude of being, along with an authoritative will to realize the same in consciousness. And here we must beware of confounding will with impulse. All impulses run towards the satisfaction of instincts; intelligent will alone aspires to plenitude of being. All moral authority comes from intelligent will, and is simply and solely the expression thereof. But will, in so far as it is intelligent, is the will of God; and hence there is nothing wrong in saying that the source of ethical authority is the will of God, provided we do not regard that will as something of which our will is not the image and likeness. Furthermore, there is nothing at all absurd in the belief that, if man, during his physical life, should paralyze his intellect and will by devotion to sense and instinct, the divine will should strive to impart fresh vigor to both by what would seem to be a miraculous revelation. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive that the plenitude of love should do anything else. Such a revelation would not shift the seat of authority; it

* Of course, this hell is a matter of very common experience even in this life, in the form of remorse, which is simply the protest of spurned intellect and will against the rule of sense and instinct. Repentance, or purgatory, is a yielding to this protest.

† There are few more fatal blunders in ethics than that which makes conscience a distinct, primitive faculty, a kind of sentiment, akin to the æsthetic sense. Such a sentiment, if it existed, would deprive the moral law of that which is its very essence, a clearly recognizable authority.

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would merely enable that authority to make its voice heard above the tumult of sense and instinct. Nothing could possibly be revealed to man that was not among the possibilities of his own being from the first. Thus far we have been moving in the region of theory, which has shown us that the ethics of an eternal being consist in loyal obedience to enlightened will, which seeks plenitude of being, in its three aspects of intelligence, affection, and will. It now behoves us to descend into the region of practice, and show how such ethics will affect the actions of men in the every-day relations of life. We have now to ask, How will a man, feeling that he lives but to realize in himself the eternal fulness of God, act?

In the first place, such a man, having laid his plans for eternity, and feeling assured that his purpose cannot be frustrated by any happenings outside of himself, will live with diligence and seriousness, but without haste, trepidation, or worry. He will know neither fear, doubt, nor despair, so long as he remains true to himself. He will have no anxiety about outward results. Failure in temporal projects will be as welcome to him as success, so long as he feels sure that, in striving to carry them out, he has acted with all the intelligence, affection, and energy possible for him. By such action he will feel that he has made God responsible, and this is the whole secret of a blessed life.

In the second place, he will look upon all the things of sense and ambition—wealth, honor, power, friends, family, etc.—as means to enable him to reach his goal.* When they cease to do this, he will be glad to part with them. Hence he will not strive after possession for the mere sake of possession or

* It may seem a strange thing to say that a truly moral man will regard his family and friends as means for the attainment or manifestation of his own perfection; but if we reflect that he cannot possibly use them for *these* ends, except in so far as he treats them as ends in and for themselves, the strangeness of the assertion will vanish. To say that a man values family and friends because they help him to develop and display generosity, is surely to attribute to him a lofty view of both. No man can treat another as a slave or chattel without injury to his own moral nature.

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pleasure, but will be content with what he can use for his one ultimate end. In the same way, he will avoid all public recognition, except in so far as this may help him to benefit others. All display he will abhor and sedulously eschew. His motto will be, Love to be unknown (*Ama nesciri*). He will, indeed, let his light shine before men; but, like the spirits in Dante's *Paradise*, he will take care to hide himself behind his light. At the same time, knowing that he can shed the light of intelligence, love, and will upon others only in so far as he himself is a radiating source of these, he will use every endeavor to be as much of a self as possible, developing all his powers through every experience that does not involve a lessening of his own being.* In this he will be cheered by the consciousness that what he gains is gained forever.

In the third place, while he will take an enthusiastic interest in all those institutions whereby men are aided in rising to the plenitude of being,—in family, society, state, church,—he will treat them as means, not as ends, holding that they exist for him, not he for them. Whenever any one of them sinks into such a condition as to retard, instead of accelerating, man's progress towards his end, he will stand aloof from it and refuse to countenance it, until such time as it shall have returned to its true function, not considering his life too great a sacrifice to offer for the sake of effecting this return. His allegiance to any institution will be entirely conditioned by its relation to his ultimate end, to which, in the last resort, all his allegiance will be paid, and for the sake of which he will hold his life in fee. While he will not willingly be a rebel or an iconoclast, he will not shrink from being either, when man's highest interests are jeopardized. Recognizing, on the

* There is a school of ethical thinkers at the present day who seem to fancy that a man is on a low moral plane who desires eternal life and blessedness for himself, maintaining that one ought to be content with increasing the happiness of a mortal humanity for a few years, and sinking into nothingness afterwards. But, surely, what it is good to do for a few years it is infinitely better to do, in a continually increasing degree, to all eternity. There surely cannot be a more unselfish wish than the wish to be forever such a being as shall increase the blessedness of all that is capable of being blessed. To be content with the prospect of annihilation seems to me base pusillanimity.

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other hand, that the effectiveness of institutions depends almost entirely upon the character of their members, rising and falling as this rises and falls, he will devote his chief external efforts to the elevation of character, as that "Kingdom of God and his righteousness" to which all other things are added; and this will have the effect of preventing him from attributing to institutions the shortcomings and sins which in reality belong to persons. The one question which he will put to every institution will be this: Does it aid in furthering intelligence, affection, will? If it does not, it will stand condemned for him. Hence, he will have no sympathy with those socialistic Utopias whose aim is to make men comfortable without the necessity of being heroic; heroism and death being in his eyes preferable to cowardly comfort and life.

In the fourth place, while showing all due regard for the feelings and views of his fellows, he will maintain a complete independence with respect to all social forms, demands, and caprices, yielding to them only in so far as they contribute to further the end he has in view. In all such matters he will strive after kindly rationality and unobtrusive simplicity. He will eschew all social gatherings whose aim is animal satisfaction, frivolous intercourse, or vain display. He will not waste an hour in trying to acquire the means of living in a style equal to that affected by his neighbors. In his apparel and house-furnishings he will confine himself to what is essential to health and neatness, setting an example of contempt for that luxury in the pursuit of which so many persons waste their lives. While appreciating art at its true worth, as a means of expressing to sense the highest visions of those whose faces are set towards the plenitude of being, he will not desire to make his home an art-gallery, but content himself with a few simple things, making beautiful the beauty of holiness. He will have no room in his house which the meanest and squalidest of his fellows may not freely enter without fear of defiling or injuring. In choosing his friends and associates, he will recognize no conventional distinctions of race, class, or creed, and no bond but that of a common

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aspiration after the highest. He will belong to no "set" less extensive than humanity.

In the fifth place, he will have a rich inner life of communion with himself and with God, a life of which his outer activity will be but the reflection. This life will consist of meditation and prayer. Meditation will mean every form of quiet, self-collected reflection and study calculated to clear the vision and reveal the true meaning and worth of the things of the world; prayer, every form of aspiration towards the source of all truth, all beauty, and all goodness. Both these spiritual acts, though they constitute the very innermost life of the soul, have in our day fallen into considerable disrepute, the first, because it has come to be regarded as a lazy dreaming, or fruitless play of the imagination, about certain historic facts or dogmatic definitions; the second, because it is conceived to be an attempt to enlighten God, to rouse his interest, and to obtain from him special favors, which he might otherwise be indisposed to grant,—an attempt which is obviously absurd and derogatory to God. But there is no need to limit the sphere of meditation except by the bounds of possible truth, and the above conception of prayer is a coarse, childish caricature. Let us quote some of the definitions of prayer offered by men who earnestly practised it and knew its effect. St. Basil says, "Prayer is the ascent of the mind to God, or the seeking of things descending from God;" St. Augustine, "Prayer is the pure affection of the mind directed upon God," and again, "Prayer is the ascent of the soul from things terrestrial to things celestial, the quest for supernal things, the desire for invisible things;" St. Thomas Aquinas, "We pray, not that we may alter the divine purpose, but that we may obtain what God hath decreed should be realized through the prayers of the saints;" and again, "We are commanded to unfold our desires to God in prayer, not that we may instruct him as to what we desire, but that we may direct our intellect and affection upon him." And St. Bernard says, "Let us ascend, therefore, on meditation and prayer, as on two feet. For meditation shows us wherein our defects lie; prayer obtains a remedy for these defects. The

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former shows the way, the latter leads us by it." It is easy enough in these days of feverish, thoughtless outward activity, to sneer at meditation and prayer; but no one has a moral right to do so who has not seriously and persistently practised them and experienced their effects. He who has done this will claim no such right. At all events, the man whose heart is set upon attaining the divine fulness will have a rich inner life of meditation and prayer, and will come to the activities and trials of the outer practical world as a messenger from a higher sphere, a sphere of divine quiet and serenity.

Such, in my opinion, are some of the leading characteristics of the ethics of an eternal being. That they are very different from those of the ethics suitable for a temporal being (if, indeed, we can speak of ethics in connection with such a being at all) is surely obvious enough. He who lives for time will covet the things of time; he who lives for eternity, the things of eternity. The things of time are wealth, honor, position, power, etc., which perish in the using; the things of eternity are knowledge, love, strength of will, which grow with the using forever and forever.

In conclusion, I may perhaps be allowed to say that the form which the society of those whose powers are set upon eternal things will assume will be a church, or, as Jesus preferred to say, a Kingdom of God,—a kingdom of holiness, in which each subject will claim property only in what he *is*, holding all that he *has* as a mere temporary trust, to be used as intelligence and love shall dictate, for the highest spiritual ends, a kingdom which will correlate itself naturally with a civic state aiming at external freedom and justice, and offering the widest field for the attainment and exercise of every virtue. On the other hand, the natural form for the society of those whose powers are directed solely upon the goods of this temporal world will be a socialistic and industrial state, in which each citizen will aim at the greatest possible amount of possession, and will claim the right to enjoy as he pleases all that he possesses, without being called upon to exercise generosity or self-sacrifice towards any fellow-being. It is

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between these two institutions, as the highest expressions of corporate life, that the world of the present day is called upon, and is trying, to choose. Can any one doubt what the ultimate choice will be?

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

REFORM WITHIN THE LIMITS OF EXISTING LAW.*

NOT long ago I spoke on "Jay Gould; or, Ill-gotten Gains within the Limits of Law." The law cannot prevent—at least did not prevent, in this case—much that is contrary to right and justice. It furnishes an imperfect standard in morals. Because under the law we are free to do certain things, it does not follow that, morally speaking, we may do them. The law may not be able—and it may not be considered within the province of the law—to punish us for doing things that yet are hard, inequitable, and cruel. To use the law, then, as a measure of what we may and may not do is, to this extent, to ignore conscience altogether. It was thoughts of this sort that I wished to suggest by the title of my recent lecture.

But there is another side to the matter. It is sometimes said that the law not only permits wrong, but that it sanctions wrong, is virtually in collusion with it. And it must be admitted that this is sometimes true. But what I wish to ask now is, Is there anything in the law that hinders us from doing right? The right and wrong of government in general, I do not wish to discuss, but it is a pressing, personal question, Does government as now existing anywise compel us in a wrong direction? It is a question not unlike one often raised as to our general social system. How often do we hear it said that this system compels men to be selfish or grasping,

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* A lecture given before the Society for Ethical Culture, Philadelphia, Sunday, February 19, 1893.

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whether they will or no; that they cannot act in accordance with the dictates of their higher nature, while it remains! Can we fail to feel challenged, as it were, by such a statement? For morality, our higher nature, is, we know, something to be obeyed, and if it cannot be in one set of circumstances, then another set of circumstances must be created in which we can be true to it. We have hence an immediate moral interest in knowing whether what is often said of our social system is true. For the question remains, *does* the system compel us, *are* we not free while it lasts, to follow the better instincts, the higher promptings within us? Practically, for the purposes of my present discussion, the law and the general social system under which we live may be treated as coinciding, and, of course, they are nearly related, each to a certain extent reflecting and in turn determining the other. What I really have in mind to ask is whether forces outside us, whether they be formally written down in law or not, whether they be legally compulsory or only naturally compulsory, do prevent us from acting in the spirit of love and justice, do hinder us from living a moral life? Or, to put the question in a different form, what can we do taking the law and the social system as they now are, and what is there we cannot do towards achieving justice and a better state of things, simply by following the better impulses in our hearts? Are these impulses powerless as things now are, or may they be powerful? I am not asking, what is our first duty, whether to change the system or to change ourselves, and I by no means wish to be understood as depreciating the significance or necessity of legal or other external changes. I simply ask, what can be done without them, purely by the action, the effort, and the co-operation of private individuals? In other words, is it, in the last resort, the law or system that is at fault, or is it we who are at fault? Practically it must make a great difference whether we put the responsibility for what is evil on something outside of us, and say we can do no better till it is changed, or whether we see that at least a part of the responsibility rests with ourselves.

Unquestionably where the system in which we live permits

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or sanctions wrong, it may be harder for any one to do right. This much must be admitted. If it is more or less the custom and the admitted legal right of persons to take advantage of one another (where they do not use open violence or fraud), if this is a common tendency, it is easier for any one to go with the current than to go against it. The temptation is that way,—for profit is that way, and individual interest so inclines one. But something more than temptation is required to take away responsibility for one's actions. To be in situations of temptation is the general human lot. Virtue is almost always effort, and if the race had always done what seemed easiest, what appeared most inviting at the moment to do, it would have still remained on low levels, as individual peoples or tribes have remained. Temptations do not excuse us, they simply call for strength to meet them. The question, then, for us now is not whether it is easier, more profitable, to acquiesce in or to do things that our best instincts would condemn, but whether we have to, whether the laws make us, or the necessity of getting a living obliges us to, do these things.

Let us take some instances, and, in the first place, a comparatively simple one. Suppose a person possessed of some wealth, more than he really needs to support himself and his family, taking into account every desirable comfort and advantage as well,—how shall he use the surplus? The law leaves him free to use it as he chooses. It is his private property, and the law protects him against its being forcibly taken away from him for any purpose whatsoever. If he wants to build a yacht with it, or to erect a palace for himself, or to give sumptuous entertainments with whole orchestras discoursing music while he and his guests sit at feast, if he wants to do the most extravagant thing or the most foolish or (within limits) the most vicious thing, he may do so. Yes, as the tendency of wealth, particularly where it is great in amount and newly acquired, is towards extravagance, every motive of vanity and ambition may urge him in these directions,—to do anything else may be to allow himself to be outstripped in the race for social distinction and prestige. But will any one in his senses pretend that he is obliged to do

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these things, that he cannot, if he will, put his surplus wealth to very different uses? What is to hinder his founding a library, or endowing needed chairs in a university, or building decent houses for the poor to live in, or buying whole blocks in crowded quarters of the city where filth and disease abound, and turning them into public squares and parks? Does the law or our social system prevent any of these things? Government might do some of them, but individuals might also, without the government, and the healthiest state of society might be held to be one where individuals and private associations do so much in the line of what is good that the necessity for governmental action is reduced to a minimum. I myself know one or two individuals—and I count myself happy in knowing them—who devote all their surplus income to public uses; who, instead of indulging themselves, reduce their personal expenditures to the lowest possible point consistent with decency and dignity and the duties of hospitality; who live, one feels, not for themselves, but for human advancement. And the law protects these persons in doing their will just as truly as it protects vain, unprofitable persons in doing theirs; there is nothing in our law or social system that prevents hundreds and thousands of such persons arising and living for humane ends. Probably some of you already know persons not unlike those I have mentioned.

There are those who think that there ought to be a progressive income-tax; I am not sure but that I agree with them. But the principle of such a tax might be acted on without a law; there is nothing in present laws that is inconsistent with obedience to the principle. Some are acting in obedience to it and go further than any law would be likely to require, and I am not sure that they are not acting more wisely and securing more benefit to the community than any State would be likely to (as States now are), in case the amounts were turned over to it to expend.

Laws cannot possibly command more than men may give of their own free-will, when they are guided in their conduct by moral principle, or are inspired by an enthusiasm. In

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turning over the pages of "A Short History of Philadelphia" recently, I came across an account of the great "Cooper-Shop Volunteer Refreshment Saloon," instituted in 1862, for the feeding of United States troops passing through the city. Beginning, it is said, with the supply of a single regiment by a few kind-hearted women, it developed into a thoroughly organized system, by which, in the course of the war, six hundred thousand soldiers were fed, nearly two thousand cared for in a hospital managed by volunteer nurses, and several thousand lighter cases relieved by dispensary treatment. The interesting thing (in connection with the point I am now considering) is that this magnificent contribution to the comfort and effectiveness of the national forces was supported entirely by funds raised by private individuals, with no assistance whatever from the government, and by the unremitting labor of unpaid assistants, not a few of whom, it is stated, laid down their lives as a willing offering to the work.* Is a change in the law necessary to bring about things that can be done just as well, the law staying where it is?

I am bold enough to take an instance involving a more debatable and difficult problem. The equity of land-ownership has been much discussed in recent days. As is well known, the value of property of this sort may increase at an almost fabulous rate, without the slightest effort being made by the owner of the property. It is impossible that the propriety of gains of this sort should not be questioned. Accordingly, a school of reformers has arisen which denies their rightfulness as a private possession, and says they should go to the community, the existence of which makes them possible. Nothing will avail, these reformers are apt to say, and no improvement is possible for humanity, until a change in the laws takes place to this effect. Taxation should be taken off from commodities in general (which men labor to produce), and put upon land (which they do not produce); then, it is held, the evils which afflict humanity will more or less right themselves. It would, of course, be foolish for me to give an opinion on so

* "A Short History of Philadelphia," by Susan Coolidge, p. 206.

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great and complicated a question in a few moments (for it is not so simple a question, to my mind, as it appears to be to many); and I have no idea of giving an opinion. But I do ask, must all movement in this direction wait on a change in the law? Have individual men no responsibility in the matter till a change in the law is effected? Is no action possible while the law remains as it is? For my part, I do not see why a great change should not come over men's notions and conduct in relation to this kind of property, though not one addition or alteration is made in the statute-book. If one becomes convinced that values which he has done nothing to create are not rightfully his, what is there in our present system or laws to prevent him from turning over those values (substantially) to the community's uses, and treating himself, so far as he remains the nominal owner of the wealth, as the steward of the community? Why must we wait for a law to compel us to do what we know we ought to do ourselves? Why must we wait for a change in the system to accomplish what we can just as well accomplish, the system remaining what it is?

You have, for example, a piece of ground in the heart of a great city. You do not use it; you rent it. It cost you or your father or grandfather little or nothing, and you get an income from it every year, clear of all taxes, running into the hundreds, and even into the thousands. I know men of the world would count you a fool not to take and to keep all you can get; but in the light of ethics the question may take a different shape to you. And, if so, what is there to hinder you from taking these hundreds or thousands and making yourself by means of them a public benefactor, quite refusing to turn them to private account or to use them as a means of selfish gratification, using them, so far as you use them at all, for yourself, only to better equip yourself, to set yourself entirely free, to make you nobly independent, for the service of humanity? There is absolutely nothing in our social system or in the laws to prevent this; the only thing that can effectually prevent is lack of conviction, or else sluggishness or indifference in your own heart. I cannot admit, then, that we

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must wait for a change in the laws to enable us to do justice in this matter, even if we take the most radical views of justice. I cannot admit that we are obliged to comply with the system till that time. Those who suffer from the wrong may have to, but those who cause it do not.

The same may be said of the old slavery problem. The laws permitted slavery, they sanctioned it, but they did not compel anybody to enslave the negro; and the bottom trouble was not with the laws, but with the slaveholders. If a slaveholder had excused himself by saying that there was nothing for him to do but to comply with the system, that he was powerless against it, he would have been suspected of cant by honest men, and a rugged slaveholder like John Randolph of Virginia would have been apt to despise him.

> "Sworn foe of Cant, he smote it down
> With trenchant wit unsparing,
> And, mocking, rent with ruthless hand
> The robe Pretence was wearing.
>
> "He held his slaves, yet made withal
> No false and vain pretences,
> Nor paid a lying priest to seek
> For scriptural defences."*

If, because the laws were on the side of slavery, men had to practise it, how was it, then, that individuals, and whole bodies like the Friends, set free their slaves, and yet were deemed nowise transgressors? These individuals, the Society of Friends, had conscience,—that was what marked them; and so far as their personal relations with their own slaves went, there was not, and never had been, anything in the laws that compelled them to act against it. What an edifying spectacle it would make, if those who believe that what is called the unearned increment (in land-values) should go to public uses, could inspire a body of men, as the Society of Friends were once inspired on another issue, to renounce the advantages present laws allow them to have, and actually devote to public uses the unearned increment in their pos-

* John G. Whittier's "Randolph of Roanoke."

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session of their own free will! And why should this not be? Does any really great moral enthusiasm wait for a law to enforce it?

But let us take a more difficult instance still,—one in which there are real obstacles against a man's doing what in his heart he would like to do. I refer to the business man,—more particularly the employer,—who is doing business in competition with others in the same field. Undoubtedly he cannot act just as he would if he were master of the situation, and had only his own mind to consider. If his competitors reduce their expenses, he must reduce his, or else be in danger of being driven out of the field. And in many ways, perhaps in most, this competition may be a good; and from the standpoint of ethics nothing may be said against it. But suppose that the reduction of expenses takes the particular form of the reduction of wages, and that wages are already low. The thoughtless or unscrupulous employer may, of course, do this without any qualms of conscience; but the employer who reflects on what it means, and who has some principle and humanity, may exceedingly dislike to do it, and yet, following what I have already said, he may come near being forced to. He must put what he produces or deals in at as low a price as the competitor, or be driven out of the market. Temporarily, he may devise or get hold of some improved machinery or other contrivance, by which his expenses may be reduced (proportionately) without touching wages; or he may by extra efforts make larger sales, and so be able to put down his prices; or he may consent to take less in the shape of profits for himself. But the first two things may conceivably be done by the competitor in time; so that at last he may be strictly compelled, according to all appearances, either to take less profit to himself or to pay less wages to his men.

But here the question arises, What is to hinder an employer from taking less profit to himself? Is there any law that hinders it? is there anything in the social system that prevents it? True, most men like to get as much profit for themselves as possible, and many are willing to get it at almost any cost (if they do not have to violate the law), even to the extent of

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quite ruling out considerations of humanity and justice in dealing with their employees, and treating with them, as the saying goes, "purely on a business basis;" these persons may, I think, not unfairly be said to give the tone and spirit to our present industrial system. But, for all that, this system is entirely a reflex (in this aspect of it) of individual minds, and has not an iota of power over any one who dissents from it. If anybody is willing to work for ten thousand dollars a year instead of twenty thousand dollars, or for five thousand dollars instead of ten thousand dollars, or for two thousand dollars instead of five thousand dollars, he can do so. And as far as this will make a difference, he may to this extent, in face of such a situation as I have already described, keep the wages of those who work for him where they were, or may even, if he knows they are already too low to make it possible for the men to live a worthy or even a decent human existence, raise them.

I know it may be thought fanciful to expect that anything more for workingmen will be done than they are in a situation to demand; but such a view leaves morals out of account in these relations altogether. One of the first elements in morals (taken in any other than an outward, conventional sense), one of the simplest notions connected with justice, is giving to others what they ought to have, whether they are strong enough to extort it from us or not. The meaning of morals is action from within, rather than under constraint from without; so that if a man never does more than others virtually oblige him to do, he may, even though he chances to pay the highest wages to his workingmen, never act morally towards them his whole life through. Why cannot morality, sentiments of justice and brotherhood, apply to the business dealings of men with one another as truly as anywhere else? In the old days, a man who wished to live a perfect life withdrew from society and all worldly business, and dedicated himself to the interior purification and sanctification of his soul. I have no word of mockery or reproach for those who thus sought to be blameless in their own eyes and at peace with conscience; but a more rugged and heroic virtue is needed now. We want men who will show unself-

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ishness in the world, rather than without it, and who will in those very regions where low motives are supposed to be the only effective ones, demonstrate that high motives can serve as well. And what hinders,—*i.e.*, really and forcibly? Nothing but the lack of moral insight, or else of moral impulses and of moral determination in men themselves.

And yet I wish to face the worst alternative in this matter. Suppose that willingness to take lower profits, and thus to come to something nearer equality with those whom one employs, does not suffice; suppose that one is already carrying on his business at as low a profit as he possibly can, and yet maintain himself, what is he, in such a case, to do, if his competitor, in similar conditions, reduces wages? Is he not literally obliged to do the same, or else run the risk of bankruptcy, if he continues? I doubt not that employers are in this situation at times, that it is with the greatest reluctance that they follow the example of their unscrupulous competitors, that with the best will in the world they do not see how they can do otherwise. Unscrupulous men have a power thus altogether out of proportion to their numbers, or their talent or ability, or anything but just this willingness to gain their ends by any means; they have the power to degrade the whole tone of industrial life, to drag the best men down to their level, to make the most humane men appear outwardly just as selfish as themselves. For in a competitive system, where the motive is private gain, it must be remembered that the absence of scruples may be an advantage in the struggle: the unscrupulous man, who stops at nothing, may win; and another man, just because of his conscience, may not be able to compete with him. So that I do not wonder that some say that the system itself must be changed, in which it is possible for the best to be ruled by the worst.

Yet let us ask ourselves, What may be done in this particular, taking things just as they are? Is there anything to hinder, for instance, employers uniting among themselves and mutually agreeing not to reduce wages below a certain point, so that none of them shall have an advantage over the rest by making such a reduction? There is no more interesting

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and significant phenomenon in recent industrial development than the formation of associations and combinations among employers for mutual benefit. Competition is good, but good, it is seen, within limits; and when it is absolutely unrestricted, or, what is the same, unprincipled, it may be destructive. To keep this and that line of business on a paying basis, then, men are learning to co-operate. Why should they not co-operate for something beyond their individual gains?—co-operate to maintain as good wages as possible for those whom they employ? Why should not a sentiment of honor arise on this point? Why should it not come to be regarded as inconsistent with the dignity of a business man to pay wages beneath a certain rate? Why should not business thus be elevated to the rank of a profession, and have its rules, its standards, its code, and things admitted to be professional and things admitted to be unprofessional? Is it not possibly one of the reasons why business pursuits have been thought to be unbecoming to a gentleman in the past (a worthy reason among many ignoble ones) that one was not expected to be guided by any principle in conducting them, and was at liberty to make any sort of a bargain that he could?

I refuse to admit that individuals and associations of individuals might not act from as high motives in the field of business as in the field of law, medicine, philanthropy, or religion. I believe that employers can be as solicitous for the best possible conditions for those whom they employ as for their own gains. But the other day I read in one of our local papers of a firm of manufacturers here who offered to advance the wages of those whom they employed, if their men could get other manufacturers in the same line of business to do likewise. But why do not these willing manufacturers appeal to their competitors direct, instead of leaving it to the workingmen, whose advances and demands are so apt to be regarded suspiciously by their employers? Why not form a combination of manufacturers in this particular line who shall agree to raise wages together, and not in the future to take advantage of one another by ever individually reducing wages? and why should they not, if they are pressed by competition

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at other points in the country, endeavor to bring these other manufacturers into the combination, so that all together throughout the country shall stand for justice to the workingman? All this can be done within the limits of existing law, just as associations to maintain profits are already forming themselves within these limits, and just as associations are forming among workingmen to maintain wages. Competition can be changed to co-operation to this extent in the social system that now is, and without any preliminary overthrow or even modification of it; the change can come purely from the working of moral impulses among men.

And yet you will say that the unscrupulous employer may be inaccessible to these impulses, and may stand apart from the co-operative effort that other employers are making. True; but it is also true that public sentiment may be so stirred, that public opinion may be so educated, that people in general will have nothing to do with him, will not buy his goods (if they know them), or regard him with any other feelings than those of aversion. Moreover, though he be inaccessible to moral considerations for the time, he might not be always; and even the hope would be, and the aim and the effort, to win him over to the side of humanity and right. No one can tell what might be done in this direction; even such a realizing of the situation, such a facing of the question as I have stated it, is not common at the present time, much less any united effort of the moral forces of society to accomplish the result. Ordinary religion is satisfied to have men make all the money they can, in all the ways they can (within legal limits), if they will only give a part of it to the church and to philanthropy;* the feeling has yet to dawn on the world, or at least of any considerable portion of it, that something like a fair distribution of wealth among those who help (or are ready to help) to produce it is more important than the building of

* I need hardly say that this is not the religion of such men as Father Huntington. See his article on "Philanthropy and Morality," in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1892. I think one must admit that the first searching word on this subject, in the JOURNAL, has come from an orthodox Christian believer.

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churches or the support of any number of philanthropies. Yet I say there is absolutely nothing in the existing laws or system of society that forcibly prevents the rise of such a feeling, nothing that need hinder its growth and progress, nothing that is inconsistent with its ultimate victory over all that opposes it, including whatever amount of inertia, unbelief, and moral deadness there may be among men.

There is one other instance of unsocial, unbrotherly action which I must speak of; it will be the last. It is in one way the most difficult instance, and it cannot fail to excite our sympathies. I refer to the person who, when there is a strike among workingmen for justice or against injustice, takes a striker's place, and so helps to defeat the cause for which the workingmen are contending. Of course, strikes *may be* foolish or unjust; but it must be admitted that there are just ones, too, and only these do I now have in mind. Such are present conditions that a legitimate cause may be entirely defeated by those who, though they do an unsocial, unbrotherly thing, yet have our sympathy to the extent they are necessitous themselves. Here no law, but something equally urgent, the need of getting subsistence for themselves and perhaps their families, virtually compels them. I confess that, with this fact before my eyes, I have sometimes been compelled to think that individuals and individual effort are powerless, and that nothing but a change in the economic constitution of society can bring relief. Yet what can be done, things being as they are? In the first place, the associations or unions of workingmen might be made more complete, more inclusive, than they now are; they might bring in those persons who are outside them, and who now act, on occasion, against them. In the second place, they could ask for wages which would cover the needs not only of those of their number who had work, but of those who could not get it,—just as the head of a family may ask for enough to meet the needs of his family as well as his own needs,—and in favor of such an aim and demand, in sympathy with it, all the moral forces of society might be arrayed. If society is one great brotherhood, surely all ought to have either work, or support if there

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is no work for them to do; indeed, rationally speaking, is there not an absurdity in some men working ten and twelve hours a day, and others equally able having nothing to do. If sense and conscience ruled, the workless would have work to do, and those now working would not have to do so much. And I do not see why all this might not take place quietly, gradually, peaceably, in answer to a movement of ideas among the people, in answer to individual and co-operative effort,—the general system of society and law standing just where it is, or, if modified, modified as the result of this moral evolution, not as the condition or antecedent of it.

I hope I have fairly treated these different instances which I have considered. I have tried to, and, if I have at all succeeded in so doing, the conclusion is irresistible that a vast deal might be done to reform the world, simply by a change in the ideas, dispositions, and principles of men.*

It has not been my object to discuss, in all their various bearings, any of the questions I have touched upon. I have simply asked what could private, voluntary, moral effort do in meeting them? I think it is a mistake—and often worse than a mistake—to say that men cannot do right till the system of society in which we live is right, or the laws a mirror of perfect equity. I think it is a poor and weak philosophy which holds that it must first be easy and comfortable, and even profitable, to be virtuous, before anybody can be expected to be so. Temptations always have existed, and probably always will exist, for humanity in its upward march. I have been amazed to read in one of our labor papers, from which I must say that I derive a great deal of instruction, that so long as the opportunity exists for men in our Philadelphia City Councils to make something out of the privileges they give to corporations, they must be expected to be corrupt. What has manhood come to mean in this nineteenth century, if a bribe has only to be offered to be taken, if the only way to make men honest is to take away opportunities to be any-

* Whether what I have suggested as possible *will* be done, is another question.

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thing else! Not by living in a "Garden of Eden," not by being placed in circumstances where no temptations could arise, has the race risen to whatever virtue or manly strength it now has.

It is, of course, easy to live as the world around us do, but it is not necessary. It may be hard to rise into the atmosphere of principles and great aims, but it is possible to do so. To inspire men in this direction is, as I understand it, the aim of this Society. We are not politicians, we are not statesmen, we are not economists, we are not social theorists, but we do stand for moral ideas, and for their introduction into every department of human life, until no nook and corner of it is unpenetrated by their bracing and purifying influence. What we care for more than anything else, I take it, is the development of manhood,—of live, self-acting, self-ruling manhood; for my part, I would rather see one man inspired by an idea than a hundred made comfortable without it. Law has its place, and philanthropy has its place, but to make men see the right and do it of their own accord is greater than all. We, my friends, are so small, so insignificant, that from any outward point of view we may never accomplish anything worth talking about; but if by the meetings and discussions we hold we are set to thinking; if we gain large, liberal minds; if we come to believe in great principles and to share in great hopes, and if, in the measure of our power, we lend a hand to every good, forward movement in the community, we need by no means be a useless factor in it, and perchance the world may be some time brighter and better for our once having lived.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

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FREEDOM: ITS RELATION TO THE PROOF OF DETERMINISM.

THIS paper is one more attempt to prove the reality of human freedom. Any one glancing over the magazine literature now appearing will observe that the subject is in one of its periodical acute stages of discussion. That is my excuse for broaching it,—that, and the consideration that the view here advanced and defended is simple, and I hope will be made clear, so that it can be accepted or rejected with little waste of time and thought. But first it will be well to get clearly in mind what form of proof is competent in the premises and what form is not.

The assistance offered by the various syllogisms of Formal Logic need not long detain us. The basis on which they rest is the assumption that the major and minor propositions have already somehow been established; and what is here to be set forth is precisely the nature of the ultimate basis on which we must depend for establishing propositions. I shall presently mention the syllogistic form in which the crucial part of the proof I shall offer will be cast. It will then appear that the difficulty consists, not in meeting the requirements of Formal Logic, but rather in establishing the truth of the two premises. Brushing Formal Logic aside, therefore, as of comparatively slight assistance, two types of proof remain. For the present purpose they may be distinguished as proof by induction and proof from presupposition.

Without going into the intricate questions of the kind and quality of evidence competent to establish an induction as probable or certain, what an induction attempts to prove is that certain sensations, feelings, or objects of perception are bound together, as regards their appearance in our consciousness, by determinate and fixed relations of sequence or coexistence, or both. I shall attempt to show in the sequel that inductive proof can neither prove, nor can it disprove, the reality of freedom.

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The proof by means of presupposition is of a different character. Assuming some proposition to be proved, an analysis of the process involved in the establishment of that proposition, and an examination of the evidence offered for it, are made with the purpose of showing what must be true in order that the proposition in question should be true. Any proposition established by induction, or the inductive process as a whole, may be examined for the purpose just mentioned. My attempt will be to show, by such an examination, that either freedom is real or else truth is inaccessible for us. If the disjunction be legitimate, not only do all scientific laws—logical, mechanical, physical, vital—depend for their establishment on the reality of human freedom, but also a law denying human freedom—supposing it possible to establish it on other grounds and without violence to other considerations—would here meet with check, since it would be inconsistent with a presupposition requisite to its proof. The proof may obviously be stated in the form of a disjunctive syllogism. The difficulty, as already mentioned, consists in establishing the premises. A more detailed examination of the forms of proof by induction and from presupposition in turn, in their application to freedom, will, I hope, make the position clear.

Before an examination of the process of induction, a few words on the character of the results it furnishes will be useful. One of the fictions which it seems hardest to banish from scientific and philosophic thought is the belief in the efficacy, the efficiency, the power, of a cause to produce an effect. This misapprehension, no doubt, is much aided in retaining its vitality by the use of the word "force." When in the midst of scientific procedure, scientists use the word with a very definite meaning, a meaning which has in it no slightest tinge of the notion of production. But let either scientist or philosopher discuss the question of freedom, and immediately the notion of production is somehow smuggled into their conception of cause. The more wide-spread use of the term "law of nature" is doing something to lay the ghost. For the fact of the matter is that all science can do by means of induction is to establish laws of nature,—formulæ, to use

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a more precise term. A chemist puts hydrogen and chlorine together in a jar in a dark room, by the window. In the course of the day the sun comes to shine upon the jar and the two substances spring together into chlorhydric acid. Here, evidently, is an observed sequence: nothing more is observed. The chemist expects that sequence will be repeated whenever he may choose to try the experiment. What basis that expectation has does not concern the present inquiry. The only fact present is the fact of sequence already mentioned. Of precisely the same type are laws of nature more intricate and minute. They describe sequences and spacial relations, and scientists expect repetitions of the sequences and other relations observed.

Now, if the notion of compulsion is to be introduced, it would be well to get in mind what is meant by compulsion. If a boy is kept in after school-hours, if his resignation is extorted from a dishonest official, if a nation is forced to pay a large indemnity,—in all these cases compulsion is felt. The school-teacher, the official superior, body of indignant citizens, or whoever it may be, and the nation exacting the indemnity, on the other hand, know by experience what it is to compel. In a word, both compelling and compulsion are certain emotions, and it will not do to attribute them to inorganic nature, or indeed to nature at all, under pain of lapsing into old-time animism.

Many attempts to prove freedom seek a term in the process of choice which can be one of two or more things. They bring before the mind the different motives, the appeal each makes to the individual, the fact that some are strong, others weaker, and then they introduce something called a choice which, if they are successful, must be a wholly indeterminate act. A common way of representing the situation is to figure two or three motives as tugging away at the person in different directions, he remaining entirely passive for a time, but finally pulling himself together, and pushing out into the direction of one of the tugs. It need not be said that such a description is widely at variance with the facts. If the situation is to be described in terms of hypothetically definite and

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separate mental elements, it at least cannot be described in static terms. The truth rather is that there is a constant coming and going before the mind. An impulse to action arises. Another, felt to be contradictory, opposes it. Some circumstances connected with impulse A and also attractive, let us say, occurs and re-enforces A. But some other circumstance occurs connected with B,—that is, involved in the choice of B, and re-enforces B. Suppose, then, that B is as yet somewhat less attractive than A; it may then happen that some circumstance involved in the choice of A, but this time in itself disagreeable, shall occur. And so with B. This process may continue indefinitely. Either A or B may be to such an extent re-enforced as to drive the other from the field of consciousness. A second alternative may be that neither A nor B, but a third course of conduct, C, should have slipped in between them and won the day. Or, as a third alternative, which is the second slightly disguised, it may be that the desire to decide at all costs or the hatred of indecision may finally appear and accidentally, as it were, give the advantage to A or to B. The situation is somewhat like that which would occur if the weights belonging to a sensitive balance were used with one not at all sensitive. Two nearly equal weights are put into two pans; neither moves. Additions are made to one pan and the other, somewhat indiscriminately, and finally, without previous warning, the beam tips. But describe the state of the case as one will, it is impossible at once to describe it and to leave room for capricious choice. To establish freedom it is necessary to show that at some point there is *no* definite order of sequence. To describe a sequence is to make it definite. Or, to put the same things into terms of induction, to establish an induction is to show that, given one or more elements in certain spacial or temporal positions, there will follow the same or different elements in different or the same positions. Now, in order to prove freedom it must be shown that the elements first mentioned and their position are not sufficient to determine that the subsequent elements and their position shall follow. But this is a proof from ignorance, which may at any time be overthrown by the dis-

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covery of unobserved antecedents, and of the fact that these, together with the antecedents previously known, or alone, are invariably followed by the elements in question and their position. If this statement is correct, it is evident that the attempt to prove freedom by induction is futile.

But if it is impossible to prove freedom inductively, it is equally impossible to disprove it. A generalization may be merely empirical,—*i.e.*, subject to correction on wider experience. Among the many experiences in kind and number of a physician's life, for a number of years, including the rounds of professional and domestic life, his literary, social, and political occupation, periods of travel, possibly, and many more, he picks out a certain number of symptoms exhibited by a few among his patients. He picks these out because he observes that the same symptoms occur in all the patients, and that in all they follow the same order. Let us say he calls the disease hydrophobia. Some time after him comes another physician, who declares that some of his patients exhibit the symptoms already described, but that in addition to them there is a certain state of the organism, and that it is the cause of the disease. Moreover, he declares that his predecessors were wrong in regarding the series of symptoms they described, ending with death, as fatally fixed in their sequence. He has found this condition, and by the application of certain remedies he can prevent the occurrence of death. Admit that after a while the medical profession comes to agree with the last physician. A new order of sequence is then admitted to be typical of hydrophobia. The question is, are all laws of nature equally provisional with the law of the sequence of symptoms in hydrophobia just mentioned? Are all formulæ describing empirical sequences and spacial relations at the mercy of new facts? If that is the case, it would seem possible to establish freedom without any difficulty at all. And, it must be mentioned, many of the most acute speculators are of that opinion. According to them the situation may for our purposes be described somewhat as follows: Of a large total of facts there comes to our knowledge a few of them at a time. Comparing the groups of facts which occur in the

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experience of different people, and in that of the same person at different times, certain relations among these facts have been observed. Certain typical relations have repeated themselves in the different experiences a large number of times. It is possible that they will repeat themselves again, but that is wholly problematic. That might be interpreted in this wise. The experience that each consciousness has of another never being direct, but only by means of the other's representative, his body, in the consciousness of the first, it might be thought that this representative varied in concomitance with the variations of the states of the consciousness it represents. Now, all these consciousnesses, to continue, might be "free causes" in their desires and acts of will. Further, the different consciousnesses might vary in their self-consistency. The consciousness behind a stock, a stick, or a stone might be practically without caprice, might be habit-bound, while that behind the body of a maniac might be full of caprice. According to this hypothesis, in so far as the relations under observation were those obtaining among stocks, sticks, stones, and their like, no change would be discovered in them, the reason being, according to hypothesis, that their consciousnesses are wholly self-consistent. As regards the relations among the bodily elements of the routine business-man, very little change would be observed, while in the case of the maniac the formula would have to be in constant process of correction. So the situation might be figured,—so, or in some manner analogous, and under such an hypothesis the place for freedom is obvious. To make it complete, it would of course be necessary to work it out in very much greater detail. My purpose was to mention it simply, not to expound it or make it plausible.

Suppose, however, that this is not the case at all. Suppose that there is, in truth, a world formula. It is needless to say that we are not in possession of such a formula as yet. It is also obvious that many, possibly all, of the so-called laws of sequence, already discovered, are merely provisional. But the hypothesis I wish next to face is that the ideal of science is, in fact, somewhere and somehow realized. If it be true in that sense, is freedom disproved? I do not ask in what sense

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it can be true, although, to make the discussion less difficult, I shall assume that its truth consists in its presence to some very wise consciousness. The consciousness armed with such a formula could, by substituting any value of T in it,—A.D. 1453, for instance,—read off the total situation of the world at that time. He would know not only the condition of the physical universe proper, but would, by hypothesis, know every feeling, thought, and wish of every human being at that time existing. Just so could he discover the state of things throughout the world and in every secret breast at *this* moment of time. If any one is in the midst of some moral conflict this wise consciousness can tell its issue as well as its present existence. In short, there is for him not only complete knowledge of the past and present, but complete knowledge of the future. Did any of us have that formula, he could predict every act of each of his acquaintances, and every act of his own, as long as any existed. The hypothesis is clear enough. Suppose it to be true. Is there anything in it inconsistent with freedom? To my mind, nothing whatever. As already said, such formulation cannot prove freedom. My particular thesis here, however, is that it is equally impotent to disprove it.

I must here interpose a few words upon the kind of conscious facts which the world formula cannot explain away. It is well known that tastes differ, and that they change. I hear a snarl and a growl and a snap, and immediately drop everything to rush out and look at the dog-fight; you, in the adjoining room, hear and recognize the sounds, but pay no attention to them. Sarah Bernhardt is announced as playing La Tosca. Your friend Jones stands all night in line and pays an exorbitant price for a ticket. A free ticket would not induce your friend Smith to go. Some prefer George Eliot's novels, others swear by Balzac; a third class worships Tolstoi. In the same way the tastes of childhood are not those of maturity, nor are those of maturity the tastes of old age. Nor is it only in the comparatively unimportant question of tastes that men change and differ. Men represent all kinds of character. The ideals, moral or æsthetic, of one man awaken not

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the slightest glow of enthusiasm in another. And however such curious phenomena as changes of heart, regenerations, reformations, or lapses from grace be attempted to be explained, their existence is an undoubted fact. Such novelties and differences in ideals cannot be neglected by any theory claiming to base itself upon facts. They are facts just as much as it is a fact that the rays of light coming from Mars and Jupiter differ in color, or that a falling body has a definite acceleration at a certain time and place. No competent formula can do violence to the facts of either kind. It must have a place for all.

So much being premised, let me try to explain why a world formula does not disprove freedom. It may be better to build up from a simple illustration, examining each step narrowly on the way. Imagine the universe shrunk down to a single consciousness, playing a game of chess with himself. Leaving the question why he plays chess rather than engage in some other occupation aside for the time being, suppose him to be wholly free in the choice of each move. He may play one side with an intricate and well-defined plan, the other with no plan at all, or both with, or both without; that is immaterial. Having finished the game, he shall be limited for his experience to remembering it and speculating about it. Suppose him to have a vivid memory, good powers of calculation, and considerable ingenuity in devising theories. If, then, he be curious to discover some formula in terms of which the moves of the game may be expressed, a formula less intricate but otherwise substantially the same in kind as the world formula already mentioned, he will, with his powers, undoubtedly be able to frame one. Let it be noted, in passing, that there will be a large number of repetitions in the course of the game. The knight will always move in his own curious fashion, and so with the other pieces. There will be repetition in this case, because that is the kind of game chosen. Now, the question is, Will the fact that the player has found a formula competent to express all the spontaneous actions he has performed render those actions one whit less spontaneous than they were before its discovery? It would be absurd to suppose so. Suppose

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him to stop in the midst of the game and work out a formula for the first half, and suppose it to turn out that that formula applies to the whole game, the player, for the sake of argument, having in the second halt made no effort to that end; still his spontaneity is not affected.

Let us imagine a second consciousness, B. Suppose that B knows A very well, knows his habits of mind and his preferences, "sympathetically," as we say. He knows him as you know your appointee as cashier of a bank; you are assured that under no circumstances will he misappropriate the funds. Just so Lord Salisbury knew Sir William White when he sent him on the Turkish mission. He knew what kind of a diplomat Sir William White was, and guessed pretty shrewdly how he would play the game of diplomacy. Well, let consciousness B know consciousness A after the same fashion, only much more minutely and exhaustively; let him know him so thoroughly that before A has made the first move, B knows the whole course the game will follow. Suppose B, with that knowledge in mind, to formulate the game just as A was conceived to do a short time since. B's knowledge being so accurate by hypothesis, the formula will accurately describe the whole course of the game. Is A's spontaneity in the least interfered with by that additional fact? I am sure no one will say that it is. Now, let one more personage be added. Suppose that A and B play a game of chess together. B has no more knowledge of A under these new circumstances than I have of you, or you of me, we being strangers who meet for the first time. A and B are to be free to choose their moves just as A was in the example first considered. It is one of their caprices to play in alternation, and this continues throughout the game. Then let there be a third consciousness, C, who knows both A and B sympathetically, as the B of our last example knew the A. Evidently C will know beforehand the whole course of the game. Suppose C to formulate it before its beginning; will that fact interfere with the spontaneity of either A or B? Not any more than the formulation last considered interfered with A's freedom.

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Now, instead of A and B merely, vary the occupations into infinite intricacy until they are as many as those of the past, present, and future of our own world. In the same way multiply the individuals indefinitely. Suppose, again, the existence of the sympathetic consciousness which knows beforehand the every action of each, and suppose that consciousness to work out a world formula with the same purely theoretic interest, abstaining from interference with any of the individuals. Evidently nothing essentially different from the conditions last considered, in the case of the three consciousnesses, has been introduced.

It may be asked why the sympathetic consciousness is given a part in the drama. It is because sympathy is our name for the kind of knowledge which one consciousness gets of another. One consciousness never sees another, hears, touches, or tastes it; it can only get at it through sympathy. If a time transcending consciousness which knows the consciousness of all the actors throughout the drama presentatively, and at one flash, as you or I may know our just past moment of consciousness, be introduced, sympathetic knowledge is no longer a necessary hypothesis. But I wish to put the case in terms as familiar as possible; and sympathy is a well-known form of knowledge, one that occurs many times daily in the consciousness of each one of us. Whatever the form of knowledge, the possibility of knowledge without influence, or with influence limited in extent, is the point to keep in mind.

Knowledge with influence purposely limited, every wise parent has experienced in his own person. Knowing his child well, he leaves him to follow his own impulses as long as they are wise and worthy, seeking to influence him only in case they are the opposite. Now, it is just this kind of influence that the laws of heredity, say, may be supposed to exemplify. Suppose that in the case of A and B playing the game, and C predicting its course, a slight complication be introduced. Suppose that C is not entirely passive, but has at his command two other beings, D and F. And let C decide to set D whispering advice at the ear of A whenever he thinks of making a certain move,—of moving his bishop,

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say. And let him set F at B in the same way whenever he thinks of moving his castle. Suppose, further, that although D and F are forced to give advice, what advice they are to give is left to them to decide. So complicated, the situation of the chess game is identical in every essential particular with the actual state of things about us. As the advent of D and F into the chess world is not wholly dependent upon B and A, so it is with the advent of any one of us into the real world. And just as, in the case of D and F, the fact that they cannot control their advent is in no wise inextricably bound up with their inability to control their actions after their advent, so, hypothetically, at least, can our own case be conceived. Heredity, then, and in general what will be the representative in one consciousness, if any of the acts of another can be explained as the means chosen by the sympathetic, and, according to our last-introduced complication, partially interfering consciousness for the realization of *its* ends. But given those representative facts, each consciousness may assume towards them the attitude he pleases. When B makes a move, a certain fact appears in A's consciousness. How A will treat that fact will depend wholly on himself. Knowing or not knowing what E will do when he moves his bishop, B is perfectly free to will to move it. That E comes to give him advice, and what fact B's willing will introduce into A's consciousness, these by hypothesis depend, not on him, B, but on C. I fear the illustration has been ridden to death, but I hope it will make the situation clear. The position, in a word, is that neither prediction nor formulation can in the least serve to disprove freedom. Its reality or illusoriness must be decided on other grounds. I have a line of considerations to offer which seem to me competent for the proof of freedom. I have so far attempted to demonstrate that induction, perfect and imperfect, are equally unable to answer our question. It is now time to bring forward the facts and the methods which set up some positive claims. The method, it will be remembered, was called reasoning by means of presupposition. Before considering the precise question, a few preliminary words must be said.

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Deceived by the outer and foreign guise under which facts of science appear, when used as arguments in opposition to freedom, we are apt to imagine that men have taken no important part in establishing their truth. The manner in which formal logic is commonly taught and understood has much to do with this. So many people get the notion that thinking is a purely mechanical operation, that a man thinks as water runs down hill. It is commonly asserted, without much explanation, that logical machines have been constructed, and that they are rather better thinkers than most men. They never make mistakes, while men make mistakes very frequently. One thing is certain: logical machines cannot ask questions nor invent hypotheses, and these form a large and most important part of thinking. And whether thinking be mechanical or not, every truth *we* know and can bring forward in argument is a truth attained by *us* with our processes of thinking. Whatever, then, is necessary in order to the possibility of becoming acquainted with, or getting access to, truth, scientific or other, must *a fortiori* be itself true. If freedom be proved one of the indispensable prerequisites to the attainment of truth, and if, further, the process of truth-getting can be shown to be an activity essentially the same in kind as some of the practical activities, then surely the reality of freedom can be accepted as proved.

Truth-getting reaches results so diverse in kind from those attained by other forms of activity that the essential identity in process is often lost sight of. For our present purpose, though the distinction is one of degree rather than of kind, it will conduce to simplicity to divide all activities into impulsive and deliberate. Impulses, it is commonly said, drive, while motives draw, into action. Impulsive action has no end in view; deliberative has an end. My own conviction is that impulsive action has an end in mind; that the end is vague and ill-defined, rather than absent; but let that pass. It will suffice to show the identity in process in the two cases of "theoretical" and "practical" activity of the deliberative kind, where, besides, the processes are more easy of access for examination. I get up on the right side of the bed; in a res-

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taurant I go to a table next to the wall, if any be vacant; I meet a lady I know, and lift my hat; I merely nod to Johnson across the street; I always refuse olives, but generally help myself to oranges, or *vice versa;* A's statements I accept at their face-value; when B makes a statement I set myself to ferreting out his ulterior motive; in none of these instances do I stop to think and arm myself with reasons for my action; I merely act. It is actions of this kind, which are largely in the majority, which are to be left out of consideration. But summer is approaching, and you have an opportunity to go to Europe, an invitation from a friend to spend a month at his summer cottage, a chance to join a yachting-party, while there is a large accumulation of important business which will surely go wrong if you leave home. What are you going to do? You carry the alternatives around with you in some out-of-the-way pocket of your mind, drawing them out for inspection as opportunity offers. You consult friends, and finally you decide on one of the alternatives. You have your notion of what a prudent, right, rational, or wise manner of spending the summer is, under the circumstances, and in accordance with that you decide. Another instance: a minister cannot accept some article of the creed, or does not approve of some part of the practice, of his denomination. Yet he is sufficiently convinced that he is doing useful work in his ministration. Emerson's case suggests itself as in point. What is he to do? What ought he to do? He passes through a period of more or less prolonged and agonizing indecision, balancing the pros and cons, seeking light in various directions. Finally, it may be that some striking instance of his usefulness decides him to stay, or it may be that some pungent experience shall show how untenable his position is. It may be that careful consideration without any new experiences will make clear to him the proper line of conduct and permit him to decide. In any event he has a standard of ministerial conduct, shifting, probably, possibly enlarging, possibly narrowing, but at all events a standard, and in accordance with that he decides. What is your judgment of Kipling's stories, of Pierre Lotti's, or of the paintings of the impressionist

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school? You have, or after more or less hesitation get, a standard of writing or painting, and judge them accordingly. All these cases, with the last on the border-line, are "practical" as distinguished from "theoretical." Now, my contention is that theoretical cases are of precisely this same type.

I wish to discover truth on some particular question. Did Brutus stab Cæsar? With an intricate mass of assumptions as a basis, I set out in search of pertinent facts, and such facts I can "evidence." I do not search the Hebrew Scriptures. According to my standard of evidence they furnish none. Nor, for this same reason, do I try to discover the conformation of the heavens on that fateful day. With the evidence thus selected I try to decide which of the facts, singly or in combination, make for, which against, the stabbing. And on the weight of the evidence, once more judged by *my standard*, I decide. In a manner quite analogous, Newton formulated and established the law of gravitation. If the myth of the apple be true, on observing its fall the thought flashed into his mind that all bodies might tend to approach one another, and that their mutual attraction might be capable of formulation. Using his standards at every step, both as to evidence and its weight, and as to processes of reasoning,—for the laws of formal logic are merely our standards of flawless reasoning,—he came to believe that his formula was established as a truth. Others examining it believe the formula to accord with their standards, and also accept it. The examination just made will be used for another purpose soon, but for the present the point to be brought out is that the kind of activity exercised in truth-getting, and truth-seeking, for that matter, is the same in kind with activity called practical. Or, to put the same thing in another form: deliberation and choice are the essential elements in all decisions, practical, æsthetic, or theoretic, and in all three types these elements are essentially the same. But a full understanding of this point depends upon the next, which is the keystone of the proof, since whether two facts are "essentially" similar can only be decided when the purpose to which they are to be put is made clear.

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In considering the examples of the last paragraph we have been concerned in showing that the truth-getting activity involves as a necessary part of itself teleological judgments the same in type as those involved in moral or æsthetic decision. It is now necessary to insist that the worth of a teleological judgment depends upon the worth of the conscious being making it. A moment's thought will show how inevitably we are driven to that conclusion. We talk so much about "facts" and "evidence" that we are apt to forget that they are such (*i.e.*, facts and evidence) for us only in virtue of our teleological judgments. When a man comes forward with a statement, if we are cautious persons and have reason to distrust his competence in the premises, we no doubt ask for the evidence in support of his statement. But we often forget that in so doing we are by no means doing away with the need of authority. Nor are we "letting the facts speak for themselves." Facts cannot speak. We are merely arrogating authority to ourselves to distrust the man's judgment, and to set up our own in its place as competent. Squirm how we will, in the last resort, authority, our own or that of another accepted by our own, is the basis on which all that is true for us, and each detail of it, rests. The Practical Reason has the primacy. So much being clear, is there any reason in holding that beings can be mere machines, and yet be entitled to such authority? Take the logical machine, already considered. Does the appearance of a proposition on its face, and ground out by its mechanism, endow that proposition with one whit of assent-compelling authority? The authority for that statement must be traced back to the man who devised the machine. To the degree that we are assured that he was at once competent and honest do we trust that statement. So much is sure: whenever a man is engaged in judging of the evidence and reasoning adduced in support of a proposition,—whether that proposition be, All men are subjects in thraldom to the necessary laws of Nature, or another,—his decision is of value only in so far as he is a free cause, a being of worth and weight. The presupposition without which his judgment, either for freedom

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or for necessity, is of no value, is that he is free. This, of course, is Kant's postulate of freedom. We cannot think any more than we can act without that postulate. But the consideration which changes the postulate, the attitude of the brave man who ranges himself on the side of the right, and takes the risks because they are worth taking, into a presupposition logically prior to the judgment of freedom or necessity,—the consideration which does this is brought to light when we observe that the judgment attempting to establish freedom or necessity is itself teleological. With this in mind, we see that in the act of attempting to say, We are not free, we covertly, but inevitably, assert that we are free. The logic of the situation stamps on the words, I am not free, a meaning the opposite of that they usually express.

To sum up, in conclusion, I have attempted to prove, first, that induction cannot prove freedom; second, that, neither in its present form, nor if it be filled full of perfect accuracy, can induction disprove freedom; third, that, inasmuch as our assertion of necessity depends upon our right to form teleological judgment, that assertion, the ordinary meaning of the words to the contrary notwithstanding, is itself a covert or disguised assertion of freedom; and, fourth, that the essential identity in type of "theoretical" and "practical" decision renders the latter a sharer in the freedom proven for the former.

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DISCUSSIONS.

ARE ETHICS AND THEOLOGY VITALLY CONNECTED?

A RECENT pamphlet,* which has for its subject the relation of theology and ethics, takes for its text a sentence from the "Statement of Aims" drawn up by the provisional Committee of the recently-formed West London Ethical Society. The sentence is as follows: [Our aim is] "to assist in constructing the theory or science of right, which, starting with the reality and validity of moral distinctions, shall, for the sake of clearness, separate the facts of the moral life as far as possible from metaphysical and theological presuppositions, shall explain their mental and social origin, and connect them in a logical system of thought."

[Before going on to consider the points raised, it should be noted that, as finally amended and adopted by the Society, the sentence runs thus: "To assist in constructing a theory on Science of Right which, starting with the reality and validity of moral distinctions, shall explain their mental and social origin and connect them in a logical system of thought." With the omitted clause the points of Professor Upton's criticism as against the West London Ethical Society disappears. But, though unrepresentative, the sentence may serve still as occasion for discussion of a most important point on which real difference exists.]

Professor Upton proceeds to argue:

First, that our commonest and simplest mental acts involve metaphysical presuppositions.

Second, "Strip your ethics of the metaphysical principle that the inmost spirit of the universe expresses itself with unconditional authority in man's ethical consciousness . . . and you are left with a mere collection of individual pleasures and pains, of individual likings and dislikings; and the only way an ethical preacher, who will not accept this presupposition, can morally influence society is by endeavoring to develop in his hearers a taste for a higher kind of personal satisfaction. But all experience shows how utterly feeble and futile is this method when compared with a direct

* ARE ETHICS AND THEOLOGY VITALLY CONNECTED? An Address by Rev. Chas. Barnes Upton, B.A., B.Sc. Manchester: H. RAWSON & Co., Printers, New Brown Street. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 50 and 51 Broad Street. 1892.

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appeal to that universal moral imperative which is capable of being aroused in every soul."

Third, "A man's philosophical or theoretical theory of the universe—his *Weltanschauung*, as the Germans call it, . . . reacts in a very influential way on that moral consciousness to which it largely owes its own existence, and, by this reaction, either tends to divest the moral consciousness of its sacred and authoritative character or, on the other hand, enhances that divine authority, and combines with it a powerful emotional persuasiveness growing out of the consciousness in the finite spirit of humble co-operation with the spirit of the whole."

All three contentions may be, in the main, heartily accepted, and yet it may be maintained:

First, Though metaphysical presuppositions are involved in every mental act, it is not necessary to the effective performance of any act that these metaphysical presuppositions shall be present in the explicit consciousness of the actor.

Second, Though the ultimate validity of a moral appeal depends on the universality of the principle involved, nevertheless its effectiveness depends on the adoption of the object, or will, in which the principle is to be realized as "a higher kind of personal satisfaction." If, moreover, the unconditional authority is not identified with "personal satisfaction" the authority is immoral.

Third, Though a man's philosophy undoubtedly "reacts in a very influential way" on his practice, it may be a wise, practical policy, in face of deep philosophical differences and wide-spread philosophical chaos, to separate as far as possible the discussion of ways and means for the realization of ends about which there is wide-spread agreement, from the discussion of the ultimate validity of the ends themselves. Nay, further, it may be wise, in face of the aforementioned philosophical chaos on the one hand, and having regard on the other to the ever-present (however pathetically baffled) endeavor of the human mind to bring order into the world of its experiences, to try to construct a "theory or science of right" which shall be self-consistent, scientific, systematic, *as far as it goes*, but which shall consistently set aside those ultimate questions which, however intimately they may be bound up with ethical questions, belong, in their scientific consideration, to another branch of philosophy. This is probably all that is necessarily involved in the somewhat enigmatical sentence quoted from the provisional "statement" of the West London Ethical Society.

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Whether a complete and satisfactory system of ethics can be constructed which shall neither demand explanations nor suggest questions with which ethics alone will be unable to deal, is another question. No one who believes the universe to be a knowable and systematic whole will assert the possibility of independent completeness in any one branch of knowledge. Ethics, which deals with the consideration of right and wrong modes of activity of the human spirit, in the world in which it finds itself, cannot dispense with the most thorough investigation of the nature of that spirit, the most thorough investigation of the nature of the world in which it finds itself, and the most thorough investigation of the nature of the relation between the two. It does not matter what we call the sciences which deal with these things. It does matter much that they shall be dealt with scientifically.

Those who believe in the possibility and necessity of scientific knowledge on these subjects—and however else they may differ from one another, most members of ethical societies agree in this—will find it difficult to look for much help from "metaphysics and theology" as conceived of by Professor Upton. Professor Upton says: "It is the characteristic of all metaphysics and theology, as distinct from science, that their assumptions or theories, however satisfactory to the minds which make them, do not, as the teachings of established science do, necessarily win for themselves the assent of critical thinkers." And again, "philosophical and theological theories are not, as science is, capable of being put into a shape which shall carry conviction to all minds alike." And again, "In studying philosophy and theology . . . we have entered a sphere where, as Emerson would say, the individual soul realizes, with more or less clearness and fulness, the influx of the universal soul—the sphere of spiritual discernment, of poetic vision, of prophetic inspiration; and in this sphere a thinker's philosophical and theological theories will largely depend upon the depth and richness of his spiritual experiences, and will vary even in the same individual as the tides of thought and emotion ebb and flow." It is true that philosophy has to deal with, and can only start from, the facts of life and "spiritual experience;" it is true that these vary in different individuals and change with the ebb and flow of thought and emotion in the same individual, but, if we have not arrived at knowledge of a principle, the same through all changes, persistent through all variations, true for us spite of all untruth or dulness, let us not imagine for a moment we have even a glimpse of philosophy.

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Ethical societies perhaps owe their existence to two classes: first, those who wish, in all that concerns conduct, to stand by what they can understand; second, those who wish to understand all that concerns conduct. To neither of these will a *Weltanschauung* recommend itself as stable or valuable, which depends solely on moods of mind, states of emotion, poetic insight, or spiritual discernment. The philosopher knows, *and no one but the philosopher can truly know*, how true the poet's insight may be, how far it may outrun the philosopher's knowledge. But to those in whom there has arisen the need of *knowing*, the fairest dream will be but sorry comfort.

Professor Upton's address contains a number of *argumenta ad hominem*. This method is the *pis-aller* of argument and the despair of criticism. The "despair" for the game is not worth the candle. The most elaborate analysis of the facts, as facts, leaves the real point at issue untouched. The whole force of the arguments derived from particular instances depends on the validity of the main contention in support of which they are adduced. It may or may not be the fact that "nowadays, in the very midst of our labor disputes and other social troubles, Jesus is more and more being referred to as the man in whose ideas the true key of the situation is to be found;" it may or may not be the fact that "The late Professor T. H. Green, whose Hegelian leanings are so well known, always speaks of God as the eternal self-consciousness, or the eternal thinker, and certainly regarded himself as quite in accord with all that is most fundamental in Christian theology;" it may or may not be the fact that a certain statement of aims, drawn up by members of the West London Ethical Society, is incompatible with certain statements of views by leaders of ethical movements in America,—our decision, one way or the other, as to these "facts" will not affect at all our view of the relation between the theology of Jesus and his moral insight; the relation between "all that is most fundamental in Christian theology" and "the Hegelian theory of God;" the relation between the empirical views which may be taken up by certain ethical leaders, and the metaphysical views which may be adopted by others.

It will be better, however, for members of ethical societies to think what they can learn from Professor Upton's criticism, than to dilate upon its weak points. While rejecting a conception of "philosophy" which may not concern them, students of ethics will do well to lay to heart the reminder that ethics, to be adequately studied, must be but a small part of their study; that the

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tendency to separate ethics sharply from its cognate branches of philosophy is a direct contradiction of that tendency to view life as an organic whole, which is the dominant note both in our scientific and in our moral consciousness to-day.

Members of ethical societies, moreover, must not forget that an agreement to do without agreement on ultimate questions, whether as regards the individual or the world in which he finds himself or the relation of the one to the other, cannot dissever, in reality, the intimate connection of those ultimate questions with ethics, nor can they, of all people, refuse to face the fact that to relegate such questions to regions of mystery, or ignorance, is to leave themselves an open prey to the very class of superstitions from which they are most anxious to escape. As to the effect on conduct of philosophical views, there are some members of ethical societies who echo very heartily Professor Upton's words, that the most inspiring view of life is one which makes possible "the consciousness in the finite spirit of humble co-operation with the spirit of the whole," but who nevertheless doubt the inspiring effect of that doctrine *as a mere doctrine*. Only when we have "brought ourselves under a universal" in family life, under a "universal" in civic life, and have made ourselves respond with active sympathy to the real life of ever bigger and bigger "wholes," may we feel the unique inspiration of a "universal" which we can see expressing itself in history, and which we can understand as a vital aspect of the universal life, which is our life.

Ethical societies may be forgiven if they take these steps, whether in the education of thought, or in the education of feeling, one at a time. They can, however, but be grateful to those who remind them that all are steps along one way, and that there is no final resting-place on the journey on which they have started till they complete the circle, and work out for themselves a "perfect orb of truth."

M. S. Gilliland.

London.

MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

Is it a fact that there is no distinction in ethics between theft or lying, on the one hand, and not living up to the highest ideal, on the other? Is a man who is not generous blameworthy in the same way as one who is not just? Have we as much moral right to find fault with a man for not giving up his leisure and comforts

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to relieve a poor neighbor as with one who breaks his bargains? Mr. Muirhead would appear to say "Yes" to these questions.* Mr. J. S. Mill would say "No."† I venture also to think that the ordinary sensible man of affairs (theological and supernatural ideas apart) would also say "No." Mr. Muirhead says that ethics deal with conduct and character, and that conduct is the whole of life. The ordinary man says or thinks, "When I have done my duty, then I may please myself how I act, and I am not bound to be philanthropic and self-sacrificing."

Another distinction which Mr. Muirhead appears to ignore is that between self-regarding and other-regarding conduct, between prudential and moral conduct. The ordinary man says or thinks, "Others may require me to do my duty towards my fellows, but they may not require me to be sober, cheerful, and patient. These things concern myself. I may be foolish not to practise these virtues, but I am not morally bound to do so."

Now, are these distinctions above adverted to real, or are they not? Is the area of moral obligation limited so as not to include either merely philanthropic, or merely prudential, conduct, or is it co-extensive with the whole of our conduct? It seems to me that these distinctions are essential, and the area is limited.

But if so, by what means do we determine whether conduct falls within or without this area of moral obligation? and why are we more morally bound in the case of the one class of actions than of the other?

The answer—shocking as it will be to many persons—seems to me to be that it is the mutuality of the rule which makes its observance morally obligatory, and which is one of the tests for deciding whether we are bound to observe it. When a rule is of great benefit to the community as a whole, then every member who benefits by its general observance, or hopes to do so, and who desires its continuance, feels himself morally bound to observe it also. There is a special feeling of obligation when a man knows others are observing such a rule towards him on the understanding that he does the like towards them. Of such a kind are rules against lying, theft, and breaking bargains, and in favor of bearing fair share of common tasks.

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* "The Elements of Ethics," by J. H. Muirhead, University Extension Manuals. London: John Murray, 1892. Reviewed in October number, 1892.

† See Utilitarianism, chap. v., p. 73.

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Rules of this kind have the following attributes:

1. They promote the common good.

2. They benefit each individual more than any loss he sustains in observing them.

3. They furnish him with an obvious answer to the question, "Why should I observe them?" "Because, if you do not, your fellows will not either, and you will lose as well as they."

4. Each man becomes interested in doing what he can to make his fellows observe them.

5. They are a common matter of agreement among all. All are interested in their acceptance and inculcation, all must openly profess to observe them.

6. They stand upon a feeling, deep in human nature, that it is good or wise not to injure one who is refraining from injuring us; they are part of the simple conception, "one good turn deserves another."

7. They appeal to the broader philanthropic and sympathetic spirit, as their observance is of the utmost importance to the general welfare of the community.

8. As a community cannot flourish or hardly exist without them in a more or less developed state, they tend to give rise to inherited tendencies in their favor by a process of natural selection.

Had Mr. Muirhead given due weight to the distinctions I have mentioned, he would not, I think, have made a statement so contrary to popular feeling and so, I venture to say, untrue as, that "an artisan or an artist, or a writer who does not do his best, is not only an inferior workman, but a bad man."*

NEVILLE TEBBUTT.

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* "Elements of Ethics," p. 45.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

ESSAI SUR LE FONDEMENT MÉTAPHYSIQUE DE LA MORALE. Par F. Rauh. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1891.

This work has been received with great favor by what one may call the young philosophic school in France. It has appeared to substantially represent the tendencies of the generation that is arising and that feels called upon to gather up the heritage of the schools now reigning. From this stand-point it is a curious study, as it shows us how, after a long period during which scientific ideas, principally represented in philosophy by positivism and evolutionism, have seemed to almost entirely engross all minds, a new period declares itself, wherein moral and religious ideas shall become in their turn the chief object of consideration for thinkers.

The aim which M. Rauh proposes is to endeavor to make the opposition vanish which Kant established between the order of knowledge and that of morality. He would like to show "that the ideas of duty and of liberty realize precisely the conditions that speculative reason itself demands of the truth which is to be the foundation of all other truths." Still more, by this reconciliation he attempts to go beyond Kant's practical rationalism, and to justify, not merely the idea, but the sentiment of liberty and of duty, or, rather, "*the state of the soul*, which makes us capable of active devotion and of resignation, the fellowship of men in necessary sacrifice and resignation." To attain this end, to justify morality, to justify the honest man,—him who practises resignation and self-sacrifice,—he traverses many philosophies in succession,—first of all, the naturalistic, that of Darwin and Spencer; then the intellectualist philosophy, which he also calls *le géométrisme*, and wherein it is easy to recognize the doctrine of Spinoza; then the "finalist" philosophy (a sort of reconstruction of the doctrines of Aristotle and Leibnitz); and, lastly, what he calls "moralism," which is nothing but the doctrine of Kant. It is moralism, which M. Rauh assumes to go beyond, at the same time reconciling it with the ancient metaphysics in a more ultimate doctrine, which is "*the system of liberty*."

Thus, the whole book is like a review of the great systems of metaphysics, reduced to their essential types, and successively con-

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fronted and judged, not so much by experience or science, as by the moral consciousness. Each one of them is summoned in its turn to justify resignation and self-sacrifice, and, all being weighed in this balance, are found wanting, save that one which finally takes morality for its principle.

At the same time M. Rauh brings a spirit of conciliation into this examination of systems. He struggles to discover in each one of them a soul of truth. "Even in doctrines which we do not accept," he says, "we find germs of the doctrine which seems to us the true one: well understood, they pave the way for us to a true view of things, and, more deeply studied, may appear to gravitate towards a system of liberty."

From this point of view it is very interesting to read his exposition of the ethics of Spencer. One sees very clearly the metaphysical and religious postulate upon which this ethics is based, —that is to say, that morality consists finally in harmonizing with evolution and with the Unknowable Cause which is the principle of the same. "It is," says M. Rauh, "a kind of naturalistic optimism, founded upon the belief, not merely implicit, but also clearly recognized, in something indefinitely divine which penetrates things, and acts, as it were, directly and mechanically upon them." The fundamental objection that he makes to this doctrine is that it can neither be established by experience nor proved mathematically. Spencer lacks the sense of the *a priori*.

We are less pleased with the conclusion of the very confused chapter wherein the author explains and criticises the ideas of MM. Fouillée, Guyau, and Wundt, who, in spite of notable differences, have this in common, that they attempt to reconcile naturalistic morality with metaphysical morality.

The following chapter upon "Intellectualism" is a fine example of abstruse metaphysics, the like of which has hardly been seen since Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. One passage will suffice to give an idea of it:

"One cannot deny the possibility of a *res æterna*, of conceiving of Being as a concrete union of the sensible and of the intelligible. Being may well be regarded as the profound Reason of this union, but it is transcendent. *Substantia est prior suis affectibus.* It is transcendent Being, the Intelligible or Necessary, which one must first posit before uniting it with the sensible, since the sensible is not said to exist, save in so far as this form of the Intelligible is applied to it. This form of the Intelligible or of Necessity is form only for us. The fact of thinking implies that it communicates existence. The sensible can render

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the absolute relative. But to become relative the absolute must be first posited. The relative does not relativize the absolute; it is the absolute which absolutizes the relative."

We humbly confess that we have but moderate liking for such enigmas.

The conclusions of the chapter are fortunately a little clearer. There are certain net results of intellectualism, according to M. Rauh, —for example, the positions that the real is the intelligible, (*i.e.*, a part of a dialectical system posited by reason); that knowledge is not an operation external in its character, but implies immediate union with the Supreme Principle of existence, although the latter in itself is beyond us; that, the veritable knowledge which is at the basis of all other knowledge is the immediate affirmation of the Being contained in all affirmation; that nothing is surer than the Idea, the Invisible, and that I cannot be sure even of my own existence as an individual, save as the existence of the absolute is established. The objections raised against this system are these: on the one hand, it explains neither error nor crime; on the other, it does not justify true morality,—that which has for its aim not the universal order but the individual being, capable of joy and sorrow,—and, above all, of resignation and sacrifice.

The chapter entitled "Finalism" contains an interesting though somewhat obscure and involved criticism of the value of knowledge compared with that of sentiment and action. To speculative reason, the type of certitude for which is the "notion," our author opposes what he calls "the incarnate and living reason," which attains a far superior certitude in the "sentiment" and in the "act." Nevertheless, finalism is not satisfactory; since it does not give the master-place to moral liberty, and because it still more or less regards sin and sacrifice as anomalies, scandals, instead of seeing in them "the necessary means of the divine."

Under the name of Moralism, M. Rauh, as we have said, analyzes and examines the philosophy of Kant. He essays to show that there are in it the germs of a doctrine which surpasses it,—germs which Kant has not developed, and which serve, by the development which they received later, to still better characterize what he calls the positivist attitude of Kant. He also essays to demonstrate that it is necessary to frankly substitute another type of certitude for the old metaphysical certitude, by suppressing the doubt relative to the existence of a "thing in itself," of an im-

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movable *res æterna;* to determine, in short, how the passage from metaphysical certitude to moral certitude can be rationally justified. This philosophy, which emerges from Kantism and surpasses it, is what M. Rauh endeavors himself to establish under the name of the system of liberty. Starting out with the analysis of the idea of the Absolute, he demonstrates that the Absolute is not a Notion but a Subject, that it is identical with the "I think," with the pure I; then by the study of the I he proves that the I is not a notion but a fact, and this fact is a Reason which posits itself as an end. Consequently, the Absolute and the I are one. From this principle M. Rauh deduces the evidence of God, but this God is only for him the ideal limit to which moral effort tends. . . . God is neither a perfect nature nor a holy person. So the God-man substituted for the God-nature is a beautiful symbol. As for the immortality of the soul, M. Rauh considers that it cannot be proved if it is taken in the ordinary sense; but true immortality is, in his eyes, the knowledge of our actual eternity, of our union with other reasonable beings; this alone does not deceive. Moreover, the external truth of our beliefs matters little; the essential point is that they express the state of the soul conformed to reason, the sentiment of our communion with men and the universe, the desire for joy in this communion, a state of the soul which language cannot express, and the only true manifestation of which is the moral act. From this comes the admirable doctrine of the humble, so strongly expressed by Tolstoi, and which justifies the highest metaphysics, as Pascal perceived. "Every belief which leads to good action is true; the symbols of the truth are in this sense the truth itself, if they are efficacious."

Such being the absolute, contingence is hence found in everything. Not, however, that Nature is an immediate and complete transcription of morality: it is, it must be, ambiguous. In this way the absurd comes to be justified,—the monstrous, or at least what men call so, sorrow, sin, offences, the foolishness of things. "The existence of monsters proves God as much as the harmony of forms." It is none the less true that nature, taken as a whole, is an infinite hierarchy of beings attracted to each other, and forming what might be called a ladder of love, of which the top is the conscious being. At least this is the analogy according to which we must conceive the harmony of beings, for we cannot expect to find in nature a perfect plan, but only a sort of movement towards a plan, somewhat as Darwin has partially made out. Dar-

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winism adapts itself wonderfully to the requirements of a moral system.

As one sees, this system becomes in its author's hands supple enough to contain and assimilate the very ideas which at first sight might seem directly opposed to it. I do not know but that this flexibility reaches almost to the point of uniting contradictions. Thus, after having said that we cannot employ against moral liberty any instrumentalities but itself, that we cannot suppress or violate moral liberty under the pretext of saving it in the name of a superior principle, M. Rauh admits that liberty must at times be treated as we do a thing,—constrained and violated for its own good. Likewise, he confesses that "nature shows us means for the realization of the moral ideal, which at times seems to contradict it." Let us use them, he says, only at the last extremity, but do not let us insist on being more rigorous than nature; and hence he regards it as permissible for us to enjoy as artists the spectacle of things which we condemn morally, provided the representation is beautiful and artistic. These are declarations, we think, well fitted to pain and sadden the "humble man."

To conclude: this book is the work of a mind of high rank. The spirit of it is elevated and generous; but, if one must speak with perfect plainness, the method of it is detestable. We can see nothing in it but an immense *petitio principii.* The author starts with the hypothesis that philosophy has for its aim the justifying of morality, a sort of morality, too, of which the idea remains sufficiently vague. We only know that it is the morality of the humble man, of the person who interests himself in individuals as such, and sacrifices himself for them "according as they are capable of joy, of sorrow, and of resignation." And, indeed, he manages to manipulate philosophy so that it answers to this end. But where is the proof that the justification of the humble man is really the end of philosophy?

On the other hand, the author seems incapable of making clear the principal ideas which are perpetually recurring in his discussions. He has doubtless a very keen personal feeling about them, but for want of definitions and analysis they remain very obscure for the reader. Like the motive of one of Wagner's operas, they reappear constantly, but always veiled and mysterious under the symbolical names which designate them. Such, for example, without recalling the "justification of the humble," is the *Res æterna,* or the Notion which possesses the mind of the author like a terror;

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such is again the "incarnate and living reason," often called, too, "the incarnate God," which is at the same time practical reason, sentiment, will, moral action, etc. Lastly, there is in the work an evident abuse of abstraction and the abstract dialectic,—hence, in many passages, an absolutely impenetrable obscurity. It does not seem to us, therefore, in spite of the talent of M. Rauh, that he has succeeded in his undertaking. His pretended reconciliation of the practical reason and the theoretic reason is in reality (still more so, perhaps, than in Kantism) the immolation of the theoretic reason to the practical reason. His book is, however, not the less interesting as a sign of the times, for it is nothing else at bottom than a sort of philosophical apology for Christianity, the more curious as it is written by a man who is a stranger to the whole Christian Church (M. Rauh is an Israelite), and as even the name of Christ is scarcely pronounced in it.

E. Boirac.

Paris.

The Science of Education. By J. F. Herbart. Translated by H. and E. Felkin. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Pp. xvi., 268.

We have here, in an English dress, Herbart's "Æsthetic Revelation of the World," and his "General Principles of the Science of Education Psychologically deduced from its Aim." For making these works accessible to English readers we owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. and Mrs. Felkin. They have done their work well: the translation itself is clear and idiomatic, and it is preceded by a brief life of Herbart, a lucid outline of his philosophy, and analyses of the two treatises which form the main portion of the volume. They have, however, omitted to supply an index,—an omission which we hope will be remedied in a future edition.

Herbart's work is throughout an application of philosophy to education. Its end is ethical, and the means adopted to reach this end must have their justification in psychology. These means are government, instruction, and discipline. Of these, government is essential to the possibility of both instruction and discipline. "The sole object of government . . . is to create order and keep the child within bounds." The real educative instruments are instruction and discipline. Herbart's idea of instruction is founded upon the theory of apperception. The aim is to create a wide "circle of thought" and to develop "a many-sided interest."

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Knowledge is only of educative value when it forms an organic whole, when every new acquisition is interpreted by, and finds its place in, the pre-existing totality of the contents of consciousness. That this is the only psychological theory which is directly fruitful in educational method is, we think, undoubted. Herbart sees clearly that there is not only no opposition between instruction and education, but that they are inseparable. Failure to recognize this has led to that warfare of educational schools in which both are right and both are wrong, for each has grasped a portion—but a portion only—of the truth. Instruction is even of direct ethical significance; because on the character of the "circle of thought" formed in each individual the character of that individual largely depends. For the "circle of thought" mainly determines "the circle of desires," and "action generates the will out of desires," and "the kind of the decision of the will determines the species of the character." But discipline, which is "direct action on the youthful mind with a view to form," is also essential to the formation of character. True discipline is not mere emotional influence: it is a training of the will; and this can be done by regulating the activity of the child. The true end of discipline is attained when it becomes unnecessary, for its aim is to form in the child the power of self-government. Discipline and instruction, however, are not separable, for discipline works through the circle of thought which instruction creates, and which includes not only intellectual apprehension, but sympathy, which is the foundation of moral feeling.

Such is a brief statement of Herbart's main position. With it we are in thorough agreement, and we have nothing but admiration for the philosophical depth, the cogency of reasoning, and the wealth of illustration with which it is presented. In every detail we may not follow the author. We may think, for example, that he insists too much on moulding all youths into the same form; but this is a natural reaction against the exaggerated individualism of Rousseau. And his principle is right,—a wide general training should precede specialization. As he says, "The earlier education of the child must not be burdened with special kinds of training." Of physical education we have but incidental mention; but though Herbart does not treat it in detail, he is by no means insensible to its necessity: "a healthily-ordered life must be alike the basis and the first preparation for education." Inclination would lead us, but space forbids us, to quote some of the wise and

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pregnant aphorisms which are scattered broadcast throughout the volume. For these we must refer the reader to the book itself, convinced that every one who is interested in education—as who is not?—will there find a rich feast of noble and suggestive thought. Would that all who so read may be stirred up to strive for the development of education in our own country on the broad general principles which Herbart here advances and justifies.

J. WELTON.

THE REAL JESUS: A REVIEW OF HIS LIFE, CHARACTER, AND DEATH, FROM A JEWISH STAND-POINT. Addressed to the Members of the Theistic Church. By John Vickers, author of "The New Koran," "The History of Herod," etc. London: Williams & Norgate.

The main title of Mr. Vickers's book is apt to raise apprehension in readers who recall a certain work on "The Real Shelley," and it may at once be said for him that this particular kind of misgiving, as well as any that may be raised by the sub-title, is not justified on perusal. There is really little that is specially Jewish in Mr. Vickers's stand-point, any more than in Mr. Voysey's. But all the same, his book will probably not fulfil any anticipations of profit which its title may arouse among students. It is one more application of the method of Evhemeros to the gospel narratives and their central figure; and though Mr. Vickers works with a certain independence, few of his proposed solutions are really new, while none of them is reached in a way that will satisfy those who have rejected previous applications of the same method to the same case. It is in this view that his title is most disappointing, for he does not seem to realize that the latest views concerning Jesus put in doubt far more than the supernatural side of his personality. He takes for granted not only the historical Jesus, but the historical character of the gospels, seeking only to explain away the supernaturalism, and assuming that even the miracle stories rest on some actual occurrence, either normal or fraudulent. Mr. Vickers thinks that sham miracles were actually worked. On the same lines he accepts the gospel teachings of Jesus as having been actually delivered, taking no notice of the modern view that they came from many sources, Judaic and Pagan. Thus, his aim in "The Real Jesus" is not to reach the historical bases of Christianity by sifting the gospel materials in the light of recent re-

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search, but to offer a rough-and-ready common-sense criticism, somewhat after the method of Voltaire, only more seriously. At times his expressions partly promise a historical analysis, as when he alludes to "the Pagan mysteries" in connection with "Christian masked dramas," and speaks of "the crucifixion drama." But even here he is not on the track of the important hypothesis that such narratives as those of the Last Supper and the crucifixion and resurrection are simply explanatory tales made in the common ancient way to account for the origin of a ritual or "mystery" practice. Mr. Vickers rather thinks that there was actually an original sham resurrection, a theory which, in view of the known facts as to the rituals in the cults of Mithra and Adonis and Attis and Osiris, is hardly worth discussion. He even explains the story of the transfiguration vision, not by a ritual or mystery of the later church, but by an actual open-air performance got up by some of Jesus' contemporaries.

Such a book, then, cannot help those who are seeking to pierce the clouds of legend and historic fiction which brood so thickly over Christian origins. What it may suffice for is to lead the general reader to use his judgment independently on the gospel teachings. Many will reject it as prejudiced, because it charges the Jesuine teachings with moral shortcoming much more frequently than any but professed Freethinkers are prepared for; and even many Freethinkers will demur to some of Mr. Vickers's judgments,—for instance, that on the story of the woman taken in adultery. Taking this as "truly representing the spirit" of Jesus' teaching, whether post-Jesuine or not, Mr. Vickers makes the comment: "To forbid all judicial correction for wrong-doing, because neither judge, jury, nor jailers will ever be found wholly immaculate, is only to deliver up the world to brute-violence and unabashed licentiousness." This is certainly false criticism. Whoever uttered the doctrine of the story, and it must surely have been uttered often while the Jews continued (a period hard to fix) to stone adulteresses, it is as practical as it is just. The doctrine is not that a judge must not punish theft or rape or murder because he has himself committed fornication; it is simply that we should not collectively punish those who are found committing a non-aggressive act of strictly private bearing when we ourselves all round are prepared to commit it privately. Mr. Vickers has distorted the issue.

While, however, he thus exhibits at times what some readers will

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be tempted to call Jewish prejudice, his criticism is not in general so unfair. On the contrary, it raises usefully enough a number of important problems in social ethics which are ill presented in the gospels, and which are thus kept obscure for orthodox readers, in virtue of the orthodox view of Jesus' personality. Such readers may get a wholesome shock from contact with Mr. Vickers's book. It is not a definitive ethical treatise: it savors too much, for that, of pulpit fluency, despite the methodical numbering of paragraphs; but the fluency itself attracts, and such writing may prepare the way for closer thinking. Unfortunately, the value of the book in this direction is to some extent discounted by the preface, in which, after saying a good deal in praise of his own catholicity, Mr. Vickers makes a personal attack on a clerical opponent in very imperfect taste.

JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

ENGLISH SOCIAL REFORMERS. By H. de B. Gibbins, M.A. London: Methuen & Co. 1892. Pp. 229. (University Extension Series.)

This unpretending little volume contains short accounts of the lives of William Langland, John Ball, Sir Thomas More, John Wesley, William Wilberforce, Richard Oastler, Lord Shaftesbury, Robert Owen, Charles Kingsley, Thomas Carlyle, and John Ruskin, regarded as social reformers. These accounts are tantalizing from their brevity, and are not marked by any special brightness or force; but they are uniformly accurate, sensible, and appreciative. The gist of the book is given in its concluding paragraph: "We have seen men of various periods and of various views trying with what power of good was in them to alter for the better the lives of their fellows. And, in doing so, they have used or preached one of two methods, or, if wise, they have inculcated both,—the internal and the external, the spiritual and the material, the moral and the mechanical. William Langland, poor and obscure, uttering roughly the woes of his time, yet saw that lord and villain, peer and peasant, alike must do their duty each for himself ere the troubles of England would be lessened. John Ball, fierce and courageous, believed that an outward change of social conditions was enough, and died ere he or his fellows could see his mistake. Sir Thomas More thought of man placed in some ideal state, and forgot, perhaps, that be the state never so ideal and perfect, it will,

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without a change of man's heart and mind, be ruined at the last. Wesley knew and felt that a man's social salvation, as well as his spiritual, depended on an internal and moral reformation. Wilberforce, though he believed that also, yet hoped to raise the negro by a mere change of his economic condition, and, had he lived, would have been the first to realize how utterly useless is an alteration of outward circumstances without a corresponding elevation of inward aims and ideals. In our own century the factory reformers have accentuated the outward element of reform, Carlyle, Kingsley, and Ruskin the inward and spiritual. Both are necessary, perhaps [perhaps !], yet of the two, it is the inward and spiritual alone [?] that will bring us social salvation. In the social and industrial life, as well as in any other, a man must in very truth be born again," etc. The book has an index and some good lists of authorities. It is not a powerful work, but it will be useful to those for whom it is specially designed. J. S. MACKENZIE.

FOUR LECTURES ON HENRIK IBSEN, DEALING CHIEFLY WITH HIS METRICAL WORKS. By Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A., author of "Dante: Six Sermons," "The Alphabet of Economic Science," etc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Paternoster Square, 1892.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF IBSENISM. By G. Bernard Shaw. London: Walter Scott, 24 Warwick Lane, 1891.

Mr. Wicksteed's book consists of four lectures, delivered originally in London.

The first lecture gives an interesting account of the earlier and less well known "Poems" of Ibsen. The extracts are well chosen, interesting, and characteristic, and establish the claim made by Mr. Wicksteed's opening sentence, "Ibsen is a poet." The lecture contains, also, a short but very clear statement of Mr. Wicksteed's point of view as critic of Ibsen. "Ibsen is the poet of doubt: and his doubting is so strong and true that, when we have dealt with the questions he asks us, we shall have dealt with life. . . . . What is the dead matter we are carrying with us? Is it the inheritance from our ancestors? Is it our commercial system? Is it our marriage laws? Is it our confirmed habit of lying? Is it the foolish and narrow way in which we speak the truth when we give it a turn? Is it our untamed elemental passions not yet humanized? Is it our traditional and conventional pretences? Is it our religion? If any man is afraid of these questions, let him

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give Ibsen a wide berth. If any man dares to ask them without reserve, let him welcome the terrible 'poet of doubt,' and listen to his questionings without demanding that he shall answer as well as ask them."

Lectures II. and III. are interesting analyses of "Brand" and "Peer Gynt."

Lecture IV. opens with a short account of the Emperor and Galilæan. "Here, if anywhere, Ibsen sets forth his formal creed. . . . A man may seek relief from the present by transporting himself into the past, but he cannot bring back the past into the present and make it live again. . . . Thus decisively is the reactionary solution of social and religious problems rejected."

The "question of questions" for Ibsen, Mr. Wicksteed finds to be, "How shall the self-abnegation demanded by society be combined with the self-realization that is the legitimate demand of the individual, and the salt of society itself? How shall social life and duty be made the support and the expression, instead of the charnel-house, of the free individual life?"

Ibsen's interest in marriage is due, Mr. Wicksteed thinks, to its typical significance in this respect. Here, as elsewhere, Ibsen's "*forte* is asking questions, not answering them."

The charge of immorality is well met. "Inasmuch as his works have a terribly solvent power, they may indeed tend to reduce a man to a condition of ethical agnosticism, with all its attendant dangers; but this may be said of all who challenge accepted ideas, and Ibsen is singularly free from the sin of representing a tinsel nobility as genuine, or failing to appreciate the true one of humanity wherever it is found. . . . Who, in our day, has brought home with greater force the significance to others of what we do, and what we think, and what we are, than Ibsen? Or who has made us feel the responsibility sitting closer to us for frivolity in rejecting, or hypocrisy in accepting, the current code and creeds of society?"

Mr. Wicksteed is throughout sympathetic to the modern perplexities and questionings which form the subject-matter of Ibsen's works. He neither finds answers in Ibsen nor suggests them himself.

Mr. Shaw gives us very little of Ibsen and a great deal of himself. He thinks the "quintessence of Ibsenism" is that "there is no formula." He, nevertheless, by no means thinks Ibsen merely a poet of doubt. He finds a "perfectly definite thesis." "What

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Ibsen insists on is that there is no golden rule,—that conduct must justify itself by its effect upon happiness, and not by its conformity to any rule or ideal. And since happiness consists in the fulfilment of the will, which is constantly growing and cannot be fulfilled to-day under the conditions which secured its fulfilment yesterday, he claims afresh the old Protestant right of private judgment in questions of conduct as against all institutions." This is really a summary of Mr. Shaw's own view, which he elaborates through eighty-five of the one hundred and sixty-one pages which form his book. For the remaining seventy-six pages he analyzes Ibsen's plays, with the object of showing that they are meant to illustrate this (Mr. Shaw's) principle.

Mr. Shaw is an individualist in philosophy, an anarchist in morals. The ultimate irreducible reality is the individual "will to live." This "will" must be regarded as "distinct from the reasoning machinery." "Only the other day our highest boast was that we were reasonable beings. To-day we laugh at that conceit, and see ourselves as wilful creatures." The "will" is therefore equal to "impulse," and impulse is its own sufficient justification. (Why any justification is necessary to beings who are not "reasonable" is not apparent.) But, "The impulse towards greater freedom" is the "sufficient ground for the repudiation of any customary duty, however sacred, that conflicts with it." Should I approach Mr. Shaw, and say, "My impulse to kill you is the sufficient ground of my repudiation of any customary duty, however sacred, that conflicts with it," will Mr. Shaw accept his disciple, and further the practical application of his maxim? If not, why not? "Conduct must justify itself by its effect upon happiness." "Happiness consists in fulfilment of the will." It is my will—*i.e.*, impulse—to kill Mr. Shaw. He may remind me that his happiness might not be equally secured by my deed. Then I must remind him that he has taught me that I owe no duty to any other, save only to myself, and I cannot see how Mr. Shaw, on his own principle, can deny me my happiness.

Mr. Shaw has courage and insight, but his thought is chaotic, and his book offends by its author's worse than school-boy-like love of shocking the proprieties, and by its cheap smartness, got by using familiar terms in an unusual way. Mr. Shaw cannot produce a new vocabulary, and he pays for his piquancy by self-contradiction.

The book is, however, interesting as typical of our chaotic time. Mr. Shaw tells us he has banished from his system "God, reason,

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and duty." That is, it has no unity, does not distinguish between right and wrong, and is irrational. This is quite true. Prophets are seldom so frank.

Two fine instances of moral insight may be mentioned. One is the recognition of the "higher love" developed in Rebecca West, in "Rosmershohn." The other is the treatment of the story of Solveig, in "Peer Gynt." Mr. Wicksteed's treatment of this latter is an interesting contrast to Mr. Shaw's. Mr. Wicksteed tells of the meeting of Solveig and Peer as follows: "At this moment Peer Gynt's good angel appears upon the scene. . . . Begotten of God, in her virgin bosom at that first interview is an ideal Peer Gynt, such as God would have him be. This child of her own pure heart will grow till it becomes her very life, and, however sorely tried, she will never desert it or cease to believe that it exists. Peer Gynt may ruin and annihilate his actual self; his ideal is beyond even his own reach, safe in God's keeping and in hers. She at least knows what God meant when he made Peer Gynt." "The play culminates in the doctrine that the only redeeming power on earth or in heaven is the power of love."

Mr. Shaw tells of the final scene—the home-coming and death of Peer Gynt—as follows: "At last he finds a deserted sweetheart of his youth still waiting for him, and still believing in him. In the imagination of this old woman he finds the ideal Peer Gynt; whilst in himself—the loafer, the braggart, the confederate of sham magicians, the Charlestown speculator, the false prophet, the dancing girls' dupe, the bedlam emperor, the selfish thruster of the drowning man into the waves—there is nothing heroic,—nothing but commonplace, self-seeking and shirking cowardice and sensuality, veiled only by the romantic fancies of the born liar. With this crowningly unreal realization he is left to face the button-moulder as best he can." These points of view are diametrically opposed. Which is true? Which is Ibsen's? Ibsen's is not quite simple. The figure of Solveig has at all times beauty. But she spends her whole life, from the time she loves Peer Gynt, in the depths of a forest, far removed from human life and its activities. Surely this feeling that broods and feeds upon itself is not meant by Ibsen as the love "that redeems the world." This is not the tenderness that led Cordelia to the side of Lear, Romela to the children of Tito. Does not Mr. Shaw, in this, see more clearly than Mr. Wicksteed the things that are "true" and "lovely"?

M. S. GILLILAND.

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THE ETHIC OF USURY AND INTEREST. A Study in Inorganic Socialism. By the Rev. W. Blissard, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschien & Co. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. viii., 194.

As a critic of "State or Organic Socialism," Mr. Blissard maintains that the abolition of private rights to interest on capital would be inexpedient as discouraging, and unjust as failing to recompense, the savings of the products of labor. Hence, apparently, he styles his own kind of Socialism, by way of distinction, "inorganic." But on the philosophical bearings which this distinction involves, on the relation of the individual to society, he does not dwell; his object is not to discourage socialism, but to make fresh converts to it; to lay stress not on the justice of interest, but on the injustice of usury,—*i.e.*, of any interest above the smallest necessary to reward the savings which labor has made. His success in this endeavor does not appear to me to be complete. He seeks support in arguments drawn from so many sources that he could not possibly, in an ordinary volume of the "Social Science Series," have room to justify any of them. In his historical treatment of the subject he is anxious to discriminate between the stupidity of forbidding as unnatural the taking of all interest, and righteous protests against using the necessities of the poor as a means of extorting an exorbitant rate. It is against this latter kind of interest alone, deserving the opprobrious name "usury," that Mr. Blissard thinks the doctrines of the Bible were really directed. But surely it is not very convincing to attribute simply to "bondage to the letter of Scripture" the belief, responsible for centuries of persecution and financial discomfort, that interest was in the New Testament absolutely forbidden. Mr. Blissard might at least have said that ignorance of Greek had something to do with it. The words μηδένα ἀπελπίζοντες, of Luke vi. 35, stood for centuries translated in the Latin version by *nihil inde sperantes;* and no one had the knowledge necessary to make the requisite alteration into *desperantes.* That the usury laws of more recent times were, however good in intention, failures in practice, Mr. Blissard admits, but, on the ground that the economic freedom which has followed them is also a ghastly failure, filling "some with alarm, others with horror," he urges that some new, though wiser, economic restrictions should be again imposed.

The attempt to provide a remedy necessarily leads the author

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into the department of economic theory. The simplicity which characterizes his views as to the relations of labor and capital is perhaps greater than would be desirable. The "undertaker," who is frequently considered by economists to be a distinct factor in the problem, is ignored, and thus it is allowed to appear fairly plausible that the laborer is entitled to everything beyond a small interest on the capital advanced, and that if, as is generally the case, he does not receive all that surplus, an idle, usurious capitalist has been robbing him. And this simplification would seem to involve another.

By laying stress on the directness of the relation between labor and capital it is made to appear that the condition of the laborers themselves—*e.g.*, their inefficiency or excessive supply—are not essential or primary causes at work in the depression of labor, but rather consequences of a depression for which the greediness of capital should bear the entire responsibility. That is an easy method of clearing away half the complications of the labor-question. "Until—which is very far off—the limits of food are reached, a normal increase of man made in the image of God, and every improvement in the fertility of natural forces, should be unmixed blessings to mankind." The reason why such a consummation is not realized is that "some immorality is at work," which, by means of a long illustration, hopelessly inadequate as representing the "salient features" of to-day, he expresses in the very unscientific proposition, "The germ of usury is uselessness." But it would be unsafe to examine Mr. Blissard's economic theories closely; to do so they would have to be invested with an amount of precision which might amount to misrepresentation. Nor are his statistical methods altogether convincing. To quote figures illustrating the unequal distribution of wealth is easy; to base arguments on them is very different matter. For example, from the fact that in 1888 only nine per cent. of the people who died bequeathed so much as one hundred pounds, to assume that ninety-one per cent. of the population are shut out from the inducement to save is surely rather precipitate. And, individual instances apart, it is obviously impossible to form, from statistics merely illustrative of the inequality of wealth, an impartial estimate of the extent of the evils for which that inequality is held to be responsible. The remedies which Mr. Blissard proposes as practical seem to suffer from a similar want of cogency. The enemy of labor, monstrosity as he is, is treated as void of the usual

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attributes of wickedness,—viz., cunning, obstinacy, and power. But the contingency is not on the face of it impossible that the resistance of the capitalist might prove as serious a disturbance to industrial organization as the zeal of the Socialistic reformer. I have mentioned four methods of treatment which Mr. Blissard employs, but I ought to add that they are all entangled with a fifth, which apparently justifies the description of the book as an "Ethic." I hope I am not doing him an injustice when I say that the "ethical" aspect of the book consists simply of a vigorous protest against the social and moral evils of luxury, together with a deep sympathy for, and an anxious desire to ameliorate, the distresses of the lower classes. Beyond, perhaps, the postulate that the right of possession is derived from labor, the moral stand-point is simply that of the ordinary conscience, and is supported not by philosophical arguments, but by rhetorical appeals to the emotions. That need not be an objection if the book is intended to be no more than a piece of partisan rhetoric, calculated, by culling items of fact and theory from various sources, to stimulate a hatred of the luxurious, and a sympathy for the discontents of the poor. But readers who wish to regard the book as an attempt to give a scientific explanation of the causes of "usury," together with practical proposals for their removal, will find the rhetoric a serious obstacle to the argument, and will probably be on their guard against the dangerous fallacy, into which Mr. Blissard appears to have fallen, of thinking that the economic difficulties of the age can be overcome by giving vent to the righteous indignation of the moralist.

ARTHUR EASTWOOD.

AN AGNOSTIC'S APOLOGY, and Other Essays. By Leslie Stephen. London: Smith, Elder & Co.

"It is very easy, and at the present time very safe, to tilt against the established creeds" (p. 342). The purpose of the present collection of essays (which are nearly all reprints, with alterations, from magazine articles) is to tilt against established religious creeds. This exercise finally exhausts itself in the admission that "if a man will not abandon a religion till he has another to put in its place, we must confess that his demand cannot be met" (p. 377). The reviewer is, therefore, placed in a difficulty. It is generally desirable that a criticism which intends to be serious and honest should base itself upon some fundamental principles with which the author agrees. But, as Mr. Stephen has no positive theo-

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logical principles to uphold against the theologies which he attacks, we are unable to find in theology any common ground. The position which he takes at the outset, and which he desires to enforce throughout, is that a science of theology is impossible. That theology lies beyond the sphere of human intelligence is the initial proposition which, as an agnostic, he "asserts in opposition to theologians." He is, of course, perfectly at liberty to hold such an opinion. But I should like to remind him that, if he is prepared to maintain that opinion, he must be prepared to discuss its basis. It is indeed very easy and very safe to tilt against any established theology, as, for example, the Christian, if we start with postulates which directly involve the impossibility of every theology. Mr. Stephen's postulates are of this nature. He states, on page 2, that "the gnostic"(*i.e.*, any one who is opposed to agnosticism) "holds that our reason can, in some sense, transcend the narrow limits of experience. He holds that we can attain truths not capable of verification, and not needing verification, by actual experiment or observation."

Mr. Stephen recognizes, whereas his opponents violate the limits of experience. I think it is obvious that the only possible basis on which to discuss this contention is some theory of the nature of experience and its limits. A man may attack one theology from the stand-point of another, but, if he attacks theology in general, he must retire to the more ultimate stand-point of the general principles of knowledge. Mr. Stephen's arguments are founded on assumptions as to the nature of experience and its limits. Knowledge is limited to experience; theology transcends those limits and is, therefore, unknowable. That is the initial *petitio principii*, of which all the succeeding arguments of the book are simply detailed applications, taking the form: the knowledge of experience consists of certain sensations, reflections, emotions, social instincts, and the like; theology does not limit itself to such experiences; therefore it is not knowledge. What he really asserts is, not that theology transcends experience, but that it transcends his view of experience. If this assertion is to be more than a purely personal opinion, if he is prepared to support it by argument, he must show not only that his view of experience is correct as far as it goes, but that experience cannot contain more than he says it contains. As he has not met this demand, I do not see how the question as to the truth of his opinions can form the subject of strictly scientific discussion.

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"To the great mass of mankind a sacrifice of consistency or of rigid proof is, of course, no sacrifice at all" (p. 323). To the readers of Mr. Stephen's book, who belong to this class of humanity, and, in particular, to those who are naturally predisposed to let the inconsistencies of Christianity obscure its truths, and to take on trust a scepticism of philosophy and a belief in the efficacy of science, I suggest the following considerations. Mr. Stephen attacks revelation on the grounds of what he holds to be reason; reason, with him, is the faculty which investigates the laws of natural phenomena; with such a reason revelation is inconsistent. The conclusion that, if reason as thus defined be the standard of truth, revelation is false, is a truism. It proves that the supernatural cannot be subordinate to the natural. It may or may not prove that the two cannot be held apart as co-ordinate kinds of truth. It does not prove that the supernatural must be eliminated. He attacks the conceptions of heaven and hell as states in which life is continued after death. As the only kind of life which we know on earth exists under empirical conditions, and as those conditions are removed at death, we cannot say, using the terms "life" and "know" in the same sense as before, that we know anything about a life after death. Christianity frequently talks as if it could, and, in so doing, commits the error of applying empirical conditions (*i.e.*, involving reference to phenomenal objects in space and time) where they are inapplicable. Here is a true charge which may be brought against Christianity, but one which is by no means fatal to its vitality. To convert the proposition: Christianity ought not to employ empirical terms where they are out of place, into the proposition: It is out of place for Christianity to employ any but empirical terms, would be to aim a blow at the very foundations of Christianity; but it would also be to propound a palpable fallacy. He attacks Christianity historically, by showing that degrading superstitions and barbarous persecutions have arisen in its name. No one denies the fact; but to infer that Christianity is barbarous and degraded is to commit what logical primers call the fallacy *ad hominem*. His treatment of philosophy is somewhat similar. "A vigorous religion is a superstition which has enslaved a philosophy" (p. 328). This remark appears to provide the reason why Mr. Stephen finds it necessary to make philosophy the subject of unmitigated abuse. He is never tired of informing us, in the language of scorn, that philosophy is an utter failure. As every philosopher "flatly contradicts the first principles of his predeces-

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sors," and as co-existent philosophers are hopelessly inconsistent (p. 15), the conclusion is that philosophy has established nothing. Most philosophers would, I think, flatly contradict the above premises; but no matter; as Mr. Stephen does not defend them, it would be idle to dispute them. Let us assume as granted his conclusion that philosophy has established nothing. The inevitable inference is that philosophy is unable to give us any assistance. Then is Mr. Stephen able to dispense with the aid of philosophy? He does not even attempt to do so. Causation, free-will, phenomena, sensation, consciousness, and the like, are terms of which he constantly avails himself, and to which he frequently attaches definite predicates. But these are the very terms with which those philosophers deal whose discrepancies, he alleges, prove the helplessness of philosophy. Let the "general reader," therefore, observe that Mr. Stephen does not discard philosophy but philosophies, or, more precisely, all those theories of hitherto existing philosophies with which he does not agree. But there is one peculiarity about Mr. Stephen's philosophizing. An ordinary philosopher thinks it necessary to justify his views by defending the points on which he disagrees from others; Mr. Stephen thinks that by abusing philosophers for their disagreements he has purchased the right to pick out, without the necessity for justification, an arbitrary theory of his own. (*vid.*, in particular, Chap. IV.) I dwell on this demand for a reasoned justification of all philosophical terms employed, because, as Mr. Stephen himself points out, the necessity for reasons is just what the popular mind is apt to overlook. "There is nothing, as every school-master knows, which the average mind resents so much as the demand for reasons. It will gladly accept any rule, provided that it has not to answer the troublesome question, Why? Tell me how to answer, but, for heaven's sake! don't explain the reasons of the answer" (pp. 323–324.) This reproach, directed against Christians, might profitably be taken into account by those agnostics who would believe that unsystematic philosophy is common sense.

That, however, which may probably appear the most persuasive element in the book is not so much an argument as a bribe. He is constantly reminding his readers, when he has been disgusting them with Christianity, that the refuge of agnosticism can provide satisfaction for all their highest rational instincts and aspirations. With this end in view, he succeeds in showing, with much vigorous good sense, that he himself (and, therefore, presumably, any one

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else who calls himself an agnostic) possesses a healthy aversion to everything that is degraded, and a strenuous desire to recognize the nobler aspects of human life. That those aspects are adequately expressed I should, of course, dispute; but that the intention is to express them no one can, in fairness, deny. But does this fact bear the slightest weight as an argument against the religion of Theism? Does it follow that Mr. Stephen's true emotions and instincts are inimical to, or incompatible with, or not entirely contained and absorbed in, the truths of Christianity? Because Mr. Stephen has honest human sympathies, does it follow that he has exhibited that understanding of the principles of theology and philosophy which is requisite to justify an attack on them? Not logically, perhaps; though it might appear to follow to the "general reader" whose reason is lazy but whose sympathies are active. To such emotions, however, Mr. Stephen has provided a corrective. In strange inconsistency with his protests against those people whose only argument is a sneer, he never loses an opportunity of scoffing at subjects and ideas which most people regard with reverence. Apart from the counter-emotion which may thus, perhaps, be excited, the reader is placed in a very practical dilemma. In the last chapter, entitled "The Religion of all Sensible Men," mankind is divided exhaustively into two classes,—the first, "sensible," who believe that there is no religion, and are only in doubt as to whether they should impart their beliefs to others; the second, fools, who want a religion, and whom it is the duty of the "sensible" either to dupe or to dismay. "Why drop a veil so easily worn? Religion is, after all, useful; and we are even bound—for the sensible man can take a high moral tone when he pleases—to invent the God who does not exist" (p. 339). Surely no reader can identify himself either with the presumption of such "sense" or the degradation of such folly.

ARTHUR EASTWOOD.

LE DEVOIR PRÉSENT. Par Paul Desjardins. Paris: Armand Colin et Cie., 1892.

This beautiful little book should have had an earlier notice in these pages. It breathes a spirit almost identical with that which animates the "ethical" movement in America, and contains a distinct and noble recognition of the value of the discourses translated by Professor Hoffman, of Ghent, into French, under the title, "La Religion basée sur la morale: Choix de discours publiés par les sociétés pour la culture morale" (Paris: Fischbacher, 1891).

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According to M. Desjardins, there are more fundamental questions than those relating to the divinity of Christ, or even to the existence of a personal God. Has mankind a destiny? Is there a law for human life? Is duty a reality? These are the deeper problems, and he argues for an affirmative, positive answer to them in a way that can hardly fail to persuade, and that refreshes the spirit as well. It is reassuring to hear, above all from France (which we commonly suppose to be given over either to superstition or to practical materialism, with elegant scholars like Renan, and a few philosophers or men of science, in between), such a cry, such a call. For one must not suppose that "Le Devoir Présent" is a philosophical treatise (it would have limitations considered from that side); it is the call of an earnest spirit for a new moral life in the French nation, for new practical convictions, for a transformation of individuals and society.

The aim of M. Desjardins is not to destroy the old religions, nor is it to found a new religion. The primordial affair, he says, is not speculation on the universe, but conduct. Nor is his aim to be identified with that of philanthropic societies. It includes charity; but it goes deeper than charity,—he wishes to touch and awaken the *souls* of men. He believes that working-people, as truly as others, might be inspired with a great aim,—might help themselves and help one another in various ways, and make the sacrifices and take the responsibilities, which are the only means of ennobling men. M. Desjardins believes in democracy, but is opposed to socialism. Very severe is he on the immoral literature with which France is flooded, and he hopes that art will be penetrated with a more serious spirit, a higher morality. At the outset a movement of opinion is alone desired; but in time M. Desjardins hopes that the idea will incarnate itself somewhat as it has in America and England (and, it might be added, in the light of recent events, in Germany). No meagre notice like this—no notice of any sort—can give an idea of the charm and earnestness and persuasive power of M. Desjardins's little volume. It should be translated into English.

WM. M. SALTER.

ETHICAL SONGS, WITH MUSIC. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1892. [London: T. Fisher Unwin.]

This volume of one hundred and forty-seven songs is issued anonymously, but one of the compilers is understood to be Dr. Stanton Coit. It is the practical result, the compilers say, of a

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vote passed by one of the clubs of the "Leighton Hall Neighborhood Guild," Kentish Town, London. The club wished for a collection of the best songs, with music, for singing at the graver meetings of the guild. It is not only fitted for this purpose; it is a fine collection of stirring English verse, so admirably set to music that the thoughts expressed must take a deeper hold on any one, whether at home or in school or at a religious gathering, who sings or listens. There are verses by Chaucer, George Herbert, Shakespeare, and Sir Henry Wotton, and also by such recent writers as Clough, Longfellow, John Henry Newman, Matthew Arnold, Whittier, and Lowell. All are simple and undogmatic, and appeal to universal human sentiments. Most churches would require something more distinctly religious; but all schools of an unsectarian sort (such as the public schools in the United States), all societies, clubs, guilds with a serious aim, and private families who wish to keep and perpetuate what is best in "family worship," under whatever changes of theological belief, would find the collection suited to their needs.

Its contents are arranged under three headings,—"Of the Inner Life," "Of Social Life," "Of Nature." There are such sub-headings as these: "Truth to Conscience," "Happiness from Within," "Patience in Grief," "Quiet Work," "Self-Control," "Thankfulness," "Progress," "Praise of the Good," "Freedom," "Hope," "Aspiration." The devoutest believer can object to nothing in the book; no earnest person of any description can fail to be edified by it. It points to the spiritual ground which may be taken by all good men in common, to the "one religion," of which Emerson said that "sensible men and conscientious men all over the world" belonged to it (whence his inference that a statement of religion was possible which made all scepticism absurd), "the religion of well-doing and daring," "of sturdy truth," "of integrity and feeling for others" (Works, vol. x., p. 215). To parents and teachers who are solicitous for the training of their children or pupils to high sentiments and noble conduct, "Ethical Songs" will be particularly welcome.

WM. M. SALTER.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1893.

ON CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORAL TRAINING.*

Our way in the foregoing course of lectures has been a long one; but we have yet to face, in concluding to-day, one of the most difficult and delicate of our problems,—a problem which has recently been discussed by some of the ablest of our public teachers. I refer to the problem of the moral education of the young. My only hope of being able to suggest to you anything that can at once possess any real value, and contain any relative novelty, must depend altogether upon the fact that in the present discussion, as in the earlier lectures of this course, I come to this problem, for the time, with the interests of the student of psychology. Both the practical and the purely philosophical aspects of the problems here involved are for us, just now, subordinate to the psychological questions which come in sight as we approach this region of discussion. As teachers, you are indeed usually more directly concerned with the practical question, What can I do

* The following paper was the last in a series of twelve public lectures delivered at Harvard University on Thursday afternoons in the months from February to May of the present year. The lectures, intended for teachers, were prepared under the general title "Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers," and dealt with the theory of General Ideas, with the functions of the Imitative Type, with the Psychology of Self-Consciousness, and with connected topics. The references to foregoing lectures in the present paper are thus to be explained.

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to make my children morally better? On the other hand, as a student of philosophy, I myself am usually most interested, when I devote my attention to ethical matters, in the philosophical questions as to the deeper nature, the authority, and the source of the human moral consciousness, and of the distinctions between right and wrong. But to-day you and I are once more to try to meet upon that common ground of interest in psychology in the natural history of man,—that ground which we have all found, as I hope, in the foregoing lectures, not devoid of suggestions for the teacher. And upon this ground we are to consider not so much your directly practical concerns in regard to the moral education of youth, nor the theories of the philosophers as to the ultimate nature of conscience, but rather some aspects of the natural history of the moral consciousness in man, and especially in the childish and youthful stages of the human mind.

I propose, then, to consider in your company, (1) What principal mental factors go together to make up what you and I call the human conscience; (2) How these factors, on the whole, develop as the mind grows from infancy to manhood; and (3) What difficulties and undertakings consequently lie in the way of any one who desires to train, or to aid in training, the moral consciousness of children and youth.

I.

By the conscience of man is popularly meant a collection of mental tendencies which express themselves, upon occasion, in our opinions about what we call the difference or the differences between right and wrong, in certain judgments upon the actual or conceived conduct of ourselves and of others, and in dispositions of greater or less vigor to do the right, despite evil temptations and selfish interests, and to conform our lives to ideal standards. I have intentionally shown in this decidedly hasty and incomplete definition how complex and manifold a collective mental reality our conscience, as popularly conceived, has to be. As a fact, the popular definition of the conscience is usually both vague and highly metaphorical. We have in us, it is said, a "faculty," a "power,"

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a "sense," or an "intuition," by virtue of which we naturally "perceive" a certain distinction,—namely, that between right and wrong in conduct. This distinction is often said to have something "ultimate" and "irreducible" about it, something which we comprehend only because we have this faculty or intuition itself. But it is not enough for us thus to possess a general knowledge that there is a distinction between right and wrong; we must also possess, somehow or other, the further "power" or "faculty" to apply this general distinction to the determination of right and wrong in particular instances. Our moral consciousness must tell us not only that there is in general a right and a wrong, but also that in this individual case *this* is right and *that* is wrong. Nor does our conscience, as popularly conceived, end its task here. It not only determines what is right for us and what is wrong, but it judges what ought to happen to us when we do right or wrong. It accuses us and excuses us; it gives us a sense of guilt and a sense of worth; it not only lays down the law, but acts as judge of past deeds. Moreover, it not only judges our acts, but it also weighs our general tendencies, our dispositions, our habits. It praises some of these as virtues and declares others to be vices. It undertakes to be in all this a kind of inward voice, unquestionable, imperative, authoritative; but, unfortunately, it is not altogether paramount in the guidance of our actual conduct. It estimates, but it does not always control; it sets before us ideals, but these we are free to follow or not, as we choose. What we do not get free from is the judgment which conscience passes upon our deeds when once they are done,—the penalty which its pangs impose upon us for misdoing.

Meanwhile, this "power," this manifold "faculty," revealer of truth, law-giver, judge, executioner, is, as popularly conceived, something existent in advance of education; but it is also something that can be educated. Exactly what it originally is, apart from education, seems to the popular mind doubtful. On the other hand, it is certainly supposed to need careful training. But is it not, then, after all, only a residuum left in us by our training? Is it not a mere embodiment of

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social tradition? No, says the popular consciousness, for do I not feel my conscience to be my own? Does not my moral sense declare that its judgments are self-evident, and would remain true even although all the world thought otherwise? Social traditions change, but conscience declares that its truth is immutable and is the same for all times and peoples.

Yet, on the other hand, over against this consciousness of the immutability of conscience stands as an inevitable and unquestionable fact the unfortunate existence of extremely varied and conflicting views among conscientious people whenever they undertake to judge the same moral questions in cases of any complexity. This judge whose dictates are to be universal and immutable gives laws which equally earnest and devoted persons often interpret in precisely opposite ways. In every war between civilized nations, in every controversy over serious political issues, in case of every social movement that opposes tradition, in the disputes between the religious sects, and even in the fortunes of almost every serious friendship, we observe cases where perfectly conscientious people oppose with great vigor, and with no small tendency to moral indignation, one another's dearest ideals and moral judgments. Some of the hardest quarrels to bring to a close are the quarrels of equally dutiful people concerning what constitutes their duty. If everybody's conscience pretends to be infallible, there is also little doubt that hardly any two of us, in presence of the same issues of life, and after the most careful possible consideration of the various cases which may come to hand, will always pass precisely the same moral judgments. Conscientious differences of opinion, then, are among the most familiar, as they are also among the most lamentable, incidents of the moral life. Every serious religious difference, for instance, is likely to involve just such conscientious variances of opinion. And what is more common than the existence of serious religious differences? "My conscience tells me that your soul must be in danger, because of your misbelief and your misdirected service." These are the words that each of two perfectly devout believers may, just because of his conscientious devoutness itself, address to the other.

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It is not needful to say that these paradoxes of the human conscience, as it is popularly conceived, have long since attracted the attention of philosophers, who have endeavored to classify this painful situation, and to unravel the tangle of this enormously complex thing called the moral consciousness, by devices which have themselves been of the most various sort. It is also not needful to say again that in thus glancing, as we pass, at this wonderland of inevitable difficulties, I have no intention of dealing at any length with its specially philosophical perplexities. All that I want to do in this brief sketch of the general natural history of conscience is to suggest to you a very few psychological considerations which may tend to make more comprehensible, why there should exist in the adult civilized man this complex net-work of general ideas called, in our popular speech, the conscience; why the conscience of each one of us is, as a fact, a product of training in precisely the sense in which any other group of general ideas (*e.g.*, those of mathematics) is a product of training; why, nevertheless, there is a perfectly comprehensible reason for the existence of that sense of the authority and immutableness of the true conscience which all the conscientious share; and why, meanwhile, this ideal of the authority and the immutableness of the true conscience are perfectly consistent with the variety and the fallibility of such actual fragments of this true conscience as you and I, in the course of our imperfect training, become aware of as we grow in moral insight. This undertaking of mine may seem very difficult; and of course I shall have to proceed dogmatically; yet for our purposes the matter will prove to be by no means as involved as it seems.

II.

If you examine a little your own conscientious opinions, you will find that, whatever they are in detail, they may easily be grouped under two heads: (1) They are opinions concerning the value of charitable, of loving, of humane, of kindly, of public-spirited deeds, thoughts, or tendencies, as against what are called "selfish" deeds and dispositions.

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Any moral doctrine that lays stress upon the love of God or of one's neighbor as the fulfilment of the law appeals to conscientious convictions of this type. (2) Your moral opinions are, some of them, also, opinions concerning what are frequently called matters of justice in the most general sense of the word, and the word justice used in this quite general sense, apart from any special definition of its content, always implies some sort of conformity to an universal law just as an universal law, and as against capriciousness, anarchy, passion, or mere sentiment, even if this be the noblest of sentiments. To put these two classes of judgments together: Conscience, in brief, whether it tells us of penalties or of virtues, whether it lays stress upon the general distinction between right and wrong, or insists upon particular acts as the only right ones, whether it praises or blames, whether it declares itself to be immutable and infallible, or merely lays stress upon the affairs of the passing moment, whether it defines our duties towards man, or proclaims our obligations towards God, is always engaged upon some aspect of one twofold business. It gives us two sorts of advice at the same time. It always says to us, *Be humane, be self-sacrificing*, be devoted to a will existent beyond your own. It also always says to us, *Be lawful, have a rule in life, have a plan, be consistent.* It condemns selfishness. It also condemns caprice. But it condemns them both at once. And the difference between the two commands is obvious. Conscience is not satisfied either by loving conduct that is capricious, or by well-ordered conduct that is inhumane. Yet capricious kindliness is as possible as inhuman consistency of action. The man who, without any special reason, squanders his means upon chance gifts to a crowd at a public festival, appears to us so far kindly, but he also appears immorally whimsical. There is no justice in his anarchical *largesse:* conscience easily condemns him. The man who should persistently neglect his own family in order to give happiness to the family of some stranger would in vain plead his benevolence as an excuse. We should judge him by the standard of a general rule. We should say, Let every man

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first attend to the duty that lies nearest. On the other hand, the passer-by, neglecting the stranger by the wayside because he fears some sort of contamination, may be conforming to a rule; but the benevolent rule of the Good Samaritan, who sees his neighbor in every man who needs his immediate help, is a far nobler rule, and conscience here easily decides in favor of the loving act.

Here, then, are illustrated the two universal motives of conscience. They are both present, in greater or less measure, in the determination of every moral judgment. Their complex interplay determines also, as a fact, the enormous variety of conscientious opinions and estimates to which we have already made reference. For the two motives soon prove to be often very hard in practice to combine. Virtue is at once benevolence or humanity, *and* conformity to universal rules. The first motive demands of us self-sacrifice, suppression of private for relatively disinterested motives, charity, good-will to men, love. The second motive demands of us self-consistency, conformity to principles of conduct, unity of life, harmony of motives, reasonableness. In the first sense of the word, that is, in conformity to the first motive, virtue is essentially dependent upon sympathy, social suggestibility, open-mindedness, sensitiveness to the needs of our fellows, recognition of the facts of life, realization that our brother has need, appreciativeness in the presence of the hidden inner life of other men, pity, compassion, impressibility, a disposition towards submission to the social life, a readiness to make the will of others our own will. In relation to the second motive, virtue appears as a disposition to live according to reason, to subordinate whim to good order, to act at each moment as we could always wish to have acted, to attain moral wisdom, and to live in the light of such wisdom. The first motive says, *Live for the general good.* The second motive says, *Always be true to your own rational higher self.*

These two dispositions, I say, are found wherever conscience is found, and the developed conscience of any civilized man, with all its complexities, its inconsistencies, and its varieties,

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with all its assertion of universality and infallibility, and with all its changing and often doubtful individual dictates, is a collection of opinions and interests founded upon an effort to apply to life, at the same time, and in a consistent fashion, these two motives together. It is the dignity and immutability of the ideal that these two motives ought to be somehow completely harmonized which makes the true conscience appear to us absolute. It is our ignorance of how to harmonize them which makes our actual consciences such variable and complex products of imperfect experience. The moral law, otherwise stated, runs for the individual in this twofold fashion: "Be always mindful of the will and the needs of other men; but have an universal plan, a life-rule, for the guidance of thy own will." It is necessary, but endlessly difficult to be true to both these calls at once. No man without a plan is moral. No plan without humanity about it is moral. The planless man is called an unprincipled person. His sentiments may be noble; but you cannot trust him. The man of plans and principles that are wholly inhumane and selfish is a reasoning monster, who seeks, like a Napoleon, to use reason as a tool to produce for his private pleasure what in the end would prove to mean a social chaos. Only the man of practical reason and of social sensitiveness at once can have the right on his side, and he only in so far as he has given free play to both motives, and has woven them into living harmony. His conscience, such as upon any stage of his progress it is, is simply the collective expression of such fallible insight as he so far has into these two motives and into their harmony.

It would be easy, had I time, to illustrate the presence and the union of our two elements of the moral consciousness in the various classical embodiments of conscience which are to be found in sacred and in secular literature. The Sermon on the Mount is full of exhortations to social sensitiveness, to self-surrender, to humanity, to forgetfulness of private concerns, in a word, to brotherly love. It is also full of maxims whose obviousness lies in their rational universality of point of view in the vast, all-embracing plans of life that they sug-

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gest. The sanction of the whole sermon, at the end, is given in the simile of the house founded on a rock. The life of caprice is like the house on the sandy foundation. The house founded on a rock is the self-consistent, the essentially reasonable life. The Pauline charity is explicitly the spiritual gift of an all-embracing humanity. But the element of reasonableness is not lacking; capriciousness might give goods to feed the poor, and one's body to be burned; but charity is depicted as something far more self-consistent than the noblest of such mere sentiments would be apart from reason.

Among recent philosophers, Kant has most exalted the element of reasonableness in the conscience. But he too, in applying his famous ethical formula, cannot omit the element of humanity. According to Kant, you are to act always in such wise that you could wish that the rule according to which you act were made into an universal law governing the actions of all rational beings. Conscience, in Kant's view, thus asks us always, Could you wish all men everywhere to act according to the principles upon which you are now acting? If not, says conscience, you are wrong. In other words, Kant makes absolute reasonableness, fitness to be made the principle of an universal legislation, the one moral test of the motive of any act. But in applying his principle, in determining what it is that we can desire to see made the universal motive or principle or law of life for all rational beings, Kant of course has to make humanity a factor in determining the result. Stealing or lying or uncharitableness is wrong, because the principle of such an act, if universalized, would produce essentially inhumane results. So at least, in the application, the thing has to turn out, whether Kant admits the fact or not.

On the other hand, among recent philosophers, Schopenhauer, in making pity the central ethical motive of our nature, and in seeking to define conscience wholly in terms of goodwill towards all living things, is most prominent as a thinker who subordinates the rational to the benevolent element in conscience. Yet Schopenhauer also, whether he admits it or not, has in effect to define true goodness, not as a mere yielding to chance pitiful impulses, but as a deliberate subordina-

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tion of all life to the universal maxim, "Be pitiful, because that alone is most deeply reasonable." The English Utilitarians, in similar fashion, have sought to define conscience in terms of benevolence only, or chiefly; but as a fact the element of universality or of reasonableness of conduct can never be absent, and has never been absent from their actual definitions and applications.

In brief, to sum up the whole moral consciousness in a moment's insight, the case stands thus: If I am acting morally, I must be acting reasonably. For if to the question, "Why do you act thus?" I reply, "Because I want to, and for no other reason whatever," then I am simply denying the authority of any moral law. And if I admit the authority of any law, I must submit in just so far to reason, and to a reason that transcends my own caprice. But if one asks me, What particular reasons, then, can be given for your conduct; reasons which you can make concrete and articulate and which do transcend your own caprice? then I have, in the end, upon analysis, to reply, Such reasons as are somewhere embodied in the needs, in the behests, in the dignified will, or, in a word, in the authoritative social suggestions of some being or beings whose life beyond my private self I realize, and whose worth as real live beings I respect, whether I selfishly fear their might or not.

As a mere matter of natural history, these two motives of the human conscience will not be unfamiliar to you as hearers of the foregoing course of lectures. Imitativeness or suggestibility on the one hand, the disposition to form more or less definitely organized and systematized habits of action on the other hand, are two human traits which have played no small part in the previous discussions. Both, as we have seen, are, indeed, no simple traits, but are due to an enormously complex series of conditions. In the life of the healthy brain, both of them, however, in consequence of these conditions, come to play a very large part. Our conscience expresses one form of our awareness of these very noteworthy tendencies. Not all of our imitativeness, or suggestibility, has moral significance, but only so much of it as consciously wars with and

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brings under discipline our more anarchical private impulses. Not all of our disposition to form systems of well-knit habits gives us conscientious motives, but only so much of this disposition as comes to our consciousness in the form of reasonable plans, which we insist upon as against our chaotic impulses. By nature we imitate our fellows, and so come to share in a measure their feelings and interests. This is so far not a matter of conscience. But sometimes this disposition comes into conflict with our private selfishness; and then in the conflict we become aware of our moral obligations to our fellows. By nature, again, we are likely to attain to a good deal of organization in our habits of conduct. This, too, is so far not conscience, but routine. Yet sometimes our plans come into conflict with our chaotic impulses, and then, in this conflict, we learn that reason is worthier than caprice.

The moral life is essentially a life of conflict,—of the conflict between humane and narrowly selfish impulses, of the conflict between reason and caprice, between order and chaos, yes, and of the conflict between these two moral motives themselves, which ideally ought always to harmonize, but which in our blindness we do harmonize so ill.

So much, then, for the two essential elements of every moral consciousness. And now, the existence of these two motives in our conscience explains of itself all those principal characteristics of our complex moral consciousness upon which stress has been laid in the foregoing account. The variety, the manifoldness, the dignity, and the obscurity of our actual consciences are all explicable by the fact that as conscientious beings we are required by our moral nature to accomplish a twofold task, whose ideal worth is absolute, changeless, and obvious, but whose practical accomplishment is beset with difficulties and is defined for us only in terms of our narrow experience. The moral ideal, in its most general form, is indeed immutable. It may always be stated, once more, in the abstract, thus: Be humane and reasonable at once. Be humane, that is, consider all the interests that are going to be affected by your acts so far as you can possibly realize what these interests are. Do not be blind to the other

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live beings about you. Consider what they wish as well as what you wish. But, on the other hand, do not be content with this mere submissiveness and this kindliness. Do not be merely suggestible, imitative, sympathetic, plastic. Have plans of your own. Some of your fellows desire one thing of you, and some another. You cannot please everybody. Mere kindliness and plasticity accomplish nothing. Do not be like the father in the fable of "The Man, his Son, and the Ass." It is impossible to act reasonably on mere suggestions. Consider the interests involved in any course of action, then form your own plan for meeting these interests as well as possible. Then make that plan your reasonable rule of action, and thereafter cling to that plan inflexibly till you see a better one. The moral man is an obstinate person; for justice and legality are essentially forms of obstinacy. Such is the general type of the moral life. Such is the general law of the immutable and ideal conscience as applied to each one of us.

But, alas! we are fallible. We are blind. We see only a little way. Every new growth of sympathy may show us the narrowness and actual inhumanity of our former plans. Mankind will never outgrow conscientiousness; but it has certainly outgrown nearly every specific plan of social conduct which has been suggested in the past,—has outgrown such plans, not because it has learned to reject their ideal principles, but because it has learned broader plans, more reasonable and more humane fashions of conduct. Once, for instance, we knew no better than merely to shut up the insane and the criminals, and then, as it were, to forget them. The most humane people sanctioned whole systems of abuses of this sort merely because society must be defended, and because no better plan occurred than to make naught of the outcasts for the sake of the healthy. To-day the social conscience revolts at the thought of such neglect. Why? Because the moral ideal has changed? No. Because we have learned to realize more human needs, and to form more highly organized social plans for meeting these needs. Thus indeed the embodied conscience of each of us, our little hoard of maxims,

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—that is always a very fallible and changeable thing, the product of social tradition, of experience, of our own poor thinking. On the other hand, the Ideal Conscience, with its twofold maxim, "Help thy brother, yet help him not planlessly, but according to universal rules," this is the conscience which exists in us, not because of our private experience as such, but because of our essentially social type of intelligence. The predisposition to be suggestible and reasonable at once, to develop definite plans along with wide social sympathies,—this predisposition is indeed, not as an innate idea, but as a tendency, inborn in us. It is doubtless due to that "spontaneous variation" which has made the human brain, as a product of evolution, a possible thing. We are suggestible and reasonable beings by just such an innate predisposition. Our ideal conscience formulates our awareness of this our fundamental tendency. But our embodied conscience, our particular moral maxims, our collection of specific judgments, our moral prejudices,—these are merely the best expression, so far, of what light our experience has thrown upon the problem, how to be humane and reasonable at once, how to live according to rule, and how, at the same time, to be kindly and considerate.

And so our conscience is at once in one aspect the most authoritative of ideal guides, and in another aspect is essentially a changing and fallible collection of merely probable opinions about conduct. It is in one sense innate; for had not one inherited a socially suggestible and a practically reasonable temperament, you could never teach him a single moral truth, however keen his lower wits might be. In another sense, however, the embodied conscience of each of us, our specific moral maxims, are altogether derived from training, experience, and private reflection. The difficulties and conflicts of conscience are due to the enormous difficulty of accomplishing at once the twofold aim of conscience. For our sympathies, our social suggestibility, our imitativeness, our plasticity, our kindliness, are all tendencies that act immediately and at the moment, so that they give us generous impulses, but always tend to confuse our reasonable general

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plans. On the other hand, our plans of action, our fixed habits, our moral maxims, our settled general ideas concerning conduct, tend by their very fixity to make us obstinately disregardful of the calls of sympathy. Good form is easily opposed to good impulse. To harmonize these two motives is the great problem of life. The failure to do so is the chief source of the endless varieties and wars that have rent into hostile sects the world of the conscientious. Here is the central source of the great tragedy of the human conscience, a tragedy of which the world will never see the end so long as moral insight is imperfect and so long as the best of men are fallible.

III.

The development of conscience in the individual is at best a matter of notoriously slow progress. The moral functions are far too complex and delicate in their structure to be capable of easy cultivation or of quick maturity. And as they mature they are subject, from their very nature, to a great many intercurrent disorders and tendencies to degeneracy. Especially important, however, it is to notice the way in which the two motives upon which the mature conscience is founded begin to establish their inter-relationships and to enter upon their predestined conflicts early in child-life. Once understand the nature of these two factors, observe the relative separateness of their original growth and consider their early conflicts, and then you will have an excellent basis for comprehending the natural history of the moral consciousness of any growing child.

As regards the first factor mentioned in the foregoing account, namely, the disposition to be mindful of the will and of the interests of other beings, this factor first shows itself in childhood in the form of that direct suggestibility, that disposition to imitate the expressive behavior of interesting people, which, in the foregoing discussions of this course, we have found to be such an important function from the point of view of the teacher. That all rational, intellectual growth is founded upon this factor we have already seen. But suggestibility and

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imitativeness are now interesting to us not in their intellectual so much as in their moral significance. And these functions have a moral value, not in every one of their manifestations, but only in so far as in the child's mind and conduct they chance to stand in a certain opposition to its own private impulses,—that is, to the original, non-social, reflex functions of its particular temperament. If you do something, and a child, fascinated by your act, tries to imitate you, this imitation, as we have seen in the foregoing lectures, may have a great intellectual value for the child; but it has a value from the point of view of moral training, only in case the child is led by its imitativeness actually to control or to modify some existent private impulse of its own, which would naturally oppose the deed to which the imitative activity here leads. Show a child how to draw or to sew, and so long as the child is simply fascinated, and imitatively follows your lead without inner conflict of any sort, the experience has no direct value as a moral discipline. So far you are training the wits and not the conscience. But if you quiet a restless child, or overcome an obstinate child, by means of some authoritative suggestion that arouses the imitative functions, if, by command or by request, you induce the child to leave other actions, already pleasing to it, and to begin drawing or sewing according to your wish, then at the moment when the imitative disposition in the child triumphs over its previous interests, the child more or less dimly knows that it is submitting to another will because of the mere fact that this other will has expressed itself. Now, this submissiveness exemplifies an appeal to one of our two fundamental moral motives. For when I do a thing not "because I want to do it," nor yet because of mere fear, but because some other will requires me to do this thing, and because I find myself moved through imitation to submit, my act has one of the two elements of moral conduct about it. And I never know of this my relatively moral submissiveness unless I am aware that, of myself, I desire to do otherwise, but that because of the authoritative importunity of my neighbor, or of my teacher, I resign my own will to this other will.

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The development of this side of the moral consciousness, of the motive which, in general, expresses itself, in presence of an authoritative external suggestion, by saying, "Not my will but thine be done," is therefore one expression, indeed, of the imitative function, but it is by no means the only expression of that function, nor in early childhood the usual expression of this almost universal disposition to imitate. Smooth-running, free imitation, frictionless suggestibility, establishes numerous valuable habits, but does not of itself tend to develop conscience. The rudiment of conscientiousness appears only when a suggested imitative act stands in conflict with the child's immediate impulses, and when the child nevertheless submits to the suggestion, and abandons its own impulses.

Pitiful and sympathetic acts and impulses belong, on the whole, for our purpose, to this same class, so soon as the child does, from pity or from sympathy, what is more or less consciously opposed to its momentary private desires. The affectionate child that returns your caresses for the pure fun of petting and of being petted is in nowise training any conscientious motive. The activity is here unquestionably social and normal. And it is also a good basis, yes, for many children, an indispensable basis, for future moral training. The affectionate child that loves fondling can the more easily be taught, some day, for the sake of love, to forego its private desires. But this highly normal and innocent fondness for petting, although a sympathetic emotion, is still not directly a moralizing emotion. Fairly early examples of truly moral motives based upon this primitive sympathy appear, however, in such small but significant acts as those of a three-year-old child that voluntarily and spontaneously, and, perhaps, without any previous training of that sort, suddenly foregoes the pleasure of even beginning to eat its candy until it can bring the candy, perhaps some distance, to you, to offer you the first bite. Such an act, which is a type of a large number of rudimentary moral acts in very young children, is a bit of a sacrifice, although I need not add that the sacrifice, when it occurs, is not likely to be, at this age, very deep, and that the

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child does anticipate considerable praise and not a few kisses as a reward of its virtues. Still, in such a deed there is, so to speak, one of the first flutters of the wings of the sympathetic conscience. For such acts involve rudimentary general ideas of the type already indicated, of the type, namely, embodied in the words, "Not my will but thine be done." The process of social self-enlargement is under way. This social self-enlargement it is that even in childhood makes me consciously treat my neighbor as a part of myself. And it is the victory of the enlarged social self, of the self that sees the neighbor's will, or wish, or joy, or advantage as its own, over the impulsive self of the extra social private individual,—it is this victory which constitutes the true beginning of conscience with respect to this its first motive, the true establishment of general moral ideas of our present type.

How early the true victory of either the imitative tendency or the more emotional forms of the sympathetic impulse over private selfishness can be witnessed in a young child I do not know. The observations concerning this matter are still, so far as I know, incomplete. But if you talk of the early training of the conscientious motives in a child, there is no doubt that every such act as are the acts now exemplified, where social suggestibility first wars, and consciously wars, with private impulse, and where the larger social self, suggested by the will or the need or the joy of another, then triumphs over the private impulse of the narrower self,—that every such act, I say, embodies a true general idea of a relatively conscientious type. And the condition for the appearance of such a general idea of a conscientious type is precisely this complex condition. On the one hand, a suggested social impulse, an impulse to sympathetic or to imitative submission; on the other hand, a private impulse at war with the first; a conscious conflict between the two impulses; a victory of the social over the anti-social self. Imitativeness without such conflict develops no conscience. Private selfishness, apart from social suggestions, is still innocently unaware of moral considerations. But bring the larger and the lesser self face to face; and then, in the moment of the victory of the social self, there is con-

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tained a true moral experience, a true generalization concerning what constitutes goodness. On the other hand, of course, if the battle chances to go the other way, if the lesser self passionately dominates the nobler, the result is likely to be temporarily somewhat chaotic. The child is aware of its stubbornness, and so of its failure. A sense of personal chagrin gets merged with its fear of disapproval, and an excited child, conscious, in its hopeless way, that it is naughty, and wants to be naughty, and yet hates to be naughty, and accordingly hates everybody, itself to boot, is at least for a few despairing moments as noteworthy an example for a functional nervous chaos as you will often see in a healthy person. No prudent guardian of a child will risk the young childish conscience by giving it unnecessarily difficult or numerous opportunities to go in this way wrong. And yet it is true, and is a great paradox of moral training, that without successful feats of self-sacrifice, of the sort now in general indicated, this motive of conscience never grows, and this present type of general conscientious ideas never gets developed, while, on the other hand, every opportunity for self-sacrifice is necessarily an opportunity for sin and so for chaos. But such risks are once for all involved in moral training.

These conflicts between the imitative self and the private self are among the most capricious and unpredictable incidents of early childhood, both as to the circumstances under which they will occur and as to their outcome. The child that submissively obeys you when you are present will notoriously often begin to disobey the instant you are out of sight. The child that is all plasticity in the presence of one person, may seem a little demon of stubbornness when brought into the company of another. Suggestibility, in its early manifestations, is, as we have earlier seen, an essentially whimsical phenomenon. As teacher, one thus early learns that, *apart* from well-knit habits, suggestibility means, after all, little for the growth of conscience. One comes, as most practised disciplinarians come, to lay far less stress upon the chance sentiments of the child than upon the formation of fixed habits. For the purposes of moral training, one learns to

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think with especial esteem of our second conscientious motive. One says, "Train organized habits, and the kindly feelings will follow of themselves." And thus it happens that to most persons in the past moral training has meant strict discipline rather than cultivation of any rich social experience in the child.

But here soon comes in sight the distinction, and ere long, too, the frequent opposition, of our two motives. It is indeed true that the child, despite its apparent capriciousness, is a creature that loves routine, so far as it can understand routine. It takes kindly to such well-knit habits as it can appreciate. It is fond of the same rules as to its hours of eating and sleep; of the same order of life as to its bath, its dress, its play, its favorite stories, its companionships. It hates whatever it recognizes as a capricious disarrangement of this established order. Its own actual and endless caprices are the mere accidents of its tender and rapidly growing organism. The child does not approve or choose them, but rather suffers from them. The establishment of an organized routine is therefore not only an indispensable condition for the training of its conscience, but is, on the whole, a very normal appeal to its own natural wishes.

On the other hand, however, the establishment of organized habits is never of itself enough to insure the growth of an enlightened moral consciousness. Morality involves good order, but good order is never the whole of morality. For the first, the child that has established habits is often not very clearly conscious of their existence until, for some reason or other, they have to be broken in upon. The coming of a new teacher, whose routine is unlike that of a former teacher; the entrance into a new house, in which the child's family must begin afresh the domestic routine; such incidents are examples of a necessary interference with an already established system of habits. What is the result? The child under such circumstances often shows its conservatism in the form of an unreasoning rebellion, a stubborn, if brief, insistence that the new ways are bad ways. The consequent conflicts may prove temporarily demoralizing. And this result is likely to be in proportion to the actual fixity and success of the former

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organization of habits. Here, as you see, the two motives of conscience, submissiveness and orderliness, come into an actual conflict together, precisely as in the history of society during periods of reform and of transition, the conservative instincts of society oppose the wider humanity of feeling and of outlook which the prophets and the reformers of the new age endeavor to inculcate. As reformers appeal to our sympathies and to our suggestibility, and as, on the other hand, the conservative interests of the social order appeal to our love of plan and of definite routine, and as these two appeals conflict with one another and produce the ethical tragedies of revolutionary periods, precisely so, in the life of a child, its social plasticity, its growth in sympathies, its imitativeness, its enlarging humanity, often war with its actual love of routine. Child-life is comparable in many respects to a period of social transitions in the life of a nation. The one saving thing, for the child as for the nation, in a world of chaotic temptations, often seems to be the formation of a fixed routine, the conservative clinging to traditional ways. Yet, on the other hand, such conservatism often results in actual sin against the newer light. The conservative instinct is often, after all, the instinct that opposes self-enlargement and that delights in selfish stubbornness.

It is needful to remember these things in order to understand how full of harassing moral puzzles the life of a sensitive and inquiring child must often be, of puzzles to his own consciousness, of perplexities also to ours as we train him. His conservatism, his love of reasonable good order, is, of course, in view of the tender years of the child, a very short-sighted, and therefore of necessity, as to the choice of what shall for the child embody reason, a very irrational thing. Because the child has learned to love a rational conformity he has, alas! often to rebel against a higher reason. You cannot easily teach him routine, which is essentially an obstinate tendency, and at the same time teach him perfect social plasticity, which, with all its sympathetic beauty, is essentially a tendency to a change of ideals. If you make him conscious of the good form of his conduct, you teach him to say, "That is

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my way. What a good boy I am to love to do this! What a big boy I am! I can do just as grown people do." In short, you make the child in so far essentially vain of his own will, as being essentially a good will. From this point of view, the good child often despises all younger children as being necessarily bad children, since they are so far, to borrow the words of the Buddhist scriptures, the "foolish who know not the true law." Tender age and moral baseness often come to be in the eyes of growing children largely synonymous terms. This contempt of the elder boy for the younger is a well-known incident of the nascent conscience,—a well-known incident, and an inhumane one. It is as if one said, "Little boys are essentially chaotic. We big boys are reasonable. We act as becomes the big. We are wise."

But now, into this world of a conscience that is so far substantially identical with personal vanity, continually comes the call of society, embodied in the commands of teachers, in the movings of sympathy, in all the appeals to suggestibility as such. And this call once more ordains that the child shall say, "Not my will but thine be done." Not my will? But if I am a good boy, my will is the good one. The new plan is bad. I do not want to be sympathetic. I want to act in my own well-established way. In that way I have been taught. I will not depart from it. The new teacher is bad, is foolish, for he wants us to do as our old teacher did not want us to do. The new boy at school is a public enemy, for his ways are not our ways. He needs a thrashing. Such are the perfectly natural opinions of our young moralist, precisely in so far as training has succeeded in making him in his ignorance a lover of reason, or in other words has produced in him what, at his age, has to be a narrow conservatism,—merciless and uncomprehending.

Later on in the young career these complications increase. There is in the life of many an intelligent boy the well-known period in youth when he is prepared by his numerous observations on the good order of the world to lay down the law to his mother, and, as it were, to show her the steep and thorny path to heaven. He does so, conscientiously, and

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with a certain intolerable obstinacy that indicates the organization in him of a conscience whose reasonableness of ideal is only exceeded by the impudence of its manifestation. I speak with some warmth of this kind of boy, for I myself was, in my day, a boy of this sort, and I know whereof I speak. Here you see, respect for the law comes to mean a failure duly to honor one's father and one's mother.

At the same time, however, the reverse of the foregoing complication is, in youth, an equally possible result of the conflicts between conservatism and experience. Many boys prove to be, during the school years, admirably plastic and easily amenable to the formation of organized habits. Then comes youth, with its chaos of novelties, and with its entirely new types of social suggestibility. The new triumphs over the old, the fixed habits of boyhood were narrow just because of their fixity, and they therefore seem all the more meaningless in this new environment, precisely because they were once so well organized in their own narrowness and isolation. All of a sudden the youth throws them at once to the winds, begins life afresh, and goes to wreck in a world of caprices, without a compass, without any plan of life, without law,—ruined because he is sensitive, sympathetic, suggestible, and because too, perchance, in the days of his narrow fixity of life he learned one thing, namely, a vain self-confidence, which, as a sentiment, survives the habits upon which it was founded.

To all the foregoing comes, as the child grows into the youth, one further complication. Conscience, as it slowly forms through this endless interplay between two often conflicting motives, is in any case, for good or for ill, a collection, perchance too a system, of general ideas, ideas of conscientious submission of the selfish to the social will, ideas of the formation of a plan in life, and of the conformity of all capricious impulses, whether selfish or sympathetic, to this plan. Now just because conscience is so intimately related to the child's whole idea of himself, both of himself as the immediate subject of his passing feelings, and of himself as the person who has plans,—of himself as the being who is praised and blamed, rewarded and punished, and of himself as the

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person who lays down the law to his younger companions or later, in youth, to all the world,—just because of all these facts, the conscience very early comes to be a favorite topic of reflective consciousness. One reflects upon one's self and one's possessions. Most teachers of good conduct are likely, by their efforts, to encourage just such reflections. As Professor Palmer has pointed out in a recent and much discussed article, this reflection on the complications of conscience is itself likely, especially if encouraged too early, vastly to increase the complications themselves. For reasons studied in our previous lecture on Self-Consciousness, reflection upon matters relating to the Self is, especially in youth, a business attended with decided risks. Moral education differs from most other regions of ordinary education in so far as, in cases where we learn about outer and objective truth, the more we are conscious of our general ideas, of their relations and of their conflicts, the better for us, since in these more objective regions of insight consciousness is, for the teacher, the main goal. But in case of moral training, consciousness is indeed, as we have all along seen, a necessary accompaniment, but not the express goal of the process, which is here the production of good conduct despite all the hinderances and contradictions of consciousness. The student of philosophy has to undertake the risks of reflection. But philosophy is most decidedly not for everybody, and certainly not for every youth.

IV.

The problems of moral training that I have thus suggested will not be unfamiliar to any of you. The sole merit of the foregoing paper, if it has any merit, lies in the psychological analysis which I have offered as explaining the principal paradoxes and conflicts inseparable from the growing life of the conscience. View these conflicts as due to the interplay of our two conscientious motives, and you will get a more enlightened view of a situation which has caused all reflective teachers much concern.

As to the practical outcome, I think that, in the first place, the mere fact of recognizing that the teacher must try, by

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every possible device, to organize into a well-knit whole these two different and often warring motives of the moral life, is itself a great part of the discovery of the method of teaching morals to the young. The further lesson, I think, is obvious, that, since the moral consciousness of the young is sure to be full of conflicts, the teacher will do well to beware of trying to encourage too early what would surely be a false clearness of consciousness as to moral conduct, and as to the reasons of good conduct, since, as a fact, the youthful conscience does not and cannot furnish a finished system of recognizable duties, and since efforts at producing such clear consciousness are likely to bring to light the very conflicts and contradictions now insisted upon. Of two great principles the pupil must indeed early be conscious. First, through specific acts of self-sacrifice, carefully introduced as elements into his capricious life as circumstances permit, he must learn in general to say, in the presence of the higher will without him, "*Not my will but thine be done.*" Then he must learn to recognize by an act of faith that there is indeed an ideal, a perfect plan in life, a true way to be good, and that all his fixed habits are so far fragmentary indications of this good way. He must thus learn, if possible, to say, "*My delight is in the law.*" But, for the rest, he must not be permitted too early to question the why of every precept, and he must be taught that he cannot yet judge what the true law is, and that this true law is not at all a simple and clear thing for his early years to grasp, but that it is a high and holy thing, and that, for the rest, he must wait and see. From our point of view, he is one of the disciples in the temple at Sais, waiting for the veil of the goddess to be lifted. He must learn to reverence the goddess even while the veil remains undrawn,—to reverence and to wait. It is hard to wait and at the same time to be strenuous, to recognize the mystery of conduct and still not to lose heart. But that is the problem of life. Do not fear early to let the child feel, what he cannot hope to understand, that life is a problem, and still, for all that, is sacred.

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THE PLACE OF INDUSTRY IN THE SOCIAL ORGANISM.

ETHICS and economics are now recognized to have such close relations that it may be permitted an economist, in a journal devoted primarily to the study of ethics, to leave for a little the stricter limits of his own subject, and look at things economic from a more ethical stand-point.

To the philosophic mind, the whole tone of political economy must seem more healthy and human than it used to be. While it is certainly becoming more scientific,—coming nearer to universal propositions in great departments, such as currency and international trade,—it is coming into line again with those social sciences which it had, perhaps, fallen rather behind. The science is realizing that we are not living under the industrial system of Ricardo's or even Mill's time. A century of *laissez faire* has made *laisser faire* impossible. The question has been forced on the economist, What is the place and dignity of economic effort among the other activities of human life: is it really the "business" of man's life, as the time devoted to it seems to infer; or is it merely a current in the main stream of spiritual development and realization? The following pages are a slight contribution to the answer.

Looking back on our masters of the past, it seems to us that the older economists were very optimistic. They had a wonderful faith in the power of economic effort to work out social salvation. The reason of their confidence may be explained as follows:

What most stirs the imagination of the economist is the possibility of material wealth now within man's grasp. What most perplexes him is that, with it all, the majority of our people are yet poor, and that the drift of the time seems to be towards keeping them poor. Poverty, indeed, was never yet found an insupportable condition of life; but our people are not only poor, they are slaves to incessant work. If we would console ourselves with the reflection that work is, at worst, a disguised blessing, we have to face the fact that their work is

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deadening, sometimes degrading, toil. Yet toil, and even degrading toil, might be accepted as part of the training of the gods, were it not that the working-man, and *a fortiori* the working-woman, has no guarantee of permanence even in this painful condition of working for a living, and has no time nor chance for life outside it.

In regard to this actual condition of the laboring-classes, the economist has often to complain that there are two things, familiar to him, which society does not seem quite to realize. The one is, that the *majority* of men and women spend their days, from morning to evening, in work, and spend their nights simply in preparing for more work. They are mere living machines, wearing out their bodies in toil and spending their non-working hours in making up wear and tear. The other is, the dependence of the so-called "upper classes" on the working-classes. The common folks who dig, and plough, and sweat in factories, have to provide necessaries and comforts sufficient for themselves *and* for us, and that not of choice but of necessity. The working-man finds himself born into a world of which great part is already taken as private property. He finds himself as a citizen subject to many claims imposed by the past history of his State. And he finds himself under an industrial system where the tools with which he must work belong to others. While working, then, to supply his own wants, he has to pay rent for land, taxes for old claims, and hire for tools; and although his labor, thanks to the organization bequeathed him by the past, is very productive, yet it must be confessed that the lion's share of the product goes to those who hold the claims and the tools. It is rather misleading to point to the superior conditions under which the working-man now lives as compared with his position in former times. A great deal of his comfort is due, not so much to his getting a direct share in the new wealth, as to the fact that there is a great deal of wealth which the upper classes cannot consume selfishly. If the *workers* had not clean streets, gas-lamps, cheap water, theatres for sixpence, and the like, the comfortable classes would be the sufferers with them. It is the pit that pays for the boxes, the third class for the first.

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The crumbs which fall from the rich man's table are not to be counted the workers' share in the increasing wealth of mankind.

Now, what the economists at the time of Mill hoped was, that when wars became exceptional, and the world of men was allowed to go quietly and continuously about the business of producing, wealth would increase so rapidly that it would not be possible for any considerable class to remain outside the sphere of good wages and leisured life. Capital would increase so much that labor would constantly be at a premium. Perhaps it would be rash to say that this expectation will never be realized under the present *régime*. The working-class is so numerous, and its voting power so great, that in time, either peacefully or by revolution, it will demand and obtain a greater share in the output of wealth than it now has. Still, many of us, looking back over the course of wealth and of wages for the last decade, feel bound to protest at the terrible time it is taking to give the working-man a larger share. We think that the enlightened conscience of the twentieth century should hurry up the slow grinding of the divine mills. We are not willing that this great, stable, historic edifice of a nation should be imperilled by delaying reform till it can no longer be withheld.

What should strike one is the enormous disproportion between the people to whom the "good life" is possible, and those to whom it is practically forbidden. Under the present *régime* some few of us have wealth enough to allow us to choose our life and work. Many of us have work which is at least not uncongenial, and with that we have abundant leisure after work-hours to live as we like. And there are here and there a few people who have immense wealth, and who conscientiously try to use it in furthering the interests of humanity. This, however, is not sufficient to outweigh the great conspicuous economic fact that the majority of people, even in this richest of all countries, have no time and no means to do anything but toil and sleep.

Our century's experiment, then, of leaving industry to rectify its own abuses cannot be called a success. It has

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ended in putting very much out of sight the right and due of every man, as a spiritual being, to get the utmost assistance from his fellows in securing him a rational, happy, developing, free life. It has raised a few people to a high standard of comfort and leisure, which they find so good and enjoyable that they will fight to retain it. It has made the richer classes accept their ridiculous position seriously, thinking themselves the favored of heaven, and believing that Christ's "the poor ye have always with you" is a warrant for keeping them poor. Nay, it has so stripped the working-classes of thought and aspiration that they accept the present state of things for the most part in sullen apathy, though not without underground mutterings.

The question naturally suggests itself, Has any plan of regulated industry emerged to guide the actions of those who have rejected the policy of *laisser faire*, and yet are very far from embracing the other extreme of socialism?

An answer of a kind seems to be given from one side of the industrial division. While the majority of the working-classes are swept along on a current which they do not try to control, there is a section among them which seems to have some idea of steering a course,—the workers under trade unions.

A trade unionist may be defined as a workman who considers that wages have a tendency to fall, or, at least, not to rise adequately, unless individual workers form themselves into corporate bodies, agree on a policy, pledge themselves not to act individually against that policy, and take measures to maintain themselves during any period of struggle which the carrying out of such a policy may involve. That is to say, to gain his purposes the unionist gives up his individual liberty of action, and subordinates himself to a body which aims at securing a desired end for all its members. A trade union is necessarily militant. It might be called an army of defence; but armies of defence, as we know, very easily turn into armies of aggression, and the attitude of the trade union to capitalist employers is, as a rule, more than militant; it is certainly hostile. The trade union does not seek to bridge the interests of capital and labor, much less to identify them. It seems to prefer to

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fight in the dark. It acts very much on the assumption that wages could always be higher than they are,—which may be true, but is, evidently, not a very scientific basis to go on.

The beneficent part played by the unions in the past has been, it might be said, due to the fact that unionist workmen were a minority, and, for fear of the outside unorganized workers, could not press this idea of blind hostility too far. But the ideal which trade unionism puts before itself is to gather *all* labor into its ranks. Whenever it does so, however, it must drop the aggressive: it must even cease to be militant; and must become, not a trade union, but a union of capital *and* labor. For suppose the time were come when capital was forced to show its books to labor, and prove that labor was getting all the share it could, in reason or expediency, claim; then to persevere in asking more would be suicidal, and the only form of union left would be a union of capital and labor to produce the largest total result.

Even now the most successful unions are showing this weakness of foundation. In the great union of textile workers in Lancashire, they congratulate themselves—and justly—on their success in keeping up the rate of wages, and of assimilating the wages of women and men for equal work. But they can scarcely help seeing that the average profit for some years in cotton-spinning has not been four per cent.

Although, then, the economist is bound to defend trade unions, as, hitherto, the bulwark of labor against a power stronger than itself, he approves of them as he would approve of arming the English regiments with the best available rifle,—that is, so long as the industrial, like the political, world is divided into hostile camps. And just as he would very much rather see all men lay down their Martini-Henrys, so must he seek for the ultimate solution of the problem in some form of union which is large enough to take in capital as well as labor. The ideal of trade unionism is but a temporary ideal, as all ideals based on war must be.

When we turn to the other side of society, and ask the representatives of capital what they suggest as the means of remedying the obvious evils of low and insufficient wage—

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what, in short, capital would put in place of the trade union, —the answer is, I am afraid, nothing but the old patriarchal theory of the relation of capital and labor, which tells the working-classes that their interests are safe in the hands of the enlightened employer. The usual formula is: A good master needs no union to compel him to do justice to his work-people.

This is true; but, as every one knows, even Plato had some little difficulty in getting a definition of justice in the abstract, and, possibly, he would have had more if he had been trying to find what was justice in the matter of wage. Does "justice" mean paying the average wage for average work? Well, suppose we can find what the average wage is,—which is not such a simple matter,—we are still, in the interests of justice, forced to ask, What determines the average wage? Is it a trade union? If so, there will be some difficulty in convincing employers that this is a true average wage. Or is it a union of employers? If so, it must seem to the workers that the employers are to be as gods, determining justice for other people, their servants. Or is it to be believed that industrial progress is the path of the immanent reason, and that wages work out their own just laws? Suppose we adopt the ideal of free competition which so many people are enamored of,—till it touches their own trade,—and say that the "average wage" is determined by all capital on one side and all labor on the other. Well, it is not a satisfactory thing to the philosophic mind to be told that the average wage is determined like a tug of war,—even if the weaker party should now and then pull the rope across the mark. Certainly, Plato would have objected very much to a definition of just wage which determines it by the relative strength of two parties.

But, suppose we define the "good master" as one who pays not the average, but the best wage he can, we have to ask what are the factors of this "best"? Is the employer supposed to calculate somewhat in this way: "I wish ten per cent. on my capital; all beyond that I shall pay in wage." The obvious answer is, that no employer does calculate in this way. If he gets ten per cent. one year he has to provide

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against getting five per cent. the next, and so no employer ever thinks any amount of profit too great, just because he puts the surplus aside as insurance against possible loss. But what is an employer to do who never earns ten per cent., or anything near it? Are the workers to suffer because he—perhaps by his own fault—cannot make what he considers an adequate profit? And is it always the just employer who makes the ten per cent.? Suppose—to put it concretely—that A, B, C & Co., with five millions of capital, and everything in the way of economic machinery and organization, are willing for a time to accept five per cent. on their capital,—the thing is not only possible, but is common,—and pay twenty shillings a week average wage to the workers, what is the proper wage for D, E, F & Co. to pay, who have an old factory and small capital, and cannot earn interest even on their small capital?

Without going further, any one can see the difficulties of believing that the workers' interests will be adequately guarded by leaving them to the benevolent capitalist. No employer, however good and honest and well intentioned, should be trusted to assess his workers' wages. He has to cut his industrial coat according to his cloth. If his rivals reduce prices, he has to reduce prices. If his rivals do with less profit, he has to do with less profit. If his rivals sell below cost, he has to go below cost. If his rivals like to live for a time on their accumulated capital, he has to live on his capital. But on what is the *worker* to live, if wages go below twenty shillings a week?

The failure, then, of trade unionism on the one hand, and of the patriarchal relation on the other, to supply any permanent basis for the future of industry, may serve to suggest that it is not possible to formulate, on purely economic lines, anything but a temporary policy, for the reason that, sooner or later, economic tendencies left to themselves come into conflict with the total development of society.

In face of this, what is the function of the economist? It is, of course, as always, to discover and interpret the drift of the economic activity of the time. With this most economists

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would consider their task ended; but it seems to me that, at any rate, the philosophic economist has something further to do. Is it not becoming evident that philosophy and economics must now join hands to find out and declare what is the true end and right relation of economic activity among the other activities of human life?

The task is no small one. It involves, first, the formulation of the ideal social organism; and, second, the assigning to economic activity its duly subordinated place in the total activity of this organism. With the view of giving some slight contribution to this great work, I may be allowed to suggest one or two things which an economic profession and some practical acquaintance with industrial life have convinced me must be recognized by the philosophical economist, or the economic philosopher, who attempts the task.

First, as to the nature of our economical environment. There is not much doubt of the peculiar favor which this environment affords to man's economic welfare. According to our prejudices and education we may put this truth in various ways. We may say, with Christianity, that God planted man in an earth that is half garden, half wilderness, and that man is gradually putting all things under his feet, because the universe is his and his Father's. Or we may suppose, with the pure evolutionist, that the savage animal, somehow in the far past, stole fire from heaven, and has slowly fought his way up to the present state of lord of creation because he survives as the fittest of the animals. Or, more philosophically, we may say that the whole is an evolution, not of matter and force, but of spirit, and that, as man gradually gets to know his world, it wakes into consciousness in him, and he recognizes all the powers of the universe as his friends.

It all comes to the same end,—that man, at first the sport and prey of natural forces, gradually bends them to his will, discovers a human use for everything, reconstructs his world, and becomes more at home in it, and so makes all things work together for his good. There are forces of which we have not yet got control, but one would scarcely like to say what is beyond human power. Have we not even encroached on the

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realm of the great destroyer, and exceeded the threescore years and ten? Whatever, then, the present may be, it is clear to the economist that the future holds unimaginable wealth in its command. The environment is friendly. The economic sphere will not always be truthfully represented as a struggle of labor against nature, or a calculus of pleasure and pain.

In face of this friendly environment, what is man's position? On first thoughts we are apt to conclude that the well-being of man is secured as he becomes master of the material conditions of his life,—as he accumulates wealth and capital, and yokes the universe to his car. But this is not the case.

If man were as the other animals, increase of wealth would certainly mean increase of well-being. The cow asks no more than abundant grass and a warm byre. Give her more grass and she refuses it; give her two byres and the one stands empty. The difference is that the animal gets its provision direct from nature, without more trouble than seeking for it, but never increases its wants beyond its provision. The man gets almost nothing direct from nature,—he gets all in the sweat of his brow; but his appetite for good things grows continually by what it feeds on, and his wants are infinitely progressive. Thus, although society has, every year, added power over nature,—added wealth, added capital,—the provision for human wants always lags far behind the demand. Nay, a small minority of the world's inhabitants may take up all the increase in wealth, leaving the majority at the old level, or sinking them below that level.

This may be seen most easily by a concrete case. Here is a field. Plant it with potatoes, and leave enough grass to pasture a cow, and the field will maintain a dozen farm-laborers in sound, healthy food. But now sow the field down in the finer vegetables, and plant gooseberry-bushes on the pasture, and the field will now yield food for perhaps half a dozen. But suppose, finally, the field to be sown down in flowers, not only does it not support anybody, but it cannot supply enough of flowers to satisfy a few rich people. By this it may be seen that a certain amount of labor and capital may be devoted to maintaining an entire nation in plain, sound life. Or it may

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be so employed as to yield a high level of comfort to a good many, while keeping the majority at the twenty-shilling-a-week level. Or it may be laid out to supply the intellectual, spiritual, æsthetic wants of a few, while the majority are on the twenty-shilling level, and a minority is at the starvation-level.

Now, the serious thing is that the present evil distribution of wealth—which corresponds very much to the latter case in the illustration—does not rectify itself. The fortunate few can go on consuming as much wealth as the circumstances of society allow them to obtain,—by fair means or conventional ones,—and, what is more, they can spend it *well*. Just as one could not say, in the abstract, that money spent in raising flowers was ill-spent, so this fortunate few may take to themselves all the increase of wealth as it comes, and spend it in adding to the fulness of their own life, or laying the foundation of their children's.

This, probably, explains the callousness of the richer classes to the condition of the working-classes. They feel that their annual incomes are not too large for what they may, legitimately and honorably, desire as their standard of life. If a man finds himself this year with a hundred pounds more of income than he had last, it is not altogether selfish if he spends it in hiring a horse for himself, or buying a new piano for his wife, or a pony for the children. The whole family is, perhaps, cleaner in limb and in soul for having these things. Similarly, the few rich can quite well absorb all the increase of wealth that comes into the world, and persuade themselves that they are doing well with it,—all the while forgetting the solidarity of man and the claims of their neighbors to a share. Thus the bad distribution of wealth does not tend to rectify itself. The rectification usually comes of the struggle of the one class to get and of the other to hold.

And as people get accustomed to this bad distribution, and think it natural, we get two very different ideals of life, which we use with charming naïvete. We say to the poor man, It is a good thing for you that you should labor ten hours a day, else you would get drunk in the evenings. We say to the rich man, You give far too much time to business ; you should

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come home early and read a little. We present the one class with an ideal of work, the other with an ideal of leisure.

Of course, in any philosophical ideal of social economic activity, we can have no such dualistic view. Passing over, as accidental, the present condition where society is divided into a few men with too much leisure, and a vast multitude with nothing but toil, there are certain things we find stated very clearly in the universal nature of man as man. Physically, *e.g.*, his best condition is when he has such food as he can well digest, such clothes as secure him from damp and cold, such shelter as guards him from draughts, bad air, etc.; and lastly, such *work* as keeps his body at its highest pitch of fitness. But this is also his best intellectual condition. Nay, it is more; it is the best background for all the virtues: it is the every-day condition of any ideal society.

What man, then, simply as man, by his very constitution demands is, primarily, enough wealth to supply these purely physical wants, and enough labor to keep the whole organism working in perfect health. These, I say, are the indispensable requisites of every life, not only of the rich, but of the poorest. They are the minimum standard of the animal called man, which he needs to prevent him having actually a worse status in the world than the mere beasts of the field.

Once these are gained, man may devote himself to the infinite life that lies around and above him,—the life of thought, of feeling, of living for pure living's sake. But surely it is very far from an ideal state if the attainment of this higher life by the few is to prevent the obtaining of the lower—the indispensable—life by the many. We must think *our* lives something very valuable in the sight of heaven, if we imagine that they are worth the price of the degradation of our fellows'. But how else are we to interpret the common question, If you raise the working-classes, who will do the dirty work?

Here, then, is the heavy indictment against the industrial organization of to-day,—that not only does it make the life of the vast majority a life below the level of good food, good clothing, good houses, good surroundings generally, but it totally neglects the other condition, the healthy labor which

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alone can knit these into the healthy man. It looks at labor as a mere means to an end, the obtaining of subsistence, instead of looking at both labor and subsistence as means to—living. Thus, the proposed Eight-Hours' Bill is generally argued from the point of the effect shorter hours will have on production. The question is seldom asked, Is eight hours' labor not enough for the true health, in body and mind, of the worker?

No doubt it will be said by those who think political economy was formulated and finished fifty years ago, that this consideration is not one with which economics has anything to do. The answer is that the new attitude of most economists is one that has a warrant in new circumstances. It is no disparagement to Ricardo, for instance, that he did not bring these considerations to the front. Nor will any intelligent student blame Mill that he was altogether too hopeful of what the accumulation of wealth would bring with it. We have half a century of economic development to take account of since his time,—and that the half-century which has given into man's hand the most gigantic power over natural forces,—and it would be inexcusable in the modern economist if he did not see that we are at a new stage of social history, and that a new society demands a revision of a political economy based on an analysis of the old.

In all the stern economic development of past centuries it is easy to see a true line of teleological purpose. Life then was hard and leisure was difficult, not because it is a good thing for man to live hardly and have little leisure, but because the first necessity of a true life, physically, intellectually, and morally, is Work, while it is not a necessity that there should be leisure, unless men have learned to use it for the higher life. Centuries ago it would have been a curse to England if bananas had grown overhead, and the cassava-root had been had for the digging. With no books and no amusements, no sense awakened to nature, no home but a mud-hut without chimneys and windows, what could the Saxon peasant have done with leisure but spend it as the African tribes do,—between drinking and fighting? The labor that this stern, north-

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ern climate necessitated was his salvation, and, in the hard-working life, he gradually awakened to the goodness and possibilities of the life outside of labor. This was the teleological purpose of centuries up till now.

But when machinery is replacing man and doing the heavy work of industry, it is time to get rid of that ancient prejudice that man must work ten hours a day to keep the world up to the level of the comfort it has attained. Possibly, if we clear our minds of cant, we may see that the reason why we still wish the laborer to work ten hours a day is that we, the comfortable classes, may go on receiving the lion's share of the wealth these machines, iron and human, are turning out.

If there is anything in these considerations, we must revise an economic conception which we accepted too easily. Two great English economists, it seems to me, have given a wrong turn to our ideas about labor. Mill said that the idea of labor "included all feelings of a disagreeable kind, all bodily inconvenience or mental annoyance, connected with the employment of one's thought or muscles in a particular occupation." Jevons defined labor as "any painful exertion, undergone, partly or wholly, with a view of future good." This inclusion of pain in the conception of labor, with its corollary of measuring labor by the pain which attaches to it, is surely misleading. What one, of course, sees is that, to the majority of men and women at present, labor involves a certain—even a considerable—amount of something of which they would gladly be quit. But this is the accident of our industrial system, due very much to the fact that we have forgotten the proper end of man, and have looked upon the worker not as a spirit, but as an instrument of production. It is an accident from which the comfortable classes and the professional classes have escaped. To speak of the labor of the merchant, the employer, the farmer—of any one, in fact, who has reasonable hours, who has some pride in his work, and who has some object in it—as "pain," is, in my view, a serious abuse of language. The pain of present-day labor is a consequence of the long hours and monotonous processes of the factory system; and as better organization and education shorten the

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hours of labor, make the working-classes more conscientious in their work, and give them a share in the result proportioned to the extra care they take, they also will escape the pain of labor.

What every moralist since Aristotle knows is, that only in the full, free, but unstrained exercise of body and mind does man find his happiness. It is too much, perhaps, to hope that, in any scheme of social organization, it will be possible to give every one a life of congenial work,—which would, certainly, be the ideal of economic activity. But, it may be said, with full conviction, that, if not just now, in a very short time, it will be possible to so shorten the hours of labor as to take away the pain of labor, change it into the healthy discipline of every clean life, and allow every one in his leisure hours the chance of re-creation in congenial work, play, or thought.

But all this is contingent on the proviso that we really wish it. A great many good people have not yet recognized the claims of the working-man to a soul, further, at least, than is implied in the effort to, what is called, "save" it. But once philosophy joins hands with economics, and popularizes the new ideal through the pulpit, it should not take long to rouse all good men to realize the great possibilities that now lie in our present economic position.

The abolition of poverty is now within our reach, if we, as a society, are really bent on its abolition. Of course, I am not speaking of that poverty which comes from disinclination to work or is brought on by vice; that kind of poverty we should not abolish. I mean to say that the resources of the nation in capital, invention, and labor are now so great that the one want of the time is organization, so that there shall be no destruction from war, no misdirection of production, no waste between producer and consumer. That there should be unemployed men in Great Britain arises from the same cause as brings about these frightful crises and this universal uncertainty:—that we have not brought consumer and producer to understand each other and work into each other's hands; that the best brains of this nation have not yet been turned to organizing industry.

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To sum up. The error of us all hitherto has lain in looking at man's economic effort too exclusively as an *end;* in looking upon those who started in life with a competency as "lucky souls," who alone could afford to live the life they pleased; in thinking that we had no responsibility for the fact that the great majority start infinitely behind those few.

The new economist must look at man primarily as a spiritual being, and must look at all men as spiritual beings. In considering the world of working persons, we must take what we may, without irreverence, conceive as the stand-point of the Almighty himself. To us all men must be equal in the one respect, that the *end of their being* is the same,—that is, the realization of all the powers of spirit in a free life.

From this stand-point, how are we to deal with the fact that some are born rich and many born poor? It must, I think, be the purpose and endeavor of all conscientious people to break down that primary inequality; not necessarily to take away from the one class the advantages they have, but to give something like the same start to all. No considerations of the sacredness of private property or freedom of bequest should be allowed to obscure the fact that the birthright of *every* human soul in a civilized country is an education, a training, and, finally, a working career, that will make it possible for him to realize himself in what we know to be the only true life,—the life of thought.

How that is to be brought about practically is not for me to say. Sufficient is it to point out that it must be done, or else society will be choked by its own wealth.

WILLIAM SMART.

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ON HUMAN MARRIAGE.

THAT marriage is the moral regulation of sexual relations originally uncontrolled is for most men the only natural and possible conception. Since passion is still a capricious and violent thing, sexual relations would remain comparatively free and promiscuous did not civilized life bring with it so many feelings that make for self-control and self-education. It seems therefore impossible to suppose that anything worthy of the name of marriage could have existed in the beginnings of human society. It would seem that man and woman were then drawn together by chance promptings of instinct, lived together so long as the attraction lasted, and separated when it ceased or when it drew them in another direction. All we know of primitive manners forbids the doubt that the relations of the sexes were then regarded in a light very different from that in which a more developed morality has taught us to see them. The savage woman feels no shame in abandoning herself to a man without marriage.

This conception of originally unregulated sexual relations became some thirty years ago the basis of an elaborate scientific theory about the origin of marriage. MacLennan and Bachofen pointed out the way, and were soon followed by many notable scholars. The corner-stone of all these systems is the discovery that many tribes look upon children as belonging exclusively to the mother and her people, a view exactly similar to that we commonly take of the relation of illegitimate children to their mother, except that here it is applied with absolute rigor to whole series of generations. This descent through the mother, taken in connection with a number of often acute interpretations of primitive customs, seemed to bring a new light and interest to the problem of the origin of human communities. We felt able to trace back the stages through which the life of the sexes and of the family had been developed. Scholars have differed on many particular points, but have shown an admirable unanimity upon the fundamental question. Man has steadily risen from a state in

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which the union of the sexes was entirely free to one in which it was better regulated; polyandry and polygamy were the intermediate stages, out of which monogamy arose and in civilized ages came to be enforced by law.

A more accurate investigation of primitive conditions, however, will show that this whole theory has no foundation. As early as the year 1888, I attempted to show, in a detailed critique of all the problems involved in this subject, that those hypotheses were worthless.* If I return to the question now, it is not to impart anything new, but on the occasion of a voluminous work published in English by the Finnish scholar, Mr. E. Westermarck.† Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, the well-known naturalist, has thought the work worthy of being ushered in by a very flattering preface of his own, in which he particularly praises the young author's courage and success in criticising the views of the most notable scholars. As my opinion of the scientific value of the book differs widely from this, I feel a kind of obligation to express it publicly, as I should perhaps not have done if the great name of Wallace did not shield the author. It will soon be apparent to the reader that the duty I have to fulfil is not a pleasant one.

1. In three long chapters Mr. Westermarck criticises the hypothesis we have been speaking of, that of the originally promiscuous union of the sexes. This hypothesis rests principally on three considerations. The first is the existence in our time of cases of promiscuous relations in tribes that lack all sense of sexual honor, and retain customs which are apparently vestiges of a former entirely promiscuous way of living. Mr. Westermarck attempts to prove that this argument is not conclusive, and I am ready enough to grant the failure of the proof, considering that in my book I have already expressed and upheld his opinion that those immodest customs are explained by entirely different causes, and especially that promiscuous relations, where they still are found, are a compara-

* "Die Primitive Familie." Leipzig, 1888. Intern-wissch. Bibl. lxvi. London, 1889; Paris, 1891.

† "The History of Human Marriage," London, 1891.

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tively late phenomenon, arising from a particular phase of the idea of property. Promiscuous relations are an effect rather of the sharp separation of tribes into units with relation to property than of an indiscriminate treatment of individuals. The evidence of this condition, with which I was principally concerned, will be sought in vain from Mr. Westermarck; yet I am less surprised at this omission than at the fact that he has nowhere found occasion to mention that his conclusion, in all its particulars, had already been presented by another student.

The second argument on which this hypothesis of promiscuous union rests is the fact that many primitive tribes have developed a system of appellations for the degrees of relationship, which seems to indicate that brothers shared their wives and sisters their husbands, and the children did not know who their father was, since they had the same word for father and uncle. Lewis Henry Morgan, the American scholar, has based this hypothesis mainly upon this peculiarity of nomenclature. But MacLennan has already proved that this is impossible, and that these expressions did not arise from blood relationship, but were mere polite modes of address. Peschel believed they had also some reference to the relative generation to which the persons belonged. I have shown in my book, by minute analysis of the particulars, that the question of generation was actually what determined the nomenclature, but in a purely formal way. Mr. Westermarck makes no mention of all this, but appropriates the results attained by MacLennan and Peschel. He writes, for instance, on page 85, "I shall endeavor to show that no inference regarding early marriage-customs is to be drawn from the terms of relationship." It would have been more modest to have remembered that the victory thus heralded had long ago been won by another; and this modesty would have been the more becoming as the victory could never have been achieved by the arguments he has advanced. They are insufficient. "It is needless," he says, on page 84, "to enter into further details." But this is quite incorrect. The author might, indeed, spare himself the trouble of detailed studies which others have already carried

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through, but he can use their results only by openly and honestly invoking their authority. As he fails to do so, the theory they have proved appears in his pages as an unjustified private opinion. The essential characteristics of the terms of relationship are touched upon indefinitely by the way. Thus the important distinction between the Ganowaian and Turanian systems is not even mentioned. Mr. Westermarck is content with a hypothetical assurance, and makes light of the verification which could be gained only by patient study of the details.

There remains still the third and most important argument for the existence of promiscuous relations. It is the descent by the mother's line already referred to, which is taken to prove that originally it was not known who was a child's father. Mr. Westermarck reaches the conclusion that there is no connection between descent by the mother's line and unregulated sexual relations. If I were to name the problem which more than all others my book was devoted to solving, I should have to take this one of descent by the mother's line. I have there shown that this custom is to be regarded as the outcome of a conflict for jurisdiction between the group to which the mother belonged and that which she joined by her marriage. Descent was counted by the mother's or the father's line, according as one or the other group prevailed. The child took the name of that family under whose jurisdiction he fell; there is no evidence that questions of blood relationship were concerned, but the result appears to have been due exclusively to social and economical conditions of the time. Mr. Westermarck does not attempt to explain the origin of descent by the mother's side; he is satisfied with criticising and rejecting the idea that it was due to promiscuous unions. But as this criticism, in its methods and results, often entirely coincides with mine, it cannot be thought an unjustified desire to wish that fact had been mentioned. But this never happens, although Mr. Westermarck knows of the existence of my book, and quotes it here and there upon minor points.

"Speaking of certain negro tribes," he writes on page 108, "Winterbottom suggested long ago that the prevalence of the

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female line was to be explained by the practice of polygamy, and Dr. Starcke has recently called attention to the same point." Mr. Westermarck overlooks the fact entirely that the important question is not whether polygamy was a possible cause of prevalence of the female line, but to find the proof of its origin and effects in the polygamous family. He forgets that this is my main object, and also that I have discovered many other causes of the prevalence of the female line. He even quotes me, on page 109, in such a way that any one would suppose I had overlooked the connection between this phenomenon and the custom of husbands going to live in their brides' houses (*Ambelanak* marriage). He quotes my explanation of the reasons for this custom, but adds as his own the idea of its connection with descent by the female, which is also developed by me, and at considerable length.* On page 110, Mr. Westermarck mentions how I explain a peculiar law of inheritance among the Iroquois. A woman's property passes to her children and sisters, and not to her brothers. I sought to explain this by the fact that the sisters live in the same house, while the brothers live in strange households as the husbands of alien wives. Mr. Westermarck says, "Though agreeing in the main with Dr. Starcke's hypothesis, I do not think it affords a complete explanation of the matter. It seems probable that the causes which make children take their mother's name

* On page 108 Mr. Westermarck writes, "According to Dr. Starcke, this custom is due to the great cohesive power of the several families, which causes them to refuse to part with any of their members. 'Since men are more independent,' he says, 'they are also less stationary; they can no longer attract the women to themselves, and are therefore attracted by them.' Under such circumstances there is nothing astonishing in the fact that children are named after the mother's tribe or clan." I had said, "Since men are more independent, they are also less stationary; they can no longer attract the women to themselves, and are therefore attracted by them. It might be expected that such a custom would gradually exert a destructive influence upon marriage whenever the husband gives up the connection with his own family" (p. 80). And on p. 78 I said, "*Djudur* involves the observance of the male, *Ambelanak* of the female line, and the question as to which was the original line of kinship among the Malays resolves itself into the question whether the man originally took his wife into his own home or established himself in her family." *Cf.* "The Primitive Family," pp. 34, 39, 66, 90.

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have also directly exercised some influence upon the rules of succession; but I am inclined to believe that the power of the name itself has been of the highest importance in that respect." Mr. Westermarck has evidently not understood the point in question. He has simply ignored the fact that I also attributed to the name a great influence in settling the line of succession. But this circumstance cannot account for the particular case of the Iroquois, which turns on the special question how a woman's property is inherited by her children and sisters, who bear her name, and not by her brothers, when they also bear it.

These passages comprise all the quotations Mr. Westermarck makes from my book, and he makes them in such a connection that he owed me at least the simple acknowledgment that his hypotheses were fashioned after mine. Later, he mentions my book twice in passing, on pages 391 and 514.

2. I should be glad to leave Mr. Westermarck and his book after being forced to speak of his authorship in a manner I must regret; yet my interest in the problems induces me to make a few additional remarks upon the methods and results of our author.

a. Mr. Westermarck defines marriage almost in the same way as I had done. "Marriage," he says, "is nothing else than a more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring."* I think too much stress is laid here on the birth of a child, since childless unions must certainly be called marriages. This definition appears to be chosen with a view to the subsequent explanation of the duration of marriage. This explanation is found in a comparison of the conditions of human and animal life. The utility of such a comparison is not to be denied, only it is a necessary condition for the right employment of such a

* Page 19. In "The Primitive Family," p. 13, I define marriage as a connection between man and woman which is of more than momentary duration, and as long as it endures they seek for subsistence in common. Dr. K. Friedrichs has thoroughly discussed this question in a very interesting paper in the *Zeitschrift für vergl. Rechtswissenschaft*, vol. x. I find myself in full agreement with him.

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method to have a clear consciousness of its limitations. The fact that something resembling marriage is found among the lower animals is of great interest, but this fact does not absolve us from the necessity to trace the actual causes of such relations. Mr. Westermarck takes the matter too easily, and uses the word "instinct" throughout as an adequate explanation.

"It is obvious that where the generative power is restricted to a certain season, it cannot be the sexual instinct that keeps the male and female together for months or years. Nor is there any other egoistic motive that could probably account for this habit. Considering that the union lasts till after the birth of the offspring, and considering the care taken of this by the father, we may assume that the prolonged union of the sexes is, in some way or other, connected with parental duties. I am, indeed, strongly of the opinion that the tie which joins male and female is an instinct developed through the powerful influence of natural selection" (p. 20). The author will acknowledge, without doubt, that we possess very meagre information about the mental life of animals. What we know suffices to make it probable that there is no essential difference between the human and the animal soul; but the actual ideas and motives that make up the consciousness of animals are too often entirely hidden from us. Here our knowledge of man is beyond comparison richer. And it follows that, when we notice similar behavior in men and in animals, we are compelled to explain the latter by the former, the less known by that which we know better. Mr. Westermarck's principle, however, is to explain man by the animals, the known by the unknown. Because he can find no selfish instinct except the sexual that should prolong the union of animals for months and years, he takes refuge without scruple in a hypothetical inherited parental instinct.

Instinct is only a conception by which we denote the presence of an organization which enables an individual to react usefully upon a given stimulus, without possessing an idea of the end to be attained, when there is only a very indirect connection between that end and the stimulus. Sometimes, too, we call it an instinct when a perception arouses pleasure

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or pain which cannot be explained either by the experience of the individual or by the direct impression upon the organism. But of course we should not speak of instinct when motives for an action or emotion are not absent, though undiscoverable by the observer; or when the motives seem to be absent only because habit has melted together the various elements of the process, so that they are no longer individually present to consciousness. It would be entirely misleading to talk of instinct in connection with the extraordinary facts of hypnotism. Suggestion is here the actual cause of the later act, but the individual often believes he acts from motives that arise in his mind in the ordinary manner. It happens often in daily life also that people ingeniously attribute their conduct to all sorts of imaginary motives, while the actual causes are wholly different,—as men with diseased nerves, for instance, find moral causes for their sufferings, emotions, and impulses which have a physiological origin. The physician is right in looking for the explanation in the diseased nerves; yet we should not forget that the behavior of those patients can never be perfectly understood if we take no account of their ideas and psychological motives, since they are stages in the process.

Strictly speaking, only reflex action can be regarded as instinctive. The province of instinct is abandoned as soon as emotions arise in the individual which constitute motives for his action. The sexual instinct, for example, can be explained by its physiological causes. But if we call it an instinct, arising through the powerful influence of natural selection, by which the individual is brought to pursue the interests of the race instead of his own, what explanation should we reach of the sexual life in the individual mind? None at all. For that purpose we should require knowledge of the particular feelings and images by virtue of which the sexual instinct governs men as a passion. Biology must ally itself with psychology and sociology. Mr. Westermarck admits that this is so; but this necessity seems to mean for him that a mass of facts is to be heaped together from all three departments; and yet it cannot be otherwise understood that every fact is to be regarded from all three points of view. No problem of

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human life can find its perfect and exhaustive solution in such a conception as that of utility to the race and of an instinct resting on this utility. These concepts are in themselves empty categories, well fitted as such to afford a desired cloak for ignorance.

When our author says that marriage comes from a parental instinct, he gives no explanation of the lasting union between man and wife; he merely notes the fact that such union exists and that it is useful to the children. The real problem, which remains to be solved, is what forces in the consciousness of the individual assure this lasting union.

We are ignorant of the motives of animals, but the most probable conjecture seems to us to be that the continuance of the union was brought about by the female and not by the male, because the female was consciously weaker during pregnancy. Animals are capable of the feeling that prompts the strong to protect the weak, and such a feeling may have influenced the male. Yet I think we should assume that the male soon discovers that the female is in some way useful to him; in which way, our scanty knowledge makes it hard for us to tell. Certain it is that among men and women a lasting union is dependent on this usefulness; the woman stands in need of protection from her husband, and he affords it in return for the household services which his wife renders.

Sexual instinct keeps man and woman but a short time together. A man's desire to live all his life with a woman is sufficiently explained by the division of labor which is thus made possible. When the primitive man abandons one wife, he at once looks for another, so that he spends not months or years but all his life in wedlock, from his youth up. He needs a companion, a slave, a housewife to bear the burdens of life with him,—of course a companion in the lowest sense of the word. Sexual attractions influence his choice, but the necessity of choosing is by no means dependent on them. Love becomes a passion in a great measure through sexual instinct; but other forces enter into the problem from the beginning, and the originally crude and brutal demands a man makes of his slave are the root of all the idealism of

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modern love. The services the wife renders in the house increase with the growth and differentiation of the family life, and we should now regard that love as low and as an insult to its object which arose merely from the excitements of sense, and did not have its true basis in the appreciation of those qualities which make the woman we love the life-long partner of our happiness and sorrow.

b. The ideal of beauty in any community depends upon the qualities which fit the wife to fulfil the functions which society lays upon her at that time and place. Mr. Westermarck devotes a whole chapter to determining the elements of the ideal of beauty, and here one comes upon many good remarks, although still missing a clear and sharp analysis. The author somewhere says that the formulation and development of great general laws is more essential than the analysis of particulars. This is ill-timed smartness; for of course general laws are the goal of our investigation; but the laws are worthless unless they find this verification in the particulars, which must, therefore, be always diligently examined. The law formulated on pages 264–65 is neither complete nor fundamental enough. "Men find beauty in the full development of the visible characteristics belonging to the human organism in general; of those peculiar to the sex; of those peculiar to the race." But what are we to think of the following? "We may infer that women's instinctive inclination to strong and courageous men is due to natural selection in two ways. A strong man is not only father of strong children, but he is also better able than a weak man to protect his offspring" (p. 256). We do not think there is here any question of instinct; the judgment of beauty is as usual determined by a swift consideration of the utility of the object. A house is not thought beautiful when it is unfit to live in; a vault is not beautiful if it seems too massive or too slender for the superimposed weight. A man is only beautiful when his appearance suggests that he is fit to fill the place that belongs to him in society. And as physical and mental qualities are alike demanded for this purpose, two ideals of beauty arise that are united in the perfect ideal but in prac-

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tice may be separated. The variations that occur in each come from the differences that arise in men's pursuits. Some love the statuesque, in spite of dulness and worthlessness; others prefer the beauty of intelligence and character that may be expressed in features ugly in themselves. Primitive races offer many strange examples of this dependence of æsthetic judgment on associations with utility. The Chinese, and here and there African princes, think long nails beautiful because they mark one's freedom from the necessity of labor. In some tribes the fattest and least agile women are most prized because their utter uselessness is a sign of their husband's wealth. Taste is determined among us by the same principles. To be dressed with neatness and taste means one thing in common life and another at a festive gathering. In the latter case the fact should be expressed that we have no work to do; our clothing is, therefore, of an unpractical type. In the other case our clothing should show that our work is not of a low and dirty kind. Mr. Westermarck says, on page 265: "That this connection [between love and beauty] does not depend upon the æsthetic pleasure excited by beauty is obvious from the fact that the intrinsic character of an æsthetic feeling is disinterestedness, whereas the intrinsic character of love is the very reverse." But this is nothing but an empty piece of cleverness, since the beautiful is never anything else but what we should be justified in coveting in the reality.

c. The unscientific character of every explanation of the facts of social life by appeals to instinct appears most clearly in Mr. Westermarck's account of exogamy. "The horror of incest," he says, on page 290, "is an almost universal characteristic of mankind." The remark is true. Few tribes allow marriage in all degrees of consanguinity. The horror of incest among us prevents all sexual ties between near relations. But our author assumes without proof that this is universally the case. He does not examine at all the hypothesis proposed by me and suggested by the observation that incest originally consisted in marriage only, and not in sexual intercourse. My hypothesis was that the prohibition of marriage was based upon the legal status the persons concerned had in the body

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politic. The son could not marry his mother, nor the brother his sister, nor the father his daughter, without upsetting the legal relations which had hitherto obtained between them. This hypothesis may prove to be erroneous; but the appeal to an instinct is undoubtedly no explanation. Mr. Westermarck is right in saying (p. 334) that the horror of incest is "an aversion to marriage between persons living closely together." He calls this aversion "instinctive," and I find no grounds by which he could make the rise of such an instinct appear probable. On the other hand, I believe my hypothesis can explain the origin and the unyielding rigor of that aversion. It is very superficial to compare this aversion with the repugnance of animals to pair with individuals of another species (p. 353). For the cause of this repugnance is the absence in those cases of sexual attraction, while incest is horrible in spite of the presence of the conditions of a mutual passion. And what can the author mean by saying (p. 319): "The home is kept pure from incestuous defilement neither by laws, nor by customs, nor by education, but by an instinct which under normal circumstances makes sexual love between the nearest kin a psychical impossibility"? or by mentioning in this connection (pp. 151, 155) the notion that there is something inherently impure in sexual intercourse? Is this notion the cause or the effect of that instinct? We believe this notion of the impurity of sexual intercourse has helped to bring about the cessation of all desire of this sort towards a mother, a sister, or a daughter; but we attribute to the original prohibition to marry any of these persons a far greater influence in producing the feeling that sexual intercourse is impure. Many other forces have worked to the same result, but they have all been social in their nature. Such a force, for instance, is the idea that sexual self-restraint was a sign of manly courage; that the wife had a superior position to that of the concubine, and was consequently insulted if her husband sought her only for her physical charms.

d. The chapter in which Mr. Westermarck describes the different forms of marriage is the best portion of his work. It is written in a neutral tone, and is quite satisfactory as a

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popular account of the main types of marriage. Of course one must not look here for an investigation into the manifold variations and singularities within these types. We should particularly have welcomed a sharper distinction between monogamy as it appears in primitive times as a chance fact, and monogamy as it exists among us, exclusively protected and recognized by the law. But we may overlook such minor matters, and turn our attention to the acute investigation of the causes which control the sex of children. Mr. Westermarck says (p. 482) that "It is probable that the degree of differentiation in the sexual elements of the parents exercises some influence upon the sex of the offspring, so that when the differentiation is unusually great, the births are in favor of females, when it is unusually small, in favor of males." I am inclined to agree to this; but when the author continues, "Polyandry is due chiefly to a surplus of men, though it prevails only where the circumstances are otherwise in favor of it" (p. 482), I am sorry nowhere to find what, according to him, these other circumstances are. Poverty might explain some cases, and the fact of brothers living in the same house might explain other cases, since the brothers might need only one housewife or might be able to support only one. But cases like that of the Nair on the coast of Malabar cannot be explained in this way, and, if these tribes are regarded as without the institution of marriage, the origin of their customs was still worth studying. Such other examples of polyandry as that in the Marquesas Islands also require a special explanation.

I think Mr. Westermarck would have recognized that marriage is essentially an economical institution if he had gone a little deeper into the study of its various forms. To explain polygamy by the surplus of women, and polyandry by that of men, shows a one-sided treatment, and that bias in favor of biological points of view, to the exclusion of social and psychological, which everywhere characterizes the author. The same holds good of his explanation of the victory of monogamy. "When the feelings of women," he says (p. 509), "are held in due respect, monogamy will necessarily be the

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only recognized form of marriage." We find in this only the result—by no means the cause—of monogamy. The author himself has here and there given some of the real causes of the growth of sympathy, but obscurely and disconnectedly. The growth of the feelings seems to him always the essential thing. At the conclusion of the book he gives a review of the results of his investigation. Here the origin of monogamy is attributed to the custom of regarding, in the polygamous family, only one man or woman as the true husband or wife. In the text this is only mentioned incidentally. I have myself laid great stress on this custom, and notice with pleasure this agreement in our views. A similar agreement, I may assume, exists on the subject of the Levirate, since Mr. Westermarck here expressly refers his readers to my investigations (p. 514). But I cannot explain how he overlooks the important distinction, pointed out by MacLennan, between the Levirate and the custom of marrying a dead brother's wife. In the one case the brother inherits his sister-in-law and has children by her; in the other he by no means inherits his sister-in-law, and the children he has by her are regarded as the legitimate offspring of his dead brother.

Unfortunately, I have not been able to pass a favorable judgment upon Mr. Westermarck's large and comprehensive work. I regret it all the more because he has collected a mass of material out of which a very useful book might have been compiled. The author shows considerable ability in clothing his thoughts in an agreeable, flowing style, an ability particularly valuable in scientific works upon subjects like the present. Constant, often similar, descriptions of the customs of many tribes can easily become tedious, but Mr. Westermarck knows how to keep alive the interest of his reader.

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CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.*

THEORETICAL discussions of fundamental ethical ideas appear at first sight to have little practical interest. For the student of ethics himself they carry with them their own satisfaction and possess their own value. But in what way can a theory, however true of the nature and growth of character and its relation to conduct, help us to solve the questions which press upon us at the present moment—how to prevent or mitigate destitution, what to do with the helpless or the depraved, how to satisfy the just demands of labor, how to make our houses and our lives and our occupations healthier and pleasanter. It is these social questions which beset us. But character and conduct? Character we know in ourselves and in our friends, and especially in our friends; and conduct? Is it not enough that we see its effects? We can tell when character and conduct are good, and when they are bad. They are hard facts which we have to reckon with and alter when they need alteration. But to know what character and conduct are in themselves seems to possess a merely theoretical interest, like the laws of reasoning which have their place in a science of logic, but may be dispensed with in the actual work of reasoning.

I might plead in answer that, whether theory is good or not, I have nothing to say that is not theory. But I will not plead a personal excuse. It is in fact a mistake to think that even a piece of pure psychology, such as I intend with your leave to discourse about to-night, is not of direct importance for practice. I will remind you of two instances. Take the controversies about free-will, once interminable and with no prospect, almost without the desire of conclusion, now perishing of inanition, because the world of thinkers is too busy to attend. Well, one thing has emerged from these controversies, which no one doubts, that whatever else there may be

* An address delivered before the London Ethical Society, November 20, 1892.

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behind the scenes, yet our conduct is irrevocably dependent upon our character. The sense of this, deepened, I have no doubt, by the ethical controversy, has enhanced the importance we attach to education, in order, while yet there is time, to secure the habits and even the inclinations on the side of morality. Or, again, consider how the same theoretical doctrine is affecting the view we take of the responsibility of criminals. Partly it has made us feel that responsibility belongs not only to him who commits the offence, but to those who suffer such temptations to exist, or who have left vicious natures to grow up without control. Partly it has brought us face to face with the question which now agitates the minds of many jurists, how to reconcile the infliction of punishment with our sense of justice,—a practical question which will doubtless in its turn lead to clearer ideas about the theoretical nature of responsibility.

Take another case. There is an old ethical controversy in which one party says that it is the motive, the character, the inward state which are morally valuable; the other urges that we judge morality according to the conduct and its consequences only. Be pure in heart, say the one party; be just in your conduct, say the other. It was the utilitarian philosophers who maintained this second position; and no one can doubt that all the later progress towards clearer insight into our moral or social condition has been due to these men, who bade people ask what effects their action would have; who have brought home to our minds the truth, that no amount of supposed sanctity in our internal promptings can excuse conduct which is repugnant to common sense, or the natural demands of men for happiness; who have brought us indirectly to the knowledge that you may preach for ever to a man of doing his duty, but so long as you leave him to struggle with conditions too hard for human nature to bear, you waste your breath. If such practical results as these turn for their theoretical justification on a true insight into the nature of moral action and character, what defence do I need for asking you to take with me a look into the mechanism of character?

Conduct is the mode in which character reacts upon sug-

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gestions arising from the circumstances in which a person finds himself placed. By this very dry, but accurate description, I hope to avoid raising the difficulties which oppress many people when they are told that conduct is caused by the operation of external events upon character. I mean by circumstances those which are generally called the occasions of acting. I mean by reaction the way in which anything behaves when affected by something else, in the same sense as a chemist says that a body has an acid reaction when it turns blue litmus red. Now a man acts in a certain way upon certain occasions, and these acts are the reaction of his character. If you see a man whom you hate, you double your fists; if you love him, you go to shake his hand; if you hear of a town submerged by an inundation, you put your hand in your pocket; if you are asked a question, you tell the truth; if a beautiful idea is suggested to you by a beautiful scene, you write a poem. Supposing you possessed a different character, you might respond in a different way to these occasions, but you would perform conduct of some kind or other. You may offer your cheek to the man whom you hate, or cross to the other side when you see your friend, when asked a question you may tell a lie, or when a peculiarly beautiful scene strikes you, you may stick up an advertisement. You would be called eccentric, or bad, or vulgar, but you would still possess a character.

Conduct and character and the circumstances which excite to action are related to each other in a manner which is general throughout organic life. The organism is affected by certain stimuli, and then responds to those stimuli by certain movements which serve the purpose of preserving the creature's life. What these movements are depends on the character of the organism. One of the pleasures of life which I have enjoyed recently has occurred to me when I was shown through the microscope the behavior of two minute organisms—the hydra and the paramœcium—when touched by foreign bodies or irritated by deleterious substances, like poisons. The hydra, the exquisite green animalcule with tentacles, which is found in some of our ponds, possesses on

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its surface some cells distinct from the ordinary ones. They contain within them other cells, and in these there is a long hair coiled up like a spring. When a strange body comes in contact with certain little hairs placed on the exterior surface of these large cells the internal cells explode, and the long hair shoots out to keep the enemy off. The paramœcium is an oval-shaped animal, not at all beautiful to look at, covered with short hairs, by which it swims and creates currents of water so as to bring food into its mouth. But drop a drop of corrosive poison into the water, and all over his body will shoot out long bristles, which are concealed under the skin in a special layer of cells, and form, when protruded, formidable weapons. These two microscopic animals may remind us of two types of character which we are familiar with in our friends,—the explosive and the bristly character. The first is very inviting to the outward view, but trap-guns are concealed in all its approaches, and any one of them may explode upon the unwary person who touches its highly sensitive feelings. The bristly character is unattractive, and any attempt at breaking down its reserve is met by a display of really effective hostilities.

Now the hydra explodes upon its enemy because the skin is structured in such a way that the motion set up by the stimulus pulls the trigger of one of its tiny muskets. This plan is followed up the whole scale of the organic world: movement follows stimulus in accordance with the structure of the organism. Sometimes the stimulus may actually excite a sensation, and then movement follows upon the sensation. But this, it is believed, means a high development of the bodily structure and the possession of a brain. Before we reach so high a stage, we have the simple case of reflex movement, which depends on the structure not of the brain, but of a segment of the spinal cord. Every one is familiar with this in the case of the frog. Destroy a frog's brain so that only the spinal cord is left of the central nervous system; then, if a point of the body is excited with acetic acid, the leg of the same side moves off so as to wipe off the irritant. These reflex actions serve a purpose,—in this case that of guarding

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the animal against something pernicious, or it may be the procuring of food and the like. There is no difference in principle between such a simple reaction of structure upon stimulus and the ordinary case where reaction is preceded by a sensation. In this second case the stimulus affects a more complicated structure, and the movement begins at the brain instead of at the spinal cord. The principle is the same, and in fact, to speak in purely mechanical terms, all our most complex conscious reactions are produced by a complicated system, in which the spinal cord is coupled up with parts of the brain and these with one another. It is only one step further to the truth that character, in like manner, is that structure—of course a mental structure—which, when set going by certain stimuli, such as I described before, reacts in the form of conduct.

But though this relation of character to conduct introduces no new principle, yet, of course, character, which I have described as a structure, is a different structure from that which is sufficient to produce action of a lower order than moral or immoral conduct. Common language, in spite of the looseness with which the word character is in general used, indicates this truth. If we observe a person's eyebrows, or eyelids, or legs, or arms, or facial muscles twitching continually at slight sounds, or for no apparent external cause, we do not say that he is of a nervous character, but of a nervous temperament. One man may overflow with animal spirits, while another may be grave and gentle, and the first will be brisk in his movements, the second sedate. This, again, we ascribe to a difference, not of character, but of temperament. Again, if one person possesses very strong passions, if he is, say, irascible, or if he is apt to do like the hydra and explode at a touch, if he is impulsive, in a word, this, too, we put down to disposition. We speak sometimes of persons as religious in character if they possess strong religious feelings; but we should not now think of this so-called character along with a character for veracity or lying or courage; we should speak more accurately of the strength of a man's religious feelings. When we use the words religious

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character we are referring to his performance of the religious observances recognized by his faith, of whatever nature those observances may be. In short, we mean by character, not impulses, or sentiment, or temperament, and the like, but a state of mind which produces voluntary action. Character is exhibited in acts of the will. This point is of great ethical importance because it enables us to see that we do not judge a man merely by his motive but by his character or, what is equivalent, his conduct. Whether a man does an act of kindness out of pure inclination towards another, or from a sense of duty, is of no importance whatever for judging his character. No matter from what impulse he acts, if he does the action voluntarily and can be reckoned on to repeat such actions, his moral character remains the same. It is his disposition which is different in the different cases.* In the one case he is a man of warm feelings; in the other case his natural feelings may be sluggish, and he may require always the spur of some ideal sentiment. Nor is the distinction a purely verbal one. It corresponds to a well-marked difference in fact. If your action is sufficiently accounted for by impulse or warmth of feeling, like the action of a dog in groping for food when it is hungry, or of the infant in seeking the breast, there is something wanting which is present in the voluntary action called conduct. That something is the idea of what you are about to do. Without entering into the very difficult question of what constitutes an act of will, we can see at least that in such an act the agent is affected by the idea of what he means to do,—he must act deliberately. I do not mean that he must ponder his proposed action and discuss the *pros* and *cons* of it, but he must be aware of what he is about to do, must have an idea of it before his mind. The mental structure called character depends, therefore, for its distinctive features upon the existence of ideas of things which are to be done.

* Hence Mill is not quite accurate when he says, in a well-known passage of his "Utilitarianism," that a man's motive is important for judging character, but not for judging conduct. He should have said disposition or temperament, though the context shows he has in mind the same distinction as is drawn above.

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These ideas are of course suggested for the most part by the external circumstances which we agreed to call the occasions of action, such as seeing an enemy, or a child who has slipped in the mud. Sometimes they may be suggested not by any external cause, but apparently from within. These last cases do not offer any real difficulty. We must suppose the ideas to originate from some internal bodily cause, such as a determination of blood to a particular part of the brain, which movement excites a particular kind of idea. We cannot say we know very much about these spontaneous ideas or thoughts. But they do not differ in principle from the familiar experience of how despair creeps over all one's views of life under the influence of severe fasting, or how the ideas troop gaily by, and the dull man seems to himself half a genius when his blood has been warmed by champagne. A diet of vegetable food, Tennyson tells us, set him "climbing icy capes." Our ideas have been thought to be connected with distinct portions of our brain; and the brain might be compared to a great block with many lodgers.* The right way to find one of these lodgers is to knock at any one of the five outer doors: the porter opens, and you go up-stairs to find him. But he may be induced to come out if any one of the other lodgers knocks at his door, or one of the servants; or even the hot-water pipes may burst in his room, or the electric bells start ringing and drive him out. In any one of these cases the same result is secured,—to make him open the door and show himself.

But the reason why I have dwelt upon this distinction of character from temperament, disposition, sentiment, and impulses is not merely its moral importance (I mean that it would be absurd to blame a man who behaved virtuously because to do so he had always to control his temper, whereas another person could do the same act without any strain); but because it helps us really to understand what character is by showing us how it grows. Character arises from these various causes through controlling them by ideas. Upon

* The simile serves its purpose, but the whole conception of localization in the brain is under discussion.

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this principle we proceed in all education of character. Thus, instead of allowing a child to satisfy its desire by the readiest path, we suggest to it other ideas and associate them with that desire—the idea of the mother's displeasure or her wish that the child should refrain with the impulse to seize the fruit lying on the table. The natural desire, which does not form a part of the character, becomes at last so modified or controlled by association with an idea that the child acquires as part of its character the habit of good behavior in this respect. Now to understand how character grows, we have to remember that no education eradicates altogether the natural sentiments. I said that the sequence of conduct upon stimulus in the case of character differed from other such sequences in that the character involved ideas, but the person who possesses the character retains the tendencies to the lower forms of sequence, however much they are masked by higher influences. In the midst of our self-conscious life we retain the ways of the lower animals: we roam about uneasily like the dog when we are hungry; we perform many movements not different from those of the decapitated frog; we turn our eyes to a bright light we know not why, and we proceed, when uncontrolled, straight to the gratification of our passions. To disregard this fact, to forget that some of our noblest sentiments are based ultimately upon instincts which have a lower source, and that these instincts are retained, is not only a serious blunder in theory, but may be a source of calamity in practice. We idealize our sentiments, as we say, but in doing so, we do not destroy the sentiment, but divert it from its proper object to some object closely associated with its proper object. Thus, while anger or sympathy leads us by an instinct to inflict pain on some one who has injured ourselves or others, we idealize this sentiment of vengeance by turning it from its immediate object upon the associated one of supporting the rights of ourselves or society through the impersonal action of legal punishment. The same account applies with even greater obviousness to the passion which we are accustomed to idealize more than any other of our sentiments. Well, the formation of character may be

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described as a systematic process of setting up associations between our natural objects of desire and other objects, and so establishing a system of controls.

But to explain this process of control sufficiently, I must first give a word to the fundamental principle which makes control necessary. It is that every stimulus tends to pass over, unless hindered, into its appropriate movement. Illustrations of this principle abound. Mr. Samuel Pepys going one Sunday into St. Paul's and endeavoring to kiss a very pretty girl by whom he sat, she took out a pin and stuck it into his leg, and Pepys moved farther up the bench. Stronger than the love of gallantry is the natural tendency of a painful sensation to produce a movement of escape from the source of the pain. If you think of an action long enough, inevitably you do it. Hence the practical wisdom of drawing back from the edge of a precipice when you begin to think of falling over. Hence, also, the wisdom of a rule, that if you decide something to be wrong, you had better not allow yourself the luxury of thinking how pleasant it would have been. Thinking need not always lead to action or conduct; it sometimes leads to speaking aloud (which is a kind of action), and it does so usually unless restrained. Just as if you cut me, I cry, so if you suggest any idea to me I speak. Things that one would rather have left unsaid illustrate this principle,—the thought is out of one's mouth before one can stop it. Even when the appropriate movement is repressed, it is often only by other movements. Every one knows the movements of the muscles involved in repressing actions or words or thoughts. Sometimes mere attention to what you are about to do may stop the action, but then, in the act of attention, how your brows contract or you draw a deep breath. We should expect therefore that when character is less developed, as in the child or the savage, suggestions from without or from within are at once gratified without further thought. The movement discharges along the natural paths, natural because the organism has by virtue of natural selection been chosen to perform in response to stimulation certain movements which help the animal to live.

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Now the process of control which makes volition and character out of the lower facts, the passions, and the like, consists in nothing more nor less than establishing associations between these passions and their movements and certain ideas of actions to be done (I mean as distinct from ideas of mere things or objects), and again between these ideas themselves. And observe that, except for the fact that they are ideas of actions which constitute the controlling elements, there is nothing in this process but what we find everywhere through the whole world of living beings and of mental action. Once more, the principles are the same everywhere: it is the things which follow the principle that differ. To speak generally, control exists wherever different elements in a bodily or mental structure are active at the same time and with reference to the same object. The sensations derived from the special senses control each other. The sight of an object may impel an animal to pursuit, while the smell may check the pursuit. Or the sight may be attractive and the smell being pleasant reinforce the attraction. The lowest organisms present instances of this simple control. A plasmodium or mass of amœboid organisms will make for a piece of sugar placed at a distance, but if a stream of bitter fluid, like quinine, be interposed, its movement will be stayed, until finally the attraction of the food proves too great, and the plasmodium makes its way across the quinine. When the connections between the different elements of the bodily or mental structure become well established, the organism is able to perform complicated movements and react upon its surroundings with greater accuracy,—that is, to perform with greater accuracy the movements necessary to maintain its existence. Illustrations are supplied by every case of so-called co-ordination of movements. For a limb to move to a precise place as for instance the frog's leg when the body is irritated, certain muscles must be contracted to a definite extent and others stretched. The sight of food in a definite position leads to movement in a definite direction. Compare, in respect of control, the uneconomic, though beautiful, way in which a very low animal, like the vorticella, secures its food, by making

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whirlpools in the water and sucking in food as the maelstrom does a ship, with the accuracy of the grasping hand.

The process might be illustrated at any length. But it is easiest to verify in our own lives by watching how definite sensations, and correspondingly definite movements, come to be attached to definite external objects. Take, for instance, the way in which a child learns to grasp. At first, it cannot do so at all. The only kind of prehension is that of closing the hand round an object, say the finger of the parent, which is placed inside the hand; and we know now, through Dr. Louis Robinson, how strong this prehensile power is in the earliest hours of life. But it was not till the nineteenth or twentieth week in the case of one child who has been much observed that the child could grasp at all, and even then, though it put out its hand to the object, it grasped short or aside. The sight of the object produces the action of grasping, but the action is as yet very inaccurate, and if it remained thus, the child would perish through not getting hold of its food. Gradually it connects the object as seen and the impulse to grasp it with the precise extent of movement to be made in order to have the sensation of touching the object, and thus the eye and hand have come to control each other. Hence it is that when we have found the position of an object by the eye it is easy to touch it when the eye is closed. But these connections, being acquired by experience, can be disturbed if the conditions are altered. Thus, if we look at the object first through prismatic spectacles with the edges turned to the right, which displace objects therefore to the right, then, when we shut the eyes and try to touch an object, the hand will pass to the right. When we have got used to seeing the world through the prismatic spectacles, and then remove them, for a short time the hand will now pass to the left, because new controls have been established which do not suit the actual world as seen by the unarmed eye.

In the higher processes other than those of action the same phenomenon of control exists. What is the difference between the judgment of the man of science and the ordinary man about a particular subject, except that the man of science

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connects the sight of the object with a number of other ideas derived from his experience, which he uses therefore in order to interpret the nature of the object presented? His perception is controlled by a number of others. All correctness or rightness in thinking arises from controlling our thought by a number of others, a process analogous to that by which an investigator checks or controls, as the expression goes, his observations by subjecting his instruments to observations made upon other instruments.

Now, the control with which we are familiar as volitional control, or control by the will, is an example of an extension of the same process. A man follows the natural impulse to drink until, either by suggestion from other persons or by memory of his own experience, he comes to associate with the sight of the wine and the desire to drink it the idea of stopping after a certain number of glasses. Consequently, when he drinks, this controlling idea hinders further action, though how it does so is not clearly made out. Besides the association of the original impulse with an idea, these ideas may be themselves connected with each other. Hence an impulse and the idea of carrying it out may be controlled by many other ideas, as happens when we have to consider a proposed action from a great many alternative points of view before we decide on performing the action. But any idea of action tends to fulfil itself in real action, and consequently, if any of the associated ideas lead to actions which contradict each other, there is restraint. If the proposed action does not conflict with any of the other associated ideas of conduct, the action takes place. Control is therefore not to be understood as consisting in resistance; it may be a sanctioning or reinforcement of the natural sentiment and of the idea with which that natural sentiment is in immediate connection, or it may even carry the action beyond the point for which the natural passion would have sufficed. A man's natural pluck may lead him to hold his ground only for a certain time, till the associated ideas of discipline, or fear of disgrace, or patriotism, add fresh strength to his waning energies.

Most of these controlling ideas are implanted in us by

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education, but very largely we learn them ourselves by experience. A character, then, exists, when there is a well-defined body of such ideas which are able, in the way described, to control external or internal suggestions. It would be a difficult question to decide how far this control actually alters the capacity of the individual for being affected by the passions which are controlled. Supposing I repress habitually a desire for drink because it weakens my power of working, and come, in the end, to control this desire completely; does the desire remain, though always repressed, or is the capacity for this desire actually diminished? Either hypothesis would suffice. The desire might become atrophied by disuse, or, if not atrophied, it might be repressed before it rose into consciousness. Many of the facts of hypnotism seem to indicate that a suggestion can actually suppress a feeling like pain, or a desire for drink, but it is always open to argue that the affection really exists but is suppressed by some contrary idea, either before it reaches the level of consciousness or after. And other evidences point to this last alternative in certain cases, for example, in what are known as negative hallucinations. A doctor may suggest to a patient that he is gone from the room, and no matter how much he speaks to her, or if he touches her, she will appear completely unconscious of his presence. Yet she will see and hear other persons as usual, and it is evident enough that she must perceive the doctor also, in order to recognize that here is the person whom she had been directed not to see, and so not confuse him with another person.

No matter what the means are by which instincts are encouraged or repressed under the control of certain dominant ideas, the character exists only when this control is effected, when certain ideas of conduct not necessarily present all at once become dominant. I say, advisedly, not necessarily present all at once to the mind. For most of such ideas exert their influence without our being conscious of each of them individually. They form a strong undercurrent, but only certain portions come to the surface. According to the different occasions of action, different portions of a man's character

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become visible, but no special portion is unaffected by the larger volume beneath the surface. Just so, if you are at a distance from a great river, you may see a small tributary swollen momentarily by a local rain, but the height to which the tributary rises is determined by the larger and deeper unseen channel which drains off the exuberant waters. So, too, in all our thinking, the attention is absorbed by some one vivid present object; but a spectator can see how our thoughts are guided, not by the immediate object of attention, but by a larger volume of ideas which mingle together confusedly, perhaps as mere vague excitations of the brain, perhaps really conscious ideas, but half understood, perhaps unconscious sympathies or prejudices, unconscious wishes, the dawnings of theories not yet realized by the thinker, the instigation of those inscrutable neutral tendencies which are the basis of originality,—all of which control the immediate apprehension and affect our view of the object. The case is the same with our characters. The dominant ideas which form the fabric of character, like the greater forces of nature, operate for the most part unseen, but not the less effectually. Only special portions of the man stand out upon each occasion as the primary motive. In sharp twinges of conscience, or at moments of moral hesitation, these primary motives seem to constitute the whole controlling force: "I have told a lie," or "am I to waste this gift of language, or of mathematics?" But none the less do they derive their momentum from the dominant forces which are conjoined with them. And in the instinctive uneasiness, apparently inexplicable, which we feel ordinarily at the impulse to do something incompatible with our formed habits, whether moral or immoral; in the silent approbations which accompany the trivial round of our ordinary duties, no less than in the undisturbed calmness of mind with which our vicious natures may proceed to the fulfilment of their ends; we have the operation of these dimly revealed authorities, which experience and education have combined with nature to intrust with the control of our actions.

"Force of character," "individuality of character," "con-

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sistency of character," all these are phrases which testify to the presence of the dominating ideas in the mind. They indicate, also, something else, that the control is effective; that is to say, that the control has become habitual, and that it is definite and organized control. The character does not respond differently to the same circumstances; it does not do one thing now, and a different thing the next time. The controlling elements which give the immediate direction to conduct occur in sufficient strength to make the action unambiguous. Any amount of previous deliberation, of weighing other possible courses is consistent with this type of character. The strongest characters are not necessarily the swiftest, but when they have decided, they do not flinch. Swiftness of decision goes very often with strength, but is not sufficient by itself to constitute strength, which depends partly on firmness and partly on a reasonableness which can take all proper considerations into account. There are again the antipodal characters, feeble and inconsistent, in which the control is ineffective. These contain no well established connections between the perception of circumstances and any one idea amongst the dominant mass. Consequently, though this idea is suggested, the energy is distributed over many others, and no sooner is an action begun than it is impeded by some contrary claimant. The ideas of conduct have not become systematized. There is no differentiation. An impact upon any point of the mass irradiates through the whole and action becomes uncertain, because the control is not definite. It is as if in a regiment each captain, overhearing the order imperfectly, were to begin to act for himself without awaiting for the word of command from his immediate superior; and thus one company will have formed fours and begun to march while another is wheeling to the right, and the whole column moves irregularly or the different companies interfere. The absence of effective control in the dominant mass is the reason why we declare such persons to have no character at all.

But there is a more difficult question to face. What is it which makes characters different, which constitutes individ-

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uality of character, not in the sense of greatness or perfection, but in the sense that every man has a peculiar character of his own? The difference of the dominant ideas of conduct. Yes; but how do these dominant ideas come to differ in different individuals? Nature, education, and experience combine, I said, to establish the authority of character. What are the respective parts which these three things play? Here is a question of the utmost importance, which I doubt if the data at present in our possession enables us to solve at all completely, which I, at any rate, am not master enough of the facts to solve. How far is it true that limits are fixed by nature which no education or other means can pass? Or can we so act upon the mind that we can supply forces which, if they do not obliterate the natural tendencies, may at least hold them in effective check. If I cannot answer these questions, I can at any rate show the operation of one of these three forces, and can illustrate how important physical, or, if you please, animal conditions are for the formation of character; how all differences of character depend directly or indirectly upon states of the body itself. Bear in mind that, though many ideas of conduct are implanted by education, this education consists for the most part in giving a certain direction to tendencies which exist already; that the first germs of the ideas of conduct are supplied by the objects which the child wants, and that the development of the character depends largely on the fact that individual experience acts as a control to the natural inclinations. It can hardly be doubted that the peculiarity of individual characters is due primarily to original differences of temperament and the state of the passions. Now, obscure as are the causes of temperament, they are undoubtedly referable to varieties in bodily organization. Under this term I include both the nervous organization and that of the organs of the body. There are apparently differences between different nervous systems, the tendency to response being in one case slow and irregular, in another rapid and definite. These various differences are intimately connected with differences in the general organs of the body,—the circulation, the respiration, the liver,

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stomach, and the like. For nervous action requires that the nerves should be fed, like the other bodily organs. How far differences of temperament connect with the nerves rather than the body is very obscure. Certainly, though robust health is usually exhibited in energy of character, this energy may be displayed equally in an emaciated frame with a low general vitality.

But whatever be the answer to this question, the bodily system, as a whole, is the main determinant of character, and in this the vital organs play a very prominent part. Now, our characters, or, at least, our dispositions, change with the state of the stomach, or the circulation, or of the breathing. Mr. Perkins, the lawyer in "Pickwick," was aware of this when he hoped that the jurors who were to try the case of Bardell *versus* Pickwick, had had a good breakfast. "Why so?" inquired Mr. Pickwick. "Highly important; very important, my dear sir," replied Perkins. "A good, contented, well-breakfasted juryman is a capital thing to get hold of. Discontented or hungry jurymen always find for the plaintiff." A man's character seems to shift and change with various epochs of his life, even according to the weather; and the will may even become paralyzed or ineffective from mere changes in health. Almost distinct moral codes are recognized for the convalescent and the healthy man. If these changes were to become great, they might lead to a considerable alteration of the character, and this is what happens in fact. Most noticeable are the changes in character which occur in the development of each individual at certain important epochs, at the cutting of the first teeth, or at the physical passage into manhood or womanhood. A friend of mine, who is a good observer, tells me she has observed changes of character in her own and other children at the cutting of the second teeth. All these changes, altering the character of the body as a whole, alter, also, the sensations which the person derives from his body, and modify his impulses or introduce new ones into the economy of his life. A different turn is given to his wants; his ideas of conduct are altered, enlarged, or narrowed, and his character, therefore, transformed to a greater

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or less degree. At the same time these methods of acting are embraced by him as his own, and felt to belong to his inner life, to his personality. It is indeed impossible to separate a discussion of character from a discussion of personality, because it is in our acting as well as in our thinking that we have the highest exhibition of our personality. Now, in order that we should claim our thoughts and acts as our own, they must possess, to borrow an expression of Professor William James, a certain "intimacy," be bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, and this intimacy they obtain indirectly from their connection with the feelings derived from the body. The sensations we derive from our body, from the viscera, the breathing, the circulation, muscles, form the nucleus around which we group our knowledge of our self. In the beginning of life the only knowledge which the infant can possess of what we may please to call its self is knowledge of this strangely interesting, soft, extended thing, the source of its acutest pleasures and pains, an object of curiosity to it equally with the bright light that attracts its eye. That we never cease to be infants in this respect we may satisfy ourselves if we try to imagine, as Mr. James suggests, what we should be if our internal bodily organs were gone. The background would have vanished against which all other mental objects stand out. Assume that we should recognize external objects, yet their poignancy of interest, their capacity of pleasure and pain, would be gone. With what sort of pride should we claim our pet fancies or our deepest meditations as our own, as a part of ourselves, if the face ceased to glow and the heart and the breath to move more quickly at an idea which lit up the chaos of our experience with order, at the verification of some familiar and cherished thought, at the consciousness of a great resolve? Or if we ceased to blush and our knees to tremble at the idea of conduct repugnant to our nature, if the memory of a bad act did not make us sluggish in vitality and irresolute in our movements? The larger part of the intimacy of our thoughts and conduct arises from these bodily accompaniments, which include the strain of our attention, the contractions in the muscles of the eyes, or in the case of some

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persons apparently, contractions in the throat, as if we were speaking to ourselves what we were thinking.

It is small wonder, therefore, that if any disturbance arises in the vital functions,—obstruction of the circulation, indigestion, and the like,—the character should be modified. These physical conditions alter the disposition, change the course of ideas, make some things seem desirable which were not desirable before, and rob others of all their flavor. And since the ideas which form the controlling elements of character are suggested largely by the natural inclinations, the character changes as well. Many cases of insanity are due to mere affections of the internal organs of the body, as when, for instance, a man believes himself to be hollow from some physical disturbance in the intestines or stomach. Such a change may not extend as far as the character. On the other hand, in acute melancholy or mania the character changes perceptibly: ordinary, quiet, respectable men and women may become violent and outrageous in gestures and conduct, or quick, kindly natures become sullen, immovable, and apathetic.

In many cases of abnormal alterations of the character it is not easy to point to any definite change in the mere bodily organization, except in the sense that there is always some physical basis of the change. On the contrary, direct physical influences, such as a concussion of the brain, form only one kind of exciting cause of such abnormal states. Other exciting causes are ideas, the origin of which is unknown, though doubtless dependent on some bodily event or ideas suggested from the outside by other persons. There are well-known instances in which patients exhibit in alternation different dispositions, and with them modes of conduct. The one self forgets the other, and the life of the patient becomes the life of two different persons in succession. The Irishman who, in order to recall certain events which he had witnessed when he was intoxicated had to get intoxicated again, is a type of, and a psychological commentary on, these acuter cases. In other cases two selves are present simultaneously in the same body. I have not time to describe these cases in full,

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which you may read about in Mr. James's work,* or in M. Ribot's works on the diseases of memory and will and personality. More important for the practical question, how far education can control the character, are the cases where hypnotization is able to produce changes of character, for here we have the action of an external agency, which may possibly be employed more extensively. Here, again, I must, for want of time, content myself with referring you to works on psychology.

But without presenting the evidence, I may point out two inferences which we seem entitled to draw from these phenomena. First, the cases mentioned tend to show that permanent character depends on the permanent associations of our ideas of conduct. They show this, for when by any means these ideas become changed, or if some are suppressed and others exalted into undue prominence, or when the ideas become dissociated, the character is modified, and may even fall apart into two or more. Such cases afford evidence more palpable than that afforded by introspection that consistency and individuality of character depend upon the establishment of definite associations, controls, as I call them, between our natural wants and our ideas of conduct. If I were speaking of our ways of thinking, I should have to include thoughts of objects other than practical. Hence we may feel pretty sure that our previous analysis was in the main correct. But in the next place, as we have seen, these cases also show that many different exciting causes may determine the set of the character: not only the original differences of bodily organization, but special and inscrutable circumstances may exercise a moulding influence, and so also may actual suggestion. The important practical question is how far education, which after all is only systematic suggestion, or other forms of suggestion applied medically like hypnotism, can really affect the character permanently. And about this I do not feel com-

* "Principles of Psychology," vol. i. ch. x., or his smaller "Text-book," ch. xii., M. Ribot's "Diseases of the Memory," forms a volume of the International Scientific Series. A very important work, for the hypnotic data is M. Pierre Janet's "L'Automatisme psychologique," now, I believe, in course of translation. His chief cases are recorded by Mr. James.

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petent to give a decided answer. We want to know more about what permanent effects can be produced in criminals by a proper method of reformatory discipline. There may be persons present here who are well acquainted with the experiments made at the Elmira Reformatory in New York State. These experiments have been, I believe, largely successful. But I do not know that the beneficial results have been produced in the case of those, luckily a comparatively small number, whom the Italian writers on this subject call criminals-born. These criminals are believed by Professor Lombroso to have very definite natural tendencies, as shown either in special brain development or special nervous characteristics, such as insensibility to pain, or particular shape of the skull and face, such as seen at first sight, if the observations are valid, to offer a serious obstacle to any permanent alteration. We do not yet, I think, know enough of the extent to which actual brain substance may be affected by the different direction given to ideas, to be able to judge this question properly. We are in the same position in regard to hypnotism. It is reported that many changes of character have been operated by hypnotic suggestion, and that this has been of a permanent character. More recently, Dr. Edgar Berillon reported to the Psychological Congress, here in London, that he had experimented on children of unwholesome or depraved tendencies and had succeeded in effecting fairly permanent improvement of character. But there can, I think, be no doubt that we require more information upon this subject before we conclude that characters, however naturally perverted are the tendencies out of which they have to be built, may be regenerated by a kind of psychical medicine.

Before I conclude what I have to say on this practical side of the question, let me hark back for one moment to theory, from which a theorist can never be kept for long. If I have been theoretical, I have been at least impartial; I have spoken no less of the unjust than the just. But what is it then that makes the difference between the good and the bad character? The answer is obvious if our account of character is true, as being constituted by the control exercised by

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certain ideas of conduct. The good man is he whose controlling ideas of conduct are moral ideas as opposed to immoral ideas. This is the whole difference between them, whether that difference be due to a lucky natural endowment of disposition, or to good training, or to both. If you ask me what are the moral ideas as distinguished from the immoral, I can give you to-night only the fraction of an answer. All I need say is that the moral ideas are such as are recognized by society as promoting its integrity and continuance, and with these the integrity and continuance of the individuals who act according to these ideas. We saw that the movements which the animal executes upon sensation are such as tend to preserve himself; man is a social animal, and man's movements, when he has to perform conduct, are such as tend to preserve himself and his society in life and death and help him to propagate his kind. The good man and the bad man alike, acting from their characters, seek to preserve that character in activity. Every living being, said Spinoza long ago, seeks to persevere in its being (*in suo esse perseverare*). Each goes his own way. But the bad man goes the way to the perdition of society and in general to his own perdition. Thither, too, go the weak, those who never rise from mere sentiments to character, dropping their good intentions by the way, as we are told, to pave the courts of hell. The good characters go the way which preserves the life of society and themselves, and become the authors of the predominant features of new societies in the future. Their difference from bad men all lies in the fact that they have a different set of inclinations and controlling ideas.

I believe that the most important theoretical questions of character and conduct can be solved by recognizing that conduct is the inevitable outcome of character, and that character is simply a more or less systematic, more or less effective control exercised by moral or immoral ideas. But I am not here to deliver a treatise of moral philosophy. I come to the conclusion of the matter,—a conclusion so obvious, so much a matter of every-day thought and experience, that I am half ashamed to present it as the product turned out by all this

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psychological apparatus, though I am far from believing that I have exhausted the psychology of the subject. But, if obvious, it is not the less important, and the more we know about perfectly familiar truths the more significant they become. Such analysis as I have been able to give strips character of its special mystery. We are but bodies and animal impulses controlled by certain ideas which are determined in varying proportions by nature and circumstances, or education. Even those strange mutations of character in normal lives (I am not speaking of abnormal changes), when the character assumes a new form through the shock of some stirring event, or the influence of some teacher, must ultimately be ascribed either to latent elements of temperament or to a fresh arrangement of the ideas which make up our personalities. It is as if a box of pieces had been shaken up and had fallen into a certain definite form, but one piece had been forgotten and is now added, and the pieces are shaken into a new whole again. This cold reduction of what we chiefly call ourselves, and invest, perhaps, with some concealments, as if there were something beneath which we could not hope to understand—to circumstances which we can understand in principle and may hope to understand in detail, is helpful, I believe, even for practical purposes, because it makes us reflect how far we are able, and therefore bound, to limit the power of mere accident in the formation of character. We can limit it in many ways. Remembering that character depends on the state of the body as a whole, the mere physical health, and on the circumstances in which a person lives, which are his chief stimulus to conduct, we can endeavor, first of all, to remove those external conditions which make good character impossible, and ensure those conditions which promote it. First, health and happiness, and fair play both to the animal wants and to the intellectual desires. Characters not tainted by nature will grow, half spontaneously, into healthy characters when planted in a good soil. But, secondly, we can diminish the range of accident and become the masters of our characters, so far as the obstacles of unlucky, perhaps ineradicable, malformations may allow us, by all manner of ways,

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of which direct education—I mean not only of the head, but also of the character—plays the larger part; and a large part is played by the more powerful, but less tangible, influence of public example. To this end we have to study more carefully, besides the general principle of the formation of character, the laws by which character grows in detail, and the special prescriptions which special kinds of temperament require—that study of the formation of character which Mill declared to be an immediate demand, which some have thought to be impossible. We shall have to find out both what ideas we wish to become the controlling ideas in the minds of ourselves and our children, and by what means we shall best secure their authority. And if we wish our lives to be guided by patriotism and public spirit in small things as well as great, not constrained by duty, but as if we were members of a larger family; then, after assuring to each man those material conditions without which all exhortation to high-mindedness is a mockery, we shall have to make our individual citizens lovers of their society, because we have ourselves guided their growing wills by those ideas, and fashioned them into those habits which shall effectively control whatsoever they possess of powers of enjoyment, powers of work, powers of discovery, powers of art, powers of religion, by an authority which is the counterpart, or the reflection, of the highest social aspirations.

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MORAL DEFICIENCIES AS DETERMINING INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONS.*

SINCE Socrates defined virtue as a science, attempts to discover a constant and fundamental relation between intellect and morality have not ceased to be made. On the one hand, higher intelligence has been looked upon as cause of better morality; and on the other, moral perfection has been regarded as an instrument of intellectual progress. Inversely, intellectual limitation has often been considered a condition of a certain moral elevation—*e.g.*, the blessedness of the "poor in spirit," the alleged evil effects of "enlightenment," etc.,—and likewise it has been thought that superior understanding might be attained on the path of moral depravity. Finally, instead of connecting these two movements by immediate causality, they may be regarded as separate growths from a common root, and hence indirectly connected. The direct opposition between such assertions, all of which have an apparent validity, points to a fault in the manner of putting the question. This error probably lies in the fact that these discussions deal with conceptions of too vague and general a nature. The conception of knowledge, like that of morality, covers countless acts, which partake in some degree of the quality designated, just as is the case with the particulars included under the general ideas of happiness or egotism or liberty. It is to be hoped that such vague, general conceptions in scientific ethics will soon give way to the description of specific, psychological processes, included under the general heads,—a parallel to the achievement of Herbart in regard to "*Seelenvermögen.*" A certain preparation for this end may, however, be found in developing clearly the contradictions in the general relations between Intellect and Morality. In illus-

* This article is part of the second volume of the author's "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," which is shortly to appear. The reader finds here hardly more than a general outline of the original article. From want of space, it has been considerably shortened without being able to consult the author.

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tration of this point, the following considerations are offered as removing the apparent paradox that development of intellect can be brought about by moral insufficiency, or, *vice versa*, that deficiency of understanding and thought should go with morality.

It may be admitted at once that in many cases intellectual development is united with moral elevation. We need but name Socrates, Jesus, Spinoza. Despite this, it may be asserted that certain specific experiences are not compatible with absolute purity of morals. Morality, to be sure, is an effectual means towards the understanding of human nature, because, through the destruction of the personally egoistic barriers between men, it becomes easier for the psychic phenomena in the life of one individual to be experienced sympathetically by another. In order to understand a man fully it is necessary to put one's self in his place, or, at least, to bear a psychologic resemblance to him. In the case of sin or of weakness in the face of temptation, the pure and the noble obviously cannot compete in thoroughness of comprehension with those to whom the reproduction of sinful conditions is an easy matter. The moral man lacks the psychical experience which gives the immoral one so thorough a comprehension of the immorality of others. Just as the man of low and mean mind is unable to understand the high-minded and noble one and regards him as a problem, explicable only by attributing to him secret thoughts and purposes similar to his own, in like manner the pure man is too unlike the scoundrel to comprehend him completely. Criminals become valuable assistants of the police, not only because of their knowledge of the practices of rogues and of their hiding-places, but rather by their much better understanding of the processes and motives of the criminal mind. This knowledge permits them to draw definite inferences from given situations. For them it is an easy matter to forge a psychological chain with scattered links of evidence.

Vileness and temptation are powerless to touch certain natures. Even in schools, which are often hot-beds of the most unclean thoughts and words, and in which the immo-

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rality of a few corrupted individuals becomes endemic, there are always some pure natures which are innocuous to the poison and in whose presence the obscene talk ceases. A sensitive power of reaction against evil which holds knowledge of immorality to be a taint, and which looks upon initiation into it as participation in guilt, is ethically admirable. It is certainly most desirable that as many as possible should live in a sphere of moral purity. The gain, however, is at the price of losing a knowledge of certain active powers in the life of mankind. It is a noteworthy fact that the conception of an act forms the first inclination to its execution, since a psychophysical association exists between the thought of an action and the steps towards its performance. When the tendency to action is completely removed by other causes, a clear theoretical recognition and conception of it is an impossibility. It is an acknowledged fact that the occupation of the mind with forbidden thoughts is frequently the incentive towards action, and success in leading the thoughts away from the forbidden fruit means prevention of the act. Inversely, personal consummation of the deed is the condition of pursuing it in thought to its logical consequences. Who can say whether those high natures that combine a deep comprehension of the being of man with elevated morality—who can say whether it was not in hours of temptation, of moral confusion, of alienation from God (for the noblest men least of all escape such troubles), that they attained their clear and penetrating insight into man's soul?

Genius, indeed, is able to concentrate in itself the experiences of the entire race in such a way that it can express the most profound truths concerning affairs of which it has no personal experience. The psychological conditions of the achievements of a man of genius are very often not of his own making, but of innate organization, just as is the case with so-called instinctive action or knowledge. A highly gifted judge of human nature may, accordingly, be able to comprehend fully the depths of the criminal soul, or the purity of a Jesus or a Francis of Assisi, without experiencing the emotions involved,—usually a necessary condition of such psychological

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comprehension. In any case, however, the man of genius, and indeed every one who has any trace of insight, must possess an inherited constitution, which, by reacting in a determined way upon the present or imagined situation, may lead to the full comprehension of it. Unless we wish to assume a pre-established harmony or miracle, the organic condition produced by any passion remains the only source of its further suggestions. Moral imperfection is therefore a condition of the comprehension of immoral passions. In order to bring out the consequences of this necessity, let me direct attention to a single point. The countless works on moral philosophy do not contain a description of the moral life as it really is, but rather a compendium of an ideally perfect morality. The moralists describe life as it ought to be, and, though they may be convinced that the conditions are different in real life, still they look upon the ideal rather than on the deviations from it as the subject of their study. Ethics with such a goal in view seems a most useless science, and fully deserves the cold glances bestowed on it, not by practical men alone, but by representatives of other sciences as well. The chief cause for this error is to be sought in a practical, ethical idealism and enthusiasm, which substitutes exhortation for philosophy and converts the moral philosopher into a teacher of morality. Theory should hold itself aloof from any approval or disapproval of its objects. In making human acts the subject of scientific study, the student must not allow his high regard for morality, any more than his abhorrence of vice, to exercise any influence upon the form or matter of his investigation. In a modern work on ethics, the statement may be found that the student of ethics writes in a different frame of mind from that of the anthropologist or the botanist. This seems radically wrong,—*i.e.*, not that it is not the case, for it is so most frequently, but that, as far as the welfare of science is concerned, it ought not to be the case. It is just as if the anatomist, in his work of dissection, were asked to take into consideration the beauty or ugliness of the body on the dissecting-table. Whatever the source of the desire for knowledge may be, it seems proper to consider it historically

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as an aid in the struggle for existence which has come to be valued for its own sake. The truest and purest research is that which is an aim in itself, and in which all moral ends which it might serve retire into the background. It will therefore be of great benefit to ethics as a science, if the student does not allow his personal enthusiasm for morality to exert any influence upon his investigations. A description of morality degenerates into an empty scheme if immorality is not placed in juxtaposition, in reference to which the true meaning and purpose of ethical rules can alone be grasped. To describe either by itself is as unmethodical as to write the history of spiritualism without constant reference to materialism.

The ethical students who treat morality from an abstract and one-sided point of view are like artists who work without models. True, the artist must not represent the reality with the varied and accidental mixture of all its component parts, but a side of it drawn from a certain point of view. For all that, the *certa idea* which Raphael thought necessary for the representation of beautiful forms is merely a guide, teaching how to combine certain features of reality, although a complete knowledge of the subject is the condition under which one side of the same can be correctly represented. Temptation and sin, selfishness and the depths of sensuality, humiliation, remorse, and purification,—all these experiences, without which the moral life of mankind would be a colorless, incomprehensible mechanism, would fail to be understood if personal experience were not at hand to fill out in part, at least, the empty phrases. The task of understanding these powerful elementary passions of the human soul is very difficult from the height of official station, as well as in the normal and correct life led by many scholars. The danger is always at hand, either of giving us at best an anatomy of the moral life, while the question under discussion is really one of its physiology, or of falling into a one-sided optimism. Undeniably, this is a point in which a theoretical knowledge gains depth and thoroughness from experience of comparative immorality, either present or past.

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The possible intellectual results of immorality discussed up to this point are two. First, our immorality enables us to recognize the presence of immorality in others, and thus furthers knowledge. Second, immorality, in dealing with certain definite fields of knowledge, develops intellect as a function, and strengthens its power independently of the object on which its force is exercised. From this latter point of view, there is no immoral instinct which cannot, under certain circumstances, produce a sharpening of the intellect. Since a knowledge of affairs is a means to increase of power and to better attainment of all one's ends, therefore it is furthered directly in proportion to the degree in which fitness of means to ends is secured.

In turning from the point of view of objective scientific research to practical life, a glance is sufficient to show that for reaping selfish benefits, for attaining personal ends, much more acuteness and intellectual activity of every kind is brought into play than is the case where the ends in view are altruistic. The existence of immorality being assumed, the impulse to individual advantage roused by it makes much greater demands on shrewdness, prudence, and ingenuity than would be made in similar circumstances by a pure moral disposition. The liar must have a good memory. Every form of immorality presupposes sharpness of observation, caution, and calculation of results unnecessary to a moral man. The maintenance of an unusual position always calls for increased intellectual effort, because other devices are required than those involved in a typical mode of life. The immoral man swims against the stream, and hence, *ceteris paribus*, needs more strength and more quickness than he who is borne along with the general current, therefore the most dangerous knave is the shrewd one. The "Hexenhammer" of 1487 asserts that devils are particularly remarkable for their sagacity. It is impossible for immorality to maintain itself long when combined with stupidity. Through a want of adaptation of means to ends, it soon comes into collision with social morality, and is then made harmless either by direct paralysis of its faculties or by punishment. The saying, "Honesty is the best policy," can be accepted

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only in the sense that, as a rule, the intellectual and other means at the disposal of immorality do not suffice for avoiding a collision with the normal arrangement of the world; at the same time the proverb implies that dishonesty has need of certain expedients, in order to succeed, with which a straightforward career can successfully dispense, provided no hostile powers are brought to bear against it. As soon as the necessity of a power makes itself felt, the "eternal fitness of things" provides for the possibility of its development. Since it is impossible for immoral persons—in whom these qualities are lacking—to maintain their position, a selecting process among them is necessary, and shrewdness must be developed as the most fitting instrument of evil.

However, it is not this indirect connection which, by virtue of its utility, makes immorality a means of intellectual development. This takes place in a more direct way where immorality does not concern itself with *deeds*, for which thought and the stimulation of thought in others are relatively minor points, but with cases in which immorality stands in closer relation to these theoretical conditions,—*i. e.*, where a lie is involved. We are not concerned here with the lie in the light of its evolution, but with its reflex action upon the spirit of the liar. There is no doubt that a lie develops many powers which would have remained latent in case of adherence to truthfulness. The mind grows wary and cautious, comprehensive and at the same time concentrated, delicate and yet strong, to a degree which would never have been reached, if it had always progressed in a straight line and in the path of truth. Falsehood, so to speak, creates new worlds which, however, may have connection at many points with actual existence. The popular saw, "One lie breeds seven," expresses well the fact that a lie, in order to attain its end, must call out an invention which has a close relationship to poetry. Falsehood must be capable of altering and polishing the forms of logic and judgment, the universally recognized premises of thought, in such a way that they may suggest a conclusion which, nevertheless, they essentially exclude. The liar must at all times hold in his consciousness two trains of thought, two

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entirely different orders of ideas,—the one which he knows to be true, and the false one formed on entirely different principles which, however, is to appear to the deceived to be the true one. This state of affairs presupposes a psychological intelligence which is one of the most important weapons in the arsenal of the liar. Besides this, it clearly produces and develops a power of invention, and on the theoretical side a consistency and objectivity, the intellectual effect of which is only weakened because the logical consequences of the lie, and the mask of uprightness with which it faces others, sometimes make a victim of the liar himself. For instance, when the same falsehood is reiterated again and again, the liar finally believes in it himself. Here, it is true, the lie loses its value as a means of sharpening the intellect and of increasing its objectivity, since now the double series of images, between which, otherwise, the liar has to maintain some sort of harmony, no longer exists. The necessity of maintaining such a harmony creates a mobility of mind, a great readiness in meeting an objection raised by one train of ideas by making a variation in the other series. This double objectivity which the two series require are confounded in the mind of the dupe.

But the possible improvement of the intellect through falsehood is often changed into its contrary. The very dualism of the logical series, which sharpens the intellect when the division between them is kept distinct, makes the same dull when this separation is no longer successfully maintained, the appreciation and the instinct of truth and the true conception of its standards being lost. This is especially true of great, all-permeating falsehoods, which form a part in the lives of so many people. They are not merely verbal fictions, but enacted lies. Our public and private life shows at every point remains of formerly efficient forms, which stand in direct contradiction to modern thought and, from this stand-point, must be regarded as falsehoods. Upon critical examination of the participation of the educated classes in the life of the church, or the relation of higher and lower officials in all circles and walks of life, falsehood in word and

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deed is met at every step, produced by cowardice, convenience, habit, and even by the honest belief that a revolt against the evil would work more mischief than a *laissez-faire* policy. In such a case a clear, intellectual acuteness in the conception of scientific truths must suffer, although it *can* coexist with a full recognition of the falseness in a part of our existence. Indeed, the very consciousness of the falsity of such a position has often been the spur to a purer and clearer conception of reality. Immorality can only be looked upon as guilty when it is clearly recognized as such. The act which makes it so—setting the falsehood in its true light—is, at the same time, the source of a wide-spread and penetrating knowledge. Another fact which takes away from the intellectual value of the so-called social lies is their passive acceptance by the individual, who, for the most part, simply lives on in the manner traditionally enjoined upon him. The free, formative element is lacking, as well as the necessity of measuring one's own strength at every step with a world whose aim is an entirely opposite one, and of maintaining, by constant modifications, the logical consequences of word and deed,—in all of which particulars the specific falsehood proved its strengthening effects on the intellectual powers.

The strengthening of the mind, which we denoted to be directly connected with immorality, is not generally the result of a wrong motive; but the case is different when the motive-power is self-love. Wit and learning are grounds for vanity, a passion which prompts us to energetic mental activity. This example, though simple, needs especial consideration because of the attitude of disapproval assumed towards this subjective motive as annihilating the value of all knowledge thus gained. Of all motives of intellectual activity which are not absolutely pure, vanity seems, however, least of all to modify the results obtained. In contradistinction to political prejudice as influencing historical research,—bigotry creeping into a study of natural law, or the predetermination of the result to which investigation will lead,—in contradistinction to all this, the vain desire of appearing especially clever or learned seems comparatively harmless. For the very reason

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that vanity bears so purely personal a character, it will not incline to a deviation of judgment such as might be the case where the wrong motive has a certain objective result and tendency in view. A peculiar resemblance is here particularly noticeable between the most objective and the most subjective pursuits. In both cases, although for different motives, that inequality in the treatment of subjects disappears, which is usually present as the outcome of a special leaning towards one side or the other. An entirely unprejudiced attitude, because an indifferent one, towards both sides may arise equally well from a principle of truth-seeking, which requires unquestioning acceptance of the facts taught by realities, as from a pure subjectivity which takes no interest in matters for their own sake.

In practice, the integrity of this position suffers from a socio-psychological bias, by which vanity is more gratified by the attainment of certain results than by the attainment of others. If one of two scientists discovers a cure for consumption and the other brings to light a remedy for emphysema, though the two might have exerted equal ingenuity and labor in their research, the former would be admired incomparably more than the latter, for the accidental reason that his work would enjoy a wider range of utility than that of his fellow-scientist. In like manner, the practical interest taken in the result of investigation is reflected in the importance of the process of thought by which the end is reached. If the appreciation of research were in exact and unchanging proportion to the amount of intellectual exertion involved, and depended on that alone, then vanity of recognition could not work mischief to the honesty of thought by a prejudice in favor of certain results. In point of fact, however, popular opinion sees evidence of deeper thought in certain results than in others, which leads to the temptation to obtain these conclusions at any cost. This is manifested most of all in criticism, in pessimism, in scepticism, briefly, in the negation of thought in contradistinction to its assertion. A simple, positive truth, no matter how much acuteness and penetration its discovery may involve, does not possess the same fascination of inge-

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nuity for the generality of people which belongs to destructive criticism—to Mephistophelean negation of everything traditionally true and beautiful. In condemning an action or a usage, or, in fact, anything in actual existence, the critic in so doing raises himself above the object of his attack. He stands upon a higher plane and feels himself master of the general rules and restrictions to which the matter under discussion is subject. This position is the more easily obtained the more criticism is purely negative, for weak points will be found to exist in everything empirical, even though it be the most complete of its kind. A significant shrug, although no reason may be assigned for it, is sufficient with some to indicate the existence of extraordinary hidden cleverness on the part of the critic. This mode of criticism wins for him not only an unassailable reputation for powers of judgment, but also a mysterious authority over his listener. Furthermore, the more extended and the more inclusive the range of a judgment, the more enlightened does the critic appear to himself and to others; and the most comprehensive judgments are declared in negative, sceptical, and pessimistic assertions. A positive judgment, being definite, is also limited in itself. While it is difficult to mention the qualities which a certain thing possesses, it is an easy matter to point out its deficiencies, and easiest of all to look at the matter from a sceptical point of view. An unfavorable criticism will therefore be apt to be clothed in generalities and will seem to deal with the subject in its entirety. Finally, if pessimism, in its popular and accidental form even more than in its scientific and essential one, not only judges, but condemns the whole world, if it despises that which is revered by many, and regards as a matter of indifference what to others seems worthy of attainment even by struggle,—by that very act of criticism it will appear to rise above the level of the commonplace. The polite literature of the present day, as well as popular philosophy and our topics of conversation, alike indicate this rank growth of pessimistic views, only too frequently the product of vanity and morbid self-analysis, which, in turn, flourish best in the soil of pessimism.

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Another application of this principle forms an integral part of our theme,—the sexual relation. When the importance of the sexual passions in all the relations of life is taken into consideration and the strength of the feelings concerned, the interest in the matter is an entirely natural one; nevertheless, every discussion of the topic outside a most limited circle is considered offensive. Hesitation is manifested in approaching the subject even in a most serious and scientific mood, because of the consciousness of arousing a foreign interest. In consequence, less scientific attention has been paid to the life of the sexes from a psychological and social stand-point than would be the case were it co-ordinated with all other sciences and without the fear of arousing forbidden desires. Botany and psycho-physics would now show a very high grade of development, had as universal an interest been manifested in them as in the question in hand. If, acting in the spirit of the Rigorists, we hold this interest to be an immoral one, still its existence might be made of some use to knowledge. The pleasurable charm peculiar to this field has led to experiences and thoughts scarcely to be matched by those on any other subject. The light which might thus be thrown on deep psychological, sociological, and psychiatric questions is withheld, because even among men of science there is to be found a hesitancy in using impulses usually considered immoral as a means of obtaining knowledge. In opposition to this sentiment, Thomas Aquinas significantly remarked, "Since God himself makes use of the sins of mankind in carrying out His ends, let us not hesitate to imitate him."

The foregoing discussion has shown immorality in the light of a *positive* cause of theoretical progress, and as containing in itself powers which, when given a certain impetus, led to intellectual advancement. Immorality may aid in bringing about this result in still another way,—that is, clearing away obstacles which morality usually places in the path of knowledge. Of these immoral conditions of knowledge, *indifference* towards the subject must be mentioned first. Here the total exclusion of personal or sympathetic considerations takes on the semblance of hard-heartedness. Vivisection, not

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in its therapeutic, but in its purely scientific, character, furnishes a most noteworthy example. It frequently happens that a man has to steel himself against the moods and inclinations of his own heart in order to place himself completely at the service of knowledge. The ideal of Spinoza, which demands that man should feel neither sorrow nor joy over human affairs, but that he should *understand* them, rests upon the assumption that the former emotions stand in the way of a full comprehension of things. He who feels sympathy with others, or remorse over his own deficiencies, cannot, according to Spinoza and the Stoics, be considered as standing upon the height of intellectual development. In order to attain to this point of view, it is necessary to cast aside feelings universally held to be moral in tendency. It is not through positive immorality, but still by means of an indifference towards the demands of ethics that the way is cleared to a complete comprehension of phenomena. It often is necessary to strike a direct blow at the duty of piety if a clear, objective judgment of persons is to be obtained.

This situation brings to mind the cruel character of an æsthetic interest in things. In certain landscapes, poor, tumble-down, decaying huts possess poetical charm. In looking for beauty, but one face of phenomena is regarded, and no attention is paid to the existence of another side, which, if it came under our observation, would arouse ethical emotions destructive of the æsthetic qualities of the object. When the amount of misery in the world is taken into consideration, and the appeal for sympathy and aid, from which no one penetrating below the surface of things can escape, it becomes evident that a certain paralysis of the sensibilities towards the emotional side of events is necessary for complete absorption in æsthetic interests. This callousness, which from the ethical point of view is to be condemned, may, perhaps, serve as an explanation of the moral deficiencies so frequently manifested in artistic and æsthetically inclined natures. Chamisso, in his poem of "The Crucifix," has given most powerful expression to this neglect of the ethical in the presence of the æsthetic demand.

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This connection between a theoretical interest and a lack of certain ethical emotions makes an extremely rationalistic and strictly logical habit of mind take pleasure in creating rigorous maxims of morality. The Stoic, it is true, knows not anger nor indignation; but sympathy and clemency are equally strange to him; and it is well known how much the rationalism of Kant has been reproached for a lack of human emotions. In the degree in which we are accustomed to look upon these natural feelings as necessary parts of the moral life, it is impossible to include them all in the circle of a logical theory because of the number and variety of their sources, and the completely independent position of each one in our consciousness. If a certain fundamental doctrine is used as a guide of conduct, and is followed to its rational consequences, a point is usually reached from which the way to a gratification of moral desires branches off from the logical continuation of the course previously adhered to. From Descartes's extremely spiritual conception of the soul, and the strictly mechanical character assigned by him to the corporeal world in antithesis to the former idea, he deduced the belief that animals are mere machines. He declared that their expressions of feeling—*e.g.*, the cry upon being struck—did not come in the range of conscious action, but followed as mechanically as the sound from an organ when a key is touched. Some Cartesians pushed this logical deduction so far that they practised cruelty to animals in order to prove to others their belief in the mechanical nature of beasts. There is no doubt that the moral sensibility of these men stood in inward opposition to their action; in order to be logical, it was necessary to overcome this feeling. In order to act strictly in accordance with the rules of knowledge, it becomes necessary to ignore certain ethical impulses. Even if there is a common root for ethical feelings and logical forms, it certainly lies far enough away from them in the present stage of their development to allow them to appear as absolutely independent formations. Their paths run side by side without coming in contact with each other; it is only occasionally that it is impossible to walk on both at a time, and that it becomes necessary to leave

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the one entirely in order to keep within the limits of the other.

And now, as a final consideration of the relation under discussion, it must be observed that the attainment of certain knowledge is morally forbidden, and that penetration into the same is a sin. The traditional illustration of this point is to be found in the story of the fall of man: "And when the woman saw that the tree . . . was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat." To Adam and Eve the knowledge itself must have appeared as something sinful, without its being necessary to investigate further as to the reason for this prohibition.

The story of the Image of Sais shows this perhaps even more plainly. Truth here appears as something holy and—without further cause being assigned—not to be approached. The despair of the youth after the consummation of the deed does not appear in the light of a punishment inflicted on him by deity because of the violation of a command, but as the necessary result brought about by the mere psychological impression of an untimely view of truth. The conception of holiness, although produced by practical and teleological considerations, finally loses sight of these beginnings and fastens itself upon the object, which thereupon possesses sanctity as a concrete quality,—a part of the essence of its being. The pious Jew feels an aversion towards the "unclean" without recognizing each time the social fitness and the religious elements which connect this feeling with the object in question. In like manner, sanctity cleaves to ideas and thoughts and engenders a hesitation in laying hands on them, which does not seek any further cause, and whose violation is considered a sign of immorality.

In cultivated circles, this duty becomes a universal discretion, because of a knowledge of the feelings of others. The desire to keep secret certain matters of much personal concern was of course the origin of this discretion, and the consideration taken for this point of view by others was but one manifestation of the general, altruistic interest. The affairs of a third person took on sacredness as an essential quality,

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and the duty of respect became such for every person of culture, not because its violation might have injurious results, but because it was immoral in itself. Hence, a general restraint, a suppression of the natural impulse of curiosity, even where no harm could accrue to the third person from yielding to it. Just as prying into the affairs of others, even without deriving the slightest advantage from it, is a source of pleasure for many people, so refraining therefrom, without any consideration of practical results, becomes a duty. The prohibition against laying hands on anything "that is his" extends in its widest application even to the intellectual seizure of anything not voluntarily revealed to us. The immoral character of indiscretion does not belong merely to the crude means of knowing the circumstances of others,—for instance, their outward action or bearing. A more delicate and more dangerous as well as a much more interesting ethical problem is a penetration into another's soul, to which one attains by reflection and by a combining of revelations spontaneously made by the person in question. Very often, men betray their most secret affairs—especially questions and events of their soul-life—through the very words which, though designed to hide their true character, yet furnish the psychologist with a key to a knowledge of things which they most desired to keep secret. The fact here to be noticed is that some knowledge can be gained only at the expense of morality. Moreover, this is true in the sense that it is not through some consequence or particular of that knowledge, that it acquires the character of immorality, but because the knowledge itself is prohibited.

The intervention of divine authority for the prohibition of knowledge, as took place in the legend of the Fall of Man, finds earthly means of execution. The orthodox, Catholic inhabitants of a certain district in America prevented a geologist from examining the mountains in that place on the plea that it was sufficient to know that God had made the mountains as they were, and that it was unnecessary to find out of what they consisted. Dante makes Odysseus tell of journeys made after his return to Ithaca, and intimates that the curiosity

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which drove him to them was of a sinful nature. Any penetration into the plan of creation, any intellectual aspirations beyond the sphere that seems designated for man, is in itself immoral.

In this connection, *credo, quia absurdum* is worthy of mention; in certain respects, it may be considered the superlative of Jesus's declaration of the blessedness of the "poor in spirit." According to this point of view knowledge is a matter of indifference as far as its contents are concerned, and is, moreover, a hinderance to morality; consequently, the forms and conditions of knowledge in general should be renounced altogether. Illogical methods of thought, which are not at all adapted to the consideration of realities are, in spite of their deficiencies, to be adopted by the believer, who, by so doing, gives proof of his piety. A passage in Dante illustrates this method of reasoning more clearly: "If divine justice appears unjust in the eyes of mortals, it is a proof of their belief, and not wicked heresy." This statement must be explained as follows. In the degree in which God's methods are understood and agree with our logical and ethical conceptions, we have to a certain extent a *proof* of His existence and of the realization of our ideals in Him. *Belief* becomes a necessity only when our reason fails to aid us, so that in the *credo, quia absurdum*, the accent falls on *credo*. What I *know*, I do not have to *believe*. The more difficult the matter which the reason succeeds in digesting and the more in opposition to its dictates, so much greater is the merit in believing it, and so much stronger is man's faith proved to be. This unquestioning acceptance of a contradiction can only proceed from the deepest humility towards God, and a complete renunciation of the *ego* and everything contributing to its logical self-preservation.

Goethe's view of the world, also, has in it an element which forbids a certain mode of obtaining knowledge, but it is deduced from an entirely different point of view and gives it a different form. He considers calm adoration of the "unfathomable" a requisite of elevated morality. The disintegration and the dismemberment of nature, the continuation of

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research up to the point where the beautiful harmony in the appearance of objects is destroyed, appears to him an offensive impiety, a misconception of the bounds which nature has set for man. He disliked people that wore spectacles because it seemed improper to see more than nature had intended; he disliked to think about thought and despised transcendental analysis, considering it far better to confine ourselves to phenomena and to the unmistakable tasks set before us, and to limit knowledge to that which nature voluntarily offers us, without being violently forced to give up her secrets. At the root of these opinions lies the conviction that the position and importance of a reasoning being are subject to certain inevitable limitations which require no proof from a demonstration of principles or consequences. In itself the transgression of these limits is immoral and reprehensible. The eternal obscurity of the Noumena of Kant's conception is analogous to Goethe's "Mystery of Nature," into which it is improper to penetrate even if it were possible to do so. For the former, the prohibition of that which lies beyond tangible existence is a logical obstacle, for the latter an ethical one.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE NATURE OF ETHICAL SCIENCE.

HAVING had occasion recently to write an introductory sketch of the science of Ethics, I have been led to give some attention to the consideration of the scope and method of that science; and as the view which I have adopted seems to disagree with that of several other writers with whom in the main I am strongly in sympathy, I have thought that it might be desirable to insert a few words here on the reasons that have led me to differ from these authorities. The chief point of disagreement is with regard to the question whether Ethics is to be regarded as a positive or as a normative science—*i.e.*, whether it simply sets itself to study the facts and conditions of human conduct, or endeavors, in addition to this, to define an ideal, from which principles or laws of action may be

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derived. The latter view is the one which I have adopted; and I confess I am somewhat surprised to find what a considerable number of those who are otherwise in harmony with my general point of view are opposed to this position. In order to give definiteness to the discussion, it may be well to indicate my position in relation to the most emphatic utterance that I have been able to find on the side opposed to my own. This utterance occurs in Mr. F. H. Bradley's "Ethical Studies," pp. 174–5.

"We first remark," says Mr. Bradley, "and with some confidence, that there can not be a moral philosophy which will tell us what in particular we are to do, and also that it is not the business of philosophy to do so." If the emphasis here is to be laid on the words "in particular," I have no disagreement with Mr. Bradley on this point. It seems clear that philosophy can only discuss the broad principles of conduct; how particular actions are to be brought under these principles, is a question that must be left to individual tact and insight, assisted by the *axiomata media* accumulated throughout the course of human history, and by what we may call the common sense of the community to which the individual belongs.

So far there is no difference of opinion. But Mr. Bradley goes on: "All philosophy has to do is 'to understand what is;' and moral philosophy has to understand morals which exist, not to make them or give directions for making them. Such a notion is simply ludicrous." What is ludicrous, I suppose, is the notion that philosophy is, as it were, to *invent* principles of conduct of which men were previously unaware, and which had not previously been operative in men's moral lives. This, I admit, would be somewhat ludicrous. The moral ideal can hardly be supposed to be something external to the human consciousness, which an acute man may discover, as he might discover a new star, or which a skilful man may invent, as he might invent a flying-machine. Whatever our moral ideal may be, it must surely be involved in our nature as self-conscious beings. And being so involved, it can hardly have failed to influence the history of human conduct, and even to come to some extent into clear consciousness in human reflection. It would be a little ludicrous even for a doctor to suppose that he had discovered some principle of health which had been entirely inoperative in men's lives, and which he sought now to introduce for the first time; and if this is on the whole absurd even with reference to the health of the human body, it may be

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granted that it would be still more so with reference to the health of the human spirit, which belongs much more intimately to our self-conscious nature. In morals, as in medicine, the general rules of action under ordinary circumstances may be assumed to be largely known, and to be almost instinctively put into practice. But this does not prevent the science of health from being a practical or normative science; nor need it prevent the science of morals from being of a similar character.

"Philosophy in general," Mr. Bradley proceeds, "has not to anticipate the discoveries of the particular sciences nor the evolution of history." Certainly not; but is not this rather a different point? What particular science is there which makes discoveries in morals, and whose discoveries philosophy is not to anticipate? If there were such a science, it would, I suppose, be what J. S. Mill described as "Ethology." But however true the results of such a science might be, they would merely be truths with reference to the facts of human action, whereas Ethics is concerned with the *standard of judgment* which is applied to human action. Ethology would not be Ethics any more than a diagnosis is a prescription. There is, in truth, *no* particular science of Ethics. There is only moral philosophy on the one hand and the moral consciousness on the other. "The philosophy of religion," Mr. Bradley goes on, "has not to make a new religion or teach an old one, but simply to understand the religious consciousness." The philosophy of religion, I should answer, has not only to *understand* the religious consciousness, but also to *judge* it. It has to consider how far the religious consciousness is to be regarded as superstition, and how far it may be held to contain an "Ahnung" of truth. In this sense, the philosophy of religion may be said to criticise and reconstruct the religious consciousness, though it might, no doubt, be an exaggeration to say that it was "to make a new religion." "Æsthetic has not to produce works of fine art, [Of course not! It is *human beings* who produce works of fine art. This is not even the business of an *art*, much less of a science,] but to theorize the beautiful which it finds." And by theorizing, I should add, to supply principles of criticism and suggestions of improvement. "Political philosophy has not to play tricks with the State, but to understand it." And, by understanding, to help to reconstruct it. It has to understand the State, in the sense in which Plato understood the State. But Plato's understanding of the State led at once to an effort to transform it. "And Ethics has not to make

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the world moral [!], but to reduce to theory the morality current in the world." But in reducing it to theory, I should add, you are already on the way to modify it. The man who acts from principle may seem for a time to be acting in the same way as the man who acts simply in accordance with traditional rules; and to a certain extent, no doubt, the conduct of the two may coincide. But it may safely be assumed that the coincidence will not extend far. The man who understands the principle on which a rule or tradition rests, will understand, also, when the rule should be broken or the tradition set aside.

"In short," Mr. Bradley sums up, "the view which thinks moral philosophy is to supply us with particular moral prescriptions confuses science with art, and confuses, besides, reflective with intuitive judgment. That which tells us what in particular is right and wrong is not reflection, but intuition." This last remark seems to me to contain a rather dangerous doctrine. The man who acts habitually from intuitive perception of what is right and wrong rather than from reflective consideration of what is reasonable, is surely not a man to be trusted in cases of difficulty; though on ordinary occasions he may perhaps be more reliable than the man who sophisticates his conscience by too much deliberation. On the whole, however, if the emphasis is to be laid on "particular," I am substantially in agreement with Mr. Bradley's summing up. I do not consider that any theory of morals can be expected to instruct us with regard to our particular moral duties. Even a theory of health could hardly descend to every minute detail of diet and exercise; and a science of morals is concerned with conditions that are indefinitely more complex. But surely in the one case, as in the other, the ideal can be defined, and the broad principles by which it is to be attained can be clearly determined. In so far as Ethics does this, it appears to me that it may fairly be characterized as a normative science. In so far as it does not do this, we may call it Ethology, or Social Science, or the Psychology of Ethics, or the Metaphysic of Ethics, but surely it is not Ethics proper. The science of Ethics is related to Psychology and Metaphysics in very much the same way as the science of Medicine is related to Physiology; it is related to Ethology or Social Science in very much the same way as the science of Medicine is related to Pathology. And it seems to me to be of great importance not to confound Ethics with any of those other sciences, however closely it may be related to them.

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I hope I have succeeded in making my point of view sufficiently clear. I should be glad if any of those who disagree with it would explain exactly the nature of their objections.

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"MORAL DISTINCTIONS."

IN a note under the above title in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. III. No. 3, Mr. Neville Tebbutt accuses me of neglecting certain obvious moral distinctions:

1. I ignore the distinction between theft, lying, dishonesty, on the one hand, and the failure to live up to the highest ideal or to give up my leisure and comforts to relieve a poor neighbor, on the other.

2. I ignore the distinction between self-regard and other-regarding conduct, between prudence and morality.

Mr. Tebbutt himself apparently would divide life into three parts. First, there is the field of self-regarding acts which have no moral quality. They "concern myself," and are, in a sense, below morality. Next there is the sphere of moral obligation, with which you "may require me to do my duty,"—*e.g.*, to be honest and truthful. Above this is the field of merit, where I may "please myself how I act." I am praised, perhaps, if I live up to my first ideal, but "I am not bound to," and am not blamed if I do not.

In support of these contentions, Mr. Tebbutt appeals to the "ordinary sensible man of affairs," who is not troubled with theological or supernatural scruples,—he might have added with scruples of any kind.

To take the second of these accusations first. If Mr. Tebbutt had turned to page 186 of my "Elements of Ethics," he would have seen that I admit the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts. I may do so, however, as a convenient mode of classification. On page 181 I give my reasons for this limitation. How important it is to recognize them, and so avoid the fallacy of pressing a logical distinction into the service of an immoral theory of life is illustrated by Mr. Tebbutt's confusion. It is true that insobriety (to take Mr. Tebbutt's instance) may be said to injure myself primarily and others only secondarily. But it requires little reflection to perceive that this is only a superficial distinction. That it is so may be shown by asking where does the "self" end

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and "others" begin? Is my wife a part of that self, or my trade, or the society in which I live? Without them, clearly I would be different from what I am, even to a greater extent than if I lost a hand or a foot from the body, which is sometimes thought of (though not by the "ordinary man") as the true self. And if this be true, sobriety may be as much a duty we owe to others as honesty and truthfulness are.

I need not labor this point, but pass to the other accusation Mr. Tebbutt brings against me. What lends color to it is the obvious distinction between those duties which it is necessary to observe, if there is to be any social life at all, and those which the good man acknowledges over and above. The former are the conditions (to borrow Aristotle's antithesis) of living at all, the latter of living well. Hence, the former are those which, as the rudimentary conditions of self-preservation, society exacts on the pain of fine, imprisonment, or death. Society has to exact them, and its members have to observe them, on pain of material loss, and possibly of extinction. A man who pays his debts and keeps his hands off his neighbor's person and purse may be said to be good enough to be left alone by the police. But it would be more correct to say that he is as bad as he can be consistently with the survival of himself and the society to which he belongs. The *law* may not demand anything else of him, *morality* certainly does. It requires not only that he should be good enough to elude the policeman, or to be considered a respectable member of society, but that he should be as good as he can,—in other words, that he should "live up to the highest ideal" he possesses.

This view, like the previous one, has the support of all the "ordinary sensible men" I know. None of them, so far as I am aware, holds that when he has kept his word, performed his part of a bargain, and abstained from theft in his business transactions, he has done his duty, and for the rest of the day "may please himself." They recognize the duty, when they reach home, of being "sober, cheerful, and patient." Some of them even recognize a further duty of giving up some of their leisure and comforts to attend a political meeting or a committee of the poor-land guardians. If they did not do any of these things, and confined their efforts to the elementary duty of keeping out of gaol, I should not consider them "sensible men of affairs." I should regard them as "suspicious characters," and keep an eye upon them.

This must not, of course, be taken to mean that the good man

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is the man who is always acting from a sense of duty or consciously living up to his highest ideal. On the contrary, by a familiar paradox, a man can only do his duty by forgetting to think about it; by interesting himself in the business on hand and not in his motives for doing it.

Whether in any particular case (to return to the question with which Mr. Tebbutt starts) "we have as much moral right to find fault with a man for not giving up his leisure and comforts to relieve a poor neighbor as with one who breaks his bargains," will depend upon circumstances. I may be more blamable for letting a neighbor starve than for not paying my tailor's bill when I promised to pay it. If it be replied that we are speaking of characters and not of particular acts, this ought to have been plainer; but it makes no difference. It is again a question of degree and circumstance whether the man who habitually neglects to pay his debts is more reprehensible than the man who is habitually selfish in respect to his leisure and comforts.

In the second part of his note, Mr. Tebbutt raises the question, "By what means do we determine whether conduct falls within or without the area of moral obligation?" It is the less necessary to consider his answer to it, first, because it is only after we have divided life, as Plato would say, "with a hatchet," that there can be any problem here at all; and, secondly, because, on Mr. Tebbutt's own admission, his solution will be "shocking to many persons," and is therefore unlikely to find acceptance with the ordinary man.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

REPLY TO A REVIEW.

M. RAUH, the author of "Essai sur le Fondement Métaphysique de la Morale," which we reviewed in the April number, has sent the following brief reply:

"The principal fault with which you reproach me, the obscurity, I also recognize. But I do not think there is in my work a 'begging the question,' which you see there. When I said, at the outset, that the end of philosophy is the justification of the humble man, I simply stated the problem. If I have succeeded in proving, in the latter part, that incarnate reason is in effect the type of absolute certitude, I have justified in this way that statement of the philosophical problem. I know no other means of exposition than to first state the problem, then to give the solution of it. And, according to this, every announcement of a theory to be demonstrated would constitute a 'begging the question.'"

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The readers of our review can judge whether our criticism concerned merely the form, as M. Rauh believes, or the substance of his argument. But we very willingly give a place to M. Rauh's explanation.

E. BOIRAC.

PARIS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE UNSEEN FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY. An Examination of the Fallacies and Failures of Economic Science due to Neglected Elements. By the Duke of Argyll, K.G., K.T. London: John Murray, 1893. Pp. xx., 591.

The Duke of Argyll has produced a book which, though long, is not tedious, because, as might have been expected, it is well and vigorously written; it is full of ingenious criticism and the suggestive reflections of a thoughtful and observant man of varied interests and much practical experience of different kinds. But it contains a good deal of irrelevancy, a good deal of prejudice, a good deal that would be extremely irritating, were it less naïve. It is a book that attracts admiration and provokes dissent on successive pages. It is doubtful whether it will convert any one not already holding the writer's opinions on practical problems: but if it helps to emphasize the need of bringing economic science into closer relation with other sciences, it will do good service.

In the very interesting preface, in which the author supplies his readers with the means of making the necessary "personal equation," he tells us how, "although not only born of a Whig family, but representing the one particular family in connection with whose proceedings the very name of Whig is said to have originated in Scotland," he, "nevertheless, began life with an aversion, almost an antipathy, to the Whig party." "This was due," he adds, "to a very early familiarity with the life and speeches of the younger Pitt, whom I regarded and do still regard as, on the whole, by far the noblest figure in our political history" (p. vi.). On entering public life "I joined that group of statesmen who inherited the traditions of Sir Robert Peel, of which group Mr. Gladstone and myself are now the only survivors. With them I remained till we were absorbed in the coalition cabinet of Lord Aberdeen in 1853. Our first and special bond of union with the Whigs was resistance to

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any attempted return to the system of protection. In that cabinet I followed with hearty sympathy the brilliant prosecution of that work of tariff-reform by Mr. Gladstone, on which he had already entered more than ten years before in the great administration of Sir Robert Peel. But I was not then, and have never been, in anything like complete sympathy with what has been called the 'Manchester school.' Not a few of them seemed to me to be tainted with the narrow and erroneous teaching of Ricardo, and their language too often implied the curious delusion that protectionism was the special and the evil device of land-owners. They seemed wholly forgetful of the fact that the trading and manufacturing classes had been the earliest, and for centuries continued to be the most vehement, supporters of protection and monopolies. Again, the language of the school on war, and their complete oblivion of the great part it has played in the progress of mankind, always struck me as unnatural, and especially as unhistorical. Above all, the coldness, to say the least, with which they regarded the contest that ended in the passing of the Factory Acts, convinced me that their views of political economy moved within a comparatively contracted circuit of ideas. From any sympathy with this attitude of mind I was all the more easily saved by another influence" —the intimate friendship of Lord Ashley, afterwards Lord Shaftesbury, whose "life was devoted, with untiring sacrifice of self, to the relief of suffering in all its forms among the industrial poor." . . . "It was in writing (in 'The Reign of Law') on the principles involved in the legislation which he did more than any other man to secure, that I first began to study closely and systematically the larger natural laws which are the only foundation for any true economic science. . . . In reading the old orthodox economists, with however little critical resistance, I had always been more or less conscious of a want, which even to myself I could hardly specify or define. . . . Continually the whole region of human nature, and of the human will, was left out of account, or, if taken into account, the shallowest motives were selected, and the most permanent and potent were forgotten. Conclusions were reached which contradicted glaringly the actual experience of life, because they were founded on abstract conceptions and propositions, which were badly abstracted, and largely composed of hollow phrases or ambiguous words. The whole system of the school of Mill and Ricardo seemed to be an artificial world, with only a few points of contact with the world of nature and of life" (pp. x.–xiii.). The

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duke's rebellion against the orthodox economists is now open and declared. "It is, indeed, high time. So utterly has the teaching of political economy broken down as a controlling, or even as a guiding, power, that its very elements and not a few of its most certain truths seem to have lost their hold. There are numbers of educated men, who are now more than half prepared to go back to the grossest delusions of the Dark Ages. [This means, apparently, to extend more widely, in order to check individual selfishness, that action of the state which the duke himself considered beneficial in the case of the Factory Acts!] The very idea of natural law as a prevailing power in human nature, and in all successful legislation, has almost disappeared in popular discussions." It may be questioned whether the Duke of Argyll's own idea of "natural law"—with its perpetual ambiguity between an ideal of what ought to be (from the stand-point of the particular writer) and a generalization about actually existing facts or tendencies—is likely to do anything but introduce additional confusion into the discussion of economic theory or of practical problems.

The method by which the Duke of Argyll proposes to reform economic science is the analysis of *words*. "The analysis of words," he says (p. 29), "such as value, wealth, labor, capital, and others of a like kind, ought to be exactly like the analysis of any material substance in a chemist's laboratory. It ought to be a report upon facts." This method does not seem very different from that which the old economists have been in the habit of adopting. Does the Duke of Argyll apply it more carefully and thoroughly than his predecessors? Here is his definition of wealth: "Wealth is the possession, in comparative abundance, of things which are legitimate objects of human desire, and are desired by men who are able, as well as anxious, to acquire them at the cost of some sacrifice, or of some exertion" (p. 64). In this definition, the introduction of the term "possession" (frequently spelt with a capital P, in spite of the writer's protest against what he calls the "Capital-Letter Fallacy," p. 373), and the limitation involved in the term "legitimate," are claimed as distinctive improvements on preceding definitions. In proof of the customary neglect of the fundamental idea of possession, Professor Marshall's definition is quoted: "A person's wealth will, in this treatise, be taken to consist of his external goods" (p. 41). If "*his*" does not imply possession, why do we call it a possessive pronoun? As to the other emendation, "Possession," we are told, "means, in all

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ordinary use, lawful and legitimate possession. And it is in this sense, undoubtedly, that it enters as an essential constituent into the concept of wealth" (p. 41). A good part of the Duke of Argyll's method will be found to consist in an appeal from the scientific economists to the *ordinary* unanalyzed use of words, just as the "common-sense" philosophers appealed from the metaphysicians to "the vulgar." If possession, however, means legitimate possession, the term "legitimate" in the definition of wealth is superfluous. If it merely means that no person can legally call anything "his," unless the law allows him to do so, that is true, but hardly novel. But the Duke of Argyll expressly tells us that by the word "legitimate" he wishes to introduce an ethical element into economics. That is not legitimate which is contrary to the welfare of man, and the welfare of man is coincident with his obedience to the laws of nature, which are the laws of God (p. 63). If, then, slavery be an institution contrary to the "law of nature," are we bound to deny that slaves could ever be or have been a form of wealth? and if slaves were not wealth, why did the British government give compensation to the West Indian planters? If any one sincerely believes that the possession of large estates, or of vast sums of capital, is not a morally legitimate object of desire, would he, in the Duke of Argyll's opinion, be justified in treating the great land-owner or capitalist as not really owning what he seems to own? Economic difficulties are not cleared by the introduction of uncritical ethical terms. "Nobody can get wealth," we are told (p. 490), "except by serving in some way the wants of others [either, then, we must say that the successful gambler can never get wealth, or that he gets wealth by serving the "wants" of the unsuccessful, these "wants" being taken to mean the passion for gambling]; and even the mere spending of wealth in any way not positively vicious, is in itself the production of that demand which has the most powerful effect of all among the sources of general prosperity." Now, what is to be understood by expenditure that is "positively vicious"? On a later page the duke speaks of sums "wasted on strikes, and, still worse, wasted on drink:" are these examples of vicious spending? But at what point do the "wasting" and the viciousness begin? What expenditure on anything beyond the bare necessities of life (and a strike may, conceivably, be an attempt to obtain them) is to be considered "vicious" is an important question, indeed, but not an easy question. What are necessities? There are, besides, several

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matters in which, so far from economic questions being settled by the introduction of ethical considerations, ethical questions are coming to be affected by economic considerations,—*e.g.*, the view of ascetic moralists, and of some sentimental moralists, which regards everything as vicious luxury that goes beyond what will just maintain life, comes in conflict with what seems a certain conclusion of inductive as well as of deductive economics, that a lowering in the standard of living is disastrous to the well-being of a community (as the Duke of Argyll recognizes when he is speaking of the calamities caused by a potato-diet in Ireland, p. 484). So again, the old idea that liberality is *per se* better than saving needs revision in the light of the economists, thorough exposure of the fallacy that all spending is good for trade, and of their complete proof that unregulated "charity" necessarily increases poverty. Much expenditure, again, which most persons would not consider "vicious" is eminently disastrous in its effects on general well-being, because it is fluctuating in kind and amount. Changes in fashion help to produce that instability of condition which is a chief source of the unsatisfactory state of the working-classes. Many a moralist, judging on *a priori* grounds (*i.e.*, generally influenced by some past tradition), might pronounce changes of fashion ethically harmless, and all consumption of "alcohol" (or what he calls such) ethically harmful; a study of economics raises the question whether a *steady* demand for wholesome and light wine or beer is not, perhaps, ethically preferable to a *fluctuating* demand for beads, feathers, lace, crinoline wires, etc. I do not say that it certainly is, but it is one of those questions of practical ethics which cannot be discussed independently of economic considerations. The Duke of Argyll is perfectly right in insisting that economic questions cannot be adequately studied in abstraction from the political, ethical, and legal basis of particular societies. But while economic terms should, as he demands, be submitted to careful analysis, the same careful analysis must be applied to political, ethical, and legal terms. We get no help towards a scientific economics by introducing unanalyzed terms like "legitimate," "vicious," "natural law." And it will not do to assume that ethical, political, and legal ideas and institutions are incapable of modification and improvement.

Even where no complication is introduced from ethics or politics, the Duke of Argyll seems a little open to criticism in his own analysis of economic words. Thus, he tells us (p. 533) that the

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phrase "natural monopoly" is a contradiction in terms. The real meaning of monopoly is "any artificial limitation put on the value of things, whether scarce or abundant, by arbitrary laws." We are referred in a footnote to Liddell and Scott for the proper meaning of "the two Greek words which make up the one English word monopoly." If the Duke of Argyll had pursued his researches in Liddell and Scott a little further, he might have discovered that *monopôlia* is a Greek word, and that it is used by Aristotle, who may be considered an authority on the meaning of Greek words (perhaps even on some economic ideas) not inferior to the Duke of Argyll himself. Now, Aristotle uses the term precisely for the kind of case to which the Duke of Argyll denies that the term is applicable. "If one man in a famishing city," says the duke, "had legitimately become possessed, by foresight or otherwise, of a store of corn, he would not on that account be a monopolist." The philosopher's examples of monopolists are Thales, who, foreseeing a good olive-crop, hired all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, and the man in Sicily who bought up all the iron and gained two hundred per cent. ("Politics," I., 11.) Even had the Duke of Argyll been correct about the original meaning of the term "monopoly," that would have settled nothing respecting the validity of the economic conception of a "natural monopoly." Etymology does not decide present meaning, even for the most pedantic of persons; and popular usage cannot prevent a term being taken in a special sense for scientific purposes. The duke himself, in spite of his protests against "the careless and declamatory use of language," applies the term "communist" to Mr. Henry George (p. 394). By a "Franciscan correspondent" (p. 389) he means Mr. George from San Francisco. (But this is probably a joke.) "Arian Theology" (on p. 167) is used for the ancient religion of India. (Is this a joke, also?) On p. 22 the law of the dissipation of energy is supposed to be illustrated by the statement that too much food will injure the stomach, and too much pressure will burst a boiler: this is rather more than a mere inaccuracy of expression. On p. 539, St. Paul's figure of the Church as a body with members is said to anticipate "the latest results of physiological research in language which covers and includes them all." This is a little "declamatory," to say the least.

A great part of the volume (chapters iv.–ix.) is taken up with a sort of philosophy of history, intended to show the connection between the political condition of society and the accumulation

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and destruction of wealth. Much of this is very admirable, though the history is somewhat incomplete. Great use is made of the Bible as materials for history, not always in an unscientific spirit; and the duke dwells, with considerable unction, on the way in which the Hebrew people got possession of the promised "land" (pp. 130, 131). But the exegesis is sometimes curious. Is it not a strange lesson to draw from the words, "We are the sheep of Thy pasture" that "the psalmist wishes to express the absolute property of the Supreme Being in the human creatures of his hand"? The pathetic figure of the sheep and the shepherd does not suggest to the duke a helplessness that needs protection and guidance, but as it might to Tennyson's "Northern Farmer"—"proputty," "proputty"—capable of being turned into mutton and wool. In the parable of the laborers in the vineyard (Matt. xx. 1–16) the duke points out that the wages are regulated by free contract, and that the owner can do what he likes with his own; but as to the "equal payments for unequal earnings" nothing is said (p. 369). What would the Duke of Argyll's two Covenanting ancestors, who died on the scaffold for political rebellion, have thought of their descendant who tells us, speaking expressly of the Old Testament as well as of the New, that "it is a wonderful thing how completely the sacred writers stand aloof from the whole domain of secular politics?" "No test of rightfulness," he adds, "in those who rule is ever laid down. There is no touching on the relation between these primary obligations and the existing institutions or political system of any people" (p. 216). One can only infer that some pages of Deuteronomy, of Samuel, and of the prophets in the Argyll Family Bible must have been thumbed into illegibility two hundred years ago.

The latter half of the work is mainly occupied with a criticism of Ricardo's theories of rent, of the wages-fund theory, and of the consequences or supposed consequences of these theories. Much of this criticism is very acute, and may be welcomed by economists of the historical school as a confirmation, on the part of an independent observer, of the results at which they have arrived and of the growing discredit into which the orthodox theoretical economics has fallen. But the Duke of Argyll is hardly just to the theories he attacks,—*e.g.*, he ignores the value of distinguishing, theoretically at least, between that element in what is commonly called "rent," which is due simply to the increase of population (the element that comes to the land-owner simply as

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owner), and that element which is due to improvements resulting from judicious outlay. In practice it may be very difficult, or impossible, to say what is the "unearned increment," but the conception is a perfectly valid one, and, as the Duke of Argyll recognizes (p. 444), it is applicable to many other "possessions" besides land,—*e.g.*, to ability of any kind, physical or mental, which happens to be in request. A rise in wages, due solely to an increased demand for labor, is as much an "unearned increment" as a rise in rent, due to an increased demand for land; and a rise in interest, due to an increased demand for capital, is of the same kind. The Ricardian political economy can, however, only be defended by a perpetual use of distinctions and qualifications which tend to remove its propositions further and further from any direct application to concrete problems. If it be fully granted, then, that the Ricardian premises of Mr. Henry George and of Karl Marx are fallacious (because taken by them as if they were so applicable to concrete problems), it does not necessarily follow (as the Duke of Argyll seems to imagine) that some parts at least of their attack on the existing systems of land-tenure, etc., may not be justified on other grounds. Against many assailants of the existing economic structure of society, who borrow their weapons from the abstract economists, the duke uses very sound arguments,—*e.g.*, when domestic servants are "relegated to the unproductive sections of society," he very pertinently asks why the cooking of food in a provision-shop is productive labor, and the same labor is unproductive when performed in a private house (p. 81). He rightly lays stress on the absurdity of limiting "labor" to manual labor, and of speaking as if manual labor alone, undirected by ingenuity and enterprise, were the source of wealth; and he is quite right in pointing out, what is so often forgotten, that there are "undeserved decrements" as well as "unearned increments" (p. 445),—a fact which constitutes the great difficulty in "profit-sharing" as a solution of the labor question. All these arguments, though none of them are new, are sound and useful. But when all these and similar arguments are admitted, it does not follow that it is right or safe for a nation to allow any individual to turn a county into a deer-forest, or that it would be wrong to compel the owner of land in the neighborhood of a growing town (whether he inherited it or bought it as a speculative investment) to sell it to the municipality at its fair agricultural value, or that it is always wrong to interfere on equitable grounds with nominally "free" contracts entered into

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between persons on very unequal footings. It is true that legal security and political stability are essential to social welfare; but the greatest enemies of security and stability are those who resist every change in institutions, while such changes can still be made by legal and constitutional means. Some may think that the Duke of Argyll is damaging the case of the conscientious and public-spirited and intelligent land-owners, such as he himself claims to be (pp. 413, 439), by refusing to make any distinction between them and those whose "rent" represents no social service whatsoever, unless to have taken the trouble to be born or to have gambled successfully in land-values be considered a social service in some systems of ethics. By such a line of argument the duke can please nobody, except the most bigoted supporter of the *status quo* and its most extreme and intemperate assailants.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

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FRIEDRICH ALBERT LANGE; a Biography. By O. A. Ellisen. With the portrait of F. A. Lange. Leipzig: Julius Bädecker, 1891. Pp. 271.

It is a difficult task which the author of this book has undertaken, and he will not easily satisfy his readers either in Germany or in Europe at large. One is tempted to exclaim, Would that the man himself whom this book is designed to portray could be recalled to life! He was a man characterized by abounding vitality, responding sensitively to external circumstances, yet ever following the continuity of his inner life while making the most heterogeneous interests his own, and solving the most difficult problems. This man has, alas, been gone from us a long time, and for a long time to come will he be missed. Well for us if he is indeed missed, at least here and there among the few. The nature and influence of such a man no book can adequately describe. Nor can any mere biography hope to compensate for the loss of so noble a personality, whose qualities of mind and heart are so sadly missed in these present times. Such compensation can be eventually rendered only by a kindred personality, to whose advent we may look forward, who shall extend the hand of spirit to that earnest German fighter of the days before the war. Would we therefore do justice to the present volume, we must moderate those expectations which the unrest of the age and grief and indignation are calculated to

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engender in the breasts of those who sympathize with Lange's idealism.

The merit of this book consists, above all, in the fact that a young German holding, as Lange once did, the position of teacher in a gymnasium, should have so keenly felt the absence of a literary monument to Lange's memory as to resolve to cancel the national debt of gratitude so far as his own ability might avail. And who would be disposed to think less of our author because he was, above all, attracted to his task by the love which the versatile, philosophic nature of his hero inspired in him; more especially as this love with him is not a mere matter of caprice or blind enthusiasm, but rather leads him to pursue his subject through all the intricacies of a many-sided career, to penetrate to a clear comprehension of the underlying motives, and to shed on these motives the light of a discriminating criticism. It is possible, indeed, that the author would have better succeeded in impressing the critics if he had expressed himself with less reserve, and had taken occasion to make a formidable display of his own attainments in the field of philosophy and economics, though well-informed readers cannot fail to perceive that he is more than versed in these subjects, that, in fact, he has mastered the main points. This, however, is a question of taste; and, if I mistake not, the author will bear with equanimity the censure which he has incurred on such grounds. And certainly, censure of this sort cannot affect in the least the intrinsic merit of the book.

According to Goethe, the first requirement which a biographer should fulfil is that of loving self-surrender toward his subject, a desire to catch the impression as a whole of the personality which he describes. Let progressive investigation, thereafter, discover and impartially present any defect or weakness that may exist. To this requirement the author has conformed, and the writer of these lines would thank him warmly for the spirit in which he has undertaken his task, for the token he has given of genuine love toward an epigone of our German idealists. Yes, I would thank him in the name of those, few as perhaps they may be, who will esteem it a happy and auspicious event in German literature that the life of our Albert Lange has been held up as a mirror and as a warning to this confused age of ours. Others, too, who, engrossed with the function of criticism, have hardly expressed their recognition of the author's labors sufficiently, may, at heart, be willing to add their thanks to ours. At all events, one cannot help uttering the

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wish that, among our rising generation, there might be many whose enthusiasm should take the same direction as his, and whose intellectual orientation might be equally clear and well defined. It is this clear and definite orientation that deserves to be especially signalized. Considering the sort of criticism to which Lange's position is still subjected, the author might easily have been betrayed into diverting criticism from Lange by exposing the weak points in the attacks of his opponents. To this temptation, however, he is far from yielding. He does not attempt to conceal the faults of Lange's principal work, while, at the same time, he indicates how, in his opinion, these faults may be corrected in harmony with Lange's own tendency and ideas. These suggestions themselves, it is true, reveal the ascendency which the man whose thought he studies has acquired over the mind of his biographer.

The writer of this review may lay claim to an indefectible distinction, inasmuch as he has been favored by the author of the "History of Materialism" with the friendliest recognition, and has enjoyed with him a close intercourse in which the effort to achieve a complete understanding on matters of principle was continued almost to the last moment of Lange's life. All the more on this account he feels called upon not to let this opportunity pass without saying, not thereby detracting in the least from a deep sense of personal gratitude toward the departed friend, what should be said in the interest of impartial truth.

The study of Lange's career is chiefly profitable because it challenges us to survey and consider the entire modern situation. On all sides there are burning questions of theory and practical needs of great magnitude. So far as the field of political economy is concerned there is no lack of attempts to grapple with these problems and needs. Not only new compends, but new works on the principles of this science are incessantly appearing. In the domain of jurisprudence, philosophical velleities, sometimes even taking the form of irresponsible dilettanteism, show themselves, not only in the department of criminal law, which from of old has been in touch with philosophic theories, but even in the more positivist branch of the Romanistic studies. And yet, in this age of many books, hardly does such a thing as a philosophy of law venture to the surface. It is, then, believed possible to discuss the foundations of economics and of the science of law independently of a systematic philosophy of law! In the realm of social conflicts we

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find a similar state of things. Religion, again, everywhere and in all denominations has become an *ecclesia militans*, while between political parties and scientific sects a warfare is being carried on no less bitter than that between the religions and the creeds. The differences about which all these conflicts turn are confessedly located and rooted in the philosophic problems. And yet, here, too, the incredible occurs,—namely, that neither in name (the avoidance of the name might possibly be explained) nor in fact is an attempt made to build up a systematic philosophy of religion. And the cause of this defect is in all cases the same. Courage seems to be wanting to reconstruct ethics which itself can arise only at the centre of a philosophical system.

Now, this faulty method of dealing with philosophical questions which is characteristic of our age was shared by Lange. To this defect we must ascribe, it is true, the varied and effective impulses which he imparted in so many directions. But to the same cause, also, it is due that the penetrating eye will gradually see the shadows deepen in the bright picture of Lange's thought. As a critic and essayist in the grand style he sharply defined his attitude toward the chief social problems,—the problems of economics and religion. But he had in view neither a philosophy of law nor an ethical system which might absorb the essential questions of those practical sciences.

With this want of systematic purpose in the plan of his principal work is connected, furthermore, his failure adequately to grasp and expound the leading philosophical principle of which he treats. The fundamental concept of all philosophy and of all science is that of the *a priori*. He does not do full justice to this either on its deductive side nor yet—it is not too much to say—on its inductive side. He does not conceive of the *a priori* as of a hypothesis and presupposition which consciously and experimentally must be made the basis of all scientific work in the theoretic sciences (mathematics and the natural sciences) as well as in the ethical or intellectual sciences (*Geistes Wissenschaften*), in the interest of methodical and fruitful research. And because this Platonic conception of the ideal hypothesis escapes him, the *a priori*, much as he favors and defends it, does not in his way of thinking advance beyond the preliminary stage, to be explained as far as possible as an innate propensity, an accident of our mental constitution. It is for this reason that he fell into the snare of Darwinism, which, it is true, has rendered invaluable service in the

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exploration of the animal kingdom, but whose teachings, so far as human beings are concerned, and things spiritual and moral, can be safely used only with a polemic intent, while they may even become harmful when applied positively. Suffice it, in this connection to mention Malthus, the predecessor of Darwin, in whose writings the ethical blasphemy of the theory of natural selection is plainly enough exposed to view. Lange, in his desire to learn, in his willingness to be taught, was too pliable by far, and in all these modern problems sacrificed his own self because he lacked a firm grasp on a system. He rejoiced that the theory he held in regard to human happiness, as over against the superficial, dull, conservative attitude of contentment with things as they are, seemed to be supported by doctrines resting apparently on the sure basis of natural science. I refer to the general doctrine of the development of living beings as at once purposeless and purposeful, and likewise to the doctrine of psycho-physics, which plumes itself on its supposed purely experimental origin, and yet cannot obliterate the traces of its metaphysical parentage, traces which Lange in his humility overlooked.

And it is by the same considerations alone that we can obtain an objective explanation of his personal attitude toward religion, and especially toward Christianity. In the numberless germs that are rejected by natural selection, he finds the cause of that consciousness of misery which he desires to explain and to alleviate, and of all the pain and grief which he wishes to heal. And hence it is that in Nature, that great model breeding institution, the bells may never become entirely silent that toll forth the story of human woe.

Ethics, however, never turns its face backward toward a state of Nature such as is represented by the supposed a-prioristic germs, and which is, after all, only a metaphysical figment. Forward and upward it points unwaveringly to the eternal and inexhaustible future represented by our moral tasks, to which we may never admit limitation of any kind on the ground of what are styled natural germs. Between these natural germs and the idea of the moral tasks which civilized human beings set themselves no conceivable connection is possible, and even the search for such a connection is a methodical dereliction. Social idealism, in its present clarified state, rejects, on principle, all such attempts at explanation and illustration on naturalistic grounds. As a forward impelling force, or at least as a critical motive, the ethical *a priori* has penetrated

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this idealism, though consciousness of its influence may still be wanting in many instances. Proof of this fact is the severe criticism which the "*Neue Zeit*" has passed on the book we are reviewing, and which, we may add in passing, has been chiefly provocative of the remarks to the contrary that have here been expressed.

Let the memory of Lange not be effaced nor blurred among the workingmen of all nations. As a thinker and champion of the right, he was distinguished by the cosmopolitan spirit so characteristic of the Germans, and gave a new impulse to the study of moral philosophy and of the principles of the natural sciences, bringing to bear upon his task an extraordinary receptivity, and embracing the chief branches of culture in an extensive scheme of historical investigation and characterization. In the social conflicts of to-day, however, even if the scientific formulas have not yet been sufficiently perfected, the issues at stake are becoming more and more definitely crystallized, and the chief desideratum now is no longer to shed the light of historic criticism upon the problems before us, but to grasp them firmly with the help of a dogmatic system, and thus to pave the way for their actual solution in the political arena. Nevertheless, in all practical movements the function of control will not be able to be dispensed with, and it is on the possession of historic insight that the just exercise of that function depends. Respect and love, therefore, are due to the man who, in his "History of Materialism," has deciphered the idealistic motives in universal history.

HERMANN COHEN.

MARBURG.

REPORT ON THE RECENT LITERATURE OF ETHICS AND RELATED TOPICS IN AMERICA.

1. THE MEANING AND THE METHOD OF LIFE. A SEARCH FOR RELIGION IN BIOLOGY. By George M. Gould, A.M., M.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893. Pp. 297.

2. A REVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF ETHICS FOUNDED ON THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. By C. M. Williams. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xv., 581.

3. FIRST STEPS IN PHILOSOPHY (PHYSICAL AND ETHICAL). By William Mackintire Salter. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1892. Pp. 156.

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1. Amongst the books named in our list the first in order is also first in the warmth, the passionate directness, of the author's appeal to experience. The present reviewer has often confessed a partiality for the philosophical essayist, be he technical student of philosophy or not, who has really visited in person those regions, in the realms of the Spirit, which he tries to describe. And it is often surprising and saddening to observe how certain men can somehow write whole books about the absolute without showing that they have ever really tried to make the latter's acquaintance "in his native wilds," or that they know of such Absolute otherwise than by more or less technical hearsay, gathered from lectures and compends. Now, Dr. Gould is a man who has personally seen the face, not to be sure of the Absolute (for thereto he makes no pretence), but of his own chosen problems as to the "meaning and method of life." It is this directness of experience, this presence of a truly passionate interest in the subject, which makes our author's work fascinating, and which ought to make it valuable for many who will not accept Dr. Gould's conclusions in his own form. These conclusions, as here stated, are embodied, indeed, rather in an excellent cosmical romance than in a reasoned philosophical doctrine. But cosmical romances are works of art that few can write, and the good cosmical romance is a fiction that is sure to veil a deeper truth than perhaps its own author imagines, especially if he himself takes his legend to be literally accurate.

The hypothesis of a finite creative being, toiling in a world of hard foreign facts,—a being conscious, active, benevolent, aiming at the highest, but partly baffled, thus far, in his ideal plans for the vitalizing and ennobling of a dead physical world, by the poverty and the stubbornness of material laws,—is an old idea. But it is an hypothesis that has never quite come to its historical rights. The motives that have led men to Theism have usually involved the idea of God's absoluteness. Dualism, in religion, has reconciled itself with such absoluteness through the hypotheses of a finite Free Will and of the fall of created spirits from their original innocence. This form of secondary dualism, as one may name it, has also absorbed, by known devices, the older and primary dualism which conceived the world as one of a contest between the good and the evil powers. An hypothesis, however, that shall regard God as finite, but as opposed, not to the Devil, or to any created rebels, but to the uncreated and blind forces of nature, these latter being not intentionally either good or evil, but being

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such as to be moulded only with difficulty,—an hypothesis which regards the creative work as now in progress, and as essentially incomplete, and its pangs and shortcomings as the incidents of the struggle between a well-wishing God and the world of blind fate, —well, such a doctrine has often been suggested, but not often well worked out. For Dr. Gould it is the one intelligible scheme of things. It is more. It is the one source of ethical inspiration. For our author preaches, not a mere theory, but a practical creed. The service of God gets, in his eyes, as he writes, what he takes to be its only vital meaning. God himself gets a new name. He is "Biologos." He wants life, and the best possible life. He struggles to create it. To serve him is to share his plan, to help him against the mighty, to take part in the world-fight, to help get the better of the forces of nature, to extend organization, to live, as Biologos does, in the love of all living things; in a word, to be like God and to struggle shoulder to shoulder, as it were, with this architect of living cells and of thinking brains. He is not infinite; but he is at once leader and comrade in the ethical warfare.

Here is surely a scheme of things well worth the trouble of thinking out to its consequences. In setting himself this task our author appears as one well equipped with empirical illustrations derived from the biological sciences. His acquaintance with a considerable mass of them is as close and fresh as his own inner experience of life. It need not be said, however, that this empirical material is here used, not technically, nor in the service of science for its own sake, but rather by way of illustrating the general cosmical hypothesis. The latter, meanwhile, is itself presented with all the naïve and charming immediacy of a divine intuition. One does not prove this intuition; one simply sees its truth. The author's experience as to this matter is presented with all the usual characteristics that mark, in literature, the confessions of such intuitive experiences. "For twenty or more years I have despairingly ransacked the wisdom of ethnic religions, systems of philosophy, and of natural theology, and, lo! under the microscope I found God at work, and in biology revealing Himself so fast and so far as fate and his myriad difficulties allowed, self His incarnation and deputy, Duty and Intellect His pleading with the deputy to become co-partner and helper in the Divinization of the World. . . . Science and religion equally and alike await the vision and knowledge of the ever-present living and struggling God" (p. 9). This dissatisfaction with technical philosophy, this appeal to immediate

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insight, determine the whole of the following discussion of those fundamental problems which interest our author. Such a doctrine needs, of course, as its background, a realistic metaphysic. This our author finds ready to hand, and accepts it without a shadow of reflective concern. "Berkeley, Hegel, Spinoza, and others" have "spun imaginative phantasmagoria" in "dreamland and word-land;" but what they said does not concern us, and is in fact apparently dangerous, if not wicked (p. 30). An extract from Mr. Salter's exposition of the idealistic analysis of reality, quoted on pp. 140, 141, seems to Dr. Gould to embody only "jugglings with words after such words have been disconnected from a vital significance and relationship with facts." "To see no difference between the objective, self-existent causes of sensation and the ultimate products of sensation is simply philosophic barbarism or monomania. It is not healthy thought. To deny objectivity and self-existence because the forces and impingements of matter must be translated into sensation before being presented to mind, is to flatter one's self that dreams and imaginations are facts; it is a lazy sort of dogmatism that contents itself with the whirr of subjective machinery."

An idealist would naturally answer this vehemence by saying that of course the only penalty for one who will not philosophize with critical considerateness concerning the nature of his knowledge of truth, and who will still love the world and write about it,—that, I say, the only penalty for such a thinker lies in the fact that he is then confined to his cosmical romances. But the present romance, as has already been said, has its charm in something else than its philosophically critical character, and one is little disposed to interrupt this man of unique experiences either here, or when, elsewhere, he summarily indicts, or with equally summary immediacy propounds, other speculative views. All proofs of God's existence are vain (p. 51). "If instinctively one have the belief in his heart, he would better never read the 'proofs.'" "Facts need no proving." And the plain facts are that the phenomena of life, from the lowest to the highest, are utter exceptions in the world of physical processes. "The simplest bit of alga, diatom, or of self-mobile protoplasm proves God's existence" (p. 54). For everything that lives embodies a purpose. And no mechanism can embody a purpose. "If you don't see and perceive God, no reasoning and proof will enable you to do so."

The "Design-argument," regarded from a critical point of view,

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is never more admirable than when it is short. And our author's form is as short as any upon record. He joins it (p. 55) with an equally immediate interpretation, in his own sense, of the contrast between consciousness in any sentient being, and the physical realities about this being. "The hyperphysical, therefore, is a fact, and this hyperphysical is mental, volitional, purposive" (p. 56). As this hyperphysical element is identical in respect of its ultimate nature, in all living beings that are conscious, the unity of the living things points to some one hyperphysical source of them all.

"Of course," continues our author, "no Infinite or Omnipotent is gained by this road, but none such is desirable. We reach, however, a working and actual God, of very satisfying proportions and powers." Meanwhile, our author regards the doctrine of the infinity and omnipotence of God as not only an unproved, but an impious doctrine, since it would put "the reason and ground" of "evil and imperfection in the very being of God, instead of in a condition outside of Himself," "which He is successfully and progressively overcoming. Waste worlds, incomprehensible mechanicalism, glaring evil, deadness, uselessness, are everywhere the distinguishing characteristics of the mechanical universe. If God did all this, He is an incomprehensible God, and covers in Himself such hideous contradictions that I prefer blank atheism as being far more truthful and comforting both to the intellect and to the heart" (p. 31). "Monism" (p. 28) "is muddleism. It is the sole system of religion or philosophy without any truth whatever as a basis."

Enough, perhaps, of these intuitive proclamations. Their only significance lies in the fact that our author is above all ethical in his concern, and feels precisely that opposition between the ethical and the all-powerful characteristics, in the God of tradition, which has so divided in twain the religious consciousness of the ages. The worth of the present intuition lies then in the fruits that spring from it. And there is something delightful, as one reads Dr. Gould's glowing pages, in watching this fervent student of current medical and of general biological lore, who, inspired by a moral devotion, "sees," "under the microscope," the workings of a God whom he now has to conceive with attributes quite pathetically, yes, tragically, human. This, for him, is a God who struggles with death (*i.e.*, with "the problem of nutrition") and who hates death as we do, but who, owing to the unsolved "problem of nutrition," cannot yet make cells or bodies that will be able to escape it. The

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problem of evil is not our problem alone, but "Biologos" is toiling at it. We may yet help him on the road towards the solution. One's relation to Biologos is once more very similar to Abraham's relation to his God. One takes counsel with him, as it were, concerning Sodom and Gomorrah. Meanwhile, such thoughts make very concrete to our author the notion that the business of man's life is to "imitate God, to do what God is doing, and to be what he is" (p. 243). Since God is the essentially biological being, the study of biology becomes, for our author, as for Spencer, but with much more warmth of meaning, a part of ethics. The respect for all living things thus gets a very definite formulation. Buddhistic ethics ought even to be extended. The vegetable world ought to be included within the range of the objects of our duty. There should be "a society for the prevention of cruelty to trees" (p. 243). The highest and the lowest virtues are alike to get formulated in biological terms. The fault of the former doctrines that have made natural laws the basis of ethics, has been that such doctrines have not known what part of nature to select as the model for virtue. The heavens do not of themselves declare the glory of God. In the author, of old, before he found his insight, these "useless worlds" used to arouse only "cosmic horror" (p. 7). Not the telescope but the microscope is the religious instrument. It is the study of the processes of life that alone shows us in nature the models for our conduct. The author is sure that these models can be made very definite. The "Kingdom of God" must include "the subhuman part of the incarnation process" (p. 246), for in all living things the purpose of Biologos is incarnate, and is to be observed. "The extension and perfection of healthy life over the globe is undoubtedly the plainest aim and the most primary work of Biologos. Whatever aids in that is right and whatever opposes it is wrong" (p. 248). To the working out and application of this practical doctrine, whose simplicity, directness, and purity of motive our author constantly insists upon, much of his space is devoted, in chapters which are full of the very manly and vital experience of the concrete issues of life upon which stress has been laid in the foregoing. Here it is that what we have called our author's cosmical romance gets its moral expressed, and, in its own way, will make its influence felt.

The air of what we have called "unique experience" in this volume can be but faintly suggested by such a review. These propounders of intuitions will always be welcome guests in philoso-

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phy. For the rest, our author's "twenty years" of search among the religions and philosophies have indeed left him singularly unaware that his romance of the "struggling God," "incarnate" in a time world, and unable there to do his perfect work until the fulfilment of times, is not only a familiar idea of traditional theology (as our author does indeed fully recognize), but is also the symbol of a very deep metaphysical truth, which the so much abhorred "Monism" of philosophy has not only recognized, but has expressed to the full, and without any loss of its Monism, either. That the Eternal, without hurt to his Eternity, appears and must appear in time as the struggling and incomplete One, beladen with dualism, with evil, with unattained ideals, surrounded with a world of uncomprehended fragments,—well, this for "monistic" philosophy, of the sort now referred to, is most decidedly an old story. To be sure, it takes more than the intuitive glance of one who believes only in the immediate "facts," to conceive how these things may be. And herewith enough, in this place, of our author's most admirable personal confession. We commend this book to all lovers, not only of Biologos, but of vigorous temperament.

2. As one passes to the quiet atmosphere of the study where Mr. C. M. Williams does his laborious and scholarly tasks, the scene and one's sensations decidedly alter. The author of "A Review of Evolutional Ethics" is engaged in critical portrayal. He is deeply in earnest, but his mood is cool, and he gives us comparatively little in the way of personal confession. He is deeply interested in his subject, and expects his reader to be so too. He may overestimate the average reader's patience, but such overestimate is itself a compliment, and Mr. Williams undertakes very seldom to bid for our attention by even the most innocent allurements of style.

This volume consists of two parts. In the first, which is expository of the various doctrines of "Evolutional Ethics," Mr. Williams begins with the views of Darwin on instinct, and on the origin of the social, and in particular of the moral instincts. Next follows a statement of Wallace's discussions of the same general questions. A sketch of Haeckel's opinions, in so far as they bear in the direction of Evolutional Ethics, concludes this preliminary glance at the "special theories by which the great original authorities paved the way for a system of Evolutional Ethics" (p. 28). With Spencer, the list of "the more purely philosophical writers" begins. Spencer himself is expounded (pp. 28–76) by following

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the general growth of his views from the "Social Statics," to the appearance of Vol. I., of the "Principles of Ethics," in 1892. Mr. Fiske next receives a half-dozen pages. The book "Biologische Probleme," by W. H. Rolph, stands next in order of exposition (pp. 82–106), and is followed by an account of Barratt's "Physical Ethics" (pp. 107–120). Thereafter Leslie Stephen's "Science of Ethics" is summarized (pp. 120–143); and then follow in order Carneri's "Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus," and the same author's other ethical studies (pp. 143–175), Höffding's "Ethik" (pp. 175–200), Gizycki's "Moralphilosophie" (pp. 200–224), and Alexander's "Moral Order and Progress" (pp. 225–263), with an appendix on Paul Ree's "Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen" and "Entstehung des Gewissens" (pp. 264–268). The scope and laboriousness of the expository work is only suggested by this catalogue.

These summaries are to a very small degree accompanied with critical observations. Mr. Williams considers it here his duty to give his various authors in succession the word, and he seldom interrupts them even to characterize or to recapitulate any of the views once set forth at length. But the whole of the second part of our treatise, on the contrary, is devoted to the exposition of the author's own views upon the Ethics of Evolution. Here, too, as in the first part, the book shows evidences of wide reading, and, in general, of a decidedly judicial frame of mind, at least as regards the current and recent ethical issues. Where our author comes, as on page 520, *et seq.*, to touch upon a distinctly historical problem, such as that of the relation of modern ethics to the religious ideals of the past, he does indeed temporarily lose this judicial frame of mind, and uses speech that reminds one of the old tone of crude liberalism, which was customary before the historical movement, and the higher criticism, taught us how to try to understand the religion of our fathers, without merely condemning it in a lump. On the whole, however, our author appears as a many-sided man, who carefully weighs conflicting claims, and who takes account of the organic unity that lies beneath most great issues.

Technically considered, the structure and method of the book are meanwhile disappointing. In case of so complex a piece of expository and critical work, the absence of an index is inexcusable. One never knows when a given author, expounded in the first part of the work, will come in for his share of criticism and estimate in the second part. A citation or a critical observation once

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noted in our author's pages, but not accurately placed in the reader's mind, becomes at once lost, as if in the sea. The historical and positive divisions of the subject remain, moreover, without definite relations. The first part contains what Hegel would have called a *Vorrath von Meinungen*, the second a series of independent expressions of opinion and of critical observations, intermingled in a complicated fashion, whose results are neither to furnish us a connected history of opinion, nor yet to give us a clean and transparent statement of a theory. As for the expositions of the first part, they are not only made unnecessarily tedious reading, but are rendered in a great measure unenlightening, by their too frequent omission of general surveys and recapitulations, and by the fact that most, although indeed not all of them, tell us too little about how each author himself divides his subject and chooses the titles and headings by which he guides himself and his readers. These summaries, in fact, proceed, on the whole, with a dead level monotony of bald restatement of each author's views one after another, so that one easily loses his way, as on a treeless prairie.

More serious, however, from an historical point of view, appears an objection to our author's general plan which grows upon us as we read his work, and which the present reviewer had not anticipated on first becoming acquainted with this plan as announced in the table of contents. The idea of treating in one place the evolutionary doctrines of ethics, and of writing their critical history, seems one eminently justified by the large place that evolution has played in recent discussion. Yet when one actually comes to consider the list of names brought together in the first part of this work, one begins to see how impossible it is to make, amongst recent writers, a distinct category of "evolutional" ethical thinkers, without hopeless perplexity. Höffding appears in the list, and justly. But Paulsen's and Wundt's treatises, and Von Ihering's unfinished but admirable *Zweck im Recht*, are excluded. Shall one say that none of these writers make sufficient use of the doctrine of evolution? And is Wundt then to be excluded for the sins against evolutional ethics for which the author chastises him on p. 513? But surely to choose thus would be to risk mere sectarianism. For whatever Wundt thinks of the Spencerian method and results, he is not only himself an evolutionist in belief, but has devoted a section of his treatise to an elaborate study of the social evolution of the ethical ideas on human levels. What reason, except our author's disagreement with certain of Wundt's opinions, can be found for ex-

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cluding his book from this list, and including that of Stephen, which was long ago criticised by certain followers of Spencer as being after all, notwithstanding its free use of evolutionary ideas, still not sufficiently informed by the doctrine of evolution? It is easier to omit Paulsen's book from the list of evolutionary ethical writers, yet if one brings Paulsen and Stephen side by side, without prejudice, it is hard to say why they should not after all be classed, despite differences, as representatives of the same general tendency in ethics. The fact is that, despite the unquestionable importance of the doctrine of evolution for modern ethical inquiry, the sole "natural class" which can well be formed, and which will be adequate to include the modern evolutionary ethical writers, is that of "Recent Ethical Realists." As distinct from writers of the very various types which Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, and Green respectively represent,—that is, as distinct from the writers who may roughly be grouped together as "Ethical Idealists," despite the varieties of their idealism,—these Ethical Realists may be defined as those who, in recent times, seek, not in general reflections upon the logic of moral ideals, but in the study of the actual constitution and of the evolution of human nature, for guidance as to the moral law. What part the technical researches of the biological doctrine of evolution shall play in this realistic study of the laws of human nature as it is, the individual writer must determine for himself. No modern Ethical Realist can wholly ignore the doctrine of evolution, because he is looking for the facts as to man's structure and functions as giving a basis for the law of duty, and because the doctrine of evolution throws light on these facts. The mere fact that, like Wundt, an author doubts or denies that moral conceptions can arise, *as* moral conceptions, out of "tendencies stored up in the nervous system," does not exclude him from the present category, so long as for him the study of man's actual psychological nature and growth, and of "the social tissue" (to use Stephen's phrase), throws a genuine light on the fundamental ethical problem. The opposing class of thinkers, the ethical idealists, look to some inner and reflective source for rational guidance, or found ethics upon a metaphysic, rather than upon an empirical study of the natural history of man. Here, as one must hold, is the true issue of recent ethics, and one to which all others are subordinate.

In the positive section of the book, our author makes his foundations broad. The ethics of evolution must be founded on a study

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of the general "Concepts of Evolution." Fechner's speculation concerning the "tendency to stability" as first criticised, and then with modification, accepted in an essay by Petzoldt, entitled "Maxima, Minima, and Œkonomie," in the "Vierteljahresschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie," is first recognized as an important central concept of the general theory of evolution; and Mr. Williams later returns from time to time to the same matter, whose relation, however, to the ethical problem is somewhat obscurely treated. The Heredity problem, that burning question, so dangerous for any but the professional biologist to handle, is then somewhat cautiously taken up, as bearing on the question of the origin of conscience, nor is our author satisfied with one treatment of it, but has it often afterwards ready to his hand as he proceeds. If the present reviewer has understood the reasons that have led not only biologists like Weissman and Wallace, but psychologists like James, to doubt the traditional theory of the heredity of acquired characters (a theory which, by the way, whether it ever proves to be scientifically verifiable or not, certainly has an origin in folk-lore), Mr. Williams is decidedly mistaken in supposing that the facts which he cites from Ribot, on pp. 402–3, concerning the heredity of alcoholism, could to-day offer any difficulties whatever either to Weissman or to such a "Weissmanian" as James is.

In the subsequent discussion from Chapter II. to Chapter VI. of the second part, Mr. Williams, in considering, in detail, the evolution of the factors of our complex moral consciousness, shows an admirable disposition to reject simple explanations. In dealing with the organic, as he holds, we must not look for simple forces. To be sure, this very respect for complexities does not render his book any easier reading. The most important definitions are postponed until disappointingly late. Mr. Williams's exposition shares with the "mystery" romances the one feature of keeping the reader in suspense. "Our analysis," he says in Chapter VI. (p. 443), "has hitherto omitted all definition of morality and conscience," whereupon he proceeds to observe that "morality, as we ordinarily define it, has a very intimate connection with the relations of individuals to each other," and adds, on p. 444, concerning the supposed opposition of egoism and altruism, that "we begin to suspect that we are making a mistake in separating, in a definition, things which must be indissolubly united in actual practice." It is this "beginning to suspect" which keeps the reader

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of this most conscientious book in a doubtless very salutary, if occasionally somewhat exasperating condition of indecision of judgment, which Mr. Williams is never in any haste to relieve. At length, on p. 449, "we come finally to the definition of conscience." "In humanity as a whole, and in the single societies of which it is composed, a certain moral evolution may be perceived which we have found reasons for believing to be internal as well as external, a matter of heredity as well as instruction. In this internal sense, conscience, as innate capacity, may be said to be an instinct. . . . That which, when we become capable of reflection, we term conscience, consists in pleasure in forms of action furthering the welfare of society,—forms gradually moulded to habit with the development of social relations,—and in a corresponding pain at the realization of having failed of such action; the knowledge of the demand, by society as a whole, or by a part of society, of action in accord with the general welfare, and the sense of the justice of this demand, constituting the feeling of obligation and duty. . . . Our whole analysis of the course by which conscience is developed tends to show the truth of that which Darwin claimed, —namely, that the moral instinct is a development and organization of many instincts."

The following chapter, the seventh, discusses, on rather familiar lines, "The Moral Progress of the Race as shown by History." In the next chapter, on the "Results of Ethical Inquiry," we learn at last that the "work of Evolution for Ethics" "has unified and clarified the attempts made to discover a basis for moral principles, and has rendered that foundation for the first time secure; it has cleared away with one sweep the rubbish of ancient superstition, made exact methods possible, and raised Ethics to the plane of a science" (p. 515). After the display of opinions in the first part, and the elaborately cautious and often extremely hesitant analyses of the text up to this point, the possibly breathless reader, thus relieved at last as to what we have called the "mystery" of the tale, can only joyously recognize how all is well that ends well. An interesting chapter on the Ideal and the Way of its Attainment concludes the book, on p. 581, the last words being lines from George Eliot's "Choir Invisible."

Mr. Williams has certainly not lost his labor. One can only wish that so careful a scholar could have given his monograph a more permanent form and sharper outlines. In any case our author, through his modesty, industry, and patience, gives a noble example,

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in all his work, of the ethics of self-restraint and self-sacrifice. One ventures to add that his book may even tend also to cultivate these virtues in his readers.

3. Mr. Salter's too modestly entitled book discusses two fundamental problems of philosophy,—the idealistic analysis of the nature of physical reality, and the logical problem of the definition of the moral ideal. As for the first problem, the idealistic analysis of the sensible world soon brings us to a point (p. 22) where "the material" of this world "does not indeed cease to be, but its manner of existence is found to be subjective." "So far as sensible phenomena are concerned" (p. 24), "nothing is left; the whole sensible world is but an effect upon ourselves. But because nothing sensible or material is left, it would be a hasty inference to say that nothing whatever is left. If we are asked, What? We answer, All that causes sensations." . . . "Our search for causes" (p. 25) "has proved unsuccessful. But though we know of no causes, we have an inextinguishable faith that there *are* such causes." "It only remains to us then, in the absence of knowledge, to think, conjecture or speculate,—by which I mean to form some kind of hypothesis which we cannot hope to (in the strict sense of the word) verify." "This position" (p. 27, *note*) "might be called Sensible or Physical Idealism, and is nowise inconsistent with, but rather implies a Supersensible or Metaphysical Realism. . . . Absolute Idealism, as I understand it, takes a step further and involves the causes of sensible phenomena in the same subjective relationships (whether in a human or absolute mind) in which we have found sensible phenomena themselves to be involved." Such absolute idealism lies, however, beyond Mr. Salter's present meaning. "Metaphysics" (p. 68), being concerned with the causes of our experience, and not with "the last elements of the sensible world," "cannot become science—*i.e.*, verified speculation—in the present state of human faculties."

The "absolute idealist," as the present reviewer understands his position, would of course accept the substance of Mr. Salter's excellent exposition of "sensible idealism," and would only insist upon further considerations. As to the ultimate problem of "metaphysic," however, such an idealist would decline to admit that "metaphysic" is concerned with the "causes" of our experience. Causation belongs to the concepts whereby we describe the connections of events in the world of "sensible experience," when this world is regarded as an object of human science; and the very

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essence of "absolute idealism" consists in its implicit denial of the ultimate validity of the concept of causation, if applied beyond the field of sensible experience itself. Our experience, viewed not as an event occurring to this or that physical organism in the natural world, but as that total collection of data which constitutes this phenomenal natural world itself, is in need of no "causal" explanation. One cannot tell, as even Lotze used to say, what external cause makes any world at all exist, "*und nicht lieber gar nichts.*" The only genuine question is, What is the *true* world? and absolute idealism consists in the assertion that the "true" world is essentially a "truth-world," existent as the Object of the insight of a logically complete subject or truth-knower, not as the unknown external producer of sensations in us finite subjects, or in the true "Subject" of knowledge himself. "We know something" (namely, the decidedly fragmentary objects of human experience), "and for logical, not for causal reasons, this fragmentary experience of ours must be an organic part of a complete experience." Herein lies the thesis of "absolute," or, if one prefers the word, of Complete Idealism, for which the real is not the "cause of sensations," but the truth that is the present and immanent object of a final insight,—the existence of such a final insight being logically implied, according to such Idealism, in the very failures and inadequacies and errors of our human and finite insight. A "cause of experience," would, as cause, be either an object of somebody's knowledge, or else would be nothing, precisely as an odor, for Mr. Salter's analysis, can exist only in so far as somebody smells it. One has only to be thorough in one's analysis, and to treat "cause" as one treats pains and odors. Hence not "Cause," but "Object of Insight," must be the final name for the reality at the bottom of things. If one still calls this object "cause," one must do so only in a logical or teleological, not in a physical sense. Whether, again, there is indeed a sense in which teleological (although not physically causal) concepts are also still applicable to the absolute Subject, so that he may indeed be called a "creator" in so far as, even in the act of knowing the eternal truth, he yet knows only what he finds it most worth while to know,—this is another question, and belongs not here. But in the physical sense of the word "causation," the phenomenal motion of the moon "causes" the equally phenomenal movement of the tides; and in this physical sense *nothing* causes or can cause the whole phenomenal world of "objects of insight" to come into being, since such "cause"

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could itself be only another object of insight, another phenomenal thing. Herein lies the true difference between Mr. Salter's admirably analyzed "Sensible Idealism" and that "Absolute Idealism" which he regards only as an hypothesis about the nature of the causes of experience.

The second part of this little treatise discusses the nature of ethical truth with much ingenuity. The "ought," so Mr. Salter first teaches us (pp. 72–100), must be a truth, and must still be different from a physical fact or from a mere psychological disposition. Here are precisely the considerations of the sort which really lead in the direction of absolute idealism. There is more metaphysic in ethics than men of Mr Williams's type know, and Mr. Salter is to be thanked for bringing out the fact afresh, and in his own way. It is to be hoped that our honored friend, Dr. Paul Carus, will take Mr. Salter's book into account when next he is disposed to assert that the leaders of the "Ethical Movement" in this country are not sufficiently alive to the logical dependence of ethics upon fundamental philosophical considerations. But Mr. Salter, near as he is to the absolutely idealistic tendencies just indicated, still preserves, in this second part of his "First Steps," the caution and philosophical reserve of the first part of his volume. He approaches the promised land of the idealist, but declines to enter. "The realization of the nature of each being" is, according to his definition, "the end to be striven for." The conception of a real "capacity," existent in each moral agent as a potentiality, whose present incompleteness is to be so far as possible completed, is for Mr. Salter the somewhat tentatively defined theoretical solution of the ethical problem.

There is no time here to discuss at any length a notion which is old in ethical theory, but which deserves a critical study as cautious as that of Mr. Salter, and yet more under the influence of an explicitly and "absolutely" idealistic doctrine than his view is here permitted to be. Mr. Salter's result is in substance closely related to the fundamental ethical doctrine at the basis of Aristotle's theory concerning this same problem. But, although Aristotle was a stranger to our modern issues, the truth of Aristotle is, as a fact, the world of absolute Idealism. And this too, in the present reviewer's opinion, is the partly unconscious drift of Mr. Salter's present philosophy.

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